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Abstract
Food security concerns and arguments have made a revival in European Union (EU) 
governance since the 2007-8 and 2010 global food price crises. This renaissance 
of food security has been accompanied by increasing awareness among scholars and 
policymakers about high degrees of complexity, uncertainty, controversy, and cross-scale 
dynamics surrounding food security as well as consequent governance implications. 
This dissertation conceptualizes food security as a wicked problem. Following from 
this conceptualization, the dissertation aims to explore how the EU governs the 
wicked problem of food security. Both the EU governance of food security and the 
EU governance of wicked problems in general have hardly been systematically studied 
so far. Wicked problems are policy problems that are ill-defined, that rely upon elusive 
political judgment for resolution, and that evolve out of an attempt to solve yesterday’s 
perceived problems. By definition, wicked problems cannot be permanently solved. 
The overarching question of how the EU governs the wicked problem of food security 
is addressed through four sub-questions: (i) what insights does the existing body of 
food security governance literature provide about governing the wicked problem of 
food security?; (ii) which food security frames can be distinguished in EU policymaking 
and how do the EU institutions deal with this diversity?; (iii) what conditions enable 
or constrain the European Commission in coping with the wicked problem of food 
security?; and (iv) to what extent has the EU realized a shift towards strengthened policy 
integration in the governance of food security?
Overall, the dissertation shows that the EU institutions, and particularly the Commission, 
are relatively well capable of dealing with the frame conflicts surrounding food security 
debates and possess sufficient latent abilities to govern the wicked problem of food 
security. At the same time, actual governance changes in the aftermath of the food price 
crises were found to be rather limited. Whereas EU decision-makers pleaded for more 
comprehensive and holistic food security approaches, policy integration remained largely 
restricted to discursive levels. I conclude that in most EU policy domains food security 
frames were primarily used to find support or legitimization for existing policy processes 
or preferences. Although substantial policy efforts were initiated, these remained largely 
restricted to the traditional domains of development cooperation and humanitarian aid. 
Consequently, the re-emergence of food security concerns in EU policymaking has not 
(yet) resulted in a more comprehensive and integrated EU governance of food security. 
The dissertation ends with putting forward notions of good-enough governance and 
clumsy solutions as suggestions for strengthened EU food security governance.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Europe’s capacity to deliver food security is an important long-term choice for Europe 
which cannot be taken for granted (European Commission, 2010a).
The claim that the EU should massively invest in food security […] builds on 
attitudes like ‘better safe than sorry’ and ‘you never know’. There are a number 
of threats out there about which we cannot have absolute certainty: attacks 
by Martians, killer mummies from the Pyramids and dinosaurs escaping from 
Jurassic Parks. Serious policy makers have to analyze and weigh these risks. 
Food security does not pass the test; there is no reasonably discernible threat 
during the coming decades (Zahrnt, 2011).
Chapter 1
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1.1 Background and problem outline
1.1.1 The re-emergence of food security concerns in EU policy discourse
The food price crises of 2007-8 and 2010 shocked policymakers around the world. 
Within a fortnight relative food prices doubled (figure 1.1), driving hundreds of 
thousands of people into a sudden state of food insecurity (Barrett, 2010; Brinkman, de 
Pee, Sanogo, Subran, & Bloem, 2010; Ruel, Garrett, Hawkes, & Cohen, 2010). Various 
scholars have argued that these events were a decisive catalyst for a worldwide increase 
of violent conflict, including the Arab Spring (Breisinger, Ecker, & Al-Riffai, 2011; 
Rosin, Stock, & Campbell, 2012). More recently, lack of food security has been linked 
to migration waves in the Middle East and Africa (Baker, 2015; FAO, 2015b). Most 
governments and international organizations were caught off-guard by these events, so 
it took some time before adequate responses were deployed (FAO, 2011; FAO et al., 
2011; Timmer, 2010).
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Figure 1.1 FAO food price index,       Figure 1.2 Attention to food security in the 
data derived from FAO (2015a)       EP, data derived from EUR‐Lex   
 
The food price crises led to a recurrence of food (in)security concerns in macropolitical and 
subsystem policy debates within the institutions of the European Union (EU). Figure 1.2 illustrates 
this trend by showing the number of resolutions within the European Parliament (EP) that refer to 
food (in)security from 2000 through 2012. As the first quotation above illustrates, food security was 
hereby discussed not only in terms of external action vis‐à‐vis least developed countries, but also 
with regard to the resilience of European food availability and, to a lesser extent, accessibility 
(Bindraban, Burger, Quist‐Wessel, & Werger, 2008; Grant, 2012b; Zahrnt, 2011). Such concerns had 
been absent from EU policy discourse since vivid memories of widespread hunger during World War 
II led the founders of the European Community to ensure the availability of affordable food as one of 
the key objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 (Meester, 
2011; Spaargaren, Oosterveer, & Loeber, 2012). The recent pervasiveness of food security arguments 
in debates about the CAP, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the EU’s biofuels policy, the 
development of the new framework program for research and innovation Horizion2020, and even 
environmental policy, inter alia, therefore came as a surprise to many. 
This renaissance of food security arguments within EU policy domains other than development 
cooperation did not occur without considerable criticism, as is illustrated by the second quotation at 
the start of this chapter in which Zahrnt ridicules food security discourse within the CAP reform 
debate. His critique contends that it is absurd to discuss EU food security while food production 
levels are much higher than domestic consumption (Zahrnt, 2011). According to this line of 
reasoning, such a focus distracts attention from more pressing problems; increasing production and 
productivity within the agricultural policy community would obscure solutions that arguably have a 
higher potential of achieving food security, such as food wastage reductions, allowing developing 
countries to protect and develop their agricultural sectors, or the greening of agriculture (cf. Boysen, 
Jensen, & Matthews, 2015; Grant, 2005; WWF, 2013). Some scholars and stakeholders have even 
argued that the concept of food security has been hijacked by neo‐liberal and productionist interests 
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Figure 1.1 FAO food price index, 
data derived from FAO (2015a)
The food price crises led to a recurrence of food (in)security concerns in macropolitical 
and subsystem policy debates within the institutions of the European Union (EU). 
Figure 1.2 illustrates this trend by showing the number of resolutions within the 
European Parliament (EP) that refer o food (in)s curity from 2000 through 2012. 
As the first quotation above illustrates, food security was hereby discussed not only in 
terms of external action vis-à-vis least developed countries, but also with regard to the 
resilience of European food availability and, to a lesser extent, accessibility (Bindraban, 
Burger, Quist-Wessel, & Werger, 2008; Grant, 2012b; Zahrnt, 2011). Such concerns 
Figure 1.2 Attention to food security in 
the EP, data derived from EUR-Lex
14 
 
 
Figure 1.1 FAO food price index,       Figure 1.2 Attention to food security in the 
data derived from FAO (2015a)       EP, data derived from EUR‐Lex   
 
The food price crises l d to a recurre c  of food (in)security concerns  n macropolitical and 
subsystem pol cy debates with n the institutions of the European Union (EU). Figur  1.2 illustrates 
t is trend by showing th  number of resolutions within the European  arli ment (EP) that refer to 
food (in)securi y from 2000 through 2012. As the first quotation above illu trates, food security was 
h reby discussed not nly in terms of external action vis‐à‐vis least developed countries, but also 
with  gard to the resili nce  f European food availability and, to a less r extent, accessibility 
(Bindraban, Burger, Quist‐W ssel, & Werger,  08; Gr nt, 2012b; Zahrnt, 2011). Such concerns had 
been absent from EU policy discourse since vivid memori s of wid spread hunger during World War 
II led the founders of the European Community to ensure the  v ilability of affordable  ood as one of 
h  key objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 (Meester, 
2011; Spaa garen, Oosterveer, & Loebe , 2012). The recent pervasiveness of food security arguments 
in debates about the CAP, the Comm n Fisheries Policy (CFP), the EU’s biofuels policy, the 
development of the new framew k prog am for research and innovation Horizion2020, and even 
environmental policy, inte  ali , therefore came as a surprise to many. 
This renaissance of food security arguments within EU policy domains other tha  development 
cooperation did n t o cur without ons derable criticism, as is illustrated by the second quotation at 
the start of this chapter in wh h Zahrnt ridicules food security discourse within the CAP reform 
debate. His critique contends that it   ab urd t  discuss EU food security while food production 
levels are much higher than do estic consumption (Zahrnt, 2011). According to this line of 
reasoning, such a focus distracts attention from more pressing problems; increasing production and 
productivity within the agricultural policy community would obscure solutions that arguably have a 
higher potential  f achieving food security, such as food wastage reductions, allowing developing 
c untries to protect and develop their agricultural sectors, or the  reening of agriculture (cf. Boysen, 
Jensen & Matthews,  1 ; Grant, 2005; WWF, 2013). Some scholars and stakeholders have even 
argued that the concept of food security has bee  hijacked by neo‐liberal and productionist interests 
0
50
100
150
200
250
FA
O
 Fo
od
 Pr
ic
e In
de
x (a
ve
ra
ge
s o
f th
e 
ye
ar
s 2
00
2‐2
00
4 =
 10
0)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
N
um
be
r o
f E
P r
es
ol
ut
io
ns
 in 
w
hi
ch
 
fo
od
 (in
)s
ec
ur
ity
 is 
m
en
tio
ne
d
Introduction
17
had been absent from EU policy discourse since vivid memories of widespread hunger 
during World War II led the founders of the European Community to ensure the 
availability of affordable food as one of the key objectives of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 (Meester, 2011; Spaargaren, Oosterveer, & 
Loeber, 2012). The recent pervasiveness of food security arguments in debates about the 
CAP, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the EU’s biofuels policy, the development 
of the new framework program for research and innovation Horizion2020, and even 
environmental policy, inter alia, therefore came as a surprise to many.
This renaissance of food security arguments within EU policy domains other than 
development cooperation did not occur without considerable criticism, as is illustrated 
by the second quotation at the start of this chapter in which Zahrnt ridicules food 
security discourse within the CAP reform debate. His critique contends that it is absurd 
to discuss EU food security while food production levels are much higher than domestic 
consumption (Zahrnt, 2011). According to this line of reasoning, such a focus distracts 
attention from more pressing problems; increasing production and productivity within 
the agricultural policy community would obscure solutions that arguably have a 
higher potential of achieving food security, such as food wastage reductions, allowing 
developing countries to protect and develop their agricultural sectors, or the greening of 
agriculture (cf. Boysen, Jensen, & Matthews, 2015; Grant, 2005; WWF, 2013). Some 
scholars and stakeholders have even argued that the concept of food security has been 
hijacked by neo-liberal and productionist interests and have pleaded for the introduction 
of alternative notions and paradigms (Jarosz, 2011; Koc, 2013; Lang & Barling, 2012). 
A common denominator that these critiques share with proponents of the ‘doubling 
food production by 2050’ discourse (Tomlinson, 2013) is an underlying profound belief 
that food insecurity can ultimately be solved. It may be a complex problem whose causes, 
impacts, and recipes are not yet well understood, but a combination of new knowledge, 
coordinated and coherent strategies, and innovative solutions could provide an effective 
approach to rooting out food insecurity (cf. Purdon, 2014). The polarized debate 
between proponents of further agricultural intensification using modern technology, 
such as genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and those who are in favor of organic or 
agro-ecological agriculture in the (EU) agricultural policy domain is a good illustration 
of this belief in solubility. Both camps draw on valid scientific insights to support claims 
that a certain mode of production would be the most effective way of addressing food 
insecurity (cf. de Schutter & Vanloqueren, 2011; Diao, Headey, & Johnson, 2008; 
Horlings & Marsden, 2011; Shiferaw, Prasanna, Hellin, & Bänziger, 2011). Various 
scholars have attempted to overcome the divide by introducing approaches that could 
potentially bring both camps together, arguing that the road forward lies in ‘sustainable 
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intensification’ (Garnett et al., 2013; Tilman, Balzer, Hill, & Befort, 2011). However, 
the underlying belief in solubility has remained largely unchallenged. 
Apart from a (criticized) diversification of food security concerns across policy domains, 
EU decision-makers and stakeholders came to call for better integrated food security 
approaches to address the complex and cross-cutting nature of food security (Council 
of the European Union, 2013; e.g., European Commission, 2010c; Piebalgs, 2013; Red 
Cross EU Office, 2013). Some commentators have even argued that the EU should 
develop a ‘common food policy’ to integrate its existing fragmented policy efforts 
into a holistic approach (e.g., Marsden, 2015; Slow Food; Via Campesina, Friends of 
the Earth Europe, European Platform for Food Sovereignty, & European Health and 
Agriculture Consortium, 2010). The underlying rationale of such calls is that integrated 
approaches would be better able to signal and respond to emerging threats, to reduce 
externalities, and to realize synergies between policy efforts. As such, integrated food 
security approaches would be more ‘effective’ in addressing food insecurity.
In this dissertation, I argue that, due to the above-shown complexity, crosscutting nature, 
and controversies as well as attempts to deal with these in EU governance, food security 
should be considered as a ‘wicked’ policy problem, which is insoluble by definition1. 
Although it may be possible to further increase food production levels and enhance 
access to nutritious food, a combination of high uncertainty and complexity, frame 
controversies, stagnated interaction patterns, and cross-scale dynamics make a final or 
most effective solution to food (in)security impossible (Rittel & Webber, 1973; Termeer, 
Dewulf, Breeman, & Stiller, 2015a). Instead, formulating the problem is the problem, 
as actors disagree about key challenges and desirable directions, and because today’s 
problem definitions arise from attempts to solve yesterday’s perceived problems (Head, 
2008). The latter means that policies and interventions deployed to address wicked 
problems themselves contribute to a continuous evolution of problem definitions and 
understandings (cf. Newman & Head, 2015). 
1.1.2 Three challenges to the EU governance of food security
Characterizing food security as a wicked problem poses specific challenges to its 
governance. The EU, and particularly the European Commission, have been criticized 
for their ability to deal with wicked problem characteristics (for overviews of these 
critiques, see: Jordan & Schout, 2006; Kassim et al., 2013). At the same time, both the 
ways in which the EU governs food security and its ability to address wicked problems 
1 In line with the food security literature, the actual policy problem here is lack of security, i.e. food insecurity. Unless 
indicated differently, when referring to the policy problem of food security I mean food insecurity.
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in general have hardly been studied systematically. This dissertation therefore aims to 
explore whether and how the EU is capable of governing the wicked problem of food 
security. By combining initial empirical observations with knowledge gaps following 
from the lack of theorization about the EU governance of wicked problems in general 
and food security specifically, I have identified three particularly critical challenges to 
the EU governance of food security: (i) the difficulty of defining the problem of food 
security; (ii) the European Commission’s alleged incapability of governing wicked 
problems; and (iii) the problem of overcoming policy incoherence and inconsistencies 
vis-à-vis food security in the stovepiped EU governance system. These three challenges 
follow a consequential order: the first challenge involves the diversity of meanings and 
interests associated with food security (in EU policymaking), thus the manifestation of 
food security as a wicked problem; the second challenge questions the potential or latent 
ability of the Commission to deal with the wicked problem of food security; and the 
third challenge focuses on (changes of ) actual food security governance practices. 
Regarding the first challenge, the previous section showed that food security concerns 
have emerged in a wide array of EU policy domains and debates. Because these domains 
entail different policy subsystems and associated ideas and interests (Peterson, 1995; 
Sabatier, 1998), the question of what constitutes food security and how it could best be 
pursued is approached and answered in many different ways, both within and between 
domains. Such ‘frame diversity’ surrounding food security is not unique to the EU level 
as it has also been observed in other governance contexts, such as the United States 
(U.S.) (Mooney & Hunt, 2009) and the United Kingdom (U.K.) (Kirwan & Maye, 
2013). The simultaneous pervasiveness of the notion of ‘food security’ and diversity of 
food security frames in the U.S. context have led scholars to classify food security as a 
‘consensus frame’, i.e. a goal or idea that finds wide resonance among stakeholders and is 
collectively agreed upon (Gamson, 1995), behind which may lie considerable ‘dissensus’ 
about problem definitions and possible solutions (Maye & Kirwan, 2013; Mooney & 
Hunt, 2009). Initial empirical observations suggest that a similar dynamic has occurred 
at the EU level, implying that a shared and agreed-upon problem definition is lacking. 
Moreover, the polarized debate between proponents of different types of (sustainable) 
farming, both inside and outside the EU governance context, suggest that governing 
food security has stranded in what has been referred to as a ‘dialogue of the deaf ’ (van 
Eeten, 1999; Wildavsky & Tenenbaum, 1981); a stagnated interaction pattern in which 
various groups of actors interact without truly listening to each other, while invoking 
arguments that are each scientifically valid on their own terms. This combination of 
frame diversity and contested knowledge claims seriously complicates the EU governance 
of food security. The literatures on frame controversies and wicked problems have put 
forward suggestions for dealing with such challenges (e.g., Bryson, 2004; Koppenjan & 
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Klijn, 2004; Schön & Rein, 1994). However, the constellation of food security frames 
and associated stakeholders in EU policy debates must first be identified.
The second challenge to the EU governance of food security involves the European 
Commission’s ability to govern wicked problems in general. Frame diversity is a crucial 
element of wicked problems and being able to deal with frame conflicts is therefore an 
indispensable quality for governing wicked problems. Wicked problems however go 
beyond frame controversies in that they also involve high degrees of complexity and 
uncertainty and crosscut spatial, temporal, and jurisdictional scales (see section 1.2.2 for 
a conceptualization of wicked problems). EU governance scholars have predominantly 
argued that the EU institutions, and particularly the Commission, are incapable of 
coping with these wicked characteristics simultaneously. The Commission’s rigid 
jurisdictions and compartmentalization, limited capacity and resources, and lack of 
coordinative instruments would have resulted in a general inadequacy to govern wicked 
problems satisfactorily (Ellinas & Suleiman, 2012; Jordan & Schout, 2006; Laffan, 
1997; Metcalfe, 1996; Peters & Wright, 2001; Spence & Edwards, 2006; Stevens & 
Stevens, 2001). Kassim et al. (2013, p. 75) summarize these critiques as follows:
[T]he Commission is highly ‘stove-piped’, its administrative code is burdensome, 
it is resource-poor, and it is heavily dependent for its success on its relationship 
with other EU institutions. And still it is tasked with trying to solve ‘wicked 
problems’, whose very nature makes it unlikely that they can be solved by 
administrations that strictly observe their own administrative code, especially 
one as cumbersome as the one under which the Commission operates.
At the same time, recent insights suggest that the Commission may be more capable 
of coping with wicked problems than is commonly assumed. Kassim et al. (2013), for 
example, show that by drawing upon their personal networks, Commission officials 
manage to circumvent many of the more formal and structural constraints. These 
contrasting perspectives in the literature illustrate the lack of systematicity with which 
the wicked problems research agenda has been applied to studies of EU governance; 
existing studies have pointed at single factors and have put forward partial explanations 
to account for the Commission’s ability to govern wicked problems, but comprehensive 
analyses have been lacking so far.
The third challenge to the EU governance of food security involves the organization 
of policy integration within the EU governance system to overcome jurisdictional 
fragmentation and consequent incoherence and inconsistency of policies (cf. Hovik 
& Hanssen, 2015; Howlett & Rayner, 2007; Rayner & Howlett, 2009; Termeer et 
al., 2011). As elaborated in section 1.1, decision-makers in the EU and elsewhere 
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have argued that the 2007-8 and 2010 world food price crises showed the need for 
more holistic approaches to food security. Initiatives such as Policy Coherence for 
Development (PCD) show that the EU actively attempts to enhance policy integration 
in the governance of wicked problems, including food security (cf. Carbone, 2008; 
Hartlapp, Metz, & Rauh, 2010; Hustedt & Seyfried, 2015; Kassim et al., 2013). 
At the same time, accounts of high degrees of compartmentalization within the EU 
institutions (e.g., Hooghe, 2005; Kassim et al., 2013; Stevens & Stevens, 2001) seem to 
suggest that actual integration between domains is limited at best, and virtually absent at 
worst. More in general, previous research has shown that commitments to strengthened 
policy integration do not necessarily result in actual substantive governance changes, i.e. 
changes of policy instruments and subsystems involved (Jacob, Volkery, & Lenschow, 
2008; Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Mickwitz & Kivimaa, 2007). 
Having set out the three challenges to the EU governance of food security that are central 
to this dissertation, this introductory chapter proceeds in section 1.2 by elaborating the 
key concepts used throughout the dissertation: (i) food security, (ii) wicked problems, 
and (iii) the EU governance of food security. The central research question, sub-
questions and research objective are presented in section 1.3. Section 1.4 sets out the 
methodological approach and underpinnings of the research project. The introductory 
chapter ends with an outline of the dissertation.
1.2 Key concepts
1.2.1 Food security
Although dealing with hunger and guaranteeing a stable food intake is probably the 
oldest policy problem that mankind has had to deal with (Diamond, 2005; Fresco, 
2015), the concept of food security was only introduced in an international setting 
during the World Food Conference of 1974, at which it was defined as:
[A]vailability at all times of adequate world supplies of basic food-stuffs … to 
sustain a steady expansion of food consumption … and to offset fluctuations in 
production and prices (United Nations, 1975; cited in: Maxwell, 1996).
The World Food Conference and the associated definition of food security followed 
on subsequent major famines and shared concerns about the potential to keep food 
production levels up with population growth, which explains its focus on global 
production and availability. 
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Already before its introduction, this definition of food security was considered to be 
too narrow as food insecurity prevailed even in countries that had reached national 
self-sufficiency in food production (e.g., Berg, 1973; Joy, 1973). This line of thinking 
culminated in the influential work of Nobel Prize laureate Amartya Sen (1981), who 
argued that individual food insecurity is often related to a lack of access to food, which 
he referred to as ‘food entitlements’. The inclusion of the dimension of access extended 
understandings of food security towards the social domain by raising questions about 
issues such as social inequality and gender differences. 
In the years that followed, food security came to be understood and defined in many 
different ways, as was illustrated by Smith et al. (1992), who provided a list of 194 
existing definitions of food security. During the World Food Summit of 1996, however, 
a definition came to be adopted that has become the most commonly used and cited 
since then:
Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic 
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO, 1996).
Apart from availability and access, this definition includes two additional dimensions of 
food security: utilization and stability. Utilization involves the nutritional value of food 
as well as the required water sanitation, health, and cultural acceptability required for 
a nutritious diet. The fourth dimension refers to the stability of availability, access and 
utilization over the longer term. These four components have become the established 
food security dimensions or food system outcomes (Ingram, 2011).
In spite of the presence of an agreed-on definition, food security is still subject to a 
‘cornucopia of ideas’ (Maxwell, 1996), because different actors emphasize and focus on 
varying underlying problems and possible solutions. Maxwell (ibid.) identified three 
broad paradigm shifts in thinking about food security between the 1970s and early ‘90s. 
The first shift is that the focus of both scholars and policymakers shifted from global 
and national to household and individual food security, which corresponds with the 
inclusion of the dimension of access. Second, food security understandings developed 
from a ‘food first’ perspective, i.e. a narrow focus on food production and availability, 
towards a broader livelihoods perspective. Third, food security increasingly came to 
be assessed by studying subjective perceptions, in addition to objective quantifiable 
indicators. 
Since Maxwell’s publication, the broadening of food security understandings has further 
advanced to include environmental and social considerations. Lang and Barling (2012) 
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describe this trend as the emergence of a ‘second perspective’ on food security. In contrast 
to the older perspective’s focus on agriculture and raising production, with which 
Maxwell also started, this second perspective focuses on the sustainability of the food 
system as a whole, thereby including social, ecological and economic criteria. The food 
system involves the whole array of activities, most notably food production, processing, 
packaging, distribution, retailing, and consumption, that affect food security outcomes 
(Ericksen, 2008; Ingram, 2011), which also interact with social and environmental 
factors. 
Approaching food security through a food systems lens enables a more holistic 
understanding of the concept, thereby recognizing its many facets and the complexity 
of interactions by which it is affected. The implication of such a holistic understanding 
is that food security is no longer restricted to specific research fields or policy domains, 
such as development cooperation, agriculture, or social policy (Ingram et al., 2013; 
Lang, Barling, & Caraher, 2009). Instead, food security comes to function as a cross-
scale problem, spanning the boundaries of governance levels and policy domains and 
associated advocacy coalitions and epistemic communities. Therefore, throughout this 
dissertation food security governance involves the whole array of policies and domains 
that influence food security outcomes, i.e. the dimensions of food availability, access, 
utilization, and stability. Section 1.2.3 elaborates further on what is meant by the EU 
governance of food security. 
1.2.2 Food security as a wicked problem
The dominant rational policy-planning paradigm in the 1970s assumed that societal 
problems could be solved by selecting the most appropriate policy alternative. Practice, 
however, showed that many policies and programs failed in delivering the outcomes they 
promised (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). A major shortcoming in this respect was that 
existing theories did not or hardly consider the role of  societal norms, values, and power 
(Stone, 2012). Building forth on these critiques, Rittel and Webber (1973) introduced 
the concept of ‘wicked problems’ as opposed to ‘tame problems’. Whereas for tame 
problems it is clear when a problem is solved or not, wicked problems are ill-defined 
and they “rely upon elusive political judgement for resolution” (ibid., p. 160). Rittel and 
Webber oppose resolutions to solutions, because, by definition, wicked problems can 
never be solved. This is also how wicked problems differ from other types of complex 
or unstructured problems (Hoppe, 2010), for which the assumption is that, although 
it may be very difficult, they can ultimately be solved. Wicked problems, on the other 
hand, may only be temporarily settled or resolved, often as the result of a trajectory of 
Chapter 1
24
‘small wins’ (Bryson, 1988; Weick, 1984) or the introduction of clumsy (re)solutions 
(Verweij et al., 2006).
Rittel and Webber provided a list of ten characteristics of wicked problems. Newman and 
Head (2015, p. 2) recently synthesized these characteristics into three interconnected 
dimensions: 
[F]irst, wicked problems are complex, in that they have shifting boundaries and 
moving parts as well as far-reaching and cascading negative externalities. Second, 
the information available to help resolve wicked problems is finite: uncertainty 
about the effects of a problem on society, who the relevant stakeholders are, and 
what consequences will follow any particular strategy is a major contributing 
factor to the wickedness of the problem. Third, wicked problems arise when 
there is a high level of disagreement among stakeholders, to the extent that 
consensus or even compromise is unlikely.
Although these interconnected dimensions may seem rather self-evident to most public 
administration and public policy scholars, the merit of the concept of wicked problems 
lies in its recognition that these dimensions may occur simultaneously and interact, 
which explains the recent increased popularity of the concept. Head (2008, p. 103) 
stated that studying these dimensions together may provide additional insights in “why 
many policies and programs generate controversy, fail to achieve their stated goals, cause 
unforeseen effects, or are impossibly difficult to coordinate and monitor.” 
Examples of policy problems that have been characterized as wicked in recent research 
include fisheries and marine policy (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2009), natural resources 
management (Chapin et al., 2008; Lach, Rayner, & Ingram, 2005; Lachapelle, McCool, 
& Patterson, 2003), health care policy (Blackman et al., 2006; Kreuter, De Rosa, 
Howze, & Baldwin, 2004), business management (Camillus, 2008), and climate change 
adaptation (Termeer, Dewulf, & Breeman, 2013; Vink, 2015). Various scholars have 
suggested that food security can also be typified as a wicked problem (Anthony, 2012; 
Breeman, Dijkman, & Termeer, 2015; Dentoni, Hospes, & Ross, 2012; Hamann, 
Giamporcaro, Johnston, & Yachkaschi, 2011; Hamm, 2009; MacMillan & Dowler, 
2012). However, most studies  have thus far provided limited insights into how exactly 
the dimensions of wicked problems apply to food security. Comparing the existing food 
security literature with the three wicked problem dimensions provided by Newman and 
Head, I arrive at the following characterization of food security as a wicked problem, 
whereby I discuss the dimensions of complexity and uncertainty together. It is important 
to stress that it is not the individual dimensions but their simultaneous occurrence that 
lead to food security being typified as a wicked problem.
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The first and second dimensions of Newman and Head’s wicked problem definition, 
complexity and uncertainty, became very clear in respect to food security during and 
following the food price crises of 2007-8 and 2010 and consequential outbreaks of 
conjunctural food insecurity in large parts of the world. Although these crises were 
preceded by many small signals, to most policymakers and scholars they came as a 
surprise. In the years during and following the crises, scholars heavily debated the factors 
that caused food prices to peak, including the development of biofuels, rising oil prices, 
climate change, financial speculation, depleted stocks, and trade measures. It is now 
generally agreed that the crises resulted from a complex interplay between several of these 
factors, some of which allegedly had a greater impact than others (Headey & Fan, 2008; 
High Level Panel of Experts, 2011; Tadesse, Algieri, Kalkuhl, & von Braun, 2014). 
Although states of food security are affected by more factors than just food prices, the 
crises illustrate the uncertain and sudden contextual changes that policymakers need to 
cope with in food security governance. In addition, the crises showed how food security 
is interconnected with other (wicked) policy problems and associated policy domains, 
including climate change, the development of renewable energy sources, and financial 
markets. Interventions in these other domains, such as the setting of biofuels targets, 
have been shown to produce major and often unexpected externalities. As a consequence, 
the boundaries to governing food security are unclear and shift over time, resulting in 
considerable overlap with adjacent governance arrangements and communities. This 
complexity and uncertainty also imply that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
oversee the effects of interventions targeted at strengthening food security outcomes or 
reducing externalities. 
An element that Newman and Head do not mention explicitly but that could be gathered 
under wicked problems’ complexity is the tendency of wicked problems to cut across 
temporal, spatial, and jurisdictional scales (cf. Cash et al., 2006). Regarding the temporal 
scale, whereas some food security concerns manifest themselves within a relatively short 
and immediate time frame, such as price volatility and financial speculation, others span 
a longer time frame and are less visible, e.g., soil fertility, climate change, and social 
inequality. Similarly, a distinction can be made between long-term structural and short-
term or occasional conjunctural food insecurity.  On a spatial scale, food insecurity 
occurs and is governed at global, regional, national, local, household, and individual 
levels. Sometimes the level at which food insecurity primarily manifests itself and the 
level at which it is governed show a mismatch (Termeer & Dewulf, 2014). For example, 
whereas most food security governance arrangements are situated at national, regional, 
and global levels, many of the problems and manifestations of food insecurity occur at 
local and household levels (McKeon, 2011). And following from the above-mentioned 
argument that governing food security has no clear boundaries, food security transcends 
jurisdictions, for example of national ministries (iPES Food, 2015; Lang et al., 2009).
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The third dimension of wicked problems as distinguished by Newman and Head, high 
levels of disagreement between stakeholders,  was already extensively described in section 
1.1, where the assumption was raised that food security functions as a consensus frame 
behind which considerable dissensus lies hidden in EU policy debates. A result of this 
dissensus is that there is no ‘stopping rule’ to food security (Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
As Maxwell (1996, pp. 162-163) argues, there is “no overarching theory, applicable 
to all situations: no “meta-narratives” about food security, whether derived from 
modernization, dependency or neo-liberal perspectives”, and argued that “[p]olicy will 
instead need to recognize the diversity of food insecurity causes, situations and strategies, 
and be contingent on particular circumstances.” 
These examples of how food security meets the three wicked problem dimensions of 
Newman and Head are not exclusive; many other examples of wickedness could be 
identified across food security governance settings. The paragraphs above do however 
illustrate why and how the wicked problem heuristic is valuable to understanding food 
security governance. This heuristic will therefore be further applied, elaborated, and 
extended in the various chapters of this dissertation. 
1.2.3 EU governance of food security
The concept of governance has become very popular among both scholars and 
policymakers in the last two decades. Because the concept has been studied and 
conceptualized by a broad range of academic disciplines, and schools of thought, a 
plethora of definitions exists (for overviews, see: Kjaer, 2004; Torfing, Peters, Pierre, & 
Sorensen, 2012). It is important to note that I restrict myself here to understandings of 
public governance, thus excluding notions and schools of corporate or ‘good’ governance 
(for a discussion of these, see: Kjaer, 2004). In general, public governance refers to 
forms of societal steering that differ from traditional government-centered approaches 
and that include interactions between a wide array of both public and private actors 
when addressing societal problems. Public governance scholars have emphasized 
different aspects of these emerging forms of societal steering, including focuses on self-
organization (Jessop, 1998, 2002), interactions in network configurations (Klijn, 2008; 
Kooiman, 1993; Scharpf, 1994), and neo-liberal discourse (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003). 
Building forth on the observation that many of these accentuations have either been 
too narrow or too open (Torfing et al., 2012), I here adopt the broad but bounded 
governance definition by Termeer et al. (2011) in defining food security governance 
(in general) as the formal and informal interactions across scales between public and/or 
private entities ultimately aiming at the realization of the food security dimensions of food 
availability, access, utilization, and the stability of these three dimensions over time. 
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The definition I propose provides a general understanding of what is meant by food 
security governance. This dissertation, however, focuses on food security governance 
at the EU level, which requires a further delineation. In addition to international 
relations and comparative politics theories, the governance research agenda has become 
particularly influential in studying EU integration and policymaking over the last two 
decades, resulting in an emerging body of EU governance literature (Jachtenfuchs, 
2001). At the same time, multiple governance theories and perspectives have also been 
applied at the EU level (Pollack, 2015). In this dissertation, EU governance is intimately 
bound up with cross-sectoral policymaking and coordination through networks within 
the EU institutions (cf. 6, Leat, Setlzer, & Stoker, 2002; Jordan & Schout, 2006). The 
EU governance of food security then refers to how the EU’s policy subsystems more or 
less holistically cope with the wicked problem of food security. The research presented in 
this dissertation thus concentrates on actors and activities at the EU level and excludes 
those at member state, global, and other governance levels. In addition, the research 
focuses primarily on governance activities of the EU institutions and of policymakers 
working within these institutions, i.e. on public actors and institutions. Actors and 
activities that are external to the EU institutions are, where relevant, included in the 
analyses when they interact with the EU institutions and officials. The focus on cross-
sectoral coordination and holism corresponds with the broad approach to food security 
(section 1.2.1) and implies that all policy efforts of the EU institutions are included 
in the analyses, possibly in interaction with other public and/or private entities that 
either positively or negatively affect the food security outcomes of food availability, 
access, utilization, and the stability of these three dimensions over time. Food security 
outcomes can hereby apply to the EU and its member states, but also externally, for 
example to developing countries. 
Within such a broad perspective to the EU governance of food security, the EU’s explicit 
food security efforts are naturally also taken into account. The EU has deployed various 
initiatives to address food insecurity directly, particularly in developing countries. 
The main outlines of the EU’s approach are laid down in its 2010 communication 
on food security (European Commission, 2010c). Since the food price crises, the EU 
has deployed various policy instruments to assist developing countries with addressing 
food security, the most notable of which have been the €1 billion Food Facility and 
the expanded Food Security Thematic Programme. Interventions explicitly targeted at 
food security within the EU have been more limited in number and magnitude. This 
can be largely explained by the limited social policy competences that the EU possesses. 
Nevertheless, the EU has deployed the relatively substantial Fund for European Aid to 
the most Deprived (FEAD), which is used to help the most deprived European citizens 
with their basic needs, including food. In addition to these direct interventions, the 
EU has undertaken initiatives to reduce externalities and thus increase the coherence 
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of its other policies vis-à-vis food security outcomes. An important instrument in this 
respect is Policy Coherence for Development (PCD); a commitment to minimize 
contradictions and enhance synergies that has been reinforced in the Treaty of Lisbon 
and has been institutionally embedded within the EU institutions.
Summing up, the EU governance of food security is understood as all policy efforts of 
(subsystems within) the EU institutions that either intentionally or unintentionally and 
more or less holistically affect food security outcomes.
1.3 Research questions
The central research question that this dissertation aims to address is: how does the 
European Union govern the wicked problem of food security? To address this question, 
four sub-questions are defined. Questions 2, 3, and 4 each correspond with one of the 
three challenges to the EU governance of food security identified in section 1.1.2. These 
questions are preceded by a research question that aims to elucidate the current state of 
knowledge about food security governance in general.
1. What insights does the existing body of food security governance literature provide 
about governing the wicked problem of food security?
To be able to study the EU governance of food security, it is first necessary to more deeply 
understand food security governance and associated manifestations of its wickedness in 
general. Synthesizing the fragmented body of literature on food security governance will 
provide a better insight into the challenges inherent in governing food security. Such an 
insight helps determine both the validity of the initial conceptualization of food security 
as a wicked problem and the context in which EU institutions and policymakers govern 
food security. 
2. Which food security frames can be distinguished in EU policymaking and how do 
the EU institutions deal with this diversity?
This research question addresses the first challenge to the EU governance of food security. 
Addressing this research question can provide a better understanding of the conflicting 
meanings attached to food security in EU policy debates. In addition the question 
focuses attention on how the EU institutions deal with food security frame conflicts, 
e.g., by analyzing which food security frames (actors within) the EU institutions deploy 
themselves. 
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3. What conditions enable or constrain the European Commission in coping with the 
wicked problem of food security?
This research question addresses the second challenge to the EU governance of food 
security. The ability of the Commission to govern wicked problems has been subject 
to contradictory accounts and arguments within the EU governance literature (Jordan 
& Schout, 2006; Kassim et al., 2013). This research question aims to investigate the 
potential or latent ability of the Commission as a whole, including its procedures, 
structures, resources, and dependencies in coping with the wickedness of food security. 
4. To what extent has the EU realized a shift towards strengthened policy integration 
in the governance of food security?
This research question addresses the third challenge to the EU governance of food 
security. Calls for the realization of more holistic approaches and policy coherence have 
been the dominant perspective on strengthening food security governance within the EU 
in recent years. The main focus here is on whether an actual shift towards strengthened 
policy integration has been realized and thus on whether food security governance 
practices have altered.
By answering these four research questions I aim to also contribute to theoretical debates 
within the public policy and governance literatures, most notably on food governance, 
the (EU) governance of wicked problems, and policy integration. In addition, the 
dissertation seeks to identify opportunities and provide suggestions for strengthened 
EU food security governance. 
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 An exploratory research design and multi-theoretical approach
The (EU) governance of food security and the EU governance of wicked problems are 
phenomena that have hardly been studied systematically. This is not to say that scholars 
have paid no attention to these governance fields and associated challenges and dilemmas 
at all, but existing accounts predominantly take the form of (partial) narratives that lack 
substantive empirical foundations. Although there certainly is merit in such narratives, 
the goal of this dissertation is to empirically explore the EU governance of the wicked 
problem of food security. The research presented in this dissertation has therefore been 
conducted through an exploratory research design. 
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Exploratory research is generally used to study phenomena about which no or only sparse 
systematic knowledge exists (Kumar, 2011; van Thiel, 2007). It is an approach that can 
be used to gain more familiarity with a phenomenon that is not clear or contrived 
enough to make conceptual distinctions or posit explanatory relationships beforehand 
(Shields & Rangarajan, 2013). Exploratory research would therefore lend itself well for 
investigating the ‘virgin territory’ of the EU governance of food security; it can provide 
in-depth knowledge about the unique case of the EU, which is a highly relevant and 
underexplored food security governance setting. Additionally, it is a type of research 
that is often used for studying processes of meaning-making by actors, for example to 
analyze how meaning is given to a particular concept or notion in policy debates (van 
Thiel, 2007). This fits well with the second research question of studying the meanings 
that EU policymakers and stakeholders attach to food security and how these play a role 
in EU governance processes. 
An implication of such a research design is that the final conclusions are typically not 
one-on-one generalizable to other governance settings (Stebbins, 2001). The findings 
can, however, be used to identify relevant dynamics that could serve as starting points for 
additional research, for example by producing hypotheses and tentative generalizations 
that can be tested or extended in following research (Babbie, 2010; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). 
The adoption of an exploratory research design does not mean that the research lacks 
theoretical points of departure or theoretical ambitions. This is where the research in 
this dissertation differs from purely inductive or ‘grounded’ theory (e.g., Charmaz, 
2006). Instead, for each of the research questions 2, 3 and 4, I have selected a theoretical 
approach from the public governance and policy literatures that seemed most 
appropriate and potentially insightful. The research can thus be qualified as following a 
reasoned exploratory design. Apart from enabling the individual research questions to 
be addressed purposively and systematically (cf. Stebbins, 2001), such a design allows 
for a more comprehensive understanding of the dimensions of the wicked problem of 
food security set out in section 1.2.2 (cf. Termeer & Dewulf, 2012).
The theories that have been used in the various chapters of this dissertation are: framing 
and consensus frames for research question 2, a governance capabilities framework for 
research question 3, and a policy integration framework for question 4. Question 1, on 
the existing body of knowledge about food security governance, was the only question 
that was addressed inductively, although critically appraised through the perspective of 
wicked problems and governance philosophies. Each of these theoretical approaches and 
associated questions and expectations are extensively discussed within the individual 
research chapters. 
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Apart from using theories to explain empirical dynamics in the EU governance of 
food security, I also hope to contribute to these theoretical debates themselves. As a 
consequence of this dual ambition, the EU governance of food security is both the 
focus and the locus of the research presented in the various chapters. Whereas in some 
chapters the emphasis lies on empirical questions related to the EU governance of food 
security (chapters 3 and 6), in others the main argument revolves around contributions 
to a theoretical debate for which the EU governance of food security is used as an 
in-depth single-n case study (chapters 4 and 5). All chapters, however, directly or 
indirectly address one of the four research questions. This also means that, although the 
dissertation’s overall nature is explorative, various parts of the dissertation have a more 
explanatory or theory-testing character. 
1.4.2 Ontological and epistemological position
A common denominator throughout the research presented in this dissertation is a 
realist ontological point of departure. Drawing from Brewer and Hunter (2006) and 
Pawson (2006), Biesbroek (2014, p. 9) defines a realist ontology as “the middle ground 
between the positivist paradigm and interpretative research in which social reality 
is seen as locally constructed and in which all research findings are considered to be 
situated rather than universally true (i.e. the constructivist paradigm).” Realists thus 
share a recognition of the value of meaning-making, emotions, norms, and values with 
interpretive researchers, but simultaneously argue that this does not mean that it is 
not possible to discern and describe general patterns of behavior and structural change 
(Sayer, 2000). 
Following from this realist understanding, the epistemological position adhered to can 
be qualified as a pragmatist mixture between relatively more interpretivist and relatively 
more positivist perspectives, without every fully matching these research paradigms. 
Whereas chapters 3, on food security framings, and 4, on the Commission’s ability 
to cope with food security’s wickedness, can be characterized as taking a relatively 
interpretivist approach, chapters 2 and 5 are more focused on developing and testing 
generally applicable theories about (EU) food security governance. These different 
focuses allow for varied understandings of both how the wickedness of food security 
manifests itself and is experienced in every-day policymaking, and how this wickedness 
is understood and coped with in broader governance patterns. I shall further reflect on 
this in section 7.3 in the concluding chapter.
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1.4.3 Methods of data collection and analysis
The multi-theoretical approach and realist perspective have implications for the choice 
of methods for addressing the various research questions in that they make a mixed 
set of methods most desirable. The exact methods of data collection and analysis as 
well as reflections on their validity and limitations are extensively elaborated within the 
specific chapters. Table 1.1 summarizes the research design and methods that were used 
for addressing each of the research questions. It is important to note that the research 
chapters do not necessarily provide insights into one question only. Therefore, chapter 7 
synthesizes the combined insights to answer the research questions.
The multi-method approach is also used as a tool to validate insights and findings within 
the individual chapters of this research, thereby applying the principle of triangulation 
– although methodological puritans would not refer to the approach as triangulation in 
the strict sense (Jick, 1979). For example, the food security frames that are presented 
in chapter 3 were initially identified through an analysis of official documents. 
Subsequently, the results of this initial analysis were compared to observations made at 
various practitioner conferences to see whether the frames made sense in actual policy 
debates. 
Table 1.1 Overview of research design and methods per research question
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Research 
question 
Research design  Methods 
1  Review of existing grey and academic literature about food security 
governance. The literature was synthesized for its theoretical and empirical 
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Agricultural Policy post‐2013. This case was chosen for the pervasiveness of 
different food security arguments within the debate.  
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stakeholder input, EU documents, 
and media coverage; Conference 
observations. 
3  Interview round at the European Commission in which policy officers 
working in a broad range of directorate‐generals were asked about how food 
security (concerns) is governed within the Commission and what the main 
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scientific journals. Chapter 2 synthesizes the fragmented state-of-the-art on food 
security governance by presenting the results of a systematic literature review. The 
synthesis identifies seven overarching themes within the literature. The current state 
of knowledge is critically appraised from the perspective of wicked problems and 
governance philosophies. Chapter 3 disentangles the consensus frame of food security 
by identifying the various food security frames in the policy debate surrounding the 
reform round of the Common Agricultural Policy post-2013. The framing analysis 
also includes the various actors invoking specific frames, including the EU institutions. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of a study of the European Commission’s governance 
capabilities for dealing with wicked problems. In this chapter, the governance of food 
security serves as a case study for systematically investigating the contradictory claims 
within the EU governance literature regarding the Commission’s ability to govern 
wicked problems. The analysis is based on an extensive interview round at the European 
Commission. Chapters 5 and 6 should be read together because they together address 
research question 4. Chapter 5 proposes a conceptual framework that can be used to 
study the development of policy integration vis-à-vis a crosscutting policy problem 
within a governance system over time. Such a conceptual framework is currently lacking 
within the political sciences. Chapter 6 applies the framework to the EU governance of 
food security, addressing the question of whether policy integration has increased during 
and following the 2007-8 and 2010 global food price crises. The dissertation ends with 
a concluding chapter in which the research questions are answered and an overarching 
conclusion is presented. In addition, this chapter reflects on the main contributions to 
scholarly debates and on the methodology applied in this dissertation and presents some 
recommendations for EU policymakers. The concluding chapter is followed by various 
supplementary materials and a list of references.

CHAPTER 2
Food security governance: a systematic literature review
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Abstract2
The role of governance has been receiving increasing attention from food security 
scholars in recent years. However, in spite of the recognition that governance 
matters, current knowledge of food security governance is rather fragmented. 
To provide some clarity in the debate about the role of governance in addressing 
food (in)security, this chapter reports the results of a systematic review of the 
literature. The synthesis revolves around seven recurring themes: i) the view of 
governance as both a challenge and solution to food security; ii) a governability 
that is characterized by high degrees of complexity; iii) failures of the current 
institutional architectures; iv) the arrival of new players at the forefront; v) 
calls for coherency and coordination across multiple scales; vi) variation and 
conflict of ideas; and vii) calls for the allocation of sufficient resources and 
the integration of democratic values in food security governance. Two lines of 
discussion of this synthesis are raised. First, the researcher argues that a large 
proportion of the food security governance literature is characterized by an 
optimist governance perspective, i.e., a view of governance as a problem-solving 
mechanism. Complementing this body of literature with alternative governance 
perspectives in future research may strengthen current understandings of food 
security governance. Approaching food security as a ‘wicked problem’ could 
provide valuable insights in this respect. Second, food security governance as a 
research field could make headway by engaging in further empirical investigation 
of current governance arrangements, particularly at sub-national levels.
2 This chapter is published as: Candel, J.J.L. (2014) Food security governance: a systematic literature 
review, Food Security, 6(4), 585-601.
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2.1 Introduction
Food security has received much attention in recent years, from both academics and non-
academics (Allen, 2013; Lang & Barling, 2012). This increase in attention is particularly 
noticeable after the 2007–8 and 2010 world food price crises and the 2008 World 
Development Report, which called for greater investment in agriculture in developing 
countries. These events made clear that, in spite of decades of efforts to eradicate hunger 
and malnutrition, food insecurity is still a significant problem. Furthermore, it has 
become increasingly clear that food security is strongly interlinked with other issues, such 
as global environmental change and energy markets, and that its policy environment is 
undergoing transformation and globalization (Ingram, Ericksen, & Liverman, 2010; 
Lang et al., 2009). For those reasons food security has become a concept that finds wide 
resonance among academic institutions and in policy considerations (Candel, Breeman, 
Stiller, & Termeer, 2014; Mooney & Hunt, 2009).
Within these recent food security debates, the role of governance has been attracting 
increasing attention. This development stems from the often-heard notion that food 
security solutions or approaches should not only address the technical and environmental 
dimensions of the issue, but also take social, economic, and political aspects into account 
(FAO, 2012; Maye & Kirwan, 2013; von Braun, 2009, p. 11; Wahlqvist, McKay, Chang, 
& Chiu, 2012). Katrien Termeer (in: Kropff, van Arendonk, & Löffler, 2013, p. 128), 
for example, stated that “food security cannot be realized by means of idealistic plans or 
new technologies only. It requires advanced steering strategies that involve governments 
as well as companies, NGOs and citizens.”
The concept of governance has been used and developed in a broad range of academic 
disciplines, resulting in a plurality of definitions and applications (for an overview, see: 
Kjaer, 2004). Here, I follow Termeer et al. (2011, p. 160) in choosing a broad definition 
of governance as “the interactions between public and/or private entities ultimately 
aiming at the realization of collective goals.” Governance is generally differentiated from 
government, which is associated with more hierarchical and state-centred modes of 
managing public issues (e.g., Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004; Pierre & Peters, 2000). As 
the above quote illustrates, in recent years the concept of governance has been increasingly 
applied to the notion of food security,3 which is most often defined as “all people, at all 
times, having physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food 
to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 
2003) and which is constituted by the elements food availability, food access, and food 
utilization, and their stability over time (FAO, 1996). These interactions take place both 
3 Food security governance here refers to the governance of food security, and not to a specific type or mode of 
governance. Food security governance and governance of food security are used interchangeably in this chapter.
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within and outside food systems (cf. Ericksen, 2008; Ingram, 2011), and cover factors 
such as food prices, agricultural trade, poverty reduction, infrastructure, education, and 
crisis management. In addition to interactions aimed at improving food security, food 
security governance is about man- aging the context in which these interactions take 
place (cf. Jessop, 2003).
What is striking is that, in spite of these various calls for food security governance, it is 
not very clear yet what food security governance entails, what its essential characteristics 
or features are, and how it could be enhanced. The aim of this chapter is therefore 
to: i) provide a state-of-the-art of the current state of knowledge about food security 
governance, ii) provide a critical appraisal of this state of knowledge, and iii) lay out an 
agenda for future research.
These research objectives were addressed by performing a systematic review of both 
academic and grey literature elaborating on food security governance. This chapter 
presents the synthesis that resulted from this review as well as the researcher’s critical 
appraisal of the state of the research field. Here, it is important to note that, although 
many concrete global, national, and local food security initiatives, programs, and 
projects have been both developed and studied, the focus of this chapter is primarily 
on that part of the literature, which studies these initiatives and interactions through 
an explicit governance lens, in which governance is both study objective and theoretical 
perspective. Also, although this study focuses explicitly on the relatively recent literature 
on food security governance, this is not to say that there was no governance of food 
security before the introduction of the notion. On the contrary, governance of food and 
food security are probably as old as man (cf. Diamond, 2005).
The reason for choosing a systematic review method is the assumption that bits and 
pieces of knowledge regarding food security governance already exist, but that these 
have only sparsely been linked to one another. In other words, there is no clear overview 
of the food security governance literature. On the one hand, this has proved to be an 
advantage, because, as shown in the fourth section, it has resulted in complementary 
insights from various schools, disciplines, and approaches. On the other hand, however, 
it has prevented the realization of a combined understanding up to now. This chapter 
aims to fill this gap.
The chapter proceeds in section 2.2 with a description of the systematic review methods 
used. In section 2.3, the data, i.e., the body of included literature, are described. Section 
2.3.1 sets out the key characteristics of the literature, 2.3.2 gives an overview of the 
various conceptualizations of food security governance in the literature. A synthesis of 
the literature is presented in section 4 along seven recurring key themes. This synthesis 
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is reflected upon by the researcher in the discussion section, which revolves around two 
lines of discussion: section 2.5.1 elaborates on the dominant governance perspective 
within the literature and 2.5.2 on the current state of the research field. The chapter ends 
with some brief conclusions.
2.2 The systematic review process
The advantage of using systematic review methods over other review types is that 
researcher bias can be limited and made visible (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). Systematic 
methods require a certain structured way of working, the use of clear inclusion and 
exclusion criteria to select eligible literature, and a positive attitude towards transparency, 
in both doing the analysis and reporting findings. They urge the researcher to take the 
reader by the hand and walk him/her step by step through the procedures followed 
and the choices made during the research process. Thus, systematic review methods 
can enhance the trustworthiness of the conducted research, and, consequently, the 
legitimacy of claims being made (Gough, Oliver, & Thomas, 2012).
2.2.1 Data collection
The data collection process is depicted schematically in Fig. 2.1.
First, an initial assessment of the literature was performed in Scopus to develop a query. 
Besides governance, similar concepts that are more common in specific academic 
communities, such as stewardship and management, were included. The resulting 
query, consisting of the terms ‘food (in)security’ and (synonyms of ) ‘governance’ 
(Supplementary Material (SM) A), was used to search academic articles, reviews, articles 
in press, and conference papers in two digital bibliographical databases: Scopus and Web 
of Science. Scopus and Web of Science were both chosen to prevent either European 
(Scopus) or American (Web of Science) bias. Grey literature was retrieved by searching 
Google Scholar, and the websites of five organizations. Although Google Scholar has 
some serious limitations in relation to performing a systematic review (cf. Anderson, 
2013), it did provide two relevant documents that could not have been retrieved 
otherwise. I therefore chose to accept this impurity for the sake of the comprehensiveness 
of the included body of literature. The organizations whose websites were searched 
were the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme 
(WFP), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), and the World Bank. These organizations were selected on the 
basis of a Google Scholar search using the query ‘food security governance.’
Chapter 2
40
For the academic databases, this query was restricted to the titles, abstracts, and keywords 
of articles. The first search led to 663 academic articles,4 2 additional academic publications 
on Google Scholar,5 and 10 texts from global organizations, of which 2 were academic 
publications.6 All abstracts were loaded in Endnote and read. Academic articles were 
judged potentially relevant when they matched the inclusion criteria (SM A) (n=65). 
Reflections were included on both concrete food security governance arrangements and 
food security governance in general. Also, both empirical and theoretical or conceptual 
articles and documents were considered potentially relevant.
Full papers were read and judged again using the inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
This led to a final body of academic literature of 30 articles. Backward and forward 
4 Duplicates excluded
5 I scanned the first twenty pages of results. All other relevant results had already been retrieved by searching Scopus 
and Web of Science, global organizations’ websites, or reference checking.
6 Eight from the FAO website, two from IFAD. Searches on the other websites did not lead to relevant results.
Initial 
assessment of 
the literature
Keywords and 
synonyms list
Scopus 
(n=524)
Web of 
Science 
(n=331)
Grey 
literature 
(n=12)
Boolean 
search 
(June 2013)
Scopus search: Food 
(in)security AND governance 
(+synonyms) (June 2013)
Merging databases 
and exclusion of 
duplicates
Primary body of 
literature (n=675)
Secondary body of 
literature (n=77)
Final body of 
literature (n=50); 
synthesis
Applying inclusion and 
exclusion criteria to abstract, 
title, and key words
Applying inclusion and exclusion 
criteria to full papers + backward 
and forward reference checking
Using data 
extraction table
FAO, World Bank, 
IFAD, WTO, WFP
Figure 2.1 Data collection process, based on (Biesbroek, Klostermann, Termeer, & Kabat, 2013a)
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reference checking led to 8 more articles (SM A). Including the 2 Google Scholar and 
10 international organization articles this led to a total of 50 documents.
2.2.2 Data analysis
All articles and other documents were read again, and the data were collected in a data 
extraction table (SM A). The data extraction table presents the results literally, without 
interpretation by the researcher, and includes the following categories: governance level, 
governance locus, type of document, method, theoretical orientation, conceptualization 
of food security governance, core argument and insights into the nature of food security 
governance, and recommendations made to improve food security governance. The 
table is a summary of the key insights into food security governance that each document 
provided, and it served as the basis for the synthesis.
Before the synthesis was written, the various insights in the table were compared to one 
another and grouped under the main themes that recurred throughout the literature. 
This provided the opportunity to identify differences and similarities between the data, 
and to interpret these. The resulting seven themes eventually became the headings of 
the synthesis. The synthesis is thus the researcher’s endeavour to bring together the 
core observations and arguments throughout the data extraction table and associated 
literature.
2.2.3 Limitations
Despite its attempt to provide a review of a body of literature that is as comprehensive 
as possible, this review has some serious limitations. First, only documents written in 
English were included. The initial search led to several results in other languages, such 
as French, Spanish, and Portuguese, that could be highly relevant for the purposes of 
this review but were excluded nevertheless (e.g., Lerin & Louafi, 2012; Postolle & 
Bendjebbar, 2012; Soula, 2012). Second, the review is heavily skewed towards academic 
peer-reviewed articles. Although some book chapters, conference proceedings, and 
grey literature documents were included, complementing the body of literature with 
books, dissertations, and more grey literature could lead to additional insights. This 
is especially true for books and book chapters, which proved difficult to retrieve by 
searching digital databases. Third, the academic literature was searched using the two 
biggest databases, Scopus and Web of Science. Although these two databases together 
cover a significant majority of international peer-reviewed journals, other, more 
specialized databases might cover other potentially relevant journals. In addition, new 
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journals are often not (yet) covered by either Scopus or Web of Science. It also means 
that the body of literature is dominated by publications from the Western hemisphere, 
whereas publications from other parts of the world, such as India, Brazil, and China, 
are relatively underrepresented. Finally, both food security and governance are labels 
that have become particularly popular in recent decades, whereas the combination of 
the two has only emerged in recent years, as shown in the next section. Many issues and 
domains that touch upon food security have been studied for a much longer time, and 
these research lines hold potentially highly relevant insights with respect to food security 
governance. In other words, there has been governance of food security for a much 
longer time than the notion itself has been used. The scope of this chapter was restricted 
to studies and articles that focus explicitly on the notion of governance in combination 
with food security, and not agriculture, rural development, or other related issues. In 
future research or reviews, this review could be complemented with insights from these 
specific domains or disciplines. Some studies, books and chapters that were not included 
in this review because of one or more of the limitations mentioned, and that could be 
particularly relevant additions to this review’s synthesis are an edited volume by Barrett 
(2013) on food security in relation to socio-political stability, a chapter by Schilpzand et 
al. (2010) on the role of private sector involvement and a book by Barrett and Maxwell 
(2005) on governance issues in food aid.
2.3 A description of the data
2.3.1 Characteristics of the body of literature
The food security governance literature can be categorized along various characteristics. 
This section presents a ‘map’ of the body of literature included (see: Gough et al., 2012).
The ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citations Report indicates that the various journals in 
which the 33 included academic articles were published cover a broad range of disciplines 
within both the natural and the social sciences. Among these fields7 are International 
Relations (n=5), Food Science & Technology (n=4), Sociology (n=4), and Economics 
(n=3). Of all the journals that included articles on food security governance, only one 
journal had more than two articles (Food Security, n=3), which, together with the journal 
categories, indicates the spread of academic attention across various disciplines and 
communities.
7 Based on journal subject categories in Journal Citations Report. Only ISI-indexed journals were included in the 
analysis. Ten articles were not published in an ISI-indexed journal. If journals were ascribed to multiple categories, 
all categories were included.
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Regarding the years in which the documents were published, an upward trend can be 
seen from 2009 onwards (Figure 2.2). Whereas none of the years before 2009 includes 
three or more documents, this increases to five and four in 2009 and 2010, respectively, 
and ten, twelve, and nine in 2011, 2012, and 2013,6 respectively. This observation 
confirms the notion that the recent food crises formed the impetus for an increase in 
research on food security in general (Rockson, Bennett, & Groenendijk, 2013). 
Figure 2.3 shows that a large proportion of the included documents focus on the global 
governance level. The concept of food security governance seems most integrated in 
the discourse of, and research on, global organizations, such as FAO, the Committee 
on World Food Security (CFS), and the G20. Nevertheless, more than a fifth dealt 
with national food security governance. Countries covered range from developed 
countries like Canada and Japan, to developing countries such as South Africa, Malawi, 
the Philippines, and Brazil. Only a relatively small proportion of the literature covered 
governance of food security at sub-national levels.
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Finally, the data extraction table indicates that 69 % (n=29) of the 42 academic 
publications did not c llect data, or id not justify t  methods used. Those that did 
me tion the methods most oft n used int rviews (n=8) r documents analysis (n=6).
2.3.2 Food security governance conceptualizations in the literature
Of the 50 included documents, 8 provided a conceptualization of food security 
governance, or mentioned what food security governance comprises (Table 1). The 
remainder of the articles and documents either discussed food security governance 
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without explicitly defining the notion, or did not have food security governance as their 
core focus but provided some insights on the margins.
As Table 2 shows, the six conceptualizations differ considerably regarding the elements 
of food security governance that they underline or deem crucial. Also, various 
nomenclatures are used, such as ‘food security governance,’ ‘governance of food security,’ 
and ‘good governance for food security’ (FAO, 2011a).
A recurring element in most definitions is ‘steering,’ which refers to the exercise of 
power through the design and enforcement of interventions aimed at improving food 
security conditions. Although this can be done by both public and private actors, most 
conceptualizations are relatively government-centred.
Apart from steering, elements that are mentioned repeatedly are ‘deliberation,’ ‘formal 
and informal,’ ‘democratic values,’ ‘institutions,’ ‘multi-levelness,’ and ‘nutrition.’ 
Deliberation is particularly pervasive in the three FAO definitions, which all emphasize 
the articulation of views and/or ideas. This could be due to FAO’s closeness to the CFS, 
which primarily aims to stimulate and facilitate deliberation. The formal–informal nexus 
suggests that these deliberations do not necessarily take place in formal institutional 
settings, but that both exchanges of ideas and steering can also occur through informal 
pro- cesses and institutions.
In two of the conceptualizations of food security governance, the authors find it essential 
that these steering and/or deliberative activities are grounded in societal support and 
respect democratic values, such as legitimacy, accountability, and transparency. Two 
other conceptualizations underline the importance of nutrition, which can be traced 
Figure 2.3 Governance levels on which documents focused
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back to wider support within the food security academic community to include the 
nutritional dimension in measures of food insecurity.
Two final elements of food security governance mentioned more than once were 
‘institutions’ and ‘multi-levelness.’ Regarding the first, a good example is Margulis’ 
equation of food security governance with the global constellation of institutions and 
organizations. This description differs from the five others in the sense that it does not 
mention the role of agency or interactions. Regarding the element of multi-levelness, it is 
not self-evident whether this refers to multiple levels of governance, or to merely aiming 
to have an impact on multiple levels of food security. These conceptualizations do seem 
to imply, however, that food security is an issue that spans spatial and jurisdictional 
scales.
Table 2.1 Food security governance conceptualizations
1. a mechanism that will facilitate debate, convergence of views and coordination of actions to improve 
food security at global but also at regional and national levels (FAO, 2009, p. 1).
2. the exercise of power within institutional contexts, particularly crafted to direct, control, and regulate 
activities concerned with food security whereby these institutions are viewed by citizens as legitimate, 
accountable, and transparent (Mohamed Salih, 2009, p. 501).
3. Good governance for food and nutrition security is fundamentally about national governments prioritiz-
ing policies, plans, programs and funding to tackle hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity in the most 
vulnerable populations, whether it be through humanitarian or development assistance, nationally, bilat-
erally or multilaterally (High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, 2010, p. 3).
4. relates to formal and informal rules and processes through which interests are articulated, and decisions 
relevant to food security in a country are made, implemented and enforced on behalf of members of a 
society (FAO, 2011a, p. 17), also used in (Colonelli & Simon, 2013; Pérez-Escamilla, 2012).  
5. governance for food and nutrition security relates to formal and informal rules and processes through 
which public and private actors articulate their interests, and decisions for achieving food and nutrition 
security (at local, national and global level) are made, implemented and sustained (FAO, 2011b).
6. there are over a dozen international institutions active in the field of food security. Working alongside 
these institutions are numerous regional, non-governmental and private organizations. This decentralized 
patchwork of institutions constitutes what may be best described as global food security governance 
(Margulis, 2012, p. 231).
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Finally, three elements mentioned only in a single conceptualization were ‘coordination,’ 
‘convergence,’ and ‘public and private.’ However, as can be seen in the following section, 
these are all themes that recur frequently throughout the literature.
Food security governance is thus conceptualized in various ways, whereby each description 
highlights different elements. Moreover, rather than reflecting a current regime, most 
conceptualizations sketch an ideal state of (good) food security governance.
2.4 Synthesis of the literature
The synthesis presented in this section is divided along seven interrelated key themes that 
recur throughout the literature. For each theme, the central insights and arguments are 
presented. These insights and arguments are reported as they are raised in the literature 
and do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of the researcher. It is important to note that 
the boundaries between these seven themes are relative, and consequently there is some 
substantive overlap between themes. 
The synthesis starts with the broad views of governance as both a challenge and a 
potential solution to food security. Themes 2 through 5 show that the potential positive 
contributions that governance arrangements can make to food security are argued to 
be complicated by the high degrees of complexity that characterize the issue (theme 
2), failures of current institutional architectures to address this complexity (theme 3), 
and the arrival of new types of actors in food security governance (theme 4), but could 
arguably be stimulated by a stronger focus on coherency and coordination across scales 
(theme 5). However, apart from complexity, the literature shows that food security 
governance involves various, sometimes conflicting, ideas about the way(s) in which 
to address food insecurity, as is set out under theme 6. Theme 7 adds two more factors 
Table 2.2 Elements of the various conceptualizations
37 
 
A recurring element in most definitions is ‘steering,’ which refers to the exercise of power through 
the design and enforcement of interventions aimed at improving food security conditions. Although 
this can be done by both public and private actors, most conceptualizations are relatively 
government‐centred. 
Apart from steering, elements that are mentioned repeatedly are ‘deliberation,’ ‘formal and 
informal,’ ‘democratic values,’ ‘institutions,’ ‘multi‐levelness,’ and ‘nutrition.’ Deliberation is 
particularly pervasive in the three FAO definitions, which all emphasize the articulation of views 
and/or ideas. This could be due to FAO’s closeness to the CFS, which primarily aims to stimulate and 
facilitate deliberation. The formal–informal nexus suggests that these deliberations do not 
necessarily take place in formal institutional settings, but that both exchanges of ideas and steering 
can also occur through informal pro‐ cesses and institutions. 
In two of the conceptualizations of food security governance, the authors find it essential that these 
steering and/or deliberative activities are grounded in societal support and respect democratic 
values, such as legitimacy, accountability, and transparency. Two other conceptualizations underline 
the importance of nutrition, which can be traced back to wider support within the food security 
academic community to include the nutritional dimension in measures of food insecurity. 
Two final elements of food security governance mentioned more than once were ‘institutions’ and 
‘multi‐levelness.’ Regarding the first, a good example is Margulis’ equation of food security 
governance with the global constellation of institutions and organizations. This description differs 
from the five others in the sense that it does not mention the role of agency or interactions. 
Regarding the element of multi‐levelness, it is not self‐evident whether this refers to multiple levels 
of governance, or to merely aiming to have an impact on multiple levels of food security. These 
conceptualizations do seem to imply, however, that food security is an issue that spans spatial and 
jurisdictional scales. 
Finally, three elements mentioned only in a single conceptualization were ‘coordination,’ 
‘convergence,’ and ‘public and private.’ However, as can be seen in the following section, these are 
all themes that recur frequently throughout the literature. 
Food security governance is thus conceptualized in various ways, whereby each description highlights 
different elements. Moreover, rather than reflecting a current regime, most conceptualizations 
sketch an ideal state of (good) food security governance. 
 
Table 2.2 Elements of the various conceptualizations 
Definition elements  FAO 2009  Mohamed Salih 
2009 
High‐Level Task 
Force 2010 
FAO 2011a  FAO 2011b  Margulis 2012 
Global 
governance of 
food security 
Governance of 
food security 
Good 
governance for 
food security 
Food security 
governance 
Governance for 
food and 
nutrition 
security 
Global food 
security 
governance 
Coordination  X  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Convergence   X  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Deliberation  X  ‐  ‐  X  X  ‐ 
Democratic values  ‐  X  ‐  X  ‐  ‐ 
Formal and informal  ‐  ‐  ‐  X  X  ‐ 
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2.4 Synthesis	of	the	literature	
 
The synthesis presented in this section is divided along seven interrelated key themes that recur 
throughout the literature. For each theme, the central insights and arguments are presented. These 
insights and arguments are reported as they are raised in the literature and do not necessarily reflect 
the viewpoint of the researcher. It is important to note that the boundaries between these seven 
themes are relative, and consequently there is some substantive overlap between themes.  
The synthesis starts with the broad views of governance as both a challenge and a potential solution 
to food security. Themes 2 through 5 show that the potential positive contributions that governance 
arrangements can make to food security are argued to be complicated by the high degrees of 
complexity that characterize the issue (theme 2), failures of current institutional architectures to 
address this complexity (theme 3), and the arrival of new types of actors in food security governance 
(theme 4), but could arguably be stimulated by a stronger focus on coherency and coordination 
a ross scales (theme 5). However, apart from complexity, th  literature shows th t food security 
gov rnance involves variou , sometimes co flicting, ideas about the way(s) in which to address food 
insecurity, as is set out under theme 6. Theme 7 adds two more factors that should be taken into 
account according to the literature: resources and democratic values. 
 
Theme 1: the view of governance as both a challenge and a solution to food security 
 
Throughout the literature, governance is considered as both a potential driver of, and a potential 
solution to, situations of food insecurity. Regarding the former, Boyd and Wang (2011) clearly show 
that, in some situations, poor governance, rather than natural conditions, constitutes the main driver 
of food insecurity. Conflict, lack of institutional capacity, poor policy design, and lagging 
implementation can inflict serious harm to the producti n and distribution  f healthy food. Boyd and 
Wang, in this respect, refer to Peter Bauer’s earlier example of North and South Korea, which have 
similar natural conditions but big differences regarding their levels of food security, which can be 
traced back to differences in the quality of governance. Note that, in this example, poor governance 
does not necessarily refer explicitly to governance of food security, but rather to a country’s 
governance system in general.  
Other authors stress that, even when poor governance is not the main cause of food insecurity, it can 
be a significant contributory factor when it fails to effectively address natural, economic, or social 
drivers of conjunctural or structural hunger (Committee on World Food Security, 2012; Pereira & 
Ruysenaar, 2012; Sahley, Groelsema, Marchione, & Nelson, 2005). For example, in a food security 
assessment of Malawi, Sahley et al. (2005) argue that the limited capacity of the Malawian 
Institutions   ‐  X  ‐  ‐  ‐  X 
Multi‐level  X  ‐  ‐  ‐  X  ‐ 
Nutrition  ‐  ‐  X  ‐  X  ‐ 
Public and private  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  X  ‐ 
Steering  ‐  X  X  X  X  ‐ 
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that should be taken into account according to the literature: resources and democratic 
values.
Theme 1: the view of governance as both a challenge and a solution to food security
Throughout the literature, governance is considered as both a potential driver of, and 
a potential solution to, situations of food insecurity. Regarding the former, Boyd and 
Wang (2011) clearly show that, in some situations, poor governance, rather than natural 
conditions, constitutes the main driver of food insecurity. Conflict, lack of institutional 
capacity, poor policy design, and lagging implementation can inflict serious harm to 
the production and distribution of healthy food. Boyd and Wang, in this respect, refer 
to Peter Bauer’s earlier example of North and South Korea, which have similar natural 
conditions but big differences regarding their levels of food security, which can be 
traced back to differences in the quality of governance. Note that, in this example, poor 
governance does not necessarily refer explicitly to governance of food security, but rather 
to a country’s governance system in general. 
Other authors stress that, even when poor governance is not the main cause of food 
insecurity, it can be a significant contributory factor when it fails to effectively address 
natural, economic, or social drivers of conjunctural or structural hunger (Committee 
on World Food Security, 2012; Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012; Sahley, Groelsema, 
Marchione, & Nelson, 2005). For example, in a food security assessment of Malawi, 
Sahley et al. (2005) argue that the limited capacity of the Malawian government to 
implement its own policies and programs formed a significant constraint to tackling the 
country’s development challenges. Likewise, Pereira and Ruysenaar (2012) contend that 
governments often fail to respond to crises because of poor decision- making, limited 
coordination, weak institutions, and scarce resources. 
At the same time, it is underlined throughout the literature that, whereas bad governance 
often has a significant negative impact on food security, the opposite is true for good 
governance. Although often overlooked, well-developed governance arrangements that 
are able to respond effectively to both crisis situations and structural concerns are key to 
eradicating hunger (Galiè, 2013; Haddad, 2011; High-Level Task Force on the Global 
Food Security Crisis, 2010). Pereira and Ruysenaar (2012), for example, show how 
the extension of South-African business’ ‘good corporate governance’ principles to 
the inclusion of stakeholders in decision- making has resulted in an improved ability 
to respond to changes in the food system. Similarly, Haddad (2011) argues that the 
creation of a new social policy program and a ministry, which has been tasked with 
coordinating the work of other ministries toward a number of food security goals, has 
had a significant positive impact on Brazil’s food and nutrition security.
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Theme 2: a governability that is characterized by high degrees of complexity
Although the importance of food security governance is increasingly acknowledged, the 
literature indicates that food security is not an issue that lends itself to being ‘governed’ 
easily. It is recognized that food security is a highly complex and multi-dimensional 
issue that is impacted by a broad range of drivers and food system activities, stretches 
across various scales, and involves multiple sectors and policy domains (Behnassi & 
Yaya, 2011; Colonelli & Simon, 2013; Drimie & Ruysenaar, 2010; Duncan & Barling, 
2012; Makhura, 1998; Maluf, 1998; Margulis, 2011, 2013; Marzeda-Mlynarska, 2011; 
McKeon, 2011; Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012). Regarding the last point, food security 
is not so much approached as a domain in itself, but, rather, as an issue affected by a 
wide array of domains, such as agriculture, trade, fisheries, environment, development 
cooperation, and energy, as a result of which many actors and institutions are involved in 
food security governance (Mohamed Salih, 2009). Consequently, it is difficult to identify 
the main drivers of food insecurity, the more so because there is a distinction between 
structural food insecurity and associated drivers, and conjunctural food insecurity, such 
as hunger related to sudden food price spikes (Clapp & Murphy, 2013; High-Level Task 
Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, 2010). Margulis (2013) argues that there is, 
nevertheless, increased awareness of the structural factors that play a role. 
The body of literature shows that food security governance is spread not only across 
domains and sectors, but also across spatial scales. States of, as well as challenges to, food 
security can be considered on a global, regional, or national level, but have also been 
increasingly studied and addressed at local, community, household, or individual levels 
over the last decades. Whereas Robert Paarlberg (2002) argues that the main drivers and 
solutions should primarily be sought at national level, recent food crises have shown 
that ongoing globalization and the associated entanglement of world food systems have 
led to a situation whereby food insecurity drivers increasingly lie outside the scope of 
national governance (McKeon, 2011).
Theme 3: failures of the current institutional architectures
Addressing an issue as complex as food security thus requires a sophisticated governance 
system. Nevertheless, the majority of the reviewed literature is highly critical of the 
current institutional architecture and practices of food security governance and offers 
recommendations for a more effective and/or democratic future governance system. 
Most of this critique is focused on the global level of food security governance (e.g., 
Colonelli & Simon, 2013; Global Forum on Food Security and Nutrition, 2011; 
Margulis, 2011; McKeon, 2011). However, to a large extent this can be attributed to 
Food security governance: a systematic literature review
49
the lack of national and sub- national governance arrangements and associated studies, 
especially in developing countries (Thomson, 2001). The main critique of the global 
governance of food security is that there is no truly authoritative and encompassing body 
or institution with a mandate to address food security concerns across sectors and levels 
(Amalric, 2001; Behnassi & Yaya, 2011; Colonelli & Simon, 2013; Margulis, 2011; 
McKeon, 2011; von Braun, 2009). Instead, responsibilities, jurisdictions, and foci are 
spread across a broad range of international organizations and forums, which all have 
their own core business, but none of which deals with food insecurity in a holistic and 
inclusive manner (Committee on World Food Security, 2012; Global Forum on Food 
Security and Nutrition, 2011). Margulis (2013) and Orsini et al. (2013) have termed 
this the shift from an international food security regime towards a regime complex for 
food security, in which food security is affected by a wide array of governance regimes 
that are all constituted by distinct sets of actors, forums, discourses, interests, and so 
forth. As a result, there is a considerable overlap of mandates and actions, in the best 
scenario resulting in duplicate actions, but in the worst in conflict between interests, 
visions, and paradigms (Margulis, 2011, 2012, 2013; McKeon, 2013). Moreover, as the 
CFS (2012) argues, this fragmented effort has resulted in a large number of projects that 
lack the scale to make a real difference. This vacuum of global governance has therefore 
led to a general inadequacy in tackling effectively both structural hunger and sudden 
food crises (McKeon, 2011). Many authors see a potentially important role for the 
recently reformed Committee on World Food Security in filling this vacuum, but state 
at the same time that the CFS still needs to prove its effectiveness (Clapp & Murphy, 
2013; FAO, 2010, 2012; Global Forum on Food Security and Nutrition, 2011; High-
Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, 2010). 
In addition to the occurrence of conflict between international bodies, the literature 
also gives examples of how these bodies affect one another through their norm-setting 
tasks, the creation of rules, and diffusion of paradigms. This effect is reinforced by the 
participation of actors in several of these bodies at the same time, all of which attempt 
to pursue their interests through various channels (González, 2010). Clapp and Murphy 
(2013), for example, argue that the G20’s unwillingness to address the root causes of price 
volatility has had a chilling effect on the discussions taking place in other organizations, 
such as the CFS. For this reason, and because of an arguable lack of legitimacy of the 
G20, they plead for the G20’s withdrawal from food security governance and for other 
organizations to take back the helm. 
Although a large proportion of documents focus on the global level, some of the 
literature describes similar dynamics in national or local governance. Sahley et al. 
(2005), for example, observe that policy formation in Malawi was ad hoc and resulted in 
a plethora of policies and programs that were sometimes disconnected and contradicted 
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one another, and were spread across central government agencies. Similarly, Drimie 
and Ruysenaar (2010) argue that the South African Integrated Food Security Strategy 
(IFSS) was poorly executed and had too strong an emphasis on agriculture. There was a 
lack of coordination between departments, sub-programs were weakly integrated, and 
supportive legislation was lagging behind.
Theme 4: the arrival of new players at the forefront
Part of the complexity and the difficulties with the design of institutional structures 
stems from an increase in the number of actors involved in food security approaches, 
or that have a direct or indirect impact on food security (Behnassi & Yaya, 2011; 
Duncan & Barling, 2012; Edwards, 2012; Koc, Macrae, Desjardins, & Roberts, 2008; 
Margulis, 2012; McKeon, 2011; Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012; Seed, Lang, Caraher, & 
Ostry, 2013; von Braun, 2009). This increase in stakeholders can be reduced to three 
types in particular: international organizations, civil society organizations (CSOs), and 
private sector corporations. These actors are active on all governance levels and within 
international organizations or government agencies, whereby they often ‘shop’ between 
forums or venues, depending on where they perceive their interests to be best represented 
(Duncan & Barling, 2012; McKeon, 2011).
The increase in international bodies, in particular, followed the 2007– 8 world food 
crisis. After the crisis, the CFS was thoroughly reformed, the UN installed a High-
Level Task Force, the World Bank renewed its focus on agriculture and food security, 
and the G8/G20 became increasingly involved (Clapp & Murphy, 2013; Jarosz, 2009; 
Jarosz, 2011; Margulis, 2012). However, as the above section on the global institutional 
architecture has made clear, this increase in organizations has not been without criticism. 
Civil society participation has not only increased in recent years, but is also considered 
crucial for effectively addressing food insecurity on all levels (FAO, 2009; Global Forum 
on Food Security and Nutrition, 2011; High-Level Task Force on the Global Food 
Security Crisis, 2010; Jarosz, 2009; Makhura, 1998; Margulis, 2012; Rocha & Lessa, 
2009; Seed et al., 2013; Thomson, 2001; von Braun, 2009). The literature indicates a 
broad range of advantages that CSOs could provide to more traditional government-
centred approaches. First, civil society can provide the policymaking process with 
valuable information. Local, bottom-up knowledge creation may contribute to 
identifying food insecurity problems and response gaps of which policymakers are often 
unaware (Bastian & Coveney, 2012; Brownhill & Hickey, 2012; Koc et al., 2008; Seed 
et al., 2013). Second, CSO participation brings food security governance closer to 
those who are hungry. It therefore enhances the legitimacy of, and public support for, 
food security interventions, which, together with the resources that CSOs can bring 
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in, stimulate effective implementation (Behnassi & Yaya, 2011; Edwards, 2012; Koc 
et al., 2008). Third, CSOs can form bridges between government agencies that did not 
previously cooperate, or between various governance levels (global – national, national 
– local, global – local), and thus contribute to a multi-sector and multi- scalar approach 
(Edwards, 2012; McKeon, 2011). Fourth, CSOs frequently operate as co-workers of 
government agencies and can offer the capacity that government often lacks (Seed et 
al., 2013). 
In spite of these potential advantages and a handful of best practices, the inclusion of 
CSOs in food security governance is not self-evident. Both Seed et al. (2013) and Koc 
et al. (2008) show that these forms of collaborative governance call for appropriate 
structures, capacity, and political will, which are not always at hand. In addition, 
involving civil society actors entails a shift in bureaucratic philosophies, and this requires 
time and continuous effort. Moreover, some actors may benefit from the exclusion of 
others, because it enables them to satisfy their own agendas. The inclusion and exclusion 
of actors influences the structures and mechanisms of food security governance as well as 
the substance of decisions made, and is therefore important to take into account when 
setting up or evaluating arrangements (Duncan & Barling, 2012). 
A third group of actors who are increasingly involved in food security governance 
are private corporations and related associations. Compared to CSOs, this group has 
received relatively limited attention. This is partly because, although private corporations 
do participate in global forums and organizations, most of their activities and impacts 
remain relatively hidden. This has led to critiques about the lack of regulation and 
democratic control of private sector interests (Behnassi & Yaya, 2011; McKeon, 2011), 
but others have argued that this new reality should be accepted and that these players 
should be further embedded in food security governance (von Braun, 2009).
Theme 5: calls for coherency and coordination across multiple scales
To overcome the identified problems of fragmentation, overlap, conflict, increasing 
numbers and types of stakeholders, and ineffectiveness that characterize current food 
security governance, the literature almost unanimously calls for an enhanced institutional 
capacity that could contribute to realizing higher degrees of coherence and coordination. 
A central argument is that addressing the complex food insecurity drivers requires 
policies and programs that mutually reinforce one another, thereby contributing to 
shared goals and outcomes. The individual actions of (international) organizations, 
countries, donors, corporations, and other private actors can address various drivers and 
aspects of food insecurity but would, together, have to result in a coherent and holistic 
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approach, whereby trade-offs and duplicated efforts are minimized and one actor’s course 
of action does not impair that of others. This calls for high degrees of coordination, 
both between the currently fragmented institutions and between governance levels, and 
integration of food security concerns into other policy domains or sectors (Clapp & 
Murphy, 2013; Drimie & Ruysenaar, 2010; FAO, 2009, 2012; High-Level Task Force 
on the Global Food Security Crisis, 2010; MacRae, 1999; Maluf, 1998; Margulis, 2011, 
2013; McKeon, 2011; Rola, 2013; Seed et al., 2013). This would imply that, on each 
governance level, regimes, sectors, policy domains, and associated actors and institutions 
would have to be brought into line; but this can only be realized by active coordination on 
the one hand, and the inclusion of multiple public and private actors and decentralized 
initiatives on the other (Behnassi & Yaya, 2011; Committee on World Food Security, 
2012; Drimie & Ruysenaar, 2010; Edralin & Collado, 2005; FAO, 2009; High-Level 
Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, 2010; Lang & Barling, 2012; Marzeda-
Mlynarska, 2011). At the same time, it is argued that coordination between governance 
levels would have to be stimulated, so that drivers of food insecurity are addressed at the 
appropriate level, thereby complying with the principle of subsidiarity (Global Forum 
on Food Security and Nutrition, 2011; McKeon, 2011). According to Misselhorn et al. 
(2012), ‘boundary organizations’ can play an important role in this respect. As the term 
indicates, these organizations operate on the boundaries between sectors or governance 
levels and thus have the potential to stimulate coordination. Regional organizations, such 
as the European Union or ASEAN, or their divisions, provide promising opportunities 
in this regard (FAO, 2011b).
These last examples point to the issue of institutional capacity, which is deemed essential 
to organize sustained coordination (Haddad, 2011; Margulis, 2011; Thomson, 2001). 
As the example of Malawi shows, a lack of institutional capacity can lead to lagging 
implementation, and it may also hamper the quality of policy formation and integration 
with multiple policy sectors and governance levels (Sahley et al., 2005). Moreover, 
it is not only the capacity itself that matters, but also where this capacity is situated 
institutionally. Drimie and Ruysenaar (2010) show that, although there was a certain 
amount of capacity to implement the South African IFSS, this capacity was mainly 
positioned at the Department of Agriculture, and this led to a neglect of non-agricultural 
issues and actors related to food security. For that reason, the researchers plead for a 
concerted effort by departments and other actors to harness available expertise and to 
initiate and coordinate food security efforts across sectors. Here, the importance of 
boundary organizations, such as interdepartmental committees, becomes clear again. 
Various authors have either shown the effectiveness of these kinds of organizations, 
or plead for their creation (FAO, 2011b; Maluf, 1998; Misselhorn et al., 2012). Both 
Misselhorn et al. (2012) and Pereira and Ruysenaar (2012) argue that creating such 
capacity demands a different governance perspective, in which states shift from a 
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predominantly mono-centric governance perspective to governance arrangements that 
stimulate and facilitate interactions across multiple levels and scales.
Theme 6: variation and conflict of ideas
An issue identified in the literature as a major challenge to institutions’ coordinative 
efforts is the plurality of ideas around food security in general, and food security 
governance more specifically (González, 2010; Jarosz, 2009; Lang & Barling, 2012; 
Margulis, 2011, 2013; McKeon, 2011; Seed et al., 2013). This multitude of ideas comes 
on top of the varying formal definitions, which are set out in section 2.3.2, and is a 
result of the variety of sectors, countries, governance levels, and associated actors and 
interests that are involved in, or have an impact on, food security governance. Idea, here, 
is an umbrella concept for ideational concepts used in the literature on food security 
governance, such as discourse, paradigms, norms, governmentality, or philosophies. 
Some ideas are deeply embedded in the culture or administrative philosophy of 
organizations, countries, or other actors. Barclay and Epstein (2013), for example, explain 
how Japan’s approach towards food security is firmly grounded in ways of thinking 
about the protection of national culture and social and environmental responsibility. 
This governmentality led the Japanese government to support both free trade and 
protectionist policies at the same time. Similarly, Edwards (2012) empirically showed 
that collaborative governance had become deeply institutionalized in the administrative 
philosophy of various U.S. state agencies. Edwards’ results form an interesting contrast 
to Seed et al. (2013), who reveal that bureaucratic cultures in state agencies in British 
Columbia were strongly dominated by ideas of top-down policymaking. A third 
example is provided by M. Haddad (2012), who by analyzing the Quran shows that 
Islam champions a state-centred perspective on food security. 
Lang and Barling (2012) show that, on an aggregate level, these perspectives or modes of 
thinking may result in encompassing discourses or paradigms that can have a significant 
impact on how food security is approached, on the distribution of power and resources, 
and on which governance or policy options are considered. Often, various discourses or 
paradigms exist at the same time and compete for domination; this leads to conflicts 
between their proponents about the courses of action to follow and about who is to 
decide (Lang & Barling, 2012). These conflicts in food security governance become 
most visible in the work of Matias Margulis (2011, 2013), whose central argument is 
that diverging rules and norms (paradigms) across the global regimes of agriculture and 
food, international trade, and human rights concerning the appropriate role of states 
and markets in tackling food insecurity cause conflict and have a detrimental effect on 
policy coherency. Before global food security governance became a regime complex, 
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assumptions and principles were more shared within the food security regime (Coleman 
& Gabler, 2002; Margulis, 2013). 
Similar ideational conflicts can also occur with- in organizations. Both González (2010) 
and Jarosz (2009) argue that the FAO is subject to conflicting discourses. According 
to Jarosz, the FAO’s ineffectiveness can, to a large extent, be traced back to a conflict 
between a discourse that centres on free trade and productivity, and one that is more 
concerned with shared moral responsibility and human rights. Stakeholders in these 
organizations play active roles in protracting these conflicts by actively framing food 
security (governance) according to their views and interests (Barclay & Epstein, 2013; 
Clapp & Murphy, 2013; McKeon, 2011). 
How are these ideational conflicts to be re- solved? The literature provides no silver 
bullet solutions in this respect, but both Margulis (2013) and McKeon (2011) argue 
that a first step would be to increase awareness and understanding of the multitude of 
ideas, and to agree on some basic principles and values.
Theme 7: calls for the allocation of sufficient resources and the integration of democratic 
values in food security governance
As repeatedly stated in the above sections, most of the literature focuses primarily 
on what food security governance should ideally look like, thus on what good food 
security governance entails. The previous themes have already shown that coherency, 
coordination, and dealing with ideational pluralism and a broad range of actors are 
widely considered to be crucial elements of a good governance approach. Here, two 
more criteria that are repeatedly mentioned in the literature are added: resources and 
democratic values. 
Various types of resources that are essential to create and maintain responsive and effective 
governance arrangements are underlined in the literature. Many of these articles share 
the concern that governance arrangements have often failed to effectively address hunger 
because most energy was expended on shaping their architectural features without 
sufficiently thinking out the sustainable resource allocation that these institutional 
architectures need to be effective in the long term. A first type of resource required is 
finance, i.e., a sufficient budget (FAO, 2009). Edralin and Collado (2005), for example, 
argue that, although decision-making authority was decentralized in the Philippines, the 
effectiveness of these measures was hampered by a lagging decentralization of financial 
resources. A second crucial resource is political will, leadership, and prioritization 
(Committee on World Food Security, 2012; Global Forum on Food Security and 
Nutrition, 2011; Haddad, 2011; High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security 
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Crisis, 2010; Makhura, 1998; Sahley et al., 2005). The success of an approach often 
relies on the sustained efforts of one or more actors. Of particular concern in this regard 
are political shifts, such as changes of office. Such shifts can lead to a discontinuation of 
political efforts (Rocha & Lessa, 2009). A third resource often mentioned is knowledge. 
Knowledge can come, inter alia, from stakeholders who are active on the ground, from 
the experience and expertise of policymakers, or from research institutes in the form 
of scientific evidence (Behnassi & Yaya, 2011; FAO, 2009; Global Forum on Food 
Security and Nutrition, 2011; Koc et al., 2008; Rocha & Lessa, 2009). 
Besides resources, other elements that are generally considered essential for good food 
security governance are good governance and democratic values. Good governance, 
here, does not necessarily refer to effective governance. It is indeed conceivable that 
governance arrangements are effective in addressing food insecurity without fulfilling 
particular democratic values. Values repeatedly mentioned are accountability, 
transparency, legitimacy, inclusiveness, and responsiveness (FAO, 2011a; Global Forum 
on Food Security and Nutrition, 2011; Haddad, 2011; McKeon, 2011; Mohamed 
Salih, 2009; Pérez-Escamilla, 2012; Rocha & Lessa, 2009). These  values are applicable 
not only during policy formulation, but throughout all governance processes, including 
implementation and evaluation (FAO, 2011a). Regarding this last point, an important 
issue is how to measure the  effectiveness of interventions and how to determine an 
intervention’s success (Pérez-Escamilla, 2012). Apart from these values, good food 
security governance relies on a general supportive environment in which human rights 
are respected and in which the provision of basic public goods is guaranteed (FAO, 
2011a; Global Forum on Food Security and Nutrition, 2011; Paarlberg, 2002).
2.5 Discussion
The synthesis presented in the previous section has shown that the emerging literature on 
the governance of food security has already provided some highly relevant, albeit non-
cohesive, insights and recommendations. Nevertheless, as a research field, food security 
governance is still in its infancy and many questions and challenges remain unanswered 
and unaddressed. In this section, the synthesis is critically reflected upon. Two lines 
of discussion are raised: the first concerns the dominant governance perspective in the 
literature, the second, the current state of the research field.
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2.5.1 Dominant perspective: governance as problem-solving
Governance has become a popular and much supported notion in food security 
communities. This is well reflected by the rather recent emergence of the body of 
literature synthesized in the previous section. What is striking is that, although different 
parts of the literature have different emphases, the perspective on governance that 
emerges seems relatively consonant. In the governance literature, this perspective has 
been termed an ‘optimist philosophy on governance’ or a ‘problem- solving governance 
lens’ (Biesbroek, Termeer, Klostermann, & Kabat, 2013b; Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996). This 
perspective is particularly clear in the third and fourth themes of the synthesis. From 
this perspective, food security is recognized as a highly complex issue that cannot be 
dealt with effectively by the current fragmented institutional architecture. Therefore, the 
governance system should be made more coherent, better integrated and coordinated, 
and more inclusive. The general underlying argumentation is that, if governance regimes 
were further integrated on multiple scales, more knowledge and information would be 
acquired and shared; and if all relevant stakeholders were able to engage in collective 
rational deliberations, it would ultimately be possible to overcome the complexity of 
food security and to develop a holistic approach that would enable food insecurity to 
be addressed in the most effective way. Governance is thus approached as a concerted 
effort to solve (complex) societal problems (Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996). A clear exponent 
of this line of reasoning is the recently reformed Committee on World Food Security, 
which now portrays itself as “the most inclusive international and intergovernmental 
platform for all stakeholders to work together in a coordinated way to ensure food 
security and nutrition for all” (Committee on World Food Security, 2013). However, 
as some included authors – particularly under the fifth theme – made clear, inclusion 
of actors and coordination are not always sufficient to overcome conflicting ideas and 
interests, and do not necessarily lead to an effective food security approach.
Therefore, notwithstanding the merits of the optimist governance philosophy for 
understanding and designing food security governance arrangements, the dominance 
of this perspective has led to a rather narrow, normative, and simplistic view of 
governance within a large proportion of the food security community, and particularly 
in the included publications of global organizations. This is so for at least two reasons. 
First, both Bovens and ’t Hart (1996) and Biesbroek et al. (2013b) have shown that, 
apart from the optimist philosophy, at least two other governance perspectives can be 
applied, termed by Bovens and ‘t Hart as the ‘realist’ and the ‘pessimist’ philosophies. 
Whereas the optimist philosophy approaches governance as problem solving, the 
realist philosophy centres on a view of governance as the whole of interactions between 
actors in a particular institutional context through which they identify and address 
problems. These interactions may be characterized by various degrees of conflicts of 
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interest, ideational struggles, and institutional deadlocks, as studies in the fields of 
public administration and policy studies have extensively shown (e.g., March & Olsen, 
1989; Schön & Rein, 1994; Stone, 2012). In the pessimist philosophy, governance is 
approached as a complex system in which societal problems are interrelated and nested 
in a ‘locked- in’ society, in which power plays between actors take place (Biesbroek et al., 
2013b). Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate much further on 
the differences between these philosophies, it goes without saying that the perspective 
through which governance arrangements are studied has important implications for the 
dynamics that are considered vital as well as for consequential policy recommendations. 
The perspective through which governance is studied influences not only the answers 
or solutions proposed, but also the very research questions and problem definitions 
that are considered essential (cf. Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Biesbroek et al., 2013b). As 
a consequence, the dominance of the optimist philosophy in a large proportion of the 
food security governance literature may lead to a process of theory development that 
overlooks dynamics that might have been considered crucial if a different perspective 
had been applied. As a result, policy recommendations that stem from the body of 
literature might result in interventions that are not necessarily effective. Therefore, a 
diversity of perspectives and comparisons of understandings may have a healthy impact 
both on acquiring a better theoretical understanding of food security governance and 
on plans and practices deriving from this knowledge. The recent attention paid by 
some food security governance scholars included in this review to interactions between 
actors and institutions, power plays, ideational struggles, and to notions of adaptive and 
collaborative governance, is a promising development in this respect (e.g., Margulis, 
2013; Misselhorn et al., 2012; Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012).
A second reason why a broader governance perspective might contribute to a better 
understanding of food security governance is closely related to the first and concerns 
the very nature of food security. A large majority of the literature, especially that part 
which adheres to the optimist philosophy, approaches food (in)security as a complex 
problem. This complexity originates from the interplay of technical, environmental, 
economic, and social drivers across various scales. As elaborated above, a core assumption 
is that, although difficult, this complexity can ultimately be overcome by designing 
and implementing ‘smart’ governance arrangements. This idea of solubility is severely 
challenged by a concept that builds further on complexity theory, i.e., that of wicked 
problems, which has been repeatedly applied to food security (Anthony, 2012; Hamann 
et al., 2011; MacMillan & Dowler, 2012; Termeer et al., 2015a). Wicked problems are 
policy problems that are not only complex, but also ill-defined, ambiguous, contested, 
and highly resistant to solutions (Head & Alford, 2015; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Termeer 
et al., 2015a). This resistance to solutions results from the dynamic that “today’s problems 
emerge as a result of trying to understand and solve yesterday’s problems” (Termeer et 
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al., 2015a, p. 2). Wicked problems therefore require a different governance perspective 
from that propagated by the problem-solving lens. The literature on the governance 
of comparable wicked problems may prove a valuable source from which to obtain a 
better understanding, for instance, of climate change adaptation (e.g., Biesbroek et al., 
2013b; Huitema, Aerts, & van Asselt, 2008; Stripple, Rayner, Hildingsson, Jordan, 
& Haug, 2009; Termeer et al., 2013; Vink, Dewulf, & Termeer, 2013). One of the 
insights from this community, for example, is that fragmentation is not necessarily a 
negative condition in the attempt to govern wicked issues. Fragmented networks may 
be better able to provide capacity, to adapt to unexpected circumstances, and to create 
space for variability and learning than mono-centric governance systems (Termeer et al., 
2011). In this review, Pereira and Ruysenaar (2012) and Misselhorn et al. (2012) make 
similar arguments with respect to food security. The challenge, then, is to organize the 
fragmented governance system in such a way that it works collectively towards a shared 
goal. Termeer et al. (2011) have identified three challenges with respect to the wicked 
issue of climate change adaptation: i) to organize connectivity between policy domains, 
scale levels, leadership, and the ‘old’ and the ‘new,’ ii) to (re) allocate responsibilities and 
costs and benefits, and iii) to deal with controversies, in particular frame conflicts and 
contested knowledge. More is to be said about how these challenges apply and could 
be addressed in food security governance, but they offer a refreshing alternative to the 
current dominant mono-centric problem-solving paradigm within the literature.
2.5.2 The current state of the research field
Although research on food security governance is rapidly developing, a number of issues 
still need to be addressed in the near future. Here, we highlight four such issues. 
First, as section 2.3.2 has shown, it is not yet very clear what is actually meant by food 
security governance. Definitions vary and emphasize various elements of the notion. 
One could argue that the absence of a clear definition is not troublesome because it 
has not hampered the amount of research being done on food security governance so 
far, which has, on the contrary, been increasing in recent years. However, at the same 
time, the lack of clarity regarding what food security governance is – and what it is 
not – makes it hard to determine what constitutes the dependent variable, i.e., the 
indistinctness of the phenomenon that is being studied, i.e. food security governance 
research, and this complicates meaningful comparisons and theoretical advancement 
(Dupuis & Biesbroek, 2013). For that reason, a new definition, combining Termeer et 
al.’s (2011, p. 160) broad definition of governance given in the introduction with the 
three core dimensions of food security and some main elements mentioned in previous 
definitions, is proposed:
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The formal and informal interactions across scales between public and/or private 
entities ultimately aiming at the realization of food availability, food access, and 
food utilization, and their stability over time.
Second, in spite of the rising attention on food security governance, a majority of the 
reviewed publications were of a conceptual or normative nature. As section 2.3.1 has 
shown, it seems that not many empirical studies have been conducted,8 although it could 
be the case that some researchers did use empirical methods but did not explain them. Our 
knowledge of food security governance is thus to a large extent dependent on narratives. 
Although these narratives have contributed to the rise in attention on governance in 
food security approaches, this lack of empirical foundations is somewhat worrying. 
Not only does it hinder obtaining a sound academic understanding of the governance 
issues at hand, it also weakens the strength of recommendations made to policymakers 
and stakeholders involved in designing food security governance arrangements. Food 
security governance is therefore in need of further empirical investigation and theory 
testing as well as of the development of a conceptual framework or indicators to do so.
Third, a large proportion of the current literature focuses on what food security 
governance should ideally look like, instead of how the governance system is functioning 
at present. Food security governance is often used as a synonym for good food security 
governance, meeting particular effectiveness and democratic criteria. Notwithstanding 
the importance of good governance, more is to be told about current governance (best) 
practices. In particular, more research should be done on sub-national governance levels 
and initiatives, and how these are linked to global initiatives, as these have been largely 
neglected in the literature so far. It is not clear whether this is due to a lack of sub-
national governance initiatives or to a blind spot in the research being done.
A last point is that although ‘food security governance’ is a convenient heading and 
perspective under which to study the steering processes and interactions through which 
food (in)security is addressed, too rigid an approach should be avoided in future research. 
As indicated in the limitations section, whereas both food security and governance are 
powerful and widely shared notions, much can be learned from other research fields. 
This chapter should therefore be considered as a first attempt to provide an overview of 
the relatively recent body of literature on food security governance, aiming to serve as a 
stepping stone for further research in which insights from adjacent research fields could 
be integrated.
8 Nota bene: this refers to empirical studies on governance (arrangements) on a more meta-level, not on particular 
food security solutions, projects, or programs.
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2.6 Conclusions
Although the importance of governance for effectively addressing food insecurity has 
increasingly been recognized, the knowledge about, and definitions of, food security 
governance have been rather fragmented up to now. The synthesis presented in this 
chapter therefore aimed to provide a first state-of-the-art. A systematic review of the 
food security governance literature led to the identification of seven main themes that 
recur throughout the literature.
Nonetheless, food security governance is still very much virgin territory that offers a lot 
of potential for further research. In particular, the researcher pleads for the inclusion 
of alternative governance perspectives or paradigms in future research. Approaching 
food (in)security as a wicked problem could provide valuable insights in this respect. 
Additionally, there is a need for further empirical investigation of current governance 
arrangements, particularly at sub-national levels. Eventually, this line of research should 
contribute to the design of smart governance arrangements that are capable of addressing 
food insecurity in more effective ways than are possible at present.
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Disentangling the consensus frame of food security: 
the case of the EU Common Agricultural Policy reform debate
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Abstract9
This chapter addresses which food security frames can be identified in the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) post-2013 reform process, and which 
actors deploy particular food security frames. The concept of frames refers to 
relatively distinct and coherent sets of meaning attributed to a concept, such 
as food security. The chapter shows that in the European Union (EU) food 
security is a consensus frame which can be broken down in six conflicting and 
overlapping sub-frames and which has complicated the debates about the future 
of the CAP. We demonstrate that during the CAP-reform debates of 2009–
2012 a variety of food security arguments were deployed by a broad range of 
stakeholders, who attached different meanings and made different claims about 
the relationship between the CAP and food security. Inductive frame analysis 
reveals that the consensus frame of food security can be broken down into six 
conflicting and overlapping sub-frames: (1) the productionist frame, (2) the 
environmental frame, (3) the development frame, (4) the free trade frame, (5) 
the regional frame, and (6) the food sovereignty frame. Each of these frames 
was invoked by a specific group of stakeholders, whereby the productionist and 
environmental frames were deployed most often. The European Commission, 
meanwhile, invoked various frames at the same time in its communications. As 
a result of these various framings of the relationship between the CAP and food 
security, a clear political vision on this relationship is lacking. We conclude that 
politicians and policymakers may need to develop a coherent vision on what 
food security entails, and on how the CAP could contribute to both European 
and global food security.
9 This chapter is published as: Candel, J.J.L., Stiller, S.J., Breeman, G.E. and C.J.A.M. Termeer (2014) 
Disentangling the Consensus Frame of Food Security: The Case of the EU Common Agricultural Policy 
Reform Debate, Food Policy, 44, 47-58. 
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3.1 Introduction
The attention paid to food security has risen considerably in European agricultural 
policymaking, but the content of food security policy remains ambiguous. Generally 
ignored for decades, food security regained a prominent position in the public debate 
about how the European Union (EU) should organize its main agricultural steering 
device, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP is being reformed in the 
period from 2009 through 2013, and should become effective by 2014 (Grant, 2012b; 
Zahrnt, 2011).
The pervasiveness of food security in the European context is remarkable. Even 
though the CAP’s initial objectives that were set out in the 1958 Treaty of Rome 
have never been formally re- vised in any of the following EU treaties, food security 
was only of minor importance in the various reforms since its creation. Additionally, 
although guaranteeing European food provision is often mentioned as one of the 
reasons for the introduction of the CAP in 1962, the EU currently produces much 
more food than it can consume, and most of its citizens have never experienced any 
food shortage (Zahrnt, 2011). This is also reflected by most research on food security. 
Food security has received extensive attention in academic journals in recent years, 
but only a fraction of these studies has paid attention to the EU context (Brunori, 
Malandrin, & Rossi, 2013; Fish, Lobley, & Winter, 2013; Grant, 2012b; Kirwan & 
Maye, 2013; Tomlinson, 2013).
What makes the use of food security in the CAP post-2013 debate interesting is the 
ambiguity of the concept. Food security arguments have been raised by a broad range 
of stakeholders in the CAP reform debate (Zahrnt, 2011). The meanings that these 
stakeholders attach to food security, however, and the claims they make by invoking food 
security show big variations. Previous studies have argued that this ‘fractured consensus’ 
(Maye & Kirwan, 2013) about the meaning of food security results from the different 
interests and policy positions of stakeholders using the concept (Lang & Barling, 2012; 
Mooney & Hunt, 2009). In this chapter, we analyze the extent of the variation in the 
use of food security arguments and which actors deploy these different meanings.
Building on the work of Mooney and Hunt (2009), we start from the assumption 
that food security functions as a consensus frame. A consensus frame is a concept or 
term that finds broad resonance and consent, but which is used to make diverging, and 
sometimes conflicting, claims. Or, in other words, a consensus frame may in practice be 
constituted by various slumbering frames lying behind the term. Frames, here, refer to 
relatively distinct and coherent sets of meaning attributed to a concept (cf. Dewulf et 
al., 2009; van Lieshout, Dewulf, Aarts, & Termeer, 2012). Recognizing these frames is 
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important, because the ideas they contain can have a considerable impact on processes 
of policy formation and institutionalization (e.g., Béland, 2009; Béland & Cox, 2011; 
Campbell, 2002; Feindt & Oels, 2005, pp. 161-162; Grant, 2012a; Schmidt, 2008).
Consequently, we address two research questions here. The first is: which food security 
frames10 can be identiﬁed in the CAP post-2013 reform process? The aim of this question 
is to validate whether the use of food security in the CAP debate is indeed subject to 
various frames about what food security entails and about how the CAP could most 
effectively contribute to food security. The second research question is: which actors 
deploy food security frames? Frames result from actors’ discursive practices. The aim of this 
question is to identify the stakeholders who deploy specific frames.
To answer these two research questions, we performed an inductive frames analysis on 
both policy and consultation documents and on conferences to analyze the use of food 
security in the public debate about the CAP post-2013 reform.
The chapter proceeds with a theoretical section in which we briefly expound the literature 
on framing, and consensus frames in particular. In the third section, we describe our 
inductive frame analysis. In section four, we present the results of this analysis, by first 
describing the various frames identified, and then the stake- holders associated with 
these frames. Regarding the latter, we specifically consider the European Commission’s 
frames. In the final section, we present our discussion and conclusions.
3.2 Framing and consensus frames
3.2.1  Framing
Framing has gained wide popularity in multiple academic disciplines over the last 
decades. This has led to confusion regarding the exact meaning of the concept and its key 
assumptions (Entman, 1993; van den Brink, 2009). A common denominator, however, 
is that frames result from processes through which people make sense of particular issues 
and situations (Termeer & Werkman, 2011). Frames structure the way in which people 
perceive reality and communicate about it. Through these acts of communication, 
people add meaning to physical or social phenomena (van den Brink, 2009).
The definition of framing used in this chapter originates from communication science. 
Framing implies “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
10 By food security frames, we mean frames regarding the relationship between the CAP and food security.
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salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/ or treatment recommendation 
for the item  described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Following this definition, framing 
activities presuppose the presence of actors who are behaving strategically. On the basis 
of their particular position towards a policy issue, actors express both cognitive and 
normative ideas about the issue at hand. Through these ideas, actors attach meaning to 
a problem, lay causal relationships, and propose solutions, by ‘”highlighting particular 
aspects of a perceived reality, while simultaneously occluding or downplaying other 
aspects” (van den Brink, 2009, p. 35).
A focus on framing, thus, implies studying the processes through which people make 
sense of or interpret the “world out there”, and communicate about it. In this chapter, we 
merely focus on the latter; we do not study the cognitive processes through which people 
make sense of particular phenomena, but limit ourselves to how people, intentionally or 
unintentionally, communicate about these phenomena. These forms of communication 
we refer to as frames: relatively distinct and coherent sets of meanings (cf. Dewulf et al., 
2009; van Lieshout et al., 2012).
The reason why stakeholders engage in framing in policy formation processes is to 
portray a current policy issue in such a way that it supports the interests of a particular 
actor or a coalition of actors (cf. Meijerink, 2005). Sometimes, frames obtain wide 
sup- port and enable the institutionalization of a particular ideational constellation. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, European agricultural policy was, for instance, framed mainly 
in terms of food security and a steady income for European farmers. This enabled the 
introduction of a CAP that was primarily focused on the special needs and interests of 
the agricultural sector (cf. Skogstad, 1998).
At other times, however, policy issues can be subject to various, potentially conflicting, 
frames at the same time. This is particularly true when multiple actors are involved. In 
such cases, framing can lead to counter-framing by other actors, who, based on different 
interests, attach different meanings to the issue at hand. These types of policy issues may 
be called ‘wicked problems’, which are “ill-defined [problems that.. .] rely upon elusive 
political judgment for resolution” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 160). Food security 
is often classified as a wicked problem (c.f., Anthony, 2012; Hamann et al., 2011; 
MacMillan & Dowler, 2012; Termeer et al., 2015a). A good example of framing and 
counter-framing in the context of food security is the invocation of food sovereignty. 
Both non-governmental organizations, such as via Campesina – representing small 
farmers – and academics (e.g., Fairbairn, 2012), use food sovereignty as an alternative 
for food security. According to them, food security is associated with neo-liberal and 
agri-industrial interests, whereas food sovereignty offers a more inclusive approach to 
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issues of food provision, such as regional and cultural aspects of food production. Food 
sovereignty is thus a counter-frame to food security in the context of food provision 
debates (cf. Lang & Barling, 2012).
3.2.2 Consensus frames
Consensus frames are a specific type of frame. Sometimes, particular terms or concepts 
are widely shared and accepted in terms of their values and objectives. A typical example 
is sustainability: it is a concept that no one can be against and finds wide resonance, 
and therefore is used by a broad range of actors, even though many of them hold 
contradictory policy positions. Gamson (1995) calls such terms ‘consensus frames’.
However, as Gamson points out, behind this apparent consensus, dissensus, in the form 
of different frames and corresponding claims, may lie hidden. Although many actors 
use the concept of sustainability, what they mean by the term, their causal analyses, 
and which forms of action they champion differ strongly. The frames behind a single 
consensus frame can thus be used to construe a wicked problem in different ways.
Mooney and Hunt (2009) were the first to approach food security as a consensus frame. 
Since the publication of their study, several other articles have adopted this approach 
(Brunori et al., 2013; Hinrichs, 2013; Maye & Kirwan, 2013). Mooney and Hunt 
(2009) argued that, although food security finds wide resonance in general in the 
United States, meanings attached to the concept vary between discursive contexts. They 
identified three distinct frames (which they call framing, accentuating the discursive 
processes through which they are created) behind the food security consensus frame 
in the American context, namely, Hunger Framing, Community Framing, and Risk 
Framing. In the first frame, food security is primarily viewed as an issue of hunger. 
Community framing revolves around a view of food security as a component of a 
community’s development. The risk frame has to do with minimizing the risks “with 
respect to an industrialized food system’s vulnerability to both ‘normal accidents’ as well 
as the ‘intentional accidents’ associated with agri-terrorism” (Mooney & Hunt, 2009, p. 
469). At the same time, Mooney and Hunt state that their three frames are a minimum 
number of food security frames (Mooney & Hunt, 2009). Because of the conceptual 
nature of their paper, their frame identification lacks an empirical basis. The same holds 
for later articles that approach food security as a consensus frame (Brunori et al., 2013; 
Hinrichs, 2013; Maye & Kirwan, 2013). All of these studies are reported in the form of 
a narrative or conceptual paper. In this chapter, we therefore aim to provide an empirical 
basis for approaching food security as a consensus frame.
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Food security frames vary not only between discursive contexts, but also potentially 
within such contexts because actors have their own interests and associated policy 
positions. From these various policy positions, actors attach different meanings to 
issues or phenomena, such as food security (Lang & Barling, 2012). Agricultural policy 
formation involves a broad range of different actors and interests (Termeer & Werkman, 
2011), and hence we expect these actors to frame the relationship between the CAP and 
food security in different ways.
3.3 Methodology
We applied an inductive frames analysis to identify the different frames and the actors 
who apply them. More specifically, we used a frame package analysis. This type of 
analysis is a heuristic tool suitable for identifying the variation of frames behind the – 
expected – consensus frame of food security. The methodological concept of a frame, or 
interpretive, package originates from communication and media studies (e.g., Gamson 
& Lasch, 1983; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; van Gorp, 2005, 2007; van Gorp & van 
der Groot, 2012), and can be described as a “cluster of logical organized devices that 
function as an identity kit for a frame” (van Gorp, 2007, p. 64). Put differently, a frame 
package is a frame that is operationalized into various categories of signifiers (Gamson 
& Lasch, 1983). These signifiers are particular elements of a sentence or symbols that 
suggest the presence of a frame.
The devices or categories of signifiers in Van Gorp’s definition of frame packages can 
be divided into framing and reasoning devices. Framing devices consist of “manifest 
elements in a message that function as demonstrable indicators of the frame” (van Gorp 
& van der Groot, 2012, p. 131). These elements can be specific words, catchphrases, 
or images. Reasoning devices, on the other hand, are “explicit and implicit statements 
that deal with justifications, causes, and consequences in a temporal order” (van Gorp, 
2007, p. 64). These devices indicate what is conceived as the problem – the diagnosis 
– and which solutions are possible – the prognosis (cf. Verloo & Lombardo, 2007, p. 
33). Reasoning devices, in other words, are a frame’s causal line of arguing. An essential 
difference between the two types of devices is that framing devices are directly visible in 
a text, whereas reasoning devices can lie hidden behind the formal wording and must 
therefore be distilled by the researcher through careful reading and through analyzing 
the context in which a message is communicated.
In this study, we used policy documents and conference observations to discern 
framing and reasoning devices. Policy documents consisted of stakeholders’ input into 
the CAP consultation round, European Commission Communications, European 
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Parliament (EP) motions, coverage by the journal Agra Europe, and national member 
state communications and documents. For triangulation purposes, we observed four 
conferences attended by a wide range of actors from various countries and sectors 
(Table 3.1). During the conferences we made field notes that we used to determine 
whether the frames found in the document analysis could also be identified in personal 
communications. In addition, we collected documents during conferences and from 
websites to obtain a clearer view of specific stakeholders’ positions. The period covered 
by these documents started on January 1, 2009 and continued through August 15, 
2012. The starting date was chosen because it marked the end of the previous CAP 
reform round, the 2008 Health Check, and the start of the upcoming reform round of 
the CAP 2014–2020. For the EC and EP documents we included all documents that 
mentioned both the terms ‘food security’ and ‘Common Agricultural Policy’. Applying 
these two criteria to Agra Europe coverage led to too many irrelevant articles, so we 
decided to add the search term ‘reform’. All stakeholder input into the consultation 
round by definition concerned the CAP, so here we used only ‘food security’ as selection 
term. For an overview of all documents and selection criteria see Table 3.1.
We analyzed the data using the coding program Atlas.ti. In the first round of coding, 
we focused primarily on the reasoning devices that actors used to elaborate on the 
relationship between the CAP and food security. In other words: we looked at the causal 
stories that actors told regarding the linkage between food security and the CAP. With 
a slight adjustment of the reasoning devices used by Van Gorp and Van der Groot 
(2012), we coded problem definitions, proposed solutions, non-solutions, and upon 
which moral bases to act. Subsequently, these quotations and codes were compared to 
one another and the codes were made uniform. This comparison led to initial causal 
frames, which were put in separate frame matrixes (Figure 3.1). In a second round of 
coding, we coded for the framing devices belonging to these causal frames. Drawing 
on the studies of Gamson and Lasch (1983) and Van Gorp and Van der Groot (2012), 
we focused on three types of framing devices that we deemed most relevant: i.e. key 
concepts, verbal devices, and metaphors. Key concepts are specific words that actors 
repeatedly use in their argument, such as ‘productivity’, ‘greening’, or ‘trade’. Verbal 
devices consist of repeatedly used word combinations or catchphrases that often have a 
normative overtone, such as ‘do- not-harm’, ‘immediate and continual action’, or ‘one 
billion people starving’. Metaphors are figures of speech in which a comparison is used 
to strengthen an argument, such as ‘the CAP is the cornerstone of EU food security’ or 
‘sustainability is the key’. From this second round of coding, the initial frame matrixes 
were filled in further (see Supplementary Material (SM) B). These frame matrixes formed 
the basis for the description of the various frames in the results section.
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To address the second research question, we aimed to identify the specific (groups of ) 
stakeholders deploying the frames, so as to get a view of who are actually engaged in food 
security framing. We did this by reading all documents again to determine which actors 
deployed which frame. Because actors can be active in various discursive settings or 
contexts, so-called multiple inclusion (Termeer & Werkman, 2011), some stakeholders 
framed food security in various ways. Where possible, we constructed categories 
of actors. For example, the European Heart Network, the European Public Health 
Alliance, and the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh were combined as public 
health organizations. A country’s frame is based on statements of a country’s ministers in 
Agra Europe and on national position documents retrieved from governments’ websites. 
Although food security could also function as a consensus frame, behind which various 
sub-frames lie hidden, within a country, in the EU arena, national governments tend to 
speak with one voice, which is normally that of the minister that is primary responsible 
for the CAP reform (mostly the minister of agriculture). A country’s frame is thus not 
the same as the whole of frames within a country on the relationship between the CAP 
and food security, but refers to the one that is most dominant in the central reform 
debate. An overview of the actors we found deploying particular frames is given in 
section 3.4.2.
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3.4  Results
In this section, we describe the various frames found lying behind the food security 
consensus frame. These descriptions are based on the frame matrixes in Supplementary 
Material B.
3.4.1  Food security frames
The productionist frame
The productionist frame revolves around a story line that considers food security as one 
of the key goals of a future Common Agricultural Policy. The line of argumentation that 
the frame uses is well portrayed by the following quote:
It is the EU’s responsibility to produce more food – shortages have seen 
commodity prices rocket ... The disarming of food output is a nonsense. 
Simon Coveney, Irish Minister of Agriculture, Food and the Marine (Agra 
Europe, 2011)
The quotation shows the frame’s emphasis on stimulating production and increasing 
productivity. Through its focus on food production, the CAP is considered the 
cornerstone of EU food security policy. This function is deemed even more important 
in times of worldwide food crises, such as the 2007–8 world food price crisis to which 
Minister Coveney refers. Proponents of the frame state that European food security 
should not be considered self-evident and that the EU has a moral duty to produce more 
food. The precariousness of EU food security is accentuated by the fact that about 16 
million Europeans rely on food aid.
Several challenges regarding EU production and food security are identified by the 
productionist frame. One of the challenges most often mentioned is severe price 
volatility. Other threats that are foreseen by the frame are a dependence on imports for 
some goods, especially protein-rich livestock feed, and impacts of climate change.
The solution proposed by this frame to secure European food provision and, if possible, to 
contribute to global food security, is a CAP that maintains a strong first pillar. According 
to the frame proponents, agricultural production and increased productivity should be 
stimulated, and should be considered to be a form of public goods provision, for which 
a financial compensation is justified. Farmers’ competitiveness could be safeguarded 
through continued income support and market measures that can be deployed in times 
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of price crises. The demand for public good provision, other than food production, is 
generally considered acceptable, but these arrangements should not lead to decreasing 
production and should be financially compensated for. Moreover, because of the strict 
requirements that European farmers have to meet, proponents of the productionist 
frame argue that the same requirements should be applied to imported goods.
To strengthen the productionist line of argument, two verbal devices are used particularly 
often, i.e. statements that the need to deal with existing problems is of ‘‘utmost urgency’’ 
and requires ‘‘immediate and continuous action’’.
The environmental frame
In the environmental frame, the issue of food security is seen as inextricably bound 
up with the environment. This frame argues that traditionally the CAP has focused 
too much on increasing food production, thereby paying insufficient attention to the 
negative effects of intensive agriculture on nature, the countryside, and on the land itself. 
Therefore, proponents of the environmental frame argue that the CAP needs to be re-
focused, and should consider both food production and the provision of environmental 
services as integral parts of European agriculture. Fertile soils, clean and sufficient water, 
and a flourishing biodiversity are perceived as preconditions for safeguarding productive 
capacities in the  long term. Food security is thus associated with sustainable agricultural 
practices, as is well summarized by the following quote:
First, there is the fact to acknowledge food security as an issue and EU role. 
The sustainability is the key to food security. Greening measures become 
even more important as they underpin long term ability to produce food. 
(ASBL NATAGORA, 2011)
Apart from the issue of sustainability, the quote shows another characteristic feature of 
the environmental frame, namely, its focus on the long term. Food security is considered 
a goal that should be guaranteed for the long term, for which sustainable agriculture is 
seen as an essential precondition.
To achieve long-term food security, the proponents of this frame argue that some 
challenges should be addressed, most importantly climate change and environmental 
degradation. Note that climate change is one of the threats identified by the productionist 
frame also. However, whereas the productionist frame suggests increasing production in 
order to address the negative effects of climate change on food availability, proponents 
of the environmental frame argue that the impact of agriculture on the environment 
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and climate should be addressed. This impact includes, among others, the unsustainable 
use of natural resources and energy, the excessive usage of pesticides and fertilizers, the 
degradation of ecosystems, and the emission of greenhouse gasses. Most proponents 
of the frame find that the EC does not go far enough in tackling these challenges in 
its proposals for the future of the CAP, as is for example argued by the Greens in the 
European Parliament:
Whereas the current Commission and European Council positions on the EU 
2020 strategy show a clear unawareness of the need to substantially reform 
the Common Agricultural Policy and rural development policies in order to 
ensure food security, establish sustainable practices through water and soil 
management, reduce dependence on oil, preserve biodiversity and diversify 
employment in agriculture and the rural economy in a sustainable way. 
Motion of the Greens in the European Parliament (Verts/ ALE Group, 2010)
According to the Greens, and the environmental frame in general, the European 
Commission should include in its proposals far-reaching greening measures as well 
as a better targeting of income support, innovation incentives, and the polluter pays 
principle. A continuation of the current policy is seen as a non-solution, because of 
its over-emphasis on short-term challenges and solutions. Also, the frame does not 
seem to support the development of biofuels, as these lay a further claim on European 
agricultural lands and the landscape. Third, current European  consumption patterns 
are not considered sustainable, having detrimental effects on both the environment 
and public health. Therefore, a change towards more plant-based diets is considered 
desirable.
The environmental frame uses multiple recurring framing devices, such as the statement 
that this is a ‘critical time’, or that a future CAP should be ‘ambitious and relevant’, 
should guarantee ‘meaningful environmental commitment’, and safeguard the ‘heritage 
of environmental assets’.
The development frame
The focus of the development frame lies on the impacts of the CAP on food security in 
developing countries. This frame argues that these impacts have been generally negative 
so far, and have limited the opportunities of these countries to realize autonomy or 
self-sufficiency regarding their food provision. According to proponents of this frame, 
the EU, and the CAP in particular, not only has a role in safeguarding European food 
security, but also should acknowledge its wider responsibility in the world. The following 
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quote shows the – shared – disagreement with the extent to which food security concerns 
in developing countries are worked out in the EC proposals:
The CAP should take into account its impacts on developing countries, 
especially on marginalized producers and workers, and demonstrate that it does 
not generate negative effects. ... The importance of addressing food security .. . 
is highlighted but only as far as EU citizens, farmers and workers are concerned. 
Nothing is said about the need to address these issues in the South as well. 
(Fair Trade Advocacy Office, 2011)
Not only are food security issues in the South left unaddressed, some elements of 
the CAP even have a detrimental effect on these countries’ food security. One of the 
main problems the frame identifies is the income support the CAP offers to European 
farmers. This support makes it hard for non-EU parties to enter the European market 
and leads to the dumping of cheap European agri-industrial products, such as poultry, 
on developing countries’ markets, especially in Africa. A second issue is the negative 
socio-environmental effects of European imports of protein-rich livestock feed. 
European dependence on these commodities has changed land use in certain parts of the 
world, leading to diminished food production opportunities for local communities and 
to environmental hazards. A third problem mentioned is the occasional use of export 
refunds, which lead to the same type of unfair competition as income support.
The solutions proposed in the development frame are to eliminate arrangements that 
distort developing countries’ market development, to allow these countries to protect 
their own markets in certain situations so that they can develop their agricultural sectors, 
and to achieve more coherence between the CAP and EU development policies. A better 
alignment of internal and external policies is deemed necessary, including food security, 
trade, agricultural, and humanitarian policy programs.
To underline its arguments, the frame uses verbal devices that emphasize the EU’s moral 
responsibility, such as ‘do-not-harm’, and ‘take responsibility’.
The free trade frame
The free trade frame is comparable to the development frame in the sense that it focuses 
on long-term and global food security. However, the two frames differ in their causal 
analysis and consequential claims.
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The main line of argumentation underlying the free trade frame is that food security 
is best served by facilitating free trade. Free trade gives farmers from all over the world 
an opportunity to enter commodity markets and allows consumers to buy products at 
the lowest price. Thus, market access should be equal for all. The following quotation, 
derived  from  a  motion  of the Liberals  in the EP, expresses this argument well:
21. Believes that free and fair trade should be ensured; 
calls for balanced trade agreements to be reached, as they 
are an essential element of a global food security response. 
ALDE motion in the European Parliament (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe, 2011)
Free trade frame proponents do not agree with those of the development frame that 
developing countries should be protected or be allowed to protect their markets in 
particular circumstances. According to the free trade frame, food security would be best 
served if governments, and intergovernmental organizations, refrained from imposing 
trade-distorting measures. In the CAP case, income support that is not fully decoupled, 
export subsidies, and other market measures can have negative consequences for the 
trade position of other countries and producers, and should therefore be eliminated.
Contrary to some other frames, the free trade frame does not consider liberalization 
to be a threat, but rather sees it as an opportunity for the European agricultural sector 
to develop itself and to broach new markets. To achieve this, proponents of this frame 
argue that the CAP should be much more integrated with EU trade policies. The 
following quote from the commodity trade association Coceral is a good example of 
how agricultural and trade policies are seen by the free trade frame as intrinsically linked:
The future CAP aims at responding to EU and global food 
security problems. In order to achieve this goal, EU’s agricultural 
trade policy has to be further facilitated and supported. 
(Coceral, 2011)
The free trade frame is attended by recurring framing devices such as ‘free and fair trade’, 
‘open up markets’, and ‘trade as opportunity’.
The regional frame
The regional frame is primarily concerned about the impact of the CAP on regional 
differences in food security. Proponents of the frame are not necessarily pleading for 
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regional or European self-sufficiency, but seek to attract attention to the position of rural 
areas, less-developed regions, and subsistence farming.
The underlying rationale of the frame is that the market alone will not compensate 
farmers in certain regions, as they are not able to produce at world market prices. This 
may for example be caused by a backlog in technological innovation, or because of 
unfavourable geophysical conditions. The disappearance of these farmers would be highly 
undesirable as they provide regional food security but can also be considered caretakers 
of the countryside, fulfilling an important socio-cultural function, as underlined by the 
Assembly of European regions:
The presence of agriculture in all our European regions is a strong 
illustration of the identity of our continent and a significant component 
of the landscape in our territories. Questions  of  autonomy, food 
quality and security are a priority for all citizens in Europe as elsewhere. 
(Assembly of European Regions, 2011)
The Scottish Highlands and Islands are a good example of such a region that is highly 
dependent on the CAP for its regional food security:
A ‘‘No policy’’ scenario would therefore be disastrous for fragile rural economies 
such as the Highlands and Islands. Farmers could no longer make a living, resulting 
in closure of farms, loss of live- stock, loss of food security, loss of biodiversity. 
(Highland and Islands of Scotland European Partnership, 2011)
Although proponents of the regional frame thus support a continuation of the CAP, the 
current distribution of CAP funds is seen as unfair because it is partly based on historical 
claims and because it favours big companies. In addition, recent EU members do not 
yet get a fair share of the budget. A redistribution of the CAP is therefore supported, 
enhancing the position of small- and middle-sized farmers in less favourable regions. In 
addition, a broader and coherent policy framework is advocated to help these regions 
develop on several fronts.
A mere focus on increasing production is seen as a non-solution. According to the 
regional frame, food security is not so much an issue of availability of food as of access 
and distribution, which are not always warranted for remote regions. Investment in 
small-scale farming and regional development are considered more effective means of 
guaranteeing food security.
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The food sovereignty frame
The perspective of the food sovereignty frame is also regional, but this frame is more 
radical than the regional frame. The food sovereignty frame is highly critical of the term 
‘food security’, which is seen as primarily used in favour of neo-liberal interests, by 
governments, and agri-industrial and trade-centred actors. Food sovereignty forms an 
alternative interpretation of food security and focuses attention on people’s right to food 
and to decide about the modes of production, entailing local or regional self-sufficiency.
Food sovereignty proponents signal a seeming contradiction in the EC proposals, 
namely, a focus on food security on the one hand, and enhancing competitiveness on 
the other. Friends of the Earth Cyprus, one of the national food sovereignty movements, 
describes this tension as follows:
The Commission outlines food security as a key challenge while at the 
same time seeks increased competitiveness of Europe’s agricultural sector. 
European agricultural model depending only  on the international 
market is vulnerable to price volatilities of the world market and 
would easily feel the impacts of a worldwide food and economic crisis. 
(Friends of the Earth Cyprus, 2011)
To overcome this tension, the food sovereignty frame advocates a full and comprehensive 
CAP reform. Proponents of this frame identify a wide array of food security problems 
in current European agricultural practices, including the position of small farms 
and rural areas, environmental impacts, conjunctural crises, the import of low-cost 
products, and the effect of the CAP on developing countries. This last point may seem 
contradictory, because food security is primarily framed at regional level, but at the 
same time the frame revolves around a moral basis that emphasizes worldwide solidarity 
among peoples. Policies, including the CAP, should be directed towards the needs and 
preferences of people, in particular consumers and farmers, rather than articulating the 
interests of agri-industry. The frame is ill-disposed toward liberalization, global trade 
flows, industrial farming, and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Instead, food 
should be produced locally, be of high quality, and take both environmental and socio-
cultural concerns into consideration. This type of production is characterized by terms 
such as ‘organic’, ‘local’, ‘diversity’, ‘quality’, and ‘fair’.
The solution championed by the food sovereignty frame is a CAP that prioritizes regional 
food provision through public regulation of production modes and markets. Local food 
and food that is produced in a sustainable way, such as by agro-ecological methods, 
should be promoted, while regional stocks should be used as emergency tools. Payments 
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ought to be directed towards small farmers and to those characterized as active famers, 
providing specific public goods, such as greening services.
3.4.2  Actors deploying food security frames
Frames do not stand alone; they are actively deployed by actors. In our analysis, we 
found a wide variety of actors invoking food security. These actors, both public and 
private, come from the local, regional, national, and European level. They are politicians 
and policymakers, entrepreneurs and lobbyists, as well as scientists. At the same time, 
however, not all actors use food security arguments, or not at all times. In this section, 
we provide an overview of the persons, organizations, member states, or parties behind 
the six frames. The findings are summarized in Table 3.2.
The two frames most frequently used were the productionist and the environmental 
frame. The productionist frame was predominantly deployed by private stakeholders, 
such as farmers’ organizations, and food-associated industries. In addition, some member 
states, most notably France, Ireland, and, to a lesser degree, Germany, and two groups in 
the European Parliament, the European People’s Party and the European Conservatives 
and Reformists Group, frequently underlined the importance of increasing production 
in order to safeguard EU food security.
The environmental frame, on the other hand, primarily enjoyed popularity among 
environmental  and nature organizations, and health organizations. The latter 
organizations pointed at the detrimental effects of current consumption patterns 
on human health and the environment. Most of them used almost exactly the same 
wording in their inputs to the consultation round. In addition, the frame was invoked 
by a couple of companies working on sustainable farming techniques, whereas some of 
their colleagues used a more  productionist  discourse.  In the European parliament, 
the environmental frame was particularly popular among the Greens. The four other 
frames were deployed by a smaller number of actors. The development frame was used 
by development organizations and institutes, emphasizing the impacts of EU agriculture 
on global food security. Most of these actors were fair trade organizations. Trade is also 
the central issue in the free trade frame,  but here, actors related it primarily to the 
importance of free trade for EU production and food processing, and, consequently, 
for EU food security. This view was supported by the United Kingdom, and by the 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe in the European Parliament. The 
nine actors evoking the regional frame were mainly local authorities and regional 
development organizations. The latter include organizations that carry out and advise 
on the European LEADER regional development policy. The food sovereignty frame 
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was particularly deployed by  the  right-to-food and farmer-rights NGO via Campesina, 
and its European branches, as well as the European United Left/Nordic Green Left party 
in the European Parliament.
Some actors did not deploy one single frame, but combined elements of various frames; 
or they invoked different frames over time and for different audiences. This was for 
example the case in some countries’ communications, noticeably The Netherlands 
(development and free trade) and Poland (productionist, environ- mental, and regional). 
In the European Parliament, the use of elements of various frames was particularly clear 
in motions of the Socialists and Democrats group and in joint resolutions involving 
multiple parties. And, finally, a variety of frames could be identified in the influential 
parliamentary Lyon report regarding the future of the CAP after 2013.
3.4.3  Food security frames of the European Commission
A most important actor that did not deploy one single food security frame, but, instead, 
invoked elements of multiple frames was the European Commission. Depending on 
the subject of a communication and the Directorate-General responsible for it, the 
Commission communicated various stories. The following two quotes illustrate this:
Ensuring global food security: taking account of the international 
dimension, including developing countries’ needs in EU policies.  
(European Commission, 2009)
A sustainable EU economy needs a thriving agricultural sector 
making its contribution to a wide variety of EU objectives – 
including cohesion, climate change, environmental protection and 
biodiversity, health and competitiveness, as well as food security.  
(European Commission, 2010b)
Although these quotations are not incompatible with each other, they have a different 
focus. The first quotation focuses on global food security and stresses the importance 
of addressing developing countries’ needs in EU policies. The second quotation focuses 
on the EU economy and emphasizes the need of a thriving and competitive agricultural 
sector to enhance food security, while at the same time underlining sustainability 
and environmental goals. The second quotation, thus, bears elements of both the 
productionist and the environmental frame.
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Table 3.2 Stakeholders associated with the frames 
Frame  Number of actors 
(percentage of total 
of actors) 
Types of actors 
Productionist  41 (37,3%)  Agri‐chemical industry (3) 
Farmers’ organizations (10) 
Other food producers and processers’ organizations (11) 
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Agri‐technological organizations (4)  
Member states (4) 
EP groups (2) 
Academia (2) 
Others (5) 
Environmental  36 (32,7%)  Environmental and nature organizations (11) 
Health organizations (13) 
Sustainable agriculture businesses and organizations (3) 
EP groups (1) 
Others (8) 
Development  6 (5,5%)  Fair trade organizations (3) 
Associations of churches (1) 
NGOs (1) 
Research institutes (1) 
Free trade  5 (4,5%)  Food producers and processers’ organizations (2) 
Trade organizations (1) 
EP groups (1) 
Member states (1) 
Regional  9 (8,2%)  Local authorities (5) 
Regional development organizations (3) 
Farmers’ organizations (1) 
Food sovereignty  8 (7,3%)  Food sovereignty organizations (6) 
Labor unions (1) 
EP groups (1) 
Multiple  5 (4,5%)  Member states (2) 
EP groups (1) 
EP Lyon report  
European Commission 
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Ensuring global food security: taking account of the international dimension, including 
developing countries’ needs in EU policies.  
(European Commission, 2009) 
 
A sustainable EU economy needs a thriving agricultural sector making its contribution to a 
wide variety of EU objectives – including cohesion, climate change, environmental protection 
and biodiversity, health and competitiveness, as well as food security.  
(European Commission, 2010b) 
 
Although these quotations are not incompatible with each other, they have a different focus. The 
rst quotation focuses on global food security and stresses the importance of addressing developing 
countries’ needs in EU policies. The second quotation focuses on the EU economy and emphasizes 
the need of a thriving and competitive agricultural sector to enhance food security, while at the same 
The same pattern occurs within the Commission’s most i portant communication 
regarding the CAP reform, preceding the public consultation round, in which it sets 
out its broad vision for the future of European agriculture. In the communication, 
ele ents of the productionist, enviro mental, regional, and development frames could 
be identified, without one frame being particularly d inant. This variety of frame 
elements is clearly visible in the description of food security as a strategic aim for a future 
CAP:
To preserve the food production potential on a sustainable basis throughout 
the EU, so as to guarantee long-term food security for European citizens 
and to contribute to growing world food demand, expected by FAO 
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to increase by 70% by 2050. Recent incidents of increased market 
instability, often exacerbated by climate change, further highlight these 
trends and pressures. Europe’s capacity to deliver food security is an 
important long term choice for Europe which cannot be taken for granted. 
(European Commission, 2010a)
This quotation highlights the importance of the CAP for both European and global 
food security. In addition, food security is considered from a long-term as well as a 
short-term (focus on incidents) perspective. Agricultural production is needed and 
should be stimulated, but this should be done ‘on a sustainable basis’. Further on in the 
document, the Commission again stresses the importance of European production to 
meet the growing world demand for food but notes that this should be done through 
simultaneously respecting international trade and development commitments.
It is important to note that these various frames within a single Commission 
communication are the result of the way in which these communications are produced. 
Commission communications are often preceded by political struggle between various 
directorate-generals, each of which champions one or more different frames. Therefore, 
although the Commission is portrayed as a single actor in Table 3.2, it should be 
considered as an actor that is constituted by and embodies the compromise between 
various sub-entities.
3.5  Discussion and conclusions
The research questions in this chapter were: which food security frames can be identified 
in the CAP post-2013 reform process and which actors deploy these food security 
frames? We draw three general conclusions.
First, food security is a consensus frame, as initially proposed by Mooney and Hunt 
(2009). It is a concept that is both pervasive and generally accepted in the CAP debates. 
Additionally, although a broad range of stakeholders deploy food security arguments, 
our data suggest that the meanings the different stakeholders attach to food security, 
and the claims they make, show great variation. As stated in Section 3.1, Maye and 
Kirwan (2013) termed this ‘fractured consensus’: although there is consensus among 
stakeholders that food security should be a primary strategic objective for the CAP, they 
disagree about the appropriate course of  action  and how a future CAP should facilitate 
such action.
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Second, this fractured consensus masks six distinct frames behind the food security 
consensus frame within the discursive context of the CAP post-2013 reform. We have 
named these the productionist frame, the environmental frame, the development frame, 
the free trade frame, the regional frame, and the food sovereignty frame. Each of these 
frames has its own focus regarding the relationship between the CAP and food security, 
resulting in different causal analyses and claims about action to be taken. In some 
cases, these causal elements conflict with one another. Conflict particularly arises when 
solutions proposed by one frame are identified as the main problems or challenges to 
food security by another group of stakeholders. The matrix in Supplementary Material 
B gives an overview of the potential conflict between the frames. Here, we pick out 
three examples. As a first example, intensification of production as proposed by the 
productionist frame is seen as a non-solution and even a challenge to long-term food 
security by environmentalists. Productionists argue that greening is not defensible in 
times of food shortages. Second, the free trade frame’s focus on trade liberalization is 
tantamount to everything that is wrong about food production according to the food 
sovereignty frame; but the food sovereignty frame’s emphasis on local production is seen 
as insufficient to feed a growing world population by most other frames. A third example 
of such a causal conflict revolves around income support for farmers. Productionists 
argue that income support is essential for European farmers to be able concurrently to 
both compete with world prices and deliver public goods, such as food security. The 
same income support is seen as a key factor of food insecurity in developing countries 
by the development frame, because it hinders farmers in those countries from both 
entering the European market and developing viable local markets.
A third general conclusion is that the six frames are deployed by specific (groups of ) 
stakeholders. Although we did not analyze this, we believe this to be the case because 
stakeholders frame the relationship between European agriculture and food security on 
the basis of their policy position and interests (Lang & Barling, 2012). This would 
confirm Tomlinson’s (2013) argument that actors choose a particular framing of the 
food security issue that best matches their prior ideological commitments. It is not 
surprising that representatives of farmers, whose core business is to produce food, 
deploy the productionist frame, and environmental NGOs primarily the environmental 
frame. That these two frames were found most in our data cannot be a surprise either. 
Agricultural and, increasingly, environmental interests are traditionally the most 
dominant interests in European agricultural policy formation (Lynggaard & Nedergaard, 
2009; Termeer & Werkman, 2011). What is remarkable is that, in contrast to recent 
critiques on the invocation of food security to defend productionist or neo-liberal 
interests (e.g., Fairbairn, 2012; Fish et al., 2013; Jarosz, 2011; Rosin, 2013), our results 
show that a food security discourse is deployed by a much broader array of stakeholders. 
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In fact, virtually all types of actors involved in agricultural policy formation (Termeer & 
Werkman, 2011, p. 288) engage in food security framing.
Together, these three conclusions support the theoretical assumption that food security 
functions as a consensus frame behind which various frames lie hidden. These frames, 
in turn, are deployed by specific actors. But what are the implications of our findings? 
What does the finding that food security functions as a consensus frame mean for the 
practice of policy formation?
It has been argued that food security, in its function of a consensus frame, can serve 
as a lynchpin for the post-2013 CAP (MEP Diane Dodds in Agra Europe, 2010b). 
Food security arguments resonate among a broad European audience. Although most 
Europeans have never suffered from a lack of food, hunger is still part of collective 
memory in many member states. References to the Irish Potato Famine, the Dutch 
Hunger Winter of 1944, and the hunger in post-World War II Germany account for 
powerful and emotion- laden arguments (Ó Gráda, 2011) that may be triggered by 
current developments (cf. Zahrnt, 2011). At the same time, the invocation of food 
security has been criticized as scaremongering (CAP transparancy campaigner Jack 
Thurston in Agra Europe, 2010a). Additionally, it has been argued that the CAP food 
security rhetoric is out of place because the traditional CAP instruments are an extremely 
inefficient, if not detrimental, way of enhancing global food security (Zahrnt, 2011).
Irrespective of whether this criticism is justified or not, our results indicate that 
stakeholders indeed portray food security as a lynchpin of the CAP. Although 
stakeholders disagree about how a future CAP could most effectively contribute to food 
security, they find common ground in the goal of food security itself. This is particularly 
the case for the European Commission. The European Commission has been typified 
as a policy entrepreneur (Lynggaard & Nedergaard, 2009) that needs to broker between 
stakeholders with very diverse interests. Therefore, the Commission is subject to the 
phenomenon of multiple inclusion (Termeer & Werkman, 2011); the Commission is 
active in various discursive contexts in search of public support for the new CAP. In food 
security, the Commission has found a term that it can use in these various contexts to 
get a broad range of actors behind a shared goal for a future CAP. Thus not only is food 
security a widely shared and accepted consensus frame, it is also actively used to create 
consensus.
A downside of this use of food security as a consensus frame is that the relationship 
between the CAP and food security remains ambiguous. There is little elaboration, let 
alone consensus, about how a future CAP could most effectively contribute to food 
security. By applying the consensus frame, the Commission acknowledges that food 
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security is a multidimensional issue that requires a holistic approach, but it does not 
make explicit how various ideas and claims relate to one another. On the one hand, 
highlighting various frames may have served the Commission to appeal to a variety 
of audiences. On the other hand, it has led to the critique from stakeholders in the 
consultation round that the Commission’s strategic aims and proposals lack detail. In 
order to develop a coherent food security strategy, both policymakers – including the 
Commission – and scientists will therefore need to start questioning the frames that 
undergird the political debate. At the least, as has been suggested in the 3rd Foresight 
Report of the European Commission’s Standing Committee on Agricultural Research 
(Freibauer et al., 2011), this would require using the various frames to identify possible 
trends and courses of action. The authors of the report argue that it might be possible to 
develop a synthesis between narratives that seem to conflict at first sight. It is a task for 
those who are truly engaged in enhancing global food security to navigate through the 
labyrinth of food security frames and to establish a holistic and coherent vision in the 
European food security debate. Such an exercise would largely depend upon the ability 
of those actors to align the wide array of interests and ideas, and to increase the political 
priority that is given to the issue. Only when key actors, such as the Commission, the 
Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament are disposed not only to name food 
security as a strategic goal, but also to actively form policies on it, can such a vision be 
created.
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Abstract11
The European Commission’s ability to cope with wicked problems is generally 
viewed as inadequate because of its hierarchical and inflexible modus 
operandi. Recent research suggests, however, that the Commission may be 
better equipped to deal with wicked problems than is commonly assumed. To 
elucidate these contradictory viewpoints, we analysed conditions that enable 
or constrain the Commission in dealing with wicked problems. To do so, we 
applied a framework consisting of five governance capabilities required to deal 
with wicked problems (reflexivity, responsiveness, resilience, revitalization and 
rescaling) to a case study of how the Commission deals with the wicked problem 
of food security. Although our results confirm some of the earlier critiques, 
we have also identified various enabling conditions, most notably inter-service 
and inter-institutional procedures and structures, boundary arrangements and 
a widespread tolerance of frame conflicts, uncertainty and cross-scale dynamics. 
However, the Commission lacks a mechanism to continuously monitor 
and adjust its capabilities, thereby running the risk of challenges remaining 
unforeseen and unanticipated.
11 This chapter is published as: Candel, J.J.L., Breeman, G.E., and Termeer, C.J.A.M. (2015) The European 
Commission’s ability to deal with wicked problems: an in-depth case study of the governance of food 
security, Journal of European Public Policy, online first (DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2015.1068836).
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4.1 Introduction
The European Commission deals with some persistent policy problems that continuously 
require the attention of policymakers and pose serious challenges to the governance 
system. Many of these persistent policy problems can be regarded as ‘wicked’. Examples 
of such problems are sustainable development (Jordan & Schout, 2006), realizing 
sustainable food systems (Termeer et al., 2015a), climate change (Jordan, Huitema, van 
Asselt, Rayner, & Berkhout, 2010) and energy security (Chester, 2010). In contrast to 
‘tame’ problems, wicked problems are ill-defined, ambiguous, contested, and subject 
to multi-layered interdependencies and complex social dimensions (Rittel & Webber, 
1973; Termeer et al., 2015a). Wickedness goes beyond complexity in the sense that, 
as a rule, wicked problems can never be solved, although they may be temporarily 
fixed or settled, but often only as a result of a tedious trajectory of small wins (Bryson, 
1988; Termeer et al., 2015a; Weick, 1984). This insolubility results from continuous 
disagreements on problem definitions and solutions and because today’s problems have 
emerged out of the attempts to address yesterday’s problems (Head, 2008). 
Wicked problems present policymakers with five specific governance challenges (Head 
& Alford, 2015; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Termeer et al., 2015a): 
1. Unstructuredness and frame diversity, referring to the wide array of perspectives and 
views on the problem. There is no consensus on problem definitions and possible 
solutions. Instead, formulating the problem is the problem (Rittel & Webber, 
1973). The result is a seemingly ‘confusing mess of interrelated problems’ (Termeer 
et al., 2015a, p. 5). 
2. Frequent and uncertain changes, referring to the continuously changing problem 
characteristics and contextual conditions. Because of high complexity and 
interconnectedness with other issues, both the causes of the problem and the effects 
of possible interventions are unpredictable. Consequently, wicked problems involve 
sudden changes and surprises, and irreducible uncertainty.
3. Unlimited demands and concerns, which differ and change over time and keep 
pressing on decision makers’ agendas. This pressure is reinforced by (social) media. 
As a result, there is no final solution to the problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
4. Stagnating and unproductive interaction patterns, referring to the counterproductive 
blockades, stagnations and deadlocks that can occur when actors become frustrated 
about the absence of satisfying solutions and revert to more defensive positions and 
strategies (Termeer et al., 2015a). 
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5. Scale interactions, referring to the various (temporal, spatial, jurisdictional) scales 
involved (Cash et al., 2006). Mismatches can occur between the scales on which 
problems occur and the scales on which they are governed.  
Most of these challenges are not exclusively features of wicked problems, but may also 
occur in other types of complex policy problems (cf. Hoppe, 2010). What defines 
wicked problems, however, is that they entail all these challenges at the same time and 
have no stopping rules (Rittel & Webber, 1973).
The European Commission is criticized for its inability to deal with these governance 
challenges. The critiques focus mainly on the Commission’s compartmentalization, its 
rigid jurisdictions, its lack of adequate resources and its dependency on the other European 
Union (EU) institutions (cf. Ellinas & Suleiman, 2012; Kassim et al., 2013; Metcalfe, 
1996; Spence & Edwards, 2006; Stevens & Stevens, 2001). In contrast, however, other 
EU studies suggest that the Commission may be more capable of dealing with wicked 
problems than often is assumed. Kassim et al. (2013), for instance, show that the officials 
who work in the Commission manage to break through the compartmentalization of 
policy sectors through prevalent personal networks. These contradictory views in the 
literature show the need for a systematic analysis of whether and how the Commission 
is capable of dealing with wicked problems. Apart from contributing to the debate in 
the EU literature, such an analysis would also be interesting from the perspective of the 
governance of wicked problems literature, because, as Peters and Wright (2001, p. 158) 
argue, although ‘managing the problems of fragmentation, sectoralization and policy 
interdependence is not peculiar to Brussels … the extent and nature of those problems 
in Brussels is of a different order from that prevailing in the member states’. 
Against this background, this chapter aims to elucidate the presence (and absence) 
of capabilities that enable the Commission – which we approach as an internally 
differentiated arena or governance system (Cram, 1993; Hooghe, 2001; Kassim & 
Dimitrakopoulos, 2007) – to deal with wicked problems. Capabilities are defined as 
‘the ability of policy makers to observe wicked problems and to act accordingly, and the 
ability of the governance system to enable such observing and acting’ (Termeer et al., 
2015a, p. 4). We focus particularly on the last dimension: the presence of conditions that 
enable or constrain the Commission’s overall ability to deal with wicked problems. Our 
research question interrogates the extent to which the European Commission possesses 
the capabilities required to deal with wicked problems, and how these capabilities are 
deployed to resolve such problems.  
We applied a capabilities framework to a case study of a wicked problem that has been 
particularly pervasive in recent years: food security (Candel et al., 2014; Grant, 2012b). 
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We consider food security a ‘typical case’ that can be used to generate insights regarding 
the Commission’s general ability to deal with wicked problems (Section 4.3) (Gerring, 
2007).  
4.2  Theoretical framework
4.2.1  Conflicting views on the Commission’s ability to cope with wicked problems
Hierarchical and monocentric governance systems face great difficulties in dealing with 
wicked problems (cf. Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005; Head & Alford, 2015; 
Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Termeer & van den Brink, 2012; Weber & Khademian, 
2008). Because of high degrees of compartmentalization, rigid rules and jurisdictions, 
closed networks and top-down decision-making patterns, they often lack the reflexivity 
needed to recognize the wickedness of particular problems and the flexibility to respond 
to sudden changes, risks or new problem definitions (Hoppe, 2010; Termeer et al., 
2015a). In many Western states, this inability was reinforced by the introduction of New 
Public Management in the mid-1990s, whose ideas about clear objectives, performance 
targets and efficiency are by definition in conflict with the cross-scale and insoluble 
nature of wicked problems (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Verhoest, Bouckaert, & 
Peters, 2007). 
The dominant image that has arisen in the literature regarding the Commission’s ability 
to cope with wicked problems is that it lacks the organizational capacity and tools that 
are necessary to address the five governance challenges (Kassim et al., 2013; Schout & 
Jordan, 2005). Particular constraints are its organization along sectoral silos, rigid and 
often restricted mandates, scarcity of coordination mechanisms, and lack of financial 
and human resources (Ellinas & Suleiman, 2012; Jordan & Schout, 2006; Laffan, 
1997; Peters & Wright, 2001; Spence & Edwards, 2006; Stevens & Stevens, 2001). 
Put differently, whereas wicked problems require new ways of organizing horizontal 
and vertical interdependencies, the Commission is allegedly restricted by relatively rigid 
formal procedures and jurisdictions (Jordan & Schout, 2006; Metcalfe, 1996). Kassim 
et al. (2013, p. 75) summarize these critiques as follows:
[T]he Commission is highly ‘stove-piped’, its administrative code is burdensome, 
it is resource-poor, and it is heavily dependent for its success on its relationship 
with other EU institutions. And still it is tasked with trying to solve ‘wicked 
problems’, whose very nature makes it unlikely that they can be solved by 
administrations that strictly observe their own administrative code, especially 
one as cumbersome as the one under which the Commission operates.
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Some issues identified in the EU literature as further complicating the Commission’s 
ability to address wicked problems are: i) the EU’s joint-decision trap and inter-
institutional power struggles, which limit the possibilities for innovative policies 
(Falkner, 2011; Scharpf, 1988); ii) the different positions and frames of services, some 
of which are more likely to be adopted in policy proposals than others (Hartlapp et 
al., 2010); iii) New Public Management reforms that reinforce policy silos and reduce 
desired redundancy (Bauer & Knill, 2007; Cini, 2007); and iv) Commission officials’ 
different views on the role of their institution (Hooghe, 2012). 
At the same time, other parts of the EU literature portray the Commission as an actor 
that is not so incapable of dealing with wickedness at all. Various studies have found 
the Commission to act and behave as a policy entrepreneur or broker that regularly 
manages to foster change in circumstances of rapidly changing contexts, frame diversity 
and multi-actor and multi-level playing fields (Cram, 1993, 1994; Hooghe & Keating, 
1994; Pollack, 1997; Wendon, 1998).   
Others, such as Hartlapp (2011; Hartlapp et al., 2010), have pointed to various initiatives 
that the Commission under Barroso has taken to address some of its shortcomings, such 
as the Secretariat-General’s more prominent role with respect to the co-ordination and 
coherence of policy proposals, the use of extensive policy impact assessments, and the 
increasing number of inter-service consultations and inter-service groups. 
Kassim et al. (2013) recent extensive study is particularly interesting in this respect. 
Their argument is that the Commission’s success in dealing with wicked problems and 
manoeuvring itself into a favourable position vis-à-vis the Council and the Parliament 
depends on ‘the capacity of its own officials to navigate “the house” and produce unified, 
well-informed and fully prepared positions that have the backing of the administration 
as a whole’ (82), and thus on the ability of its officials to maintain effective personal 
networks. 
4.2.2  Governance capabilities for dealing with wicked problems
A general shortcoming in previous studies is that most of them focused primarily on 
one or more reasons why the Commission might or might not be good at dealing with 
wicked problems, rather than studying the variety of factors and processes that enable 
or constrain this ability. To address this lack, we apply the governance capabilities 
framework previously developed by Termeer et al. (Termeer & Dewulf, 2014; 2015a). 
The European Commission’s ability to deal with wicked problems
91
The development of the framework followed from a critique on the literature regarding 
the governance of wicked problems, which contended that it was too focused on ‘how-
to-act strategies’ without satisfactorily addressing the question of how governance 
systems could be adjusted or designed to enable such acting. Alternative strategies, such 
as reframing policy debates and organizing experiments, may conflict with existing 
formal and informal rules and values and are therefore not always easy to implement 
in existing governance systems (e.g., Edelenbos, 2005). It may therefore be necessary to 
change the governance system itself to enable these strategies (Hendriks & Grin, 2007). 
Additionally, the framework developers argue that coping with wickedness requires 
different ways of observing policy problems. 
To address these shortcomings, the framework synthesizes insights about coping with 
wicked problems from various governance and public administration theories, such 
as social-ecological systems theory (e.g., Folke et al., 2005), network, collaborative, 
multi-level and adaptive governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Hooghe & Marks, 2003; 
Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Termeer, Dewulf, & van Lieshout, 2010), punctuated-
equilibrium theory (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009), framing theory (Schön & Rein, 1994) 
and organizational psychology (Weick, 1984), to suggest observations, strategies and 
enabling conditions that facilitate coping with the challenges of wicked problems. These 
observations, strategies and enabling conditions are clustered in governance capabilities. 
We have already defined governance capabilities as the ‘ability of policy makers to 
observe wicked problems and to act accordingly, and the ability of the governance 
system to enable such observing and acting’ (Termeer et al., 2015a, p. 4). The latter 
ability is determined by the presence of certain enabling conditions, consisting of 
‘skills, repertoires, capacities, commitments, and readiness’ (ibid.: 5, drawing from 
Huxham, Vangen, Huxham, & Eden, 2000; Weber & Khademian, 2008). These 
enabling conditions thus consist of both institutional and agency-centred properties. 
Each capability listed hereunder is focused on one of the five governance challenges 
mentioned in the introduction: 
i) Reflexivity: the capability to understand and handle the variety of frames surrounding 
a policy problem; 
ii) Resilience: the capability to adapt flexibly to uncertainties and constantly changing 
conditions surrounding wicked problems;
iii) Responsiveness: the capability to observe and respond effectively and in a timely 
fashion to issues that are pressing in politics and society;
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iv) Revitalization: the capability to unblock unproductive patterns in the governance 
process;
v) Rescaling: the capability to observe and address cross-scale interactions and 
mismatches.
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the key observations, strategies and enabling conditions 
as provided by Termeer et al. (2015a) and Termeer and Dewulf (2014). Because our 
research concentrated on the extent to which the Commission as a whole is capable of 
dealing with wicked problems, we focused primarily on the enabling conditions, which 
are further elaborated in Supplementary Material (SM) C.
Table 4.1 Governance capabilities: key observations, strategies and enabling conditions
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To address these shortcomings, the framework synthesizes insights about coping with wicked 
problems from various governance and public administration theories, such as social‐ecological 
systems theory (e.g., Folke et al., 2005), network, collaborative, multi‐level and adaptive governance 
(Ansell & Gash, 2008; Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Termeer, Dewulf, & van 
Lieshout, 2010), punctuated‐equilibrium theory (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009), framing theory (Schön 
& Rein, 1994) and organizational psychology (Weick, 1984), to suggest observations, strategies and 
enabling conditions that facilitate coping with the challenges of wicked problems. These 
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i) Reflexivity: the capability to understand and handle the variety of frames 
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iii) Responsiveness: the capability to observe and respond effectively and in a timely 
fashion to issues that are pressing in politics and society; 
iv) Revitalization: the capability to unblock unproductive patterns in the governance 
process; 
v) Rescaling: the capability to observe and address cross‐scale interactions and 
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Table 4.1 provides an overview of the key observations, strategies and enabling conditions as 
provided by Termeer et al. (2015a) and Termeer and Dewulf (2014). Because our research 
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Table 4.1 Governance capabiliti s: k y  servations, strategies and enabling conditions 
Capability  Key observations  Strategies  Enabling conditions 
Reflexivity  One’s own and other 
people’s frames 
Processes of framing and 
its effects 
Seducing people into frames 
Connecting frames 
Negotiating despite frame 
differences 
Tolerance of ambiguity 
Embedding reflexive activities 
Process skills 
Resilience  Weak signals  Learning by doing  Tolerance of uncertainties 
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Varied observations 
Threshold and cascading 
effects 
Simulating and experimenting 
Taking robust or flexible 
measures 
Linking developments across 
scales 
Bridging arrangements 
Flexible institutions 
Redundancy 
Improvisation skills 
Responsiveness  Media attention 
Different venues 
Focusing events 
Stories behind dramas 
and hypes 
Windows of opportunity 
Deciding when to dive under the 
wave and when to react 
Communicating sensitively 
Tolerance of information overload 
Be present where the attention is 
Parallel structures 
Political‐sensitivity skills 
Revitalization  Symptoms 
Interlocking interaction 
patterns 
System archetypes 
Third eyes 
Animating people 
Interventions to unblock 
stagnation 
Addressing dysfunctional 
interactions 
Counterintuitive intervention 
Tolerance of disappointments 
Readiness to introduce third actors and 
contents 
Postponements of judgments  
Intervention skills 
Rescaling  Cross‐level issues on the 
problem scale 
Interdependencies 
between levels on the 
governance scale 
Fit or mismatch between 
the governance scale and 
(multiple) relevant 
problem scales 
Strategies to decouple levels on 
the problem scale 
Strategies to remodel the 
governance scale 
Strategies to match existing 
cross‐level interactions in the 
problem scale with cross‐level 
interactions in the governance 
scale 
 
Openness for multiple scale logics 
Flexible institutions to create and recreate fit 
Tolerance for redundancy and blurred 
responsibilities 
 
The positive impact of enabling conditions may be undone by constraining factors and processes, 
which we therefore included in the analysis of the European Commission’s overall ability to deal with 
wicked problems (cf. Edelenbos, 2005; Scott, 2008). Because the original framework revolves solely 
around enabling conditions, we approach constraints as the absence of enabling conditions or any 
limitation to them. These limitations are studied inductively (Section 4.3.2). The strength of an 
overarching capability is determined by the ratio between the presence and absence of skills, 
repertoires, capacities, commitments and readiness enabling governance systems to deal with 
wicked problems.  
The rationale underlying  the capabilities is that they ‘help manage wicked problems through 
repeated small wins, based on careful observation and targeted actions, rather than through 
comprehensive plans or heroic deeds’ (Termeer et al., 2015a, p. 24). Dealing with a particular wicked 
problem does not necessarily require all capabilities to be manifest to the same extent. Rather, they 
should be considered as tools and mechanisms that governance systems can possess and develop to 
enhance policymakers’ range of understandings and action repertoires needed to deal with the 
inherent variety of wicked problems (Termeer et al., 2015a). One capability may therefore curtail 
another. Stimulating (too) many reflexive activities, for example, can result in inertia and a 
consequent inability to respond quickly to pressing concerns and demands. At the other extreme, 
policymakers and governance systems should not rely on a single capability because that would 
result in the inability to deal with the other governance challenges. Termeer et al. therefore plead for 
a meta‐capability, i.e. applying the capabilities in a balanced manner by continuously monitoring and 
adjusting enabling conditions, so that these can be deployed in situations that call for action. 
However, what this meta‐capability would look like concretely remains unclear. We reflect on this in 
the discussion.  
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limitations are studied inductively (Section 4.3.2). The strength of an overarching 
capability is determined by the ratio between the presence and absence of skills, 
repertoires, capacities, commitments and readiness enabling governance systems to deal 
with wicked problems. 
The rationale underlying  the capabilities is that they ‘help manage wicked problems 
through repeated small wins, based on careful observation and targeted actions, rather 
than through comprehensive plans or heroic deeds’ (Termeer et al., 2015a, p. 24). 
Dealing with a particular wicked problem does not necessarily require all capabilities 
to be manifest to the same extent. Rather, they should be considered as tools and 
mechanisms that governance systems can possess and develop to enhance policymakers’ 
range of understandings and action repertoires needed to deal with the inherent variety 
of wicked problems (Termeer et al., 2015a). One capability may therefore curtail 
another. Stimulating (too) many reflexive activities, for example, can result in inertia 
and a consequent inability to respond quickly to pressing concerns and demands. At 
the other extreme, policymakers and governance systems should not rely on a single 
capability because that would result in the inability to deal with the other governance 
challenges. Termeer et al. therefore plead for a meta-capability, i.e. applying the 
capabilities in a balanced manner by continuously monitoring and adjusting enabling 
conditions, so that these can be deployed in situations that call for action. However, 
what this meta-capability would look like concretely remains unclear. We reflect on this 
in the discussion. 
4.3  Case description and methods of data collection and analysis
4.3.1  The case of food security in Commission policy formation
Food security is commonly defined as ‘all people, at all times, hav[ing] physical and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and 
food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO, 1996). In spite of the existence of 
this agreed definition, food security can be characterized as highly wicked, because of: i) 
numerous conflicting problem definitions and solutions; ii) high degrees of uncertainty 
about the factors that influence food insecurity; iii) rapidly changing economic, 
environmental, and social conditions; iv) interrelatedness with other wicked problems; 
and v) the transcendence of temporal, spatial and jurisdictional scales (Candel, 2014; 
Candel et al., 2014). 
Food security has been high on the EU agenda since the 2007–8 and 2010 food price 
crises, after which the Commission took various food security initiatives, such as 
Chapter 4
94
the € 1 billion Food Facility and the expanded Food Security Thematic Programme. 
Furthermore, food security concerns have come to play a role in a broad range of policy 
domains, such as agriculture, fisheries, energy and the environment. Therefore, we 
adopt a holistic view of food security, including all policy domains and efforts in which 
concerns about food availability, accessibility, utilization and stability play a role.
4.3.2  Data collection and analysis
To obtain a better understanding of the Commission’s use of the five capabilities, we 
asked Commission officials about their experiences with the wickedness of food security 
and whether and how they felt enabled to cope with this wickedness. We thus used 
an interpretive approach, i.e. one that seeks to understand the governance context by 
focusing on understandings and experiences of people working in that context (Yanow, 
2000). The advantage of such an approach is that it provides the opportunity to obtain 
an in-depth understanding of conditions that influence everyday work practice. 
We conducted an interview round at the Commission in spring 2014, in which we 
talked to a total of 20 Commission officials who worked in the various services in which 
food security concerns played a role. Interviews were semi-structured and lasted one 
hour on average. Most interviews were with individual respondents, but two interviews 
were with two or more people. Respondents were selected on the basis of the services 
and units in which they worked, their function or alleged experience with food-security-
related issues, whereby we aimed for as much diversity as possible (for an overview, 
see: SM C). Although many respondents agreed to participate when first approached, 
availability and willingness were constraints in the case of Commissioners’ cabinet 
members. Therefore, we asked high-positioned Commission officials, including a former 
cabinet member, about dynamics at cabinet level.
We first asked respondents about their function and to what extent and how food security 
concerns played a role in their work and domain. The second part of the interviews was 
structured along the five governance challenges, whereby we asked respondents to what 
extent and how they experienced these challenges (observations), how they dealt with 
them (strategies), and whether and how they felt enabled or constrained to act (enabling 
and constraining conditions) (SM C). For this part of the interview, we referred to 
the observations, strategies and conditions in Table 4.1, which we translated to the 
respondents’ frames of reference by using concrete examples. Respondents were given 
the opportunity to complement enabling conditions with additional conditions specific 
to the EU context. 
The European Commission’s ability to deal with wicked problems
95
The interviews were transcribed and coded. Subsequently, these codes were interpreted 
and compared, resulting in the categories of conditions reported in the results section (cf. 
Charmaz, 2006). Enabling conditions were interpreted by comparing these categories 
to Table 4.1 and the associated capabilities framework, although some categories 
were found to be specific to the EU context and therefore described in new terms. 
Constraints were all studied and interpreted inductively, whereby we synthesized similar 
observations into overarching categories. It is important to point out that respondents 
may have experienced the governance challenges and presence of capabilities and 
enabling conditions or constraints in different ways. We describe the dominant views 
and experiences, but also elaborate on any significant differences between respondents. 
4.3.3  Limitations 
Because the enabling conditions and constraints we identified were not specific to 
food security but to the functioning of the Commission in general, we believe that our 
findings could well be extended to the way in which the Commission deals with other 
wicked problems. Nevertheless, some case-specific characteristics should be pointed 
out. First, although we applied a holistic view of food security, it is a policy problem 
that has traditionally been dealt with mainly in the EU domain of development co-
operation. This is a domain in which the Commission has relatively limited jurisdiction 
and resources vis-à-vis the member states, and this makes it more difficult to respond 
proactively. Second, it is an issue that is widely recognized as a problem in urgent need 
of attention, as opposed to slumbering or unattended wicked problems. This implies 
that capabilities have had some time to develop. Third and conversely, although food 
security has received policymakers’ attention for decades, it only came centre stage after 
the 2007–8 and 2010 food price crises, because of which responses and developments 
are still very much in progress.
Regarding the analysis, our interpretive approach by definition involves a double 
hermeneutic (Giddens, 2007). Both the researcher and respondents are subject to bias, 
which we have aimed to: i) limit by preparing each interview with a desk study and 
by comparing respondents’ experiences with each other; and ii) make transparent by 
presenting the interpretive scheme and using illustrative quotations throughout the 
results section. Throughout the results section, references to the interview transcripts are 
made, so that it is clear to the reader which findings can be traced back to the interviews 
directly.
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4.4  Results
4.4.1  Reflexivity 
Reflexivity is the ability to deal with frame controversies that surround wicked problems. 
We found that respondents evaluated the Commission’s reflexivity relatively positively, 
mainly because of the presence of two enabling conditions: i) a widespread tolerance of 
frame diversity and conflicts; and ii) various inter-service procedures and structures that 
stimulate reflexive activities. Nevertheless, we also found some constraints, most notably 
a relatively firm belief in objectivity.
The widespread tolerance of frame diversity and conflicts became apparent through the 
wide recognition among respondents of the presence of various problem definitions, 
principles, ideologies and interests amongst external stakeholders, including the 
Council and the Parliament. They observed similar diverging perspectives within the 
Commission, especially between services but also between units within Directorates-
General (DGs) and within international fora. Regarding the content of these frame 
differences, respondents noted that, whereas virtually all stakeholders, both within and 
outside the Commission, share food security as an important value and policy objective, 
there tends to be disagreement about the ways in which food security could best be 
addressed and, consequently, about what types of policies are needed. For example, the 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy was characterized by debates over whether 
food security would be ensured best by increasing productivity and safeguarding farmers’ 
incomes or by implementing far-reaching climate and environmental measures. These 
conflicting views are well illustrated by the following quote from a senior official in DG 
Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI):
Food security is in the eye of the beholder. Everybody threw whatever they 
wanted. They used it as slogan totally delinked from any policy measure and 
objective. That’s why at end of the day, okay, food security is an objective, but 
what does it mean? I’m pretty sure you heard different answers from us all. (I- 5)
This example illustrates that, whereas there is awareness and tolerance of frame conflicts, 
these diverging views are often taken for granted and hardly negotiated.
The tolerance of frame diversity is enhanced by a second enabling condition, the various 
structures and procedures that enable collective reflexive actions. The most notable of 
these are the inter-service consultations, public consultations, Policy Coherence for 
Development (PCD) and impact assessments, which according to the respondents 
all stimulate approaching issues from various perspectives and thus enhance mutual 
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understandings. Some services have built in units that incorporate other sectors’ 
concerns and that function as boundary entities aiming at developing synergies, such as 
the unit ACP, South Africa, FAO and G8/G20 in DG AGRI, which links international 
development concerns to agricultural policy development. The Commission’s mobility 
policy, which encourages officials to change jobs once in a while, was also reported to 
accustom officials to approach issues from various perspectives (I-2, I-3). Sometimes, 
officials are exchanged between services with this explicit aim. Fisheries experts were 
for example stationed in DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) to revive food 
security efforts in that sector.
Apart from these enabling conditions, we found three constraints. A first constraint is 
the competition between units about jurisdictions. Units sometimes intentionally avoid 
reflexive co-operation because they fear losing a policy to another unit or DG when the 
policy becomes framed in a different way (I-12). A second constraint applies to global 
negotiations, in which officials experience less freedom to manoeuvre, speak out and 
change frames because they are tied to a mandate given by the member states (I-3, I-10). 
A third constraint, that particularly hinders the tolerance for frame diversity, is that 
there seems to be quite a firm belief in ‘objectivity’. A number of respondents argued 
that, although food security issues were recognized as being surrounded by controversy, 
the Commission bases itself on ‘facts’ and can place itself outside these polarized debates 
(I-1, I-2, I-5, I-10), as is illustrated by the following quote by a policy officer:
It’s about sensitive topics. Which is not easy to deal with based on facts. … But 
for our work, our work is based on facts. … For us it’s very important to see the 
difference between the statements and what are the facts. (I-10)
There is a tendency within the Commission to approach policy issues in a technocratic 
way. Conflicting values and views are often circumvented by focusing on technical 
arguments and drawing on scientific evidence and expertise (I-6A, I-6B, I-10, I-11, 
I-13, I-16). This can be a deliberate and strategic choice that makes it easier to make 
deals despite frame differences, as respondents frequently noted, but this is not always 
the case. Some respondents found it frustrating or upsetting when their objective stance 
was not acknowledged by external stakeholders (I-1, I-5). For example, one respondent 
indicated that she did not understand why controversy continued to dominate the 
policy with which she dealt, while information, research and impact assessments were 
openly shared and showed positive outcomes (I-1). 
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4.4.2  Resilience
Resilience is the ability to deal with the frequent and uncertain changes that characterize 
wicked problems. We found that the Commission’s resilience in the case of food 
security is experienced equivocally. On the one hand, there is a widespread tolerance of 
uncertainty and changing circumstances, and various procedures exist to observe and 
address these shifts. On the other hand, the Commission is hindered in acting upon 
these observations by some constraints, the most significant of which lies outside its 
influence. 
To start with the enabling conditions, we observed various bridging arrangements 
between policy sectors. These bridging arrangements are often the same procedures and 
structures that enhance the Commission’s reflexivity, but here the accent lies on the 
ways in which they facilitate the exchange of information and consequently contribute 
to signalling new pressures, trends and developments. The most notable arrangements 
in this respect are impact assessments, public and inter-service consultations, boundary 
units and staff mobility. These arrangements thus not only facilitate reflection on 
diverging perspectives, but also allow officials to update one another on relevant trends 
and signals. This ability to signal is further enhanced by the many modelling exercises, 
foresight studies, informal meetings with stakeholders and the use of insights from EU-
funded research. Also, some services, such as Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
(ECHO), use experts in the field, strikingly called the ‘antennas’ by one respondent 
(I-7), to update them about developments. As a result of these combined tools and 
procedures, officials are generally well aware of changing circumstances. 
Nevertheless, many respondents indicated that the availability of relevant data and 
information remains problematic, as the following quote illustrates:
With respect to food security and sustainable production in the EU, we know 
the slogans we want to exchange and the overall orientation, but we miss hard 
data, facts, that would allow us to see what happens and what role it plays. (I-5)
This lack of information results from the Commission’s relatively limited human 
resources. There are various reasons why limited capacity negatively affects the 
Commission’s monitoring abilities. First, capacity pressures force services and units to 
focus on the most obvious issues and developments, and consequently smaller issues or 
signals cannot be picked up (I-2, I-9). One respondent, for example, argued that services 
that are particularly tasked with responding to soaring crises, such as DGs ECHO 
and Health and Consumers (SANCO), sometimes have insufficient capacity to study 
contextual developments and therefore operate reactively more often than proactively 
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(I-9). Second, a lack of in-house expertise may result in blind spots. Respondents for 
example mentioned that DG DEVCO for a long time lacked fisheries expertise. This has 
improved in recent years, leading to a better co-ordination of fisheries and food security 
efforts (I-2, I-3). 
A second constraint is the Commission’s dependence on other actors, both within and 
outside the EU. Within the EU, in most policy sectors the Commission is only one 
of three EU institutions involved. Consequently, whereas the Commission can, in 
principle, largely decide about its policy proposals, it has only a limited influence on 
final policy outputs. For food security this means that, even if concerns are satisfactorily 
addressed in the Commission’s proposal, the other EU institutions can decide to ignore 
these in favour of other priorities. This restricts the Commission’s flexibility to act and 
improvise if circumstances suddenly change. Respondents described these deviations 
as ‘a mess’ (I-2, I-12) and ‘an outcome of last-minute bargaining’ (I-12), but also as a 
political reality (I-12, I-11, I-14, I-16) and democratically legitimate (I-2, I-16). 
Similar dependence-based restrictions exist in external action and multi-lateral 
negotiations. Regarding the former, the Commission is mainly dependent on partner 
countries and their prioritizations; regarding the latter, on the member states that closely 
monitor the Commission’s position. A respondent described this as a ‘balancing act’:
Is it an out-of-the-box approach? Certainly not. Can we be more adventurous? 
Yes. Are we going to be more adventurous? Yes, if member states let us. Are we 
entering into an adventurous mode? No, we are not, because we are entering an 
era of scepticism, of Euroscepticism, of cautiousness, of anti-European feelings. 
… I’m balancing externally and internally. … It’s complicated, it’s 80 per cent 
of my work, every day the balancing act. (I-10) 
A factor that can have both a positive and a negative impact on the Commission’s ability 
to act upon changing circumstances are commissioners’ prioritizations. Whereas some 
respondents said that the DEVCO and AGRI commissioners considered food security as a 
high priority (I-2, I-6C, I-10, I-11), one respondent critiqued a particular commissioner 
for being more eager to reach agreements than to take in-house experience into account 
(I-5). Commissioners’ influence is also affected by the Commission’s financial periods, 
which last seven years (I-11). If a commissioner is unlucky, he/she will have to work 
within the financial framework determined before his/her five-year term. 
In spite of these restrictions, the Commission has proved able to deploy robust or flexible 
measures in emergency situations when the EU institutions share a sense of urgency. 
An example is the robust € 1 billion Food Facility rapid response mechanism that the 
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Commission launched shortly after the 2007–8 crisis. An example of a flexible (or 
robust) measure was the adjustment of the biofuels policy. Following critiques about the 
land-use implications of its earlier biofuel targets, the Commission limited to 5 per cent 
the amount of food-crop-based biofuels that can count towards the EU’s 10 per cent 
target for renewable energy in the transport sector by 2020 (European Commission, 
2012). 
4.4.3  Responsiveness
Responsiveness refers to the ability to deal with unlimited demands and concerns. It 
is important to note that for the Commission these demands and concerns can come 
from both internal – i.e., other services, member states and members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) – and external actors, such as civil society and businesses. One of the 
main differences described between the EU and national level is the relatively smaller 
influence of mass media (Princen, 2011). As a consequence of the more hidden interest 
representation, public communication plays a smaller role for most administrators (I-1, 
I-2, I-6A, I-6B, I-10, I-13, I-16).
Nevertheless, we found that, although compared to national administrations the 
expression of demands and concerns by external actors tends to be more hidden at EU 
level, there are quite a number of channels through which the Commission interacts 
with actors and attempts to address their concerns. 
A first enabling condition is the relative ease for stakeholders, including researchers, 
to approach the Commission. This accessibility is particularly structured by the many 
formal and informal stakeholder and public consultations. In fact, the Commission 
relies on these interactions to draw up balanced proposals that will manage to gather 
sufficient political support. They are therefore described as a win-win: stakeholders can 
bring forward their demands and concerns, whereas Commission officials can draw 
from stakeholders’ knowledge and expertise and get an overview of the positions around 
a proposal (I-2, I-3, I-7, I-12, I-13). Within the Commission, inter-service contacts 
provide the opportunity to get to know the various societal and political demands and 
concerns with respect to a particular issue, and this enhances the ability to respond 
accordingly. 
Similar formal and informal interactions take place with actors from the Parliament 
and the Council, who try to pursue their interests and views within the Commission 
policy formation process even before the official inter-institutional negotiations and 
trilogues. Respondents argued that the best way to meet these pressures is by providing 
The European Commission’s ability to deal with wicked problems
101
well-formulated arguments, facts and data that help to win their support (I-9, I-12, 
I-14). Also, formal communications from the Commission to the Parliament and other 
EU institutions are used to gather support and legitimization by deliberately choosing 
wordings that reflect terms and objectives that find wide resonance in public and 
political spheres. ‘Food security’ was mentioned as a particularly good example of such a 
term, because it is a ‘buzzword’ that, according to Eurobarometer, finds wide resonance 
among European citizens (I-10, I-11 -12). Other examples given of these sorts of 
consensus frames were ‘sustainable intensification’ (I-5) and the ‘blue economy’ (I-3). 
Other discursive devices mentioned that appeal and contribute to gathering support 
from wide ranges of stakeholders are the use of positive narratives and success stories to 
sell a policy (I-2, I-6C, I-9), and the ability to steer debates away from short-term policy 
proposals towards long-term developments and trends. According to one senior official, 
this allows most controversies and nested interests to be dismissed and a more open 
discussion about the direction in which future policy should develop (I-9).
The above observations and examples show that the Commission can be considered 
to be relatively tolerant of information overloads. A second enabling condition found 
is the regular presence of Commission representatives at public meetings, conferences 
and seminars. These provide the opportunity to get a good view of political and societal 
demands and concerns and to simultaneously create awareness and support . 
A constraint to the Commission’s responsiveness is, again, its capacity. In this case also, 
a lack of capacity is a problem because it forces some services to deal with concerns and 
demands in a reactive way, i.e. they can only address concerns and demands that are 
dominant at a specific moment. This weakens the institution’s ability to monitor and 
detect concerns that may be on the policy agenda in the (near) future. 
The scrutiny of the other EU institutions, particularly the member states, also limits the 
extent to which Commission officials can be responsive towards the outside world. One 
respondent said:
In external meetings and conferences it’s mostly fluffy statements about food 
security. I can’t go too far, because member states are watching over my shoulder. 
So, I’m also cognizant of the fact that I can’t go outside of the contours. Because 
it’s not the first time, the moment I got out of the contours I have a member 
state coming and blasting at me. And that I can’t afford. (I-10)
Nevertheless, most respondents nuanced this by saying that, although the inter-
institutional frictions often result in the watering down of the Commission’s proposals, 
this does not mean that evolving demands and concerns are not taken into account at 
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all in the policy process(I-3, I-10, I-12), as described by a respondent in the context of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform:
If you look at the bigger picture, I mean it’s still a lot more that was achieved 
than one would have thought five years ago. So it’s really a question of whether 
you accept the fact that this was a strong political choice to make, and if you 
would accept that it was politically difficult to get something through, then you 
might appreciate that, okay, it’s a step in the right direction. It might not be a 
step big enough than what you would have thought to or liked to have, but still 
it’s an incremental change which might open the door for something bigger 
later on. (I-12)
4.4.4  Revitalization
Revitalization is the capability to unblock stagnations and to reanimate policy processes. 
We found that, although the Commission largely lacks the ability to revitalize wider 
societal impasses, stagnations hardly ever block the EU policy process entirely. 
Many respondents indicated that they hardly experience any lasting stagnations or 
deadlocks with respect to food-security-related issues, and those stagnations that were 
identified were mostly located in global negotiations; for example, about fishing quotas 
or the Sustainable Development Goals (I-3, I-17). This does not mean that other food 
security-related issues are free of societal and political controversies and deadlocks, 
but these are overcome in the Commission’s policy process through two institutional 
mechanisms: i) a technocratic fragmentation of policy problems; and ii) a policy process 
design that works towards compromises. It would therefore make sense to speak of the 
continuation of the policy process in spite of stagnations and deadlocks, rather than of 
revitalization in a broader sense. 
The first enabling condition here is the organizational compartmentalization of food 
security into multiple sub-issues, such as food assistance, fisheries in development policy 
and biofuel policy impacts, which are each dealt with in a specific DG or unit or by 
a single policy officer. There is no organizational entity that truly keeps the overview 
and attempts to co-ordinate or to integrate this broad range of efforts. These sub-issues 
are then dealt with in a highly technocratic way. This way of working both reduces the 
number of stakeholders actively involved in policy formation and bypasses much of the 
controversy by focusing on technicalities.    
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The second enabling condition consists of the whole system of inter-service consultations, 
impact assessments and trilogues that are designed to keep the policy process going by 
forcing units, services and the EU institutions to reach agreements. Although intra- and 
inter-institutional bargains and negotiations are often experienced as tough and slow, 
they nevertheless normally result in compromises. Respondents noted that, if they did 
not come to an agreement at technical level, they would run the risk of losing a bargain 
at the level of their political masters in subsequent stages of the policy process (I-6C, 
I-10, I-16). These compromises do not necessarily resolve or unblock wider societal 
value conflicts and deadlocks, but they do settle political disagreements.
Disagreements are thus mostly settled through technocratic deliberations or political 
deals, both of which more often result in incremental policy development than in radical 
shifts of policy directions. Various respondents said that there is only limited space to 
introduce very innovative policies or instruments to break through deadlocks (I-2, 
I-10), principally because the Commission will not propose any innovative proposals on 
which it knows that the member states will disagree with them. Therefore, officials apply 
a certain degree of ‘self-censorship’. One respondent said: ‘I can’t be super innovative 
because it will not fly. It’s useless having an innovative policy which never flies, if it 
remains in the drawers’ (I-10).
Despite this dependence on the other EU institutions, occasionally innovative approaches 
are possible. One respondent mentioned the example of chartering European fishing 
vessels to African countries, which resolved a conflict about African states wanting to 
expand their fishing capacity without having sufficient expertise to do so sustainably. 
She argued that it is sometimes possible to alter policy instruments within one’s policy 
objectives and that this may help accommodate the concerns of other actors and 
consequently to realize breakthroughs:
There are objectives that we cannot forget. But the means it depends, yes. If we 
have to change some modalities to attain the same objectives and that are more 
in conformity with other parties’ objectives, we have to adapt. Or to innovate. 
(I-3)
Furthermore, the Commission can also initiate innovations in its working procedures, 
such as the introduction of Policy Coherence for Development, which help to 
integrate development concerns and therefore prevent possible stagnations within the 
Commission. However, respondents indicated that these kinds of new practices require 
a cultural change and therefore take time to succeed (I-2, I-3). 
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4.4.5  Rescaling
Rescaling is the capability to deal with the relation between problem and governance 
scales. Here, we focus on a temporal scale, ranging from short to long term, and a 
spatial scale, ranging from local to global. We found that, although there is widespread 
awareness of the different scales at which problems occur and on which they are 
governed, the Commission is restricted in its possibilities to adjust governance scales, 
especially spatial scales.
An enabling condition with respect to the temporal scale is a general sensitivity regarding 
the relation between short- and long-term dimensions of food security. Examples of short-
term dimensions include the incomes and livelihoods of farmers and fishermen. Typical 
long-term elements include climate change, environmental conditions and sustainable 
economic growth (I-17). Some Commission sectors and policies are mostly relevant 
for short-term or conjunctural aspects of food insecurity, whereas others focus more on 
long-term or structural aspects. Sometimes, Commission officials face seeming trade-
offs between both. One respondent gave the example of an international negotiation in 
which a choice had to be made between protecting fish stocks to safeguard long-term 
food security and the incomes and livelihoods of fishermen fishing these species (I-3). 
The ability to rescale is well illustrated by the Commission’s 2012 Resilience 
Communication, which aims to connect short- and long-term policies and interventions, 
particularly in the fields of humanitarian aid and development co-operation (I-2, I-7). 
Additionally, most services also actively engage in foresight studies to anticipate future 
trends and developments and think about how these relate to short-term actions.
The spatial scale was described as more sensitive (I-2, I-3, I-5, I-10, I-11, I-17). Although 
respondents proved sensitive of the multi-levelness of both problems and governance, 
the subsidiarity principle forms a major constraint in adjusting governance levels when 
deemed appropriate. Respondents argued that in recent years they had to exercise even 
more constraint with respect to policy initiatives because of increased Euroscepticism 
and scrutiny by member states (I-5, I-10). They also indicated that they were therefore 
operating less proactively than they deemed desirable. Nevertheless, on various issues, 
such as humanitarian aid, respondents did experience close co-ordination between the 
Commission and member states, either through the Council or directly (I-7, I-13, I-17).
A second constraint to the Commission’s ability to adjust governance scales is its 
dependence on other actors in its external actions, such as partner countries (I-2, I-3, 
I-10, I-13). Respondents involved in external actions argued that the Commission has 
The European Commission’s ability to deal with wicked problems
105
relatively limited leverage to make food security interventions outside its territory when 
partner countries are not supportive. 
In spite of these difficulties in adjusting spatial scales, Commission staff still saw 
opportunities for being active on other governance levels (I-3, I-17). Various food security 
aspects, such as global warming, sustainable development goals and fisheries quotas, 
are dealt with in global organizations and negotiations, and respondents indicated that 
they use these global venues strategically to push for some of the Commission’s main 
objectives, such as healthy oceans and the importance of agriculture in sustainable 
development. The reason behind this is that these multilateral platforms offer the 
opportunity to address problems with a wide array of countries and stakeholders.
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4.5  Discussion
4.5.1  Discussion of the results from the perspective of the EU literature
As Kassim et al. (2013) have suggested, personal networks matter. Interactions within 
the Commission, and with external stakeholders from both within and outside the EU 
polity, play a great role in the exchange of perspectives, relevant information about 
trends and signals, and demands and concerns, and thus particularly enhance the 
Commission’s reflexivity, resilience and responsiveness. However, our study reveals that 
the Commission’s institutionalized norms, values and practices enable these networks 
to flourish. Factors such as the Commission’s staff mobility policy, the emphasis on 
stakeholder consultations, and inter-sectoral and inter-institutional compromises within 
its procedures are crucial for the development of staff’s personal networks. The image 
that the Commission is able to cope with the governance challenges of wicked problems 
because its staff manages to maintain extensive networks in spite of severe structural 
constraints is therefore incorrect, or at least incomplete. Instead, the fact that personal 
networks are enabled by institutions – and sometimes constrained by others – makes the 
Commission more successful in dealing with wicked problems than often portrayed. 
One could therefore argue that the Commission has, at least partly, progressed towards 
functioning as a ‘network organization’ (Metcalfe, 1996). This is not to say that the 
Commission has already fully evolved into such an organization. As others have pointed 
out, this would require further investments in the Commission’s coordinative and 
integrative administrative capacities (Laffan, 1997; Metcalfe, 2000; Schout & Jordan, 
2005). In this light, it is interesting to monitor whether President Juncker’s reform plans 
will further enhance these forms of co-ordination.
The effects of Juncker’s reforms on the Commission’s capacity are also relevant for its 
ability to monitor weak signals and to proactively scan demands and concerns that 
might put pressure on political agendas in the (near) future. We found that this ability is 
currently underdeveloped. This finding sheds a new light on the various reform initiatives 
undertaken since the late 1990s to make the Commission more efficient (e.g., Ellinas & 
Suleiman, 2008; Metcalfe, 2000). Although increased efficiency and clear responsibilities 
may be politically desirable, from a governance of wicked problems perspective they can 
be detrimental, because they reduce redundancy and the blurred responsibilities within 
a governance system that enable enhanced resilience and rescaling.
Dependence on the other EU institutions appeared to be a constraint to some of the 
capabilities. Our analysis has revealed various situations where the Commission proved 
relatively capable of dealing with food security challenges but where this was less certain 
for the EU as a whole. At the same time, a fragmentation of powers and responsibilities 
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among the Commission, Council and Parliament does not necessarily diminish the 
chances of settling wicked problems. When co-ordination is organized well, such power 
sharing may actually result in more holistic and democratically legitimate approaches 
(Termeer et al., 2011). Future research could elucidate the degree of, and space for, co-
ordinated efforts between the institutions. 
In addition, future research could provide more insights into the potential for developing 
a meta-capability within the Commission. In the case of food security, such a meta-
capability seemed largely absent. This finding contrasts with accounts in the literature 
that stress the enhanced coordinative role of the Secretariat-General (SG) under 
Barroso. Although the SG has the potential to embed the meta-capability, its role in 
the governance of food security proved limited. The potential for accommodating the 
metacapability within the SG fits in with Jordan and Schout’s (2006, p. 18) plea for the 
Commission to function as a ‘central coordinator or manager’ within the EU to cope 
with wicked problems. Assigning this task to the SG could institute a mechanism to 
reflect on the balance between the different governance capabilities, and to invest in 
complementary enabling conditions when necessary. 
4.5.2  Discussion of the results from the perspective of the literature on the governance 
of wicked problems
One major addition to the governance capabilities framework is the identification of 
constraints to dealing with wicked problems. Future research could provide a better 
understanding of the extent to which these constraints are generalizable and could be 
complemented. 
A second contribution is that we showed some concrete examples of interactions between 
the governance capabilities. According to the original capabilities framework, trade-offs 
may occur between the capabilities. However, until now, such trade-offs had not been 
shown empirically. The most striking of these trade-offs involves compartmentalization. 
Whereas we found that compartmentalization contributes to the ability to break through 
protracted stagnations because it enables breaking a wicked problem into multiple 
smaller problems that can be addressed by specialized subsystems, it has a negative effect 
on the ability to observe diverging frames, signals of change, and emerging demands and 
concerns. A second example is the regular trade-offs between providing policymakers 
with the latitude to act upon new signals and to be responsive in public meetings on the 
one hand and legitimacy on the other. Although resulting in diminished decisiveness, 
limiting this latitude may be rational from a democratic perspective.  
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Our last point concerns a critique on the capabilities framework. Although the 
framework pleads for a meta-capability, it does not clarify how such a meta-governance 
capacity could be realized and institutionalized. We believe the framework would benefit 
from integrating the emerging literature on policy integration and boundary-spanning 
policy regimes, as these could provide more insights into the emergence of governance 
structures around cross-cutting policy problems.
4.6  Conclusions
Is the European Commission capable of coping with wicked problems? Whereas 
the EU literature has provided equivocal viewpoints, our study of the Commission’s 
capabilities suggests a nuanced answer to this question. We showed that, for each of the 
five governance challenges that wicked problems pose, the Commission has enabling 
conditions at its disposal, but also faces constraints. These are summarized in Table 
4.2. The way in which the capabilities manifested themselves in the governance of food 
security gives rise to a more optimistic view of the Commission’s ability than currently 
prevails within the literature. On balance, the Commission seems to possess all five 
capabilities to some extent, but some are more developed than others: 
1. The Commission possesses a relatively high degree of reflexivity. Its staff is well aware 
and tolerant of frame differences, and various procedures and structures stimulate 
reflexive actions. Nevertheless, there is a widespread belief in ‘objectivity’ and the 
ability to develop technocratic solutions, thereby obscuring value conflicts.
2. The Commission enjoys various conditions that enable resilience. Respondents 
proved tolerant of uncertainty and sudden change, and various boundary 
arrangements and activities enable signalling changes in problem characteristics and 
contextual conditions. Nevertheless, the Commission often lacks the latitude to 
respond rapidly to new signals.
3. The Commission is tolerant of, and actively stimulates, engagement with a plurality 
of demands and concerns. However, this well-developed responsiveness is somewhat 
constrained by its limited capacity to proactively scan for potential new concerns 
and by its limited latitude in formulating responses in public performances. 
4. The Commission does not score well on its ability to enable the revitalization 
of wider societal and political deadlocks and stagnations. However, through 
compartmentalization, technocratic approaches, and various procedures and 
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structures that force compromise-seeking, the Commission manages to circumvent 
these stagnations within the EU policy process. 
5. Commission officials proved to be well aware of temporal and spatial scale dynamics, 
but face difficulties in adjusting governance levels when mismatches occur. This is 
particularly caused by the subsidiarity principle. 
In spite of relatively well-developed capabilities, the Commission seems to lack a 
meta-capability that would enable a continuous monitoring and adjustment of these 
capabilities. We would argue that this meta-capability requires at least a deliberate 
reflection on the system’s ability to cope with a wicked problem in all its facets. We 
did not find such a mechanism in the case of food security. Instead, actors reflected 
on, and dealt with, specific elements of the wicked problem. By doing so, they can 
and do reshape the governance system in a way that could further enable coping with 
specific governance challenges, but the compartmentalization of these efforts runs the 
risk of keeping particular challenges unmonitored and unanticipated. The very nature 
of wicked problems implies that tomorrow may pose different challenges than today, 
requiring a continuous evolution of governance capabilities. We believe that the most 
pressing question for future research would be to examine whether the Commission 
possesses mechanisms that enable such evolution or, if these are lacking, how they could 
be embedded.  
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Abstract12
The role of policy integration in the governance of cross-cutting policy problems 
has attracted increasing scholarly attention in recent years. Nevertheless, the 
concept of policy (dis)integration is still under theorized, particularly regarding 
its inherent processual nature. The main argument of this chapter is that policy 
integration should be understood as a process that entails various elements that 
do not necessarily move in a concerted manner but may develop at different 
paces or even in different directions. To study such dynamic integration 
pathways, the chapter proposes a multi-dimensional framework. Drawing on 
existing literature, the framework distinguishes four dimensions of integration: 
(i) cultures of beliefs, (ii), subsystem involvement, (iii) policy goals, and 
(iv) policy instruments. For each of these dimensions we describe different 
manifestations that are associated with lesser or more advanced degrees of policy 
integration within a governance system. Additionally, the framework suggests 
various indicators through which these dimensions can be studied. Apart from 
offering a theoretical approach that does justice to the dynamic and oftentimes 
asynchronous nature of integration processes, the framework allows for holding 
decision makers accountable for promises they make about enhancing policy 
integration. Simultaneously, it is argued that the merit of lower degrees of 
integration should not be underestimated, as these may sometimes be the most 
feasible or appropriate for the governance of a cross-cutting problem.
12 This chapter is accepted with minor revisions as: Candel, J.J.L. & Biesbroek, G.R. (sub) Toward a 
processual understanding of policy integration, Policy Sciences.
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5.1 Introduction
Many of today’s most pressing societal challenges including terrorism, food security, 
climate change, involuntary migration, or underemployment (WEF, 2015), are 
crosscutting the boundaries of established jurisdictions, governance levels, and policy 
domains. While it is recognized that these problems require some level of policy 
integration, severe integration challenges to policymakers and their institutional 
surroundings continue to exist (Briassoulis, 2004; Geerlings & Stead, 2003; Hovik & 
Hanssen, 2015; Jochim & May, 2010; Jordan & Schout, 2006; Kettl, 2006; Tosun 
& Lang, 2013). Examples in the literature are abundant, including the problems of 
compartmentalization, fragmentation, competing and incoherent objectives, policy 
under- and overreaction, competing issue-attention, and inconsistent instrument 
mixes. These integration challenges emerge particularly when complex societal issues 
are confronted with traditional forms of subsystem policymaking within hierarchic 
governance systems (Jochim & May, 2010; May, Sapotichne, & Workman, 2006). 
In these governance systems (sub-)sectoral policy is made by relatively stable actor 
configurations, each of which is characterized by specific sets of associated interests, belief 
systems, and problem perceptions (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1993). Differences between subsystems generally do not allow for the coherent or 
holistic approaches that are needed to satisfactorily deal with problems of a cross-cutting 
nature (Jochim & May, 2010). Rhodes (1991, p. 212) therefore aptly characterized the 
governance of these ‘cross-cutting problems’ through sectoral subsystems as resulting 
in ‘policy messes’. What makes the governance of cross-cutting problems even messier 
is that many are ‘wicked’; in addition to cross-scale dynamics, these problems involve 
high degrees of ambiguity, controversy, uncertainty and deadlocked interaction patterns 
(Rittel & Webber, 1973; Termeer et al., 2015a).
To overcome these integration challenges, governments and international organizations 
have introduced various initiatives to stimulate cross-sectoral policy integration between 
subsystems. Many of these initiatives, such as joined-up-government and whole-
of-government, were developed as an answer to New Public Management (NPM) 
principles that had further worsened governance systems’ abilities to deal holistically 
with cross-cutting policy problems (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Halligan, Buick, & 
O’Flynn, 2011). Various scholars argue that it is somewhat surprising that this range 
of governance initiatives has not yet led to a general theory of policy integration in 
the political sciences (Geerlings & Stead, 2003; Lafferty & Hovden, 2003; Tosun & 
Lang, 2013). Instead, the governance of cross-cutting policy problems has been studied 
through a plethora of approaches and schools of thought, all of which have distinct 
backgrounds and foci but also share considerable overlap (for overviews, see: Geerlings 
& Stead, 2003; Tosun & Lang, 2013). 
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Our aim in this chapter is to theorize and bring some conceptual convergence in the 
debate on policy integration for the governance of cross-cutting policy problems. The 
concept of ‘policy integration’ was first used by Arild Underdal (1980) in the context 
of integrated marine policy. He argues that an ‘integrated policy’ is one in which the 
‘constituent elements are brought together and made subject to a single, unifying 
conception’ (ibid., p. 159). After his publication, the notion has primarily been used in 
the context of sustainable development, where it is referred to as Environmental Policy 
Integration (EPI) (e.g., Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Lafferty & Hovden, 2003; Runhaar, 
Driessen, & Uittenbroek, 2014), and, more recently, as Climate Policy Integration (CPI) 
(e.g., Adelle & Russel, 2013; Dupont & Oberthür, 2012; Nilsson & Nilsson, 2005). 
The principle of policy integration, however, remains the same: the objective of EPI is to 
incorporate, and, arguably, to prioritize, environmental concerns in non-environmental 
policy domains13, with the purpose of enhancing environmental policy outcomes. 
Whereas much of the early EPI literature understands the concept as a governing 
‘principle’ or desired policy outcome, more recently scholars have directed their 
attention towards the ways in, and extents to which, EPI has become adopted within 
various political systems and policy processes, and the factors that facilitate or hinder this 
adoption (for an overview of this literature, see: Jordan & Lenschow, 2010). These recent 
studies mark the shift towards a more processual approach to policy integration, i.e. one 
that proceeds beyond studying whether EPI has been implemented or not towards the 
dynamics and reasons behind (dis)integration. However, as Adelle and Russel (2013) 
put it, existing typologies have been mainly used to evaluate progress towards EPI (for 
example in: EEA, 2005; Jordan & Schout, 2006; Mickwitz et al., 2009) , rather than 
approaching integration as an inherently dynamic concept in itself (i.e. as a derivative of 
the verb ‘to integrate’). As a result, integration just comes in one flavour: it is a desired 
state that is reached, or else we do not speak of policy integration at all. In this paper, 
we aim to reconceptualise policy integration by adopting a processual understanding 
of integration. The shift from a relatively static (desired) outcome centred approach 
towards a differentiated processual understanding of integration raises interesting 
questions about when integration is fully realized, what elements constitute integration 
processes, and how these may develop over time, inter alia. To address these questions 
coherently and to align integration studies with adjacent theories on policy dynamics, 
we propose a conceptual framework that unpacks the notion of policy integration 
(Hogan & Howlett, 2015). We thereby view policy integration as a multi-dimensional 
and ‘ongoing process’ (EEA, 2005; Jordan & Schout, 2006; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 
13 We use both the concepts of policy domains and subsystems in this chapter. Here, a policy domain refers to a 
substantive field of policymaking within a broader governance system, for example agriculture, foreign trade, or 
health. We use the concept of subsystems to signify the associated, relatively stable configurations of actors and 
institutions that are involved in the policy process within these domains, whereby a domain may comprise one or 
more subsystems.
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2007). This differentiated view recognizes that policy integration ‘...potentially has 
many various aspects which may not always ‘move’ in parallel or at the same speed’ (cf. 
Bauer & Knill, 2012, p. 31). Through this pursuit, the framework aims to contribute 
to the advancement of the study of policy integration beyond the dominant domains of 
environment and climate change towards more general theorization. 
5.2  Shortcomings of existing processual conceptualizations of policy 
integration
In the introduction, we already touched upon the EPI and CPI literatures and concluded 
that these literatures do not elaborate on the inherently processual nature of policy 
integration as a concept. At the same time,  we acknowledge that a focus on the processual 
nature of integration is not entirely new to the public policy literature. Here, we discuss 
two notable examples of frameworks that have provided processual conceptualizations of 
similar notions: Metcalfe’s (1994) coordination scale and the cooperation, coordination 
and collaboration hierarchy proposed by several authors, including Geerlings and Stead 
(2003), Keast et al. (2007) and McNamara (2012). However, as we will discuss, both 
approaches have their shortcomings.
First, Metcalfe (1994) focuses on degrees of (organized) coordination ranging from 
independent decision-making by ministries to a shared government strategy, in between 
which seven other steps are distinguished (for a variation on this scale, see: Braun, 
2008). The scale is still popular, as is illustrated by its use in recent extensive studies 
of coordination between public organizations and organizational entities (Bouckaert, 
Peters, & Verhoest, 2010; Jordan & Schout, 2006). Its main merit lies in that it provides 
a logical order of how coordination may increase (or decrease) over time, and as such 
provides a tool for comparison. However, the scale presents integration scholars with 
conceptual and methodological challenges, because it does not provide clear criteria 
or elements on the basis of which degrees could be distinguished. As a result, it is 
impossible to apply the scale systematically (compare, for example, applications in: 
Bolleyer, 2011; Pelkonen, Teräväinen, & Waltari, 2008; World Bank, 2006). Differences 
between studies that apply the scale make it difficult to identify and compare patterns 
and mechanisms of integration that occur across cases. This point of critique is not 
restricted to the Metcalfe scale; most of the literature on policy integration discusses 
the elements that constitute integration processes in isolation, providing limited basis 
for theory building. One of the goals of our approach is to bring some systematicity by 
synthesizing these isolated accounts. A second point of critique regarding the Metcalfe 
scale is that it suggests a consequential order of various elements of integration that do 
not necessarily follow upon each other. For example, various scholars of sustainable 
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development policy have showed that overarching strategies are not always preceded by 
instruments that substantially increase coordination and convergence between policy 
domains (e.g., Jacob et al., 2008; Jordan & Lenschow, 2010).
A second approach within the public policy and management literature covers a similar 
proposal for a hierarchy ranging from cooperation to coordination to collaboration 
or integration (e.g., Geerlings & Stead, 2003; Keast et al., 2007; McNamara, 2012). 
Although the basic outlines are similar, small differences exist between the hierarchies 
of these authors in this approach. We believe such a hierarchy to be a promising way of 
conceptualizing policy integration as a process. However, existing hierarchies do, as with 
Metcalfe’s scale, not entail clear constituting elements. In addition, these frameworks are 
generally developed in the context of social services provision (e.g., Keast et al., 2007; 
McNamara, 2012) rather than that of studying the policy process and therefore omit 
dimensions that are crucial within a public policy perspective, such as policy instruments 
or subsystems involved. 
What is more, both the Metcalfe scale and the integration hierarchy lack a clear 
theorization of the nature of change over time. As a consequence, policy integration 
appears to advance or diminish in a linear manner. Recent empirical accounts of 
integration processes, however, show that this is hardly ever the case and that, instead, 
dimensions of policy integration move at different paces (Adelle, Jordan, & Benson, 
2015; Howlett, 2009; Jacob et al., 2008; Jordan & Halpin, 2006). 
5.3  Starting principles of a processual approach
We propose to addresses the shortcomings of existing processual approaches to policy 
integration by putting the multi-layered and asynchronous nature of integration 
processes at its conceptual core. To do so, our framework builds around four dimensions 
of integration: cultures of beliefs, subsystem involvement, policy goals, and policy 
instruments. These dimensions will be elaborated in section 5.4. We first elaborate our 
four theoretical starting principles that underlie the dynamics of the framework.
First, we pose that dimensions of integration do not necessarily move in a concerted manner. 
In fact, virtually all integration processes will show some differentiation in the advancing 
of dimensions, which may increase or decrease at various paces and even in opposite 
directions. As a consequence, policy integration configurations are generally characterized 
by discrepancies or time lags regarding the degree or phase in which the dimensions of 
integration are to be found. We cannot talk about degrees of policy integration without 
understanding and appreciating these dynamics. Moreover, dimensions of integration 
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do not necessarily ‘catch up’ with each other. A well-documented example of non-linear 
integration are the approaches to sustainable development that many countries and 
international organizations have deployed after committing themselves to international 
agreements. Jacob et al. (2008)  show that whereas many governance systems design 
sustainable development policy objectives and frameworks, most do not come up to 
the mark with developing supportive instrument mixes that could realize the initially 
defined sustainable policy outcomes. There are various reasons for the occurrence of such 
partial or nonlinear integration; we mention three main reasons. First, lock-in effects 
may occur resulting from path dependency (Pierson, 2000) and consequential policy 
layering. Pre-existing elements, such as dominant subsystems or policy instruments, 
are often remarkably resilient (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). 
Even though they are complex and their inconsistent nature makes them costly to 
administer, they often remain in place because they serve vested interests (Rayner & 
Howlett, 2009). There needs to be a strong and convincing case to change such existing 
elements. Second, connected to the previous, it is well known that certain aspects of 
the policy process are easier and more likely to change than other parts. For example, 
it is easier to change policy instruments than to change policy paradigms or core belief 
systems (Hall, 1993; Pierson, 1993). Third, governments or organizations may lack the 
political will or resources to proceed beyond discursive or symbolic action (Jacob et al., 
2008; Jordan & Lenschow, 2010). Mickwitz and Kivimaa (2007) put this even stronger 
in arguing that integration strategies that are ‘...merely cosmetic or introduced in order 
to diffuse attention and resist change should be distinguished from genuine policy’. 
Howlett (2014) shows that for new cross-cutting policy issues, such as climate change, 
governments are often risk averse and use blame avoidance tactics, including reverting to 
discursive forms of integration, thereby seriously hampering policy success. In addition 
to willingness, both administrations and individual policy officers may lack the capacity 
and skills to work in an integrative manner, for example to facilitate linkages with new 
subsystems or to pursue overarching goals (Bardach, 1998; Hoppe, 2010; Jordan & 
Schout, 2006).  In sum, asynchrony between different dimensions of policy integration 
is the rule, rather than the exemption when we consider policy integration as a process.
A second principle of our framework is that integration is as much about positive (i.e. more 
integration) as it is about disintegration. So far, most of the existing conceptual frameworks 
have focused on accounting for increasing policy integration, or on capturing the 
reasons for the lack or failure thereof. However, the literature provides various empirical 
examples of regime configurations with relatively high degrees of policy integration 
that weakened or collapsed in the past, such as the ‘boundary-spanning policy regimes’ 
around community empowerment and pollution abatement in the United States 
(Jochim & May, 2010), the discontinuation of EPI efforts in Norway, Sweden and the 
EU (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Nilsson & Persson, 2008; Pallemaerts et al., 2006), or 
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the dismantling of the intergovernmental Dutch Spatial Planning to Climate Change 
(ARK) program (Biesbroek et al., 2013b). Even the most advanced regimes in terms of 
integration can go out of fashion (Jochim & May, 2010), often because the issue has 
been pushed off the macropolitical agenda by other policy problems that are perceived as 
more pressing (cf. Downs, 1972). Or simply because the integrative efforts have served 
their purpose and the policy problem is (sufficiently) addressed. Policy integration efforts 
may also fall apart as a result of internal processes, such as frictions between supporting 
actors and institutions, changing ideas, or when they become self-undermining for 
other reasons (Keast et al., 2007; Rayner & Howlett, 2009). Furthermore, integrative 
governance arrangements may be scaled down or dismantled intentionally (cf. Bauer & 
Knill, 2012), for example as a result of a collaboration fatigue (Halligan et al., 2011) or 
because political actors replace existing paradigms, such as joined-up-government, by 
new ones (Wilson, 2000), as has happened in the UK and the Netherlands (Karré, van 
der Steen, & van Twist, 2013). Jordan and Lenschow (2010) argue that the political color 
of governments can play a role in this by showing that well-developed environmental 
policy integration regimes were scaled down when a number of European left-wing 
governments were replaced by right-wing governments. Again, this disintegration 
process is not static and parts might disintegrate faster than others. 
Our third starting principle is that mutual dependencies exist and interactions take place 
between dimensions. Advancing insights from public policy studies have taught us 
that different types and levels of policy elements and contextual conditions can affect 
each other in numerous ways (e.g., Hall, 1993; Howlett, 2009; March & Olsen, 1989; 
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Studying these interdependencies and interactions 
in the context of policy integration is a crucial next step for integration research. Based 
on recent understandings in policy studies we formulate two hypotheses regarding the 
relation between dimensions of integration. The first hypothesis relates to the idea that 
there is a hierarchic and consequential order between the advancement of dimensions 
related to policy regimes, such as actor configurations and undergirding beliefs, and 
those related to concrete sets of policies, e.g., goals and instruments (cf. Hall, 1993). 
Changes of the former are then a precondition for changes of the latter (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2009; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003), implying that they advance at an earlier stage 
within an integration process. In concrete, this would mean that the advancement of 
policy goals and policy instruments towards enhanced or weakened policy integration 
is informed by and follows on shifts in the configuration of subsystems and associated 
prevalent cognitive and normative beliefs about the nature of the problem and its 
governance (Howlett, 2009). A second and partly competing hypothesis is that 
dimensions of integration have a dialectic interaction effect. For example, a change of 
dominant societal and political frames provides the opportunity for new subsystems to 
get involved in the governance of a particular cross-cutting issue. The reversed logic may 
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also apply in that the in- or exclusion of new actors within a governance process can 
result in a change or adoption of beliefs (e.g., Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Similarly, 
the success of a policy integration instrument may lead to fundamentally rethinking the 
culture of beliefs on how to tackle the cross-cutting issue. For example, the introduction 
of the Open Method of Coordination in European Union employment policy led to a 
new view on possibilities for EU integration in policy domains for which the member 
states felt reluctant to transfer jurisdictions to the EU-level, such as for health policy (de 
la Porte, 2002; Princen, 2009).
The fourth and final starting principle is that policy integration is a process of institutional 
change and design in which actors play a pivotal role. We argue that to capture the process 
of policy integration, we should focus on the institutional conditions, manifestations 
of which determine the amount of policy integration within a governance system. 
However, it is through agency that these institutional manifestations are created, 
reaffirmed and changed. Agency-centred mechanisms help to explain why and how 
dimensions of integration change towards enhanced or weakened policy integration 
within governance systems, i.e. within and in interaction with an institutional context. 
The most notable agency-centred mechanisms of policy integration include social 
learning, coalition building and policy entrepreneurship (Jochim & May, 2010). 
Social learning requires that learning between agents does not only take place within 
one or more subsystems within a governance system, but across subsystems (Jones & 
Jenkins-Smith, 2009). Learning then, does not only follow from the emergence of 
new knowledge, information and experiences, but, more importantly, from agents’ 
recognition of mutual dependencies between subsystems involved and of an associated 
variety of frames and perspectives on problems and solutions (Mickwitz et al., 2009; 
Nilsson & Nilsson, 2005; Termeer, 2009). Learning across subsystems generally goes 
hand in hand with the mechanism of coalition building. Coalition building involves 
agents’ attempts to align powers within and between subsystems, which may result in 
new network configurations in the governance of a particular problem, possibly allowing 
for more integrative approaches (Jochim & May, 2010). Finally, policy entrepreneurship 
refers to the ability of individual actors to recognize or create windows of opportunity 
and to actively couple more integrative approaches to a perceived problem (Dowd et 
al., 2014; Mickwitz et al., 2009). By doing so, they may give way to new subsystem 
interactions and alliances. These agency-centred mechanisms have mostly been discussed 
in relation to increasing policy integration. Mechanisms of disintegration have received 
hardly any consideration until now, although the same observation can be made for the 
collapse or scaling back of public policy in general (Bauer, Jordan, Green-Pedersen, & 
Héritier, 2012). The mechanisms pushing enhanced policy integration may also play 
a role in its demise, for example when coalitions fall apart, when negative feedback 
loops feed learning processes, or when policy entrepreneurs push for sectoral solutions. 
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In addition, policy dismantling has been put forward as a mechanism that could 
explain disintegration (ibid.). However, understandings of dismantling processes have 
only recently started to develop and it may well be that policy dismantling in itself 
encompasses multiple agency-centred mechanisms. 
Having elaborated the four starting principles of our processual approach to policy 
integration, we can now define the concept. We define policy integration as an agency-
driven process of asynchronous and multi-dimensional institutional change within an 
existing or newly formed governance system that shapes the system’s and its subsystems’  ability 
to address a cross-cutting policy problem in a more or less holistic manner.  Tracking such a 
process in a systematic manner requires a more concrete conceptualization of the various 
dimensions of integration. The goal of the remainder of the paper is to set out these 
dimensions.
 
5.4  Four dimensions of policy integration
We distinguish four dimensions that constitute policy integration: (i) cultures of 
beliefs, (ii) subsystem involvement, (iii) policy goals, and (iv) policy instruments. These 
dimensions have been elaborated in one or multiple of the political science and public 
policy literatures upon which we base our processual understanding. Subsystems and 
beliefs (ideas), for example, play an important role in the writing of Jochim and May 
(2010) on boundary-spanning policy regimes. Policy instrument mixes and policy 
goals form the corner stone of the Integrated Policy Strategies and New Governance 
Arrangements described by Rayner and Howlett (Howlett & Rayner, 2007; Rayner 
& Howlett, 2009). We discuss each of them here in relation to the key processual 
assumptions of policy integration as discussed in the previous section. It is hereby 
important to emphasize that each of the dimensions should be understood and studied 
in relation to a specific cross-cutting policy problem that a governance system seeks to 
address. For example, the dimension of policy goals refers to the inclusion of concerns 
about a speciﬁc problem within a governance system, its subsystems and associated policy 
goals. Thus, the dimensions do not necessarily describe the whole spectrum of general 
institutional characteristics within a governance system.
5.4.1  Cultures of beliefs
The first dimension consists of the cultures of beliefs within a governance system and 
associated subsystems regarding integration in the policy process. The literature on policy 
integration has coined various concepts to emphasize the role of ideas in integration 
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processes, such as frames, discourses, ideas, paradigms, and cultures. We refer to these 
ideas as the cultures of beliefs toward policy integration, as beliefs are particularly decisive 
in how the nature of a policy problem and its implications for more concrete policies 
and programs are understood within a policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993). We hereby make a distinction between the culture of beliefs of a 
governance system as a whole and the cultures of beliefs within individual subsystems. 
For this dimension, it is particularly relevant to what extent both these types of cultures 
entail the recognition of the cross-cutting nature of a particular problem and of the 
consequential integration challenges that follow thereof.
The culture of beliefs at governance system-level is what the European Environment Agency 
(2005) refers to as the ‘administrative culture’ within a governance system, although the 
EEA operationalizes administrative cultures mainly in instrument choices rather than in 
more commonly used notions of belief systems, shared values, and institutional ideology 
(cf. Cini, 1995). Here, it is particularly relevant whether a governance system entails 
an administrative culture that promotes integration with respect to a particular cross-
cutting problem, both amongst macro-level decision-makers and across the system’s 
subsystems. Peters (2005, p. 13) argues that if governance systems want to move toward 
more integrated forms of governance, ‘...they will have to develop and propagate ideas, 
or policy frames, that can guide and justify the development of common approaches to 
governing.’ Such common approaches help to promote cross-sectoral cooperation and a 
systematic dialogue between different subsystems that contributes to the strengthening 
of policy coherence (Geerlings & Stead, 2003). Some administrative cultures have 
hereby been shown to be more open towards integration than others and this differs 
across countries (Hoppe, 2010). For example, Anglo-Saxon countries are more likely to 
adopt integrative approaches compared to Napoleonic countries (6, 2004). The absence 
of an administrative culture that fosters a common approach can pose serious risks. 
Gieve and Provost (2012) for example show how the lack of awareness and promotion 
of the need to coordinate between monetary and regulatory policy subsystems resulted 
in the collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market and eventually in the 2007-2009 
financial crises. 
Apart from the administrative culture at system-level, amounts of integration are 
constituted by cultures of beliefs within individual subsystems. Over time, subsystems 
develop their own culture, style and tradition, and actors operating therein are often 
biased by the dominant discourses on how policymaking ought to take place. This has 
been referred to as the policy style of a subsystem (Freeman, 1985; Richardson, 2013). 
The question here particularly is to what extent a subsystem considers an issue to be of 
its concern as well as its recognition of the issue’s cross-cutting nature and governance 
implications thereof. A good illustration of how such beliefs within subsystems can change 
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over time is the adoption of fisheries concerns within EU development cooperation 
policies. For a long time, the potential role of fisheries for improving livelihoods and food 
security had been overlooked, until some policy entrepreneurs within the development 
cooperation and fisheries subsystems realized that mutual synergies could be realized 
(Candel, Breeman, & Termeer, 2015).
Both types of cultures of beliefs are difficult to study. As Rayner and Howlett (2009, 
pp. 101-102) argue, key governance beliefs are sometimes articulated in a foundational 
document or statement, but they eventually become ‘taken-for-granted elements that 
constitute the substantive basis of the goal structure of a particular strategy’. As a result, 
most of these beliefs are not easily identifiable. Retrieving them requires an extensive 
discourse analysis, including both communicative discourses and social practices (for 
example as suggested by: Arts & Buizer, 2009; Panizza & Miorelli, 2013).
We distinguish four manifestations of cultures of beliefs in policy integration processes, 
which are presented in the following table:
Table 5.1 Manifestations of cultures of beliefs
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Beliefs 
within 
subsystems 
Culture of inward 
orientation to tackle 
problems. Cross‐cutting 
nature of problem not 
recognized. Problem 
defined in narrow terms.  
Culture of inward 
orientation to tackle 
problems. Failure of 
dominant subsystem in 
managing problem and 
externalities recognized 
(Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 
2006; Feiock, 2013). Results 
in realization that mutual 
policy concerns should be 
thought over within 
subsystems. 
Culture of outward 
orientation to tackle 
problems. Awareness of 
cross‐cutting nature of 
problem. 
Culture of outward 
orientation to tackle 
problems. Cross‐cutting 
nature of the problem is 
recognized. All possibly 
relevant subsystems have 
developed ideas about 
their role in governance of 
problem. 
Beliefs 
across 
governance 
system 
Problem is considered to 
fall within boundaries of 
specific subsystem. Efforts 
of other subsystems are 
not understood to be part 
of the governance of the 
problem. No push for 
integration. 
Awareness that policy 
outputs of different 
subsystems shape policy 
outcomes, notion of 
externalities and do‐no‐
harm. Problem is still 
predominantly perceived of 
as falling within the 
boundaries of particular 
subsystem. No strong push 
for integration. 
Understanding that 
governance of problem 
should not be restricted to 
single domain. Notions of 
coordination, coherence 
emerge. 
View that problem is and 
should not solely be 
governed by subsystems, 
but by system as a whole. 
Subsystems are desired to 
work according to shared, 
‘holistic’ approach, which is 
particularly recognized 
within boundary‐spanning 
structures.   
 
5.4.2		 Subsystem	involvement	
 
The second dimension of policy integration is subsystem involvement. This dimension captures the 
range of actors and institutions involved in the governance of a particular cross‐cutting policy 
problem. The rise of a cross‐cutting problem on the political agenda, is often followed by an increase 
in the number of subsystems that are formally or informally involved (cf. Peters & Hogwood, 1985). 
This has been shown to be particularly the case when two or more subsystems share beliefs and 
functional overlap (Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998). Actors within subsystems often play an active 
entrepreneurial role in involvement by trying to expand their subsystem’s jurisdiction over such 
broad issues (Jones & Strahan, 1985). These expansions of jurisdictions are not only relevant from 
the perspective of who decides what, they also affect the way in which a problem and, 
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5.4.2  Subsystem involvement
The second dimension of policy integration is subsystem involvement. This dimension 
captures the range of actors and institutions involved in the governance of a particular 
cross-cutting policy problem. The rise of a cross-cutting problem on the political 
agenda, is often followed by an increase in the number of subsystems that are formally or 
informally involved (cf. Peters & Hogwood, 1985). This has been shown to be particularly 
the case when two or more subsystems share beliefs and functional overlap (Zafonte & 
Sabatier, 1998). Actors within subsystems often play an active entrepreneurial role in 
involvement by trying to expand their subsystem’s jurisdiction over such broad issues 
(Jones & Strahan, 1985). These expansions of jurisdictions are not only relevant from 
the perspective of who decides what, they also affect the way in which a problem and, 
consequentially, the range of possible solutions and approaches get framed (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 2009). 
It is hereby important to note that the exact boundaries of subsystems may be difficult 
to determine, because they are analytical constructs rather than firm demarcations 
(Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010). However, it is generally possible to identify relatively 
stable groups of actors and institutions involved in making a specific policy (Sabatier, 
1988). In addition, it is not necessarily entire subsystems that are raising or addressing 
an issue. Sometimes, individuals, or groups of actors within a subsystem may draw 
attention to a particular concern and as such come to function as policy entrepreneurs 
(Jochim & May, 2010). By redefining a problem as a cross-cutting policy problem, these 
actors may realize the incorporation of the problem within a subsystem, resulting in a 
broadening of the subsystems involved in the governance of the problem.
We conceptualize subsystem involvement along two indicators. The first indicator 
consists of which subsystems are involved in the governance of the cross-cutting issue. 
Subsystems are considered to be involved when they explicitly address a particular 
problem within their policy process - thus when they label policy efforts, i.e. activities 
involving agenda-setting, preparatory debates, policy design, or internal and external 
communication, inter alia, in terms of the problem -  regardless from whether these 
efforts substantially contribute to addressing the problem or not (Dupuis & Biesbroek, 
2013). Apart from those subsystems that are involved, it is important to account for 
those that are not yet but could be (Dupuis & Biesbroek, 2013; Sabatier, 1988). Drimie 
and Ruysenaar (2010) for example show how the impact of South Africa’s Integrated 
Food Security Strategy remained limited due to the failure to include subsystems other 
than the agricultural subsystem. As a result, the implementation of the strategy was 
dominated by agricultural policy efforts, while matters of health, nutrition, access, and 
social inequality remained largely unaddressed. Involvement of other subsystems could 
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have led to new information, perspectives, and resources (Jack, 2005). The indicator can 
therefore best be assessed through a proximity to target measure, determining how many 
of the potentially involved subsystems are involved. 
The second indicator refers the density of interactions between subsystems in a network 
configuration. As not all subsystems are involved to the same extent, a distinction can be 
made between subsystems in which a problem is primarily embedded, and subsystems 
that are only indirectly involved in a problem’s governance and function as part of a 
‘loosely coupled system’ (Orton & Weick, 1990). For relatively higher amounts of 
policy integration we would, apart from a larger number of subsystems involved, expect 
a set of dominant subsystems, i.e. subsystems characterized by high intentionality, 
that engage in frequent interactions with each other, while maintaining less frequent 
interactions with a loosely coupled set of subsystems. A possible manner of measuring 
these interactions lies in determining how often subsystems, e.g. departments, have the 
lead in developing policy proposals regarding a particular problem and how often other 
subsystems have an input through procedural instruments such as impact assessments 
and inter-departmental taskforces and consultations (for example as in: Hartlapp, Metz, 
& Rauh, 2012). 
Using these two indicators, we distinguish four possible manifestations of subsystem 
involvement within a policy integration process, ranging from low to high integration, 
see Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Manifestations of subsystem involvement
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Table 5.2 Manifestations of subsystem involvement 
                             
Subsystems 
involved 
One dominant subsystem, 
which governs the issue 
independently (Metcalfe, 
1994). Formally, no other 
subsystems are involved, 
although they may be in 
terms of substantial, non‐
intentional policymaking. 
Concerns emerge in one 
or more additional 
subsystems. 
Two or more subsystems 
have formal responsibility 
for dealing with the 
problem. 
Number of subsystems 
that are formally involved 
is equal to or higher than 
at previous manifestations, 
but complemented with 
loosely coupled set of 
alternative subsystems.  
Density of 
interactions 
No interactions.  Infrequent information 
exchange with dominant 
subsystem (Geerlings & 
Stead, 2003). 
More regular and formal 
exchange of information 
and coordination, possibly 
through coordinative 
instruments at system‐level. 
High level of interaction 
between formally involved 
subsystems, that maintain 
infrequent interactions 
with loosely coupled set of 
subsystems.  
 
5.4.3		 Policy	goals	
 
Each governance system and associated subsystems have several short‐, medium‐ and long‐term 
policy goals to pursue, some of which are directly impacting, or are impacted by, the cross‐cutting 
problem. A policy goal here refers to the explicit adoption of a specific concern within the policies 
and strategies of a governance system, including its subsystems, with the aim of addressing the 
concern. We recognize that policies can be rather abstract and set out strategic lines, or take the 
shape of concrete programs entailing specific interventions (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). The 
dimension of policy goals, here, focuses on two aspects: (i) the range of policies, both at system‐level 
and within subsystems, in which (concerns about) a cross‐cutting problem is adopted as a goal, and 
(ii) the coherence between the consequential diversity of policy goals. 
First, as higher degrees of integration involve a relatively high density of subsystems, they also 
encompass a broader range of policies. Ideally, concerns about a cross‐cutting problem would be 
adopted as a goal in all these policies. However, our starting principle of asynchronous integration 
implies that this does always happen in practice. Here too, a proximity to target measure could be 
used, assessing the number of potentially relevant policies in which these concerns are adopted. 
Whereas at low degrees of integration we would expect policy goals regarding a cross‐cutting 
problem to be restricted to one or a few domains and associated policies, shifts toward enhanced 
policy integration are accompanied by a diversification of policy goals across domains (cf. Peters & 
Hogwood, 1985). Stead (2008) provides an example of low integration in terms of policy goals by 
arguing that the integration of transport policy is hindered by the autonomous and sectoral goal‐
setting by other subsystems. An example of enhanced integration of policy goals is given by Hustedt 
and Seyfried (2015), who show how enhanced internal coordination of climate change policies within 
the European Commission resulted in the adoption of climate change mitigation and adaptation 
goals in the policies of a number of non‐traditional domains, such as energy and maritime affairs.  
One of the main integration challenges found in the literature is that there are often fundamental 
differences in the way in which various policy goals get framed and perceived, also in terms of 
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5.4.3  Policy goals
Each governance system and associated subsystems have several short-, medium- and 
long-term policy goals to pursue, some of which are directly impacting, or are impacted 
by, the cross-cutting problem. A policy goal here refers to the explicit adoption of a 
specific concern within the policies and strategies of a governance system, including 
its subsystems, with the aim of addressing the concern. We recognize that policies can 
be rather abstract and set out strategic lines, or take the shape of concrete programs 
entailing specific interventions (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). The dimension of policy 
goals, here, focuses on two aspects: (i) the range of policies, both at system-level and 
within subsystems, in which (concerns about) a cross-cutting problem is adopted as a 
goal, and (ii) the coherence between the consequential diversity of policy goals.
First, as higher degrees of integration involve a relatively high density of subsystems, 
they also encompass a broader range of policies. Ideally, concerns about a cross-cutting 
problem would be adopted as a goal in all these policies. However, our starting principle 
of asynchronous integration implies that this does always happen in practice. Here too, 
a proximity to target measure could be used, assessing the number of potentially relevant 
policies in which these concerns are adopted. Whereas at low degrees of integration we 
would expect policy goals regarding a cross-cutting problem to be restricted to one or 
a few domains and associated policies, shifts toward enhanced policy integration are 
accompanied by a diversification of policy goals across domains (cf. Peters & Hogwood, 
1985). Stead (2008) provides an example of low integration in terms of policy goals 
by arguing that the integration of transport policy is hindered by the autonomous 
and sectoral goal-setting by other subsystems. An example of enhanced integration of 
policy goals is given by Hustedt and Seyfried (2015), who show how enhanced internal 
coordination of climate change policies within the European Commission resulted in 
the adoption of climate change mitigation and adaptation goals in the policies of a 
number of non-traditional domains, such as energy and maritime affairs. 
One of the main integration challenges found in the literature is that there are often 
fundamental differences in the way in which various policy goals get framed and 
perceived, also in terms of temporality or geographical scale (Adelle, Pallemaerts, & 
Chiavari, 2009). A second indicator therefore involves the degree of coherence within 
a governance system vis-à-vis a cross-cutting policy problem (Rayner & Howlett, 
2009). Coherence can be achieved and measured within a policy domain (May et al., 
2006), but for cross-cutting policy problems it is particularly relevant how the goals 
of various domains and associated subsystems relate to each other. In other words, 
coherence relates to whether a governance system’s policies contribute jointly to – or 
at least do not undermine – specific objectives (e.g., food security, employment or 
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sustainable development) (OECD, 2013, p. 7). However, the operationalization and 
measurement of horizontal coherence within a governance system vis-à-vis cross-
cutting issues is understudied at best and highly controversial at worst (Nilsson et 
al., 2012). The progress of policy integration studies will largely depend on whether 
conceptual and methodological agreements for studying policy coherence can be found. 
Here, we confine ourselves to a simple binary distinction between strong and weak 
coherence. Weak coherence exists when attuning of policy goals between subsystems 
does not or hardly take place. Strong coherence exists when subsystems attune their 
policy goals to jointly address a cross-cutting problem, which they can do by mitigating 
externalities, searching for synergies, or even working toward a system-wide ‘integrated 
policy strategy’ (Rayner & Howlett, 2009). Whereas the first is achieved by ‘negative 
coordination’, i.e. one subsystem formally has the lead in drafting policy proposals and 
monitors other subsystems for possible negative effects by applying the ‘do-no-harm’ 
principle (OECD, 2014), the latter two take the shape of ‘positive coordination’, i.e. 
subsystems jointly work together towards a comprehensive approach (Scharpf, 1994). A 
good example of an integrated policy strategy are the sustainable development strategies 
that many governments have adopted to integrate economic, social, and environmental 
development objectives (Meadowcroft, 2007). 
Table 5.3 Manifestations of policy goals
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Table 5.3 Manifestations of policy goals 
                             
Range of 
policies in 
which 
problem is 
embedded 
Concerns only embedded 
within the goals of a 
dominant subsystem. 
Concerns adopted in policy 
goals of one or more 
additional subsystems 
(Keast et al., 2007; 
McNamara, 2012). 
 
Possible further 
diversification across policy 
goals of additional 
subsystems. 
Concerns embedded within 
all potentially relevant 
policy goals.  
Policy 
coherence 
Very low or no coherence. 
Occurs when cross‐cutting 
nature is not recognized, 
or when subsystems are 
highly autonomous in 
setting (sectoral) goals.  
Because of rising awareness 
of externalities and mutual 
concerns subsystems may 
address these to some 
extent in their goals.  
Coordinated sectoral goals, 
which are judged in the light 
of coherence (Geerlings & 
Stead, 2003). Subsystems 
attempt to develop synergies 
(Metcalfe, 1994). 
Shared policy goals 
embedded within an 
overarching strategy 
(Geerlings & Stead, 2003; 
Jochim & May, 2010; Keast 
et al., 2007; McNamara, 
2012; Metcalfe, 1994).. 
 
5.4.4		 Policy	instruments	
 
The fourth dimension of policy integration consists of the substantive and/or procedural policy 
instruments within a governance system and associated subsystems. Substantive instruments 
5.4.4  Policy instruments
The fourth dimension of policy integration consists of the substantive and/or procedural 
policy instruments within a governance system and associated subsystems. Substantive 
instruments allocate governing resources of nodality, authority, treasure and organization 
(Hood, 1983) to directly affect the ‘nature, types, quantities and distribution of the goods 
and services provided in society’. Procedural instruments are designed to ‘indirectly 
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affect outcomes through the manipulation of policy processes’ (Howlett, 2000, pp. 413-
415). Procedural instruments can also be deployed at a governance system-level, for 
example to facilitate the coordination between subsystems (Jordan & Schout, 2006). 
Within a policy integration process we distinguish three types of indicators related to 
policy instruments for policy integration: i) subsystems’ deployment of instruments, 
ii) procedural instruments at system-level, and iii) the consistency of substantive and 
procedural instruments.
First, as higher amounts of policy integration are characterized by a wider range of 
subsystems involved and of associated policies in which the problem is adopted as a goal, 
they ideally also include supportive instruments within subsystems’ policies to pursue 
the more or less coherent sets of goals. In other words, we would expect a diversification 
of instruments addressing the problem across subsystems’ policies. These instruments 
can be both substantive or procedural, depending on the nature of the problem and the 
governance philosophies within a subsystem (Howlett, 2009).
Second, enhanced amounts of policy integration are characterized by the deployment 
of procedural instruments at governance system-level to coordinate subsystems’ policy 
efforts and to enforce and safeguard the consistency of the instrument mix as a whole 
(Jordan & Lenschow, 2010). Examples of such instruments include overarching plans 
and strategies, constitutional provisions, legislative standards-setting, overarching 
funding programs and financial incentives, consultation mechanisms, impact 
assessments, interdepartmental working groups, and (green) cabinets, inter alia (e.g., 
Adelle et al., 2009; EEA, 2005; Feiock, 2013; Jacob & Volkery, 2004; Jacob et al., 
2008; Karré et al., 2013; Ross & Dovers, 2008). At the highest degree of integration, 
organizational procedural instruments will take the shape of a boundary-spanning 
structure or overarching authority that oversees, steers and coordinates the problem as 
a whole (Jochim & May, 2010; Lafferty & Hovden, 2003). Jochim and May (2010) 
provide various examples of such boundary-spanning policy regimes in the United 
States. One example is the Community Empowerment regime in the 1960s and ‘70s, 
targeting urban unrest. In this regime subsystems of economic development, housing, 
education, employment, social welfare, and transportation worked together to realize 
urban renewal. This mutual effort was facilitated by the creation of overarching inter-
agency review teams. Pelkonen et al. (2008) give another example of a boundary-
spanning structure by showing how the Finnish Science and Technology Policy Council, 
a governmental advisory body, fosters the integration of science and technology policies 
between domains. Although it should be noted that this body does not have the steering 
authority that would be associated with the highest level of integration.
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Third, higher amounts of integration are characterized by a stronger consistency of 
policy instrument mixes, i.e. the sets of instruments that subsystems have developed 
incrementally in an ad hoc fashion over a longer course of time (Gunningham & Sinclair, 
1999; Howlett & Rayner, 2007). This consistency is relative to the (more or less) coherent 
goals that a set of instruments is meant to help procure (Howlett, 2009; Howlett & 
Rayner, 2007; Rayner & Howlett, 2009). Thus, an appropriate instrument mix effectively 
realizes certain integration objectives (Adelle & Russel, 2013). As with policy goals, the 
consistency of instrument mixes should, in case of a cross-cutting policy problem, be 
assessed for the governance system as a whole, thus between subsystems. It is hereby not 
only the types of instruments that matter, but also their magnitude and whether they are 
targeted to the appropriate audiences (EEA, 2005). Although the public policy literature 
has provided various arguments for why inconsistencies may arise and how they could 
be overcome (on paper) (e.g., Gunningham, Grabovsky, & Sinclair, 1998; Rayner & 
Howlett, 2009), as with coherence an univocal and agreed-on operationalization of the 
consistency of instrument mixes is lacking. For the sake of our theoretical argument it 
suffices to distinguish between weak and strong consistency. Within strong consistency, 
a further distinction can be made between negative coordination of instruments, i.e. 
mitigating the externalities of subsystems’ instruments, and positive coordination, i.e. 
seeking synergies between instruments or even developing a unified instrument mix at 
system-level (cf. Scharpf, 1994). The latter has also been referred to as a ‘new governance 
arrangement’ and involves the replacement of subsystems’ existing instrument mixes 
that resulted from an incremental process of policy layering with an entirely new and 
consistent instrument mix (Howlett & Rayner, 2006; 2007).
Table 5.4 presents the four manifestations of policy instruments associated with relatively 
stronger or weaker degrees of policy integration:
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Table 5.4 presents the four manifestations of policy instruments associated with relatively stronger 
or weaker degrees of policy integration: 
 
Table 5.4 Manifestations of policy instruments 
                           
 
Range of 
subsystems’ 
policies that 
contain 
policy 
instruments  
Problem only addressed 
by the substantive and/or 
procedural instruments of 
a dominant subsystem. 
As a result of increased 
awareness of externalities 
one or more additional 
subsystems (partially) 
adapt their instruments to 
mitigate negative effects.  
 
Possible further 
diversification of instruments 
addressing the problem 
across subsystems. 
Instruments embedded 
within all potentially 
relevant subsystems and 
associated policies. 
Procedural 
instruments 
at system‐
level 
No relevant procedural 
instruments at system‐
level. 
Some procedural 
information sharing 
instruments at system‐level 
(cf. Metcalfe, 1994).  
Increasing number of system‐
level procedural instruments 
that facilitate subsystems to 
jointly address the problem. 
Broad range of procedural 
instruments at system‐level, 
including boundary‐
spanning structures that 
coordinate, steer and 
monitor subsystems’ 
efforts.  
Consistency  No consistency. Sets of 
instruments are purely 
sectoral and result from 
processes of policy 
layering (Rayner & 
Howlett, 2009). 
Subsystems consider 
externalities of sectoral 
instrument mixes in light of 
internal and inter‐sectoral 
consistency. 
Subsystems seek to jointly 
address the problem by 
adjusting and attuning their 
instruments. Consistency 
becomes an explicit aim. 
Full reconsideration of 
subsystem instrument 
mixes, resulting in a 
comprehensive, cross‐
subsystem instrument mix 
that is designed to meet a 
set of coherent goals. 
 
5.5	Discussion	
 
Although policy integration seems to be the politically preferred option nowadays to solve pressing 
societal issues, various scholars have pointed out that (full) policy integration is no panacea for a 
more satisfactory governance of cross‐cutting policy problems. Mickwitz et al. (2009), for example, 
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5.5  Discussion
Although policy integration seems to be the politically preferred option nowadays 
to solve pressing societal issues, various scholars have pointed out that (full) policy 
integration is no panacea for a more satisfactory governance of cross-cutting policy 
problems. Mickwitz et al. (2009), for example, argue that a focus on coherence and 
consistency of policy approaches with regard to climate change must not be at the expense 
of diminished attention for and devotion to ambitious climate change mitigation and 
adaptation programmes at subsystem level. This remark corresponds with the argument 
in the literature on boundary-spanning policy regimes that substantive policy efforts 
within subsystems should be coordinated, not replaced, by procedural instruments at 
a governance system level (Jochim & May, 2010). This argument runs counter to the 
idea that the highest degree of policy integration is the creation of a new policy domain 
(Massey & Huitema, 2013). We follow Adelle et al. (2009) in arguing that creating a new 
policy domain on a cross-cutting issue with tailor-made institutions, policy goals and 
instrument mixes, may seem to lead to improved coordination and coherence, but that 
this new regime could well be achieved at the cost of wider cross-sector coordination. In 
other words, it could result in the same silos, albeit on a different level, from which an 
integration process started.
Furthermore, as a result of political and administrative realities full policy integration 
may not always be feasible. Underdal (1980), for example, points out that enhancing 
integration around one issue often requires transferring resources from other areas, 
possibly resulting in a loss of performance elsewhere. He also argues that an increase of 
coordination may conflict with other political values such as decentralization and broad 
participation. Jordan and Halpin (2006) arrived at similar conclusions in their study of 
attempts to develop a unified rural policy in Scotland. They suggest that as a result of 
competing priorities between sectors and stakeholders, imperfectly coordinated rural 
policy may be inevitable and, even stronger, that the ‘...project to rid policy practice 
of incoherence is too heroic’ (ibid.: 21). Therefore, they plead for a revaluation of 
bargaining and incremental politics. 
We would add that proponents of enhanced integration should not oversee and 
underestimate the merits of relatively lower degrees of integration, such as policy 
cooperation and coordination. Referring to Metcalfe’s (1994, p. 288) comment that 
‘the more basic but less glamorous aspects of the policy coordination process’ are 
vital, Jordan and Schout (2006, p. 43) phrase this as ‘the underlying capacities – the 
mechanisms to exchange information, consult, and arbitrate, etc. – need to be in place 
before [their accent] political energies are invested in setting strategic objectives and 
defining mission statements.’ Thus, it is not only the case that lower amounts of policy 
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integration are sometimes the maximum of what is politically feasible, they are also 
an essential foundation for enhanced integration. Furthermore, the nature of a cross-
cutting problem does not always require the most advanced form of integration to be 
addressed satisfactorily. Sometimes, all that is required is the sharing of information, or 
a once-only coordinated action (Keast et al., 2007).
At the same time, situations in which the need for policy integration is not recognized 
can be dangerous when integration is required to deal with a pressing and potentially 
destructive problem. Gieve and Provost (2012) provide the example of the financial crisis 
of 2007-2009, which, they argue, at least partly resulted from the lack of coordination 
between bank regulation and monetary policy. This implies that although full policy 
integration may not always be feasible or needed, there is at least need for a reflection 
mechanism that signals gaps or tensions in the governance of cross-cutting problems 
and that informs decision makers so that proactive adjustments can be made to avoid or 
anticipate to crises (Candel et al., 2015).  
The ambition of this chapter has been to draw policy integration out of the domain 
of environment, and to make it a subject of general theorizing in the political sciences 
as more and more problems are perceived as “wicked”  and cross-cutting. Although 
debates on EPI in the early 2000s have certainly set the agenda and have provided a 
firm foundation for thinking about integration, expanding the integration debate and 
agenda to other domains and (associated) scholarly communities could provide new 
perspectives on mechanisms of stability and change, interactions and possible trade-offs 
between parallel integration processes, and normative implications of (the absence of ) 
policy integration. We believe the framework presented in this chapter provides a more 
refined lens for studying these mechanisms and patterns systematically and in more 
detail, although this requires further testing. Also, furthering the framework would 
require a more concrete operationalization of the various dimensions and indicators. In 
a separate paper, in which we apply the framework to a concrete case at European Union 
level, we offer some suggestions for how this could be done (Candel & Biesbroek, In 
Review-a). For example, we suggest studying subsystem involvement by determining 
which departments or directorate-generals are principally responsible for developing 
a specific policy proposal and which are providing input or opinions, for example 
through inter-departmental consultations. This allows for identifying both the network 
of subsystems involved in the governance of a particular cross-cutting problem as well as 
the interactions between these subsystems.
Two additional directions in which the framework could be furthered are by expanding 
it to studying vertical governance levels and to the integration of policy outcomes. 
Regarding the first, although the current policy integration body of literature primarily 
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focuses on horizontal integration between domains or services (Tosun & Lang, 2013), 
similar integration challenges arise in multi-level governance contexts (Briassoulis, 
2011). A promising way of expanding the framework in this respect, is by linking 
it to the notion of ‘functional regulatory spaces’, which span several policy sectors, 
governance levels and institutional territories (Varone, Nahrath, Aubin, & Gerber, 
2013). Regarding the integration of policy outcomes, as Jordan & Lenschow (2010) 
observe, relatively little research has been conducted on the effects of better integrated 
policy approaches on actual practices on the ground. It is not straightforward that full 
policy integration at governance system-level does necessarily result in more integrated 
outcomes compared to lesser degrees of integration. Specific challenges can occur in the 
implementation of integrated strategies, for example in the cooperation between public 
service agencies, which may prevent the realization of better outcomes. Furthermore, 
studying better outcomes or policy success is in itself conceptually and methodologically 
challenging, as different types of success exist, conceptions of success may vary, and 
agreed-on measurements of policy influence are lacking (McConnell, 2010). Further 
research and conceptualizing is needed to address these challenges and gaps.
The relevance of the framework to policymakers and political leaders lies in three 
contributions. First, the framework offers an assessment tool to evaluate current 
degrees of policy integration in the governance of a particular cross-cutting problem. 
In addition, it can be used for comparing these degrees over time, between issues, or 
between governance systems to address the normative question if integrative progress is 
enough. A second contribution is what we argued in the first half of this section, namely 
that the framework implies that these actors should not oversee the merits of lesser 
degrees of policy integration. Thirdly, the framework shows that actors should think 
about the four dimensions as conditions that they need to invest in simultaneously, if 
they want to realize a mutually supportive interplay across the four degrees that enables 
full policy integration. The challenge then, is to overcome the asynchronous nature of 
most integration processes by investing sufficient capacity and resources, including will, 
into synchronization efforts.
For those out of government office, the framework may be a helpful tool to monitor 
whether political promises to invest in more integrative approaches are kept and, 
consequentially, to hold decision-makers accountable to the commitments they make. 
Such accountability measures may be the first step towards integration beyond mere 
discursive levels for a range of issues that lie waiting to be addressed.
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CHAPTER 6
Policy integration in the EU governance of food security: 
do actions speak louder than words?
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Abstract14
The global food price crises of 2007-8 and 2010 led to European Union (EU) 
policymakers becoming more aware of the importance of better integrated 
approaches to address food insecurity. However, policy integration scholars have 
showed that such awareness and associated discourse do not always result in an 
actual change of governance. This chapter addresses the question of the extent 
to which the EU governance of food security became more integrated into the 
aftermath of the food price crises. We address this question by applying an 
innovative framework that acknowledges the asynchronous and multi-faceted 
nature of policy integration processes and that distinguishes four integration 
dimensions: (i) cultures of beliefs, (ii) subsystem involvement, (iii) policy 
goals, and (iv) policy instruments. An extensive analysis of EU documents 
complemented with interview data shows an overall advancement towards 
increased policy integration in the EU governance of food security. However, 
significant differences in dimensions exist between domains, particularly 
regarding new substantive policy instruments. Our findings suggest that 
integration has not (yet) much moved beyond discursive levels for the EU 
governance system as a whole. We identify various blind spots and opportunities 
for further integration. The authors argue that the policy integration framework 
offers a sophisticated and nuanced understanding of how integration proceeds 
over time and enables decision-makers to be held responsible for the policy 
intentions they express.
14 This chapter is submitted as: Candel, J.J.L. & Biesbroek, G.R. (sub) Policy integration in the EU 
governance of food security: do actions speak louder than words?, Food Policy. 
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6.1 Introduction
Since the 2007-8 and 2010 global food price crises, food security has received increasing 
political attention in European Union (EU) policy arenas (Candel et al., 2014; Grant, 
2012b; Zahrnt, 2011). The food price crises showed that states of food (in)security are 
affected by a broad range of factors and associated policies, not all of which are yet well 
understood (Headey & Fan, 2010; Rapsomanikis & Sarris, 2010). Consequently, the 
peak of attention has been accompanied by the rising awareness of the ‘wicked’ or ‘cross-
cutting’ nature of the policy problem of food (in)security (Brooks, 2014; Candel, 2014; 
Misselhorn et al., 2012). At the EU level, this awareness is reflected by two developments. 
First, food security concerns have been raised in a wide array of policy debates, such as 
in the reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP), the EU’s biofuels policy, and the Doha trade round negotiations. This has led to 
an expansion of meanings attached to food security (Candel et al., 2014). Second, new 
ideas have emerged about how food security ought be governed, including calls for more 
‘coherence’ (e.g., Council of the European Union, 2013; Piebalgs, 2013), ‘integration’ 
(e.g., European Commission, 2010c; Red Cross EU Office, 2013), a ‘holistic’ approach 
(Caritas Europa, 2014), and a common ‘food policy’ (European Green Party, 2008; 
Marsden, 2015). 
Public policy scholars have observed that political commitments to enhanced policy 
integration to address cross-cutting problems do not always proceed beyond discursive 
levels (Jacob et al., 2008; Jordan & Lenschow, 2010). This may result from resilient 
existing policy structures and institutions, but also from a lack of political will, capacities 
or resources (Mickwitz & Kivimaa, 2007; Rayner & Howlett, 2009). Consequently, the 
question can be raised whether actions speak louder than words in the case of the EU 
governance of food security. The EU governance of food security is here understood as 
all policy efforts at the EU level that either positively or negatively affect food security 
outcomes, i.e. food availability, access, utilization, and stability. This chapter aims to 
systematically assess to what extent political claims about enhanced policy integration 
were accompanied by an actual change of the EU governance of food security. 
The chapter also aims to make a theoretical contribution to the literature about policy 
integration. While policy integration has been hallmarked as the solution to governing 
cross-cutting policy issues, until recently no framework existed to disentangle and study 
changes of policy integration systematically. As a result, politicians’ claims about (the need 
for) enhanced policy integration were difficult to assess. In earlier work, we addressed 
this omission by developing an innovative ‘policy integration’ framework (Candel & 
Biesbroek, In Review-b). The framework defines policy integration as “an agency-driven 
process of asynchronous and multi-dimensional institutional change within an existing 
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or newly formed governance system that shapes the system’s and its subsystems’ ability 
to address a cross-cutting policy problem in a more or less holistic manner” (Candel & 
Biesbroek, In Review-b). Within such an understanding, the framework distinguishes 
four dimensions of policy integration: i) cultures of beliefs, ii) subsystem involvement, 
iii) more or less coherent policy goals, and iv) more or less consistent policy instruments. 
Both these dimensions and the definition of policy integration are further elaborated 
in section 6.3. We applied the framework to the EU governance of food security by 
conducting a quantitative study of EU legislation and preparatory acts, complemented 
with qualitative data from a previous study (section 6.4). Because this study is the first 
empirical application of the framework, we allocate some space to reflect on its usability 
in the Discussion section of this chapter.
6.2  Calls for enhanced policy integration in EU food security governance
The EU, and particularly the European Commission, have traditionally been 
characterized as hierarchical and inflexible governance systems that are generally 
incapable of coping with cross-cutting and ‘wicked’ policy problems (Adelle et al., 2015; 
Jordan & Schout, 2006; Kassim et al., 2013; Peters & Wright, 2001). Nevertheless, the 
Commission has developed a range of tools and approaches to strengthen its ability to 
foster cross-sectoral policy integration over the last decade (Lang, Radaelli, & Tosun, 
2015; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2010). Examples thereof are the reinforced coordinative role of 
the Secretariat-General, the growing importance of impact assessments and inter-service 
consultations, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), and Policy Coherence for 
Development (PCD) (Hartlapp et al., 2010; Kassim et al., 2013). The focus on enforced 
governance of cross-cutting policy problems has been an important feature of the Lisbon 
and Europe2020 strategies, both of which greatly emphasized the need for horizontal 
integration (Borrás & Radaelli, 2011; Lang et al., 2015). The rationale underlying 
these strategies and initiatives is that policy problems that transcend the boundaries of 
traditional policy domains can only be satisfactorily dealt with through coherent policy 
goals and mixes of supportive consistent policy instruments (Rayner & Howlett, 2009), 
both of which require a certain degree of meta-governance to facilitate coordination (cf. 
Jochim & May, 2010).   
During and after the food price crises of 2007-8 and 2010, a similar line of reasoning 
emerged in policy debates about the EU governance of food security. Food security is 
commonly defined as ‘all people, at all times, having physical, social and economic access 
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences 
for an active and healthy life’ (FAO, 1996). The food price crises directed attention to 
the broad range of causes of and influences on (conjunctural) food insecurity, including 
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climate change, international trade agreements, national market measures, biofuels 
production, financial speculation, armed conflict, and a general lack of good governance 
(Headey & Fan, 2008; Piesse & Thirtle, 2009). This led to a widespread recognition that 
food (in)security is a cross-cutting policy problem that touches upon the jurisdictions 
of a wide array of policy domains. Food governance scholars have therefore stressed 
the need for enhanced connectivity within food systems (e.g., Ingram, 2011; Lang 
& Ingram, 2013; Pereira, 2014; Termeer, Drimie, Ingram, Pereira, & Whittingham, 
2015b) and -chains (e.g., Barling, 2007; Tallontire, Opondo, Nelson, & Martin, 2011). 
At a political level, decision-makers have argued that food security should be governed 
in a more coordinated, coherent and/or holistic manner (Candel, 2014; Drimie & 
Ruysenaar, 2010; Margulis, 2013). The following quotes illustrate these arguments at 
the EU level: 
[D]evelopment aid alone is not sufficient to effectively fight hunger. 
We need to look at all the available options and PCD is one critical 
tool to improve global food security. […] I will personally pay a strong 
attention to the impact of EU policies on the rest of the world to ensure a 
maximum coherence between its internal and development policies.  
Andris Piebalgs, then EU Commissioner for Development (2013)
The Council stresses that good governance for food and nutrition security 
at all levels is essential, and that coherence between policies should 
be pursued in cases of negative effects on food and nutrition security.  
Council of the European Union (2013)
These calls were accompanied by the invocation of food security concerns across a broad 
range of policy debates, most notably the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
post-2013 (Candel et al., 2014; Grant, 2012b). Apart from the CAP, food security 
arguments also played a role in discussions about issues such as the Common Fisheries 
Policy reform, biodiversity and soil fertility, international trade agreements, and 
renewable energy (Candel et al., 2015). 
Both the prevalence of food security concerns in a range of policy domains and the 
attention of EU institutions and high-level decision-makers to the shortcomings of 
existing governance practices indicate that there is a strong ambition towards strengthening 
policy integration in the EU governance of food security. However, various scholars 
have pointed out that such a discursive shift does not necessarily go together with the 
inclusion of alternative actor configurations or actual reconsiderations and adjustments 
of policy goals and instrument mixes (Candel & Biesbroek, In Review-b; Jacob et al., 
2008; Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Mickwitz & Kivimaa, 2007). In other words, policy 
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integration does not always exceed symbolic or discursive levels. Various reasons for 
this have been mentioned in the literature (Candel & Biesbroek, In Review-b). First, 
pre-existing policy elements, such as instruments, institutions or capacities, often prove 
remarkably resilient as a result of lock-in effects following from path-dependent processes 
of policy layering (Pierson, 2000; Rayner & Howlett, 2009). Second, the problem may 
be replaced on the political agenda by competing issues that are perceived as more 
pressing, hence reducing the political pressure to invest in policy integration efforts 
(Downs, 1972). Third, integration is no easy task, and many examples of failure exist 
(6, 2004). As politicians are known to avoid risk (Hood, 2010), it is unlikely that they 
will invest serious time and resources in policy integration (Howlett, 2014). Fourth, the 
invocation of particular concerns or calls for integration may merely serve the purpose of 
window dressing, enhancing the legitimization of a specific policy proposal or direction 
while lacking the accompanying political will or resources (Mickwitz & Kivimaa, 2007). 
Various scholars and commentators have argued that the latter has been the case with 
food security’s pervasiveness in global policy debates in recent years. According to 
some particularly critical scholars, invoking ‘food security’ merely suits proponents of 
intensifying food production (Fish et al., 2013; Rosin, 2013; Tomlinson, 2013) or of 
a neoliberal trade agenda (Jarosz, 2011; Koc, 2013). Other scholars make the similar 
argument that food security arguments have primarily been used to strengthen the 
legitimacy of stakeholders’ desired policy directions, but show that virtually the whole 
political spectrum uses such ‘framing’ strategies (Candel et al., 2014). Both groups of 
scholars however point at the legitimizing function of food security frames. 
6.3  A policy integration framework
To study the dynamics of policy integration in the EU governance of food security, 
we applied a policy integration framework that we developed and presented elsewhere 
(Candel & Biesbroek, In Review-b). The framework synthesizes various fragmented 
literatures about integration and coordination, such as the literatures on environmental 
policy integration (e.g., Jacob & Volkery, 2004; Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Lafferty 
& Hovden, 2003), boundary-spanning policy regimes (Jochim & May, 2010), and 
integrated policy strategies (Rayner & Howlett, 2009). 
In contrast to frameworks that consider policy integration to be a governing principle 
or final outcome that can be reached by making policy goals coherent and policy 
instruments consistent, we approach policy integration as inherently processual (cf. 
United Nations, 2015). By distinguishing four dimensions of policy integration, the 
framework allows for a more nuanced understanding of the continuous dynamics of 
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policy integration. Such an understanding rests on four starting principles (Candel & 
Biesbroek, In Review-b):
(i) Dimensions of policy integration do not necessarily move in a concerted manner. 
Instead, dimensions may move at different times and paces, and even in opposite 
directions. Jacob et al. (2008) for example showed that, in the case of sustainable 
development approaches, governments have often initiated shared goals and 
strategies, while lagging behind in developing supportive instrument mixes.
(ii) Policy integration is as much about positive integration, i.e. an advancement of the 
amounts of (dimensions of ) integration, as it is about disintegration.
(iii) Mutual dependencies exist and interactions take place between the four dimensions 
of policy integration. A change in one dimension of policy integration can result in 
a change in another dimension. However, these influences may work in multiple 
directions and under different mechanisms, which have not yet been systematically 
studied.  
(iv) Policy integration is a process of institutional change and design in which actors play 
a pivotal role. Whereas policy integration itself refers to a certain set of institutional 
conditions, changes in these conditions can be explained by focusing on actor-
centred mechanisms. 
The four dimensions of policy integration that we discern are: i) cultures of beliefs, 
ii) subsystem involvement, iii) policy goals, and iv) policy instruments (Candel & 
Biesbroek, In Review-b). Each of these dimensions consists of two or more indicators 
(Table 6.1).
The first dimension of policy integration consists of the cultures of beliefs within a 
governance system and associated subsystems. The former refers to the extent to which 
the administrative culture of a governance system promotes integrative approaches to 
the governance of food security (cf. EEA, 2005). The latter involves the extent to which 
individual subsystems believe food security to be of their concern and recognize the 
governance implications of the cross-cutting nature, for example in terms of strengthened 
policy coherence or coordination.
The second dimension, subsystem involvement, revolves around the range of subsystems 
involved in the governance of food security. Subsystems refer to relatively stable and 
closed configurations of actors and institutions that govern a specific policy problem 
or domain within a broader governance system (cf. Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Apart 
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from subsystems that are actively involved, the dimension also includes those that are 
not but could be in the future because their decisions affect policy outcomes (Dupuis & 
Biesbroek, 2013). The degree of subsystem involvement is thus relative to the number of 
potentially relevant subsystems for food security. Additionally, this dimension also covers 
the density of interactions between subsystems on food security. The assumption here is 
that higher amounts of policy integration are characterized by a number of subsystems 
that frequently interact with each other and that maintain relatively more infrequent 
interactions with a wider set of ‘loosely coupled’ subsystems (cf. Orton & Weick, 1990).
The dimension policy goals refers to: (i) the range of policies across subsystems in which 
(concerns about) food security is (explicitly) adopted as a goal, and (ii) the coherence 
between a governance system’s diversity of policy goals. These goals are pursued through 
a mix of policy instruments, which constitutes the fourth dimension. Policy instruments 
can be deployed within subsystems, but also at the level of the governance system, 
for example in the case of interdepartmental working groups. We make a distinction 
between substantive and procedural policy instruments. Substantive instruments allocate 
(financial, informational, regulative or organizational) resources to directly affect the 
‘nature, types, quantities and distribution of the goods and services provided in society’ 
(Howlett, 2000, p. 415); procedural instruments are designed to ‘indirectly affect 
outcomes through the manipulation of policy processes’ (ibid.: 413). Three indicators 
are relevant to this dimension: (i) the range of policies that explicitly adopt policy 
instruments to address food security, (ii) the deployment of overarching procedural 
instruments to facilitate coordination between subsystems, and (iii) the consistency of 
the policy instrument mix as a whole.
For each of these dimensions we distinguish four ideal-type manifestations, which are 
presented in Table 6.1. The table lists both the brief descriptions of the dimensions’ 
manifestations as set out in the original framework as well as concrete expectations of 
manifestations in the EU governance of food security (italicized).
6.4  Methodical approach
To study the development of policy integration in the EU governance of food security, 
we operationalized each of the four dimensions into specific indicators. Our primary 
source of data for studying these indicators were EU documents, which we retrieved 
by systematically searching EU search engines (for search criteria, see Supplementary 
Material (SM) D). Subsequently, data was coded by using the coding program Atlas.
ti, resulting in the data extraction tables and figures presented in SM D. Table 6.2 
presents the specific indicators and modes of data collection and analysis for each of the 
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nt
at
io
n t
o 
ta
ck
le
 pr
ob
le
m
s.
 Cr
os
s‐c
ut
tin
g n
at
ur
e 
of
 pr
ob
le
m
 no
t re
co
gn
ize
d.
 Pr
ob
le
m
 
de
fin
ed
 in 
na
rr
ow
 te
rm
s.
  
        Foo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 is 
de
fin
ed
 in 
na
rr
ow
 
te
rm
s, f
or
 ex
am
pl
e a
s s
ol
el
y a
n is
su
e 
of
 de
ve
lo
pm
en
t co
op
er
at
io
n.
 
Cu
ltu
re
 of
 inw
ar
d o
rie
nt
at
io
n t
o t
ac
kl
e 
pr
ob
le
m
s.
 Fa
ilu
re
 of
 do
m
in
an
t 
su
bs
ys
te
m
 in 
m
an
ag
in
g p
ro
bl
em
 an
d 
ex
te
rn
al
iti
es
 re
co
gn
ize
d.
 Re
su
lts
 in 
re
al
iza
tio
n t
ha
t m
ut
ua
l po
lic
y c
on
ce
rn
s 
sh
ou
ld
 be
 th
ou
gh
t o
ve
r w
ith
in
 
su
bs
ys
te
m
s.
 
  Re
al
iza
tio
n t
ha
t e
xt
er
na
lit
ie
s o
f p
ol
ic
ie
s 
of
 va
rio
us
 do
m
ai
ns
 inf
lu
en
ce
 fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y o
ut
co
m
es
. 
Cu
ltu
re
 of
 ou
tw
ar
d o
rie
nt
at
io
n t
o 
ta
ck
le
 pr
ob
le
m
s.
 Aw
ar
en
es
s o
f 
cr
os
s‐c
ut
tin
g n
at
ur
e o
f p
ro
bl
em
. 
          Aw
ar
en
es
s th
at
 fo
od
 (in
)s
ec
ur
ity
 
is a
ffe
ct
ed
 by
 a b
ro
ad
 ra
ng
e o
f 
fa
ct
or
s a
nd
 inf
lu
en
ce
s.
 
Cu
ltu
re
 of
 ou
tw
ar
d o
rie
nt
at
io
n t
o 
ta
ck
le
 pr
ob
le
m
s.
 Cr
os
s‐c
ut
tin
g 
na
tu
re
 of
 th
e p
ro
bl
em
 is 
re
co
gn
ize
d.
 Al
l po
ss
ib
ly
 re
le
va
nt
 
su
bs
ys
te
m
s h
av
e d
ev
el
op
ed
 ide
as
 
ab
ou
t th
ei
r ro
le
 in 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 of
 
pr
ob
le
m
. 
  All
 po
te
nt
ia
lly
 re
le
va
nt
 
su
bs
ys
te
m
s1
7   h
av
e d
ev
el
op
ed
 ide
as
 
ab
ou
t th
ei
r ro
le
 in 
th
e g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
of
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y.
 
Pr
ob
le
m
 is 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 to
 fa
ll w
ith
in
 
bo
un
da
rie
s o
f sp
ec
ifi
c s
ub
sy
st
em
. 
Ef
fo
rt
s o
f o
th
er
 su
bs
ys
te
m
s a
re
 no
t 
un
de
rs
to
od
 to
 be
 pa
rt
 of
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 of
 th
e p
ro
bl
em
. N
o p
us
h 
fo
r in
te
gr
at
io
n.
 
      Foo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 co
ns
id
er
ed
 to
 fa
ll w
ith
in
 
th
e b
ou
nd
ar
ie
s o
f o
ne
 do
m
ai
n,
 e.g
. 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t co
op
er
at
io
n.
 Ef
fo
rt
s o
f 
ot
he
r d
om
ai
ns
, e.
g.
 ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l or
 
fis
he
rie
s p
ol
ic
y,
 no
t u
nd
er
st
oo
d in
 
te
rm
s o
f fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y.
 
 
Aw
ar
en
es
s th
at
 po
lic
y o
ut
pu
ts
 of
 
di
ffe
re
nt
 su
bs
ys
te
m
s s
ha
pe
 po
lic
y 
ou
tc
om
es
, n
ot
io
n o
f e
xt
er
na
lit
ie
s a
nd
 
do
‐no
‐ha
rm
. P
ro
bl
em
 is 
st
ill
 
pr
ed
om
in
an
tly
 pe
rc
ei
ve
d o
f a
s fa
lli
ng
 
w
ith
in
 th
e b
ou
nd
ar
ie
s o
f p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
su
bs
ys
te
m
. N
o s
tr
on
g p
us
h f
or
 
in
te
gr
at
io
n.
 
  Foo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 co
ns
id
er
ed
 to
 fa
ll w
ith
in
 
th
e b
ou
nd
ar
ie
s o
f o
ne
 do
m
ai
n,
 bu
t 
so
m
e a
tt
en
tio
n t
o p
ot
en
tia
l 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 of
 ot
he
r d
om
ai
ns
 
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 th
at
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
of
 pr
ob
le
m
 sh
ou
ld
 no
t b
e 
re
st
ric
te
d t
o s
in
gl
e d
om
ai
n.
 
N
ot
io
ns
 of
 co
or
di
na
tio
n a
nd
 
co
he
re
nc
e e
m
er
ge
. 
        Foo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 is 
vi
ew
ed
 as
 a 
po
lic
y p
ro
bl
em
 th
at
 sp
an
s th
e 
bo
un
da
rie
s o
f va
rio
us
 po
lic
y 
do
m
ai
ns
, w
hi
ch
 th
er
ef
or
e n
ee
d t
o 
co
or
di
na
te
 th
ei
r p
ol
ic
y e
ffo
rt
s. 
Vi
ew
 th
at
 pr
ob
le
m
 is 
an
d s
ho
ul
d 
no
t so
le
ly
 be
 go
ve
rn
ed
 by
 
su
bs
ys
te
m
s,
 bu
t b
y s
ys
te
m
 as
 a 
w
ho
le
. Su
bs
ys
te
m
s a
re
 de
sir
ed
 to
 
w
or
k a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 sh
ar
ed
, ‘h
ol
ist
ic
’ 
ap
pr
oa
ch
, w
hi
ch
 is 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ly
 
re
co
gn
ize
d w
ith
in
 bo
un
da
ry
‐
sp
an
ni
ng
 str
uc
tu
re
s 
  Re
al
izi
ng
  fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y c
on
sid
er
ed
 
to
 be
 a c
ha
lle
ng
e t
o t
he
 EU
 as
 a 
w
ho
le
. 
2.
  Su
bs
ys
te
m
 inv
ol
ve
m
en
t: 
  Su
bs
ys
te
m
s in
vo
lv
ed
 
         
O
ne
 do
m
in
an
t su
bs
ys
te
m
, w
hi
ch
 
go
ve
rn
s th
e is
su
e in
de
pe
nd
en
tly
. 
Fo
rm
al
ly
 no
 ot
he
r su
bs
ys
te
m
s a
re
 
in
vo
lv
ed
, al
th
ou
gh
 th
ey
 m
ay
 be
 in 
te
rm
s o
f su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l, n
on
‐in
te
nt
io
na
l 
po
lic
ym
ak
in
g 
  Foo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 fa
lls
 wi
th
in
 jur
isd
ic
tio
n 
Co
nc
er
ns
 em
er
ge
 in 
on
e o
r m
or
e 
ad
di
tio
na
l su
bs
ys
te
m
s.
 
          Ide
m
, bu
t o
ne
 or
 m
or
e a
dd
iti
on
al
 
Tw
o o
r m
or
e s
ub
sy
st
em
s h
av
e 
fo
rm
al
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 fo
r d
ea
lin
g 
w
ith
 th
e p
ro
bl
em
. 
        Foo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 (in
 a b
ro
ad
er
 se
ns
e)
 
Nu
m
be
r o
f su
bs
ys
te
m
s th
at
 ar
e 
fo
rm
al
ly
 inv
ol
ve
d is
 eq
ua
l to
 or
 
hi
gh
er
 th
an
 at
 pr
ev
io
us
 
m
an
ife
st
at
io
n,
 bu
t co
m
pl
em
en
te
d 
w
ith
 loo
se
ly
 co
up
le
d s
et
 of
 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e s
ub
sy
st
em
s.
 
  Foo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 is 
em
be
dd
ed
 wi
th
in
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       Den
si
ty
 of
 in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 
of
 a d
om
in
an
t su
bs
ys
te
m
s, e
.g
. 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t co
op
er
at
io
n.
  
su
bs
ys
te
m
s m
ay
 to
uc
h u
po
n f
oo
d 
se
cu
rit
y c
on
ce
rn
s.
 
em
be
dd
ed
 wi
th
in
 m
or
e d
om
ai
ns
, 
e.
g.
 tra
de
 or
 ag
ric
ul
tu
re
. 
al
l po
te
nt
ia
lly
 re
le
va
nt
 su
bs
ys
te
m
s. 
N
o in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 
In
fr
eq
ue
nt
 inf
or
m
at
io
n e
xc
ha
ng
e 
be
tw
ee
n d
om
in
an
t su
bs
ys
te
m
 an
d o
ne
 
or
 m
or
e a
lte
rn
at
iv
e s
ub
sy
st
em
s.
 
      Som
e in
te
ra
ct
io
n w
ith
 ot
he
r 
su
bs
ys
te
m
s. F
or
 ex
am
pl
e b
et
w
ee
n 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t co
op
er
at
io
n a
nd
 tra
de
. 
M
or
e r
eg
ul
ar
 an
d f
or
m
al
 
ex
ch
an
ge
 of
 inf
or
m
at
io
n a
nd
 
co
or
di
na
tio
n,
 po
ss
ib
ly
 th
ro
ug
h 
co
or
di
na
tiv
e in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 at
 
sy
st
em
‐le
ve
l. 
  Int
er
ac
tio
ns
 be
tw
ee
n v
ar
io
us
 
su
bs
ys
te
m
s, w
he
re
by
 so
m
e 
in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 oc
cu
r m
or
e 
fr
eq
ue
nt
ly
 th
an
 ot
he
rs
. 
Hi
gh
 lev
el
 of
 int
er
ac
tio
ns
 be
tw
ee
n 
fo
rm
al
ly
 inv
ol
ve
d s
ub
sy
st
em
s,
 th
at
 
m
ai
nt
ai
n in
fr
eq
ue
nt
 int
er
ac
tio
ns
 
w
ith
 loo
se
ly
 co
up
le
d s
et
 of
 
su
bs
ys
te
m
s.
 
  All
 po
ss
ib
ly
 re
le
va
nt
 su
bs
ys
te
m
s 
in
te
ra
ct
 wi
th
 ea
ch
 ot
he
r to
 a m
or
e 
or
 les
se
r d
eg
re
e a
bo
ut
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
ef
fo
rt
s.
 
3.
 Po
lic
y g
oa
ls
: 
  Ra
ng
e o
f p
ol
ic
ie
s in
 wh
ic
h 
pr
ob
le
m
 is 
em
be
dd
ed
 
              Po
lic
y c
oh
er
en
ce
 
   
Co
nc
er
ns
 on
ly
 em
be
dd
ed
 wi
th
in
 th
e 
go
al
s o
f a
 do
m
in
an
t su
bs
ys
te
m
’s
 
po
lic
ie
s.
 
    Sec
to
r‐s
pe
ci
fic
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
oa
ls i
n 
on
e s
pe
ci
fic
 su
bs
ys
te
m
. Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e:
 
fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y a
s p
rio
rit
y in
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t co
op
er
at
io
n p
ol
ic
y.
 
Co
nc
er
ns
 ad
op
te
d in
 po
lic
y g
oa
ls o
f o
ne
 
or
 m
or
e a
dd
iti
on
al
 su
bs
ys
te
m
s.
 
      Ide
m
, th
ou
gh
 in 
ad
di
tio
n f
oo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 
co
nc
er
ns
 m
ay
 be
 em
be
dd
ed
 to
 so
m
e 
ex
te
nt
 in 
ot
he
r su
bs
ys
te
m
s’ p
ol
ic
ie
s. 
Po
ss
ib
le
 fu
rt
he
r d
iv
er
sif
ic
at
io
n 
ac
ro
ss
 po
lic
y g
oa
ls o
f a
dd
iti
on
al
 
su
bs
ys
te
m
s.
 
    Va
rio
us
 su
bs
ys
te
m
s a
do
pt
 fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y c
on
ce
rn
s in
 th
ei
r p
ol
ic
y 
go
al
s, s
om
e s
ub
sy
st
em
s m
ay
 
de
ve
lo
p c
om
pr
eh
en
siv
e s
ec
to
ra
l 
fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y s
tr
at
eg
ie
s.  
 
Co
nc
er
ns
 em
be
dd
ed
 wi
th
in
 all
 
po
te
nt
ia
lly
 re
le
va
nt
 po
lic
y g
oa
ls.
 
      All
 po
te
nt
ia
lly
 re
le
va
nt
 su
bs
ys
te
m
s 
ha
ve
 ad
op
te
d f
oo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 
co
nc
er
ns
 in 
th
ei
r p
ol
ic
y g
oa
ls.
 
Ve
ry
 low
 or
 no
 co
he
re
nc
e.
  
Be
ca
us
e o
f ri
sin
g a
w
ar
en
es
s o
f 
ex
te
rn
al
iti
es
 an
d m
ut
ua
l co
nc
er
ns
, 
su
bs
ys
te
m
s m
ay
 ad
dr
es
s th
es
e t
o s
om
e 
ex
te
nt
 in 
th
ei
r g
oa
ls.
 
  Ext
er
na
lit
ie
s o
f so
m
e p
ol
ic
ie
s m
ay
 be
 
ad
dr
es
se
d t
o s
om
e e
xt
en
t. 
Co
or
di
na
te
d s
ec
to
ra
l go
al
s,
 
w
hi
ch
 ar
e ju
dg
ed
 in 
th
e li
gh
t o
f 
co
he
re
nc
e.
 Su
bs
ys
te
m
s a
tt
em
pt
 
to
 de
ve
lo
p s
yn
er
gi
es
. 
  Foo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 ef
fo
rt
s c
om
e t
o b
e 
vi
ew
ed
 in 
te
rm
s o
f co
he
re
nc
e a
nd
 
po
te
nt
ia
l sy
ne
rg
ie
s.
  
Sh
ar
ed
 po
lic
y g
oa
ls e
m
be
dd
ed
 
w
ith
in
 an
 ov
er
ar
ch
in
g s
tr
at
eg
y.
 
      An
 ov
er
ar
ch
in
g c
om
pr
eh
en
siv
e E
U 
fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y s
tr
at
eg
y.
 
4.
 Po
lic
y  in
st
ru
m
en
ts
: 
  Ra
ng
e o
f su
bs
ys
te
m
s’
 
po
lic
ie
s th
at
 co
nt
ai
n p
ol
ic
y 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
            Pro
ce
du
ra
l in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 at
 
sy
st
em
‐le
ve
l 
 
Pr
ob
le
m
 on
ly
 ad
dr
es
se
d b
y t
he
 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e a
nd
/o
r p
ro
ce
du
ra
l 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 of
 a d
om
in
an
t 
su
bs
ys
te
m
. 
  Sec
to
r‐s
pe
ci
fic
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 in 
on
e s
pe
ci
fic
 su
bs
ys
te
m
. 
Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e:
 fo
od
 aid
 or
 a f
oo
d 
se
cu
rit
y b
ud
ge
tin
g li
ne
 in 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t co
op
er
at
io
n 
 
O
ne
 or
 m
or
e a
dd
iti
on
al
 su
bs
ys
te
m
s 
(p
ar
tia
lly
) a
da
pt
 th
ei
r in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 to
 
m
iti
ga
te
 ne
ga
tiv
e e
ffe
ct
s.
 
    Ide
m
, th
ou
gh
 so
m
e s
ub
sy
st
em
s m
ay
 
ad
ju
st
 th
ei
r in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 to
 ad
dr
es
s fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y c
on
ce
rn
s.  
Po
ss
ib
le
 fu
rt
he
r d
iv
er
sif
ic
at
io
n o
f 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 ad
dr
es
sin
g t
he
 
pr
ob
le
m
 ac
ro
ss
 su
bs
ys
te
m
s.
 
    Va
rio
us
 se
ct
or
al
 ins
tr
um
en
ts
 an
d 
in
st
ru
m
en
t m
ix
es
 th
at
 aim
 to
 
co
nt
rib
ut
e t
o f
oo
d s
ec
ur
ity
.  
In
st
ru
m
en
ts
 em
be
dd
ed
 wi
th
in
 all
 
po
te
nt
ia
lly
 re
le
va
nt
 su
bs
ys
te
m
s 
an
d a
ss
oc
ia
te
d p
ol
ic
ie
s.
 
    All
 po
te
nt
ia
lly
 re
le
va
nt
 su
bs
ys
te
m
s 
ha
ve
 ad
op
te
d f
oo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 in 
th
ei
r p
ol
ic
ie
s. 
N
o r
el
ev
an
t p
ro
ce
du
ra
l in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
at
 sy
st
em
‐le
ve
l. 
 
So
m
e p
ro
ce
du
ra
l in
fo
rm
at
io
n s
ha
rin
g 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 at
 sy
st
em
‐le
ve
l. 
 
In
cr
ea
sin
g n
um
be
r o
f sy
st
em
‐
le
ve
l pr
oc
ed
ur
al
 ins
tr
um
en
ts
 th
at
 
fa
ci
lit
at
e s
ub
sy
st
em
s to
 joi
nt
ly
 
Br
oa
d r
an
ge
 of
 pr
oc
ed
ur
al
 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 at
 sy
st
em
‐le
ve
l, 
in
cl
ud
in
g b
ou
nd
ar
y‐s
pa
nn
in
g 
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                      Con
si
st
en
cy
 
   
      Som
e in
fo
rm
at
io
n s
ha
rin
g in
st
ru
m
en
ts
, 
su
ch
 as
 int
er
‐se
rv
ic
e c
on
su
lta
tio
ns
 or
 
im
pa
ct
 as
se
ss
m
en
ts
, m
ay
 be
 ini
tia
te
d.
 
ad
dr
es
s th
e p
ro
bl
em
. 
    Ra
ng
e o
f cr
os
s‐s
ec
to
ra
l 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
, su
ch
 as
 im
pa
ct
 
as
se
ss
m
en
ts
 or
 co
he
re
nc
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s. 
 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 th
at
 co
or
di
na
te
, st
ee
r 
an
d m
on
ito
r su
bs
ys
te
m
s’
 ef
fo
rt
s.
 
  Co
or
di
na
tiv
e fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
st
ru
ct
ur
e(
s)
 at
 sy
st
em
‐le
ve
l, e
.g
. 
in
te
r‐in
st
itu
tio
na
l or
 int
er
‐se
ct
or
al
 
ta
sk
fo
rc
e(
s)
.  
N
o c
on
sis
te
nc
y.
 
Su
bs
ys
te
m
s c
on
sid
er
 ex
te
rn
al
iti
es
 of
 
se
ct
or
al
 ins
tr
um
en
t m
ix
es
 in 
lig
ht
 of
 
in
te
rn
al
 an
d in
te
r‐s
ec
to
ra
l co
ns
ist
en
cy
. 
      Som
e o
bv
io
us
 ex
te
rn
al
iti
es
, e.
g.
 of
 
ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l or
 tra
de
 po
lic
ie
s, m
ay
 be
 
re
du
ce
d.
 
Su
bs
ys
te
m
s s
ee
k t
o jo
in
tly
 
ad
dr
es
s th
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four dimensions. The analysis covers the period from 2000 through 2014, which allows 
comparing the governance of food security in the period before the food price crises (up 
to mid-2007) with that in the period of mid-crises (2007-10) and post-crises (2011-14). 
The specific indicators at points differ from the framework’s indicators as set out in Table 
6.1. The reason for this divergence is that information and documents about the internal 
EU policy process are difficult to systematically access and analyze. We therefore had to 
use proxy data for most dimensions. Limited access to quantifiable data also forced us to 
complement the dimensions of cultures of beliefs and (procedural) policy instruments 
with qualitative data collected through interviews with twenty senior policymakers 
involved in the EU governance of food security. Interview data was collected in Spring 
2014, coded and analyzed, see (Candel et al., 2015)15. Due to a lack of qualitative data 
we had to leave the EU institutions’ overarching administrative cultures out of the 
analysis, though (proxies for) beliefs at subsystem-level were included. Furthermore, 
because the operationalization and measurement of policy coherence and consistency is 
understudied at best and highly controversial at worst (Nilsson et al., 2012), these were 
not measured directly. Instead, they were included by looking for explicit references to 
linkages between goals and by the researchers’ interpretation in the Results section.
It should be noted that we studied the development of policy integration by focusing 
on the number and types of goals and instruments, without differentiating the weight 
or potential impact of specific goals and instruments. Hence, our findings only allow us 
to make statements about how policy integration within the policy process advanced, 
not about the success of these more or less integrated policy processes in reducing food 
insecurity. This is further reflected on in section 6.6. 
6.5  Results: policy integration in the EU governance of food security
This section presents the main findings of the analysis. Each subsection first summarizes 
the general findings for a particular policy integration dimension, followed by a more 
detailed interpretation of the results.
6.5.1  Cultures of beliefs
15 For this study, 20 Commission officials were interviewed in Spring 2014 about whether and how the Commission 
is capable of dealing with the ‘wickedness’ of food security. See the original paper for more information about the 
scope of this study and the selection criteria that were used.  
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For the dimension of cultures of beliefs, we observe both an overall growth and 
diversification of awareness about food security in Commissioners’ speeches as well as 
among officials working in a broad range of policy domains (Figure 6.1). However, food 
security is still primarily perceived as a development concern, whereby awareness in 
many other domains does not proceed beyond managing externalities and the principle 
of do-no-harm. Many of the ideas and actions in these domains are a reaction to the 
work of the DG Development Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) unit rather 
than a more proactive view of addressing food security as being part of subsystems’ 
mandates or jurisdictions. 
More careful analysis of the findings suggests that there was a clear increase in 
Commissioners’ attention to food security for four domains (Development and 
Humanitarian Aid, Science and Research, Environment, and the Presidency), but 
Commissioners’ attention remained stable or even decreased for all other domains. The 
two directorate-generals for which the Commissioners most frequently referred to food 
security are Development Cooperation (and Humanitarian Aid; 79 references in total) 
and Agriculture (and Fisheries; 74 in total). In the case of Development, food security 
was addressed frequently over the whole period of analysis. The increase in the period 
2010-2014 that is shown in Figure 6.1 is likely due to the separation of the DG in 
two new DGs, one for development cooperation and the other for humanitarian aid16. 
Interestingly, Development Commissioners Michel and De Gucht, who led the DG 
during the first price crisis, paid relatively little explicit attention to  food security in 
their speeches. The awareness of the importance of coherence and coordination was 
clearest in the speeches of Development Commissioner Nielson in the period 2000-
2004, although subsequent Commissioners continued subscribing to the importance of 
aligning humanitarian aid and development cooperation efforts in the context of food 
security. Widespread attention to food security within the DG Development and DG 
Humanitarian Aid was confirmed by interview data, which showed that food security 
concerns were well-embedded within these domains (SM D). This is particularly the 
case for the Policy Coherence for Development unit, which is responsible for aligning 
the policy efforts of other services vis-à-vis food security concerns.
Commissioners of Agriculture also paid attention to food security over the whole 
period of analysis, whereby Commissioners Fischler and Fischer Boel touched upon 
the topic more often than the late-Commissioner Cioloş. All Commissioners invoked 
food security particularly in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy, and the 
multifunctionality of agriculture engrained therein, and in food security exemption 
clauses in (agricultural) trade agreements. Respondents working in DG Agriculture 
16 The latter is now officially called DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
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Figure 6.1 Attention to food security in Commissioners’ speeches per domain 
(DGs were included for a Commission term in this graph only when a Commissioner referred to food 
security five or more times in a particular term.)
argued that, althou h food security was one of th  Common Agricultural Policy’  initial 
objectives and as such engraine  within agricultural policy making, it re-appeared as a 
concern after the food price crises (SM D). Recently, food security ideas have become 
institutionally embedded within the DG Agriculture by the creation of the unit ‘ACP, 
South Africa, FAO and G8/G20’. Fisheries and the Common Fisheries Policy were 
linked relatively rarely to food security. 
Two domains in which the Commissioners paid increasing attention to food security 
after the food price crises are Research and Environment. For Research this was due 
to the various food security research programs and calls as well as the emphasis on 
international scientific cooperation to address food security. For Environment, 
Commissioner Potočnik started referring to food security in the context of sustainable 
development and agriculture, the Rio+20 conference, and biodiversity. Interviews 
showed that the cross-cutting nature of food security seemed widely recognized within 
DG Environment, although respondents working in that DG often perceived food 
security as part of overarching themes, such as sustainable development and the green or 
blue economy (SM D). Our findings also show increased attention after president Prodi 
was succeeded by Barroso, and within the Barroso presidency during and following the 
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food price crises. This suggests that the presidency and Secretariat-General came to view 
food security as a relatively more important EU concern after the crises. 
Trade and External Relations are two domains in which the Commissioners regularly 
touched upon food security over the whole period, but where attention was more 
frequent before compared to during and after the food price crises. The Commissioners 
of Trade made these references primarily in the context of food security exemption 
clauses in trade agreements and with respect to the multifunctionality of agriculture. 
The Commissioners and High Representative of External Relations mainly referred to 
existing assistance programs. 
In addition to these domains, there are a number of domains in which the Commissioners 
referred to food security only a couple of times, the most notable of which is Health 
and Consumer Protection. For some domains, Commissioners started mentioning food 
security only during and after the food price crises, but the number of invocations is too 
low to be able to signal a trend. 
6.5.2  Subsystem involvement
Before the food price crises, the subsystem Development, complemented with the related 
subsystems of Humanitarian Aid and External Affairs, was clearly the most dominant 
subsystem in the EU governance of food security. Other subsystems made infrequent 
references to food security. During and after the food price crises, and particularly 
after the food price peak of 2010, new subsystems were involved more systematically, 
particularly the Agriculture, Trade, and Environment subsystems. However, there is a 
range of subsystems, such as Fisheries and Energy, whose involvement could be relevant 
in the context of food security, but that were not or hardly involved in the period under 
analysis. 
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Figure 6.2 Parliamentary committees that invoked food security five or more times in 
parliamentary reports within a year
(note: all committees that referred to food security less than five times within a year are under 
‘Other’)
Figure 6.2 shows both an increase and a diversification of references to food security 
across committees in the EP. Before 2008, only the Committee on Development 
frequently addressed food security, and once, in 2002, the Committee on Industry, 
Resea ch a d Energy. All other committee  invoking food security, such as those on 
Foreign Affairs, Environment, and Agriculture, did so fewer than 5 times per year. 
From 2008 onwards, more committees started referring to food security (concerns) 
on a regular basis, including the committees on Agriculture and Rural Development, 
Environment and International Trade. The year 2013 showed a clear peak in the number 
of referrals. Part of this peak can be explained by an increase in the number of references 
by the ‘traditional’ Committee on Development, but most of the increase follows from 
the involvement of new subsystems. The years 2009 and 2014 are remarkable for their 
relatively low numbers of referrals, which could be explained by the EP elections held 
in these years. 
We used the number of interactions between parliamentary committees per parliamentary 
term to assess the interactions between subsystems, see Figures 6.3a-d. 
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The figures show that in the years during and following the food price crises, the constellation of 
parliamentary committees developed into a relatively more complex network. Whereas in the years 
up to 2007, the Committee on Development was the dominant subsystem with no or hardly any 
interactions with other subsystems, in 2008 and 2009 the committees on Agriculture and Rural 
Development and on Environment became more actively involved in food security. The network 
became even more complex in the seventh term of the European Parliament, when a whole range of 
committees became involved, most with two‐way interactions with the Committee on Development. 
The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development played a more central role, interacting with 
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The figures sh  that in the yea s g and following the food price crises, the 
constellation of parlia en ary committees develop d into a relativ ly more complex 
network. Whereas in the years up to 2007, the Committee on Development was 
the dominant subsystem with no or hardly any interactions with other subsystems, 
in 2008 and 2009 the committees on Agriculture and Rural Development and on 
Environment became more actively involved in food security. The network became even 
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more complex in the seventh term of the European Parliament, when a whole range 
of committees became involved, most with two-way interactions with the Committee 
on Development. The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development played a 
more central role, interacting with both the Committee on Environment and that on 
International Trade. These interactions are mostly related to the reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy and the role of food security ideas therein. However, in spite of the 
increased role of these new committees, the Committee on Development remained by 
far the most dominant subsystem in the absolute number of interactions.
Similar patterns can be observed when looking at the directorate-generals of the 
Commission. Figure 6.4 shows an increase in references to food security in COM-
documents, particularly in the years following the 2010 food price peak. Here too, 
diversification toward new domains is visible, albeit to fewer than in the case of the 
EP, and in a later stage17. The results show that the increase in references is almost 
exclusively the result of ‘new’ DGs starting to invoke food security, whereas references 
by DG Development, even in combination with DG Humanitarian Affairs and Civil 
Protection, remained at roughly the same level. Two DGs that became particularly active 
were DG Agriculture and Rural Development and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). For DG Agri this was primarily related to the reform of the CAP, whereas most 
references by the EEAS were made in the context of foreign affairs and international 
cooperation. Apart from these DGs, the group “Other” is relatively big, both before and 
after the crises. This indicates that there was a whole range of DGs that infrequently 
mentioned food (in)security concerns in COM documents. 
6.5.3  Policy goals
The inclusion of food security policy goals cautiously diversified across ‘new’ policies 
from the 2007-8 food price crisis onwards. A parallel development is the increase in 
(notions of ) coherence of policy goals. However, policy goals were often incidental, 
limited to soft law, and did not include all potentially relevant domains. 
Supplementary Material D provides an overview of the policies and programs that 
explicitly mentioned food security as one of their policy goals. A general pattern that 
emerges from the findings is that before 2010 almost all key policies are related to 
development cooperation, humanitarian aid, and external assistance to neighbouring 
or partner countries and regions. A major policy in this respect was the 2008-10 Food 
Facility, which was set up to help countries and populations adapt to peaks in food 
17 Note that because of the lower overall number of references, Figure 4 mentions those DGs that refer to FS 4 or more 
times in a year, whereas this was 5 or more times for the parliamentary committees in Figure 2. 
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prices. Although food security goals were linked to a wide array of concerns, such as 
water, climate and health, this was principally done in the context of external assistance. 
Two exceptions to this observation were several bans on the import of various fish 
species, which were justified by the argument that they were important for global food 
security, and the Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources intended to safeguard future food 
security. Additionally, food security clauses were included in a number of trade and 
fisheries treaties. The only program targeted at food security within the Union is the 
scheme of distribution of food to the most deprived persons, which for a long time 
reallocated surpluses created by the CAP, but which has been separately financed since 
intervention stocks diminished. 
From 2010 onwards, food security policy goals were defined and included in a wide 
array of other policies, most notably the CAP and the Common Fisheries Policy, soil 
and bio-economy strategies, and Horizon2020. Combined with additional development 
and humanitarian aid goals, this resulted in an overall increase of the number of policies 
that have food security as an objective. However, it is important to note that for several 
of these ‘new’ policies, such as the CAP, food security was mentioned as a policy goal in 
soft laws, green and white papers, but did not recur as such in final legislation. 
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Before 2007-8 notions of the coherence and coordination of policy goals in hard and 
soft laws were mostly restricted to the mutual coherence of development aid instruments 
and to attuning development and humanitarian aid efforts. From then onwards, 
references to a coherence of policy goals increased and food security concerns came to 
be linked, albeit incidentally, to a more varied range of issues, such as the development 
of biomass, health, and trade. Two important mechanisms to strengthen the coherence 
of food security goals were the introduction of PCD and embedding coherence in the 
development goals of the Lisbon Treaty. Despite these developments, however, we did 
not find empirical evidence that coherence and coordination were put into legislation 
for many policies relevant to food security outcomes. Nor did the EU create a shared, 
system-wide strategy of how the whole range of its policy domains could contribute to 
food security.
6.5.4  Policy instruments
We find  that since the outbreak of the food price crises, ‘traditional’ food security 
instrument mixes were expanded, made more consistent, and complemented with some 
new types of instruments. In addition, the coordination and coherence of instruments 
were increasingly facilitated within the Commission, most notably by impact 
assessments, inter-service consultations, and Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). 
Nevertheless, the large majority of instruments were still development-driven. Many 
subsystems outside of external assistance developed no or only limited instruments 
explicitly addressing food security concerns. 
Supplementary Material D provides an overview of EU food security instruments 
engrained in hard and soft law from 2000 through 2014. The most substantial 
instruments before the crises were the provision of food aid and actions supported 
through the food security program, both embedded in the 1996 regulation on food aid 
policy and special operations in support of food security. As of 2007, this regulation 
was adopted within the Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation, which 
merged various geographic and thematic development instruments into a single 
development instrument. Another key instrument is the European Development Fund, 
which is the main cooperation instrument for ACP-countries and Overseas Countries 
and Territories. Similarly, various neighbourhood assistance instruments, such as TACIS 
and MEDA, were used to provide assistance to countries and regions neighbouring 
the EU. More specific instruments that were already used before the crises were the 
Technical Centre for Agriculture and Rural Development (CTA), food distribution to 
the most deprived persons within the Union, several bans on the import of particular 
fish species, and efforts to fix export refunds. 
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Most of these instruments continued to exist during and after the crises, sometimes in a 
different or expanded form. A major expansion of food security efforts in development 
cooperation was realized by the temporary Food Facility, which was created to help 
countries and regions become more resilient. Although we did not observe a full 
reconsideration and alignment of instruments, in some sectors instruments were 
combined or adapted in more consistent instrument mixes, such as the previously 
mentioned Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation and the new European 
Neighbourhood (and Partnership) Instrument. In addition, new instruments were 
developed and food security concerns became embedded in instruments that were 
previously not intentionally targeted at food security, for example the Instrument for 
Stability (later: Instrument contributing to stability and peace) used to provide external 
assistance in cases of political instability or major disasters. This instrument replaced the 
previous Rapid Response Mechanism, which, although it may have contributed to food 
security, did not explicitly take food security concerns into account. 
A number of new food security instruments originate from subsystems other than 
development cooperation and external assistance. Examples hereof are the prominent 
position of food security within the Horizon2020 research framework, including the 
Joint Research Centre’s activities on food security, monitoring the impact of biofuels, 
and the Copernicus earth observation program. The EU also appointed a special 
representative to the African Union. In spite of this increase in the density and intensity 
of policy instruments, we find that the majority of instruments are still development-
related. For many of the subsystems and policy goals identified in the previous two 
sections we found either no or only minor associated substantive instruments. For 
example, in spite of pervasive food security invocations and food security policy goals, 
the final versions of the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy 
did not contain any explicit food security instruments to implement the objectives. 
This finding is supported by our qualitative data. Regarding the EU’s internal procedural 
instruments in the governance of food security, interviews with Commission officials 
revealed that quite a number of instruments had been used to ensure and enhance 
coordination and coherence within the Commission (SM D). Although interviews 
were only held in 2014, respondents indicated that these instruments had become more 
important in recent years. Two of the Commission’s most common internal procedural 
instruments, impact assessments and inter-service consultations, were reported to 
be important tools for addressing food security-related concerns, for example in the 
biofuels development policy, the Common Agricultural Policy, and trade agreements. 
In practice, these concerns were raised mainly by officials working in the domains 
of development cooperation and external assistance. Another key instrument in this 
respect is PCD, with food security as one of the five key priorities. PCD enables DG 
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Development to screen the Commission’s work program for initiatives that may have 
an impact on food security and, consequentially, to have a say in the policy process 
regarding a broad range of issues. However, respondents argued that because of the 
limited capacity of the PCD team, efforts were limited to major policies and programs 
that might have a detrimental effect on food security, such as the Common Agricultural 
Policy and trade agreements. PCD is therefore still primarily used according to the ‘do-
no-harm’ principle, rather than to realize synergies. Three other types of instruments 
that respondents mentioned to be relevant were: i) foresight studies performed by the 
Commission’s Joint Research Centre, which help put food security on the agendas of 
various services and provide scenarios for courses of action, ii) the Commission’s staff 
mobility policy, which facilitates a circulation of perspectives and expertise, and iii) 
the creation of ‘boundary units’, i.e. units created to address external concerns within 
a domain, e.g. the previously mentioned unit ‘ACP, South Africa, FAO and G8/G20’ 
within DG AGRI. 
6.6  Discussion: do actions speak louder than words?
Our findings suggest that each of the policy integration dimensions in the EU governance 
of food security advanced to at least some degree in the aftermath of the food price crises, 
see Figure 6.5. For none of the dimensions we found evidence of disintegration. Food 
security concerns became more prominent within a wider array of subsystems; food 
security goals diversified somewhat and there was an increased awareness of coherence 
and linkages with other issues; existing instruments, including internal procedural 
instruments, were expanded and made more consistent; and new types of instruments 
were developed. Whereas food security remained an important issue in development 
cooperation, it also spread to new domains and policy debates, such as those on biofuels, 
environmental programs, and trade. At the same time, integration proved much more 
substantial in some dimensions than in others. We will here elaborate on two lacunas 
that make us answer the initial question of whether actions speak louder than words 
with a ‘not really’; the development of policy integration remained largely restricted to 
discursive levels and did not involve any substantial change of governance. 
First, although a number of food security instruments were merged into more consistent 
instruments in 2006-2007, most notably the financing instrument for development 
cooperation and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the more 
recent development of new instruments, such as Horizon2020 and the monitoring of 
biofuels, leads to new consistency challenges. Moreover, because these new food security 
instruments no longer solely originate from the dominant domain of development 
cooperation (and external assistance), the consistency of the food security instrument 
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mix has become a challenge to the EU governance system as a whole. We did not 
observe any attempts to embed the plethora of instruments (or goals for that part) into 
an overarching EU food security strategy and associated instrument mix. 
Second, although cultures of beliefs, subsystem involvement, policy goals, and policy 
instruments diversified, food security concerns became more strongly embedded in 
some domains than in others. We observe that there are still a number of subsystems 
that could play a role in the governance of food security, but that have not or hardly 
been involved up to now. Examples hereof are the subsystems involved with migration, 
competition, social affairs and regional policy. Subsequently, we also see that relatively 
many ‘newer’ subsystems are aware of food security concerns and have developed some 
policy goals, but have not yet embedded these in formal policies or legislation and 
supportive instruments. For example, although food security concerns were pervasive in 
the reforms of the CAP and the CFP and food security was mentioned as a goal in both 
EP reports and preparatory COM documents, final legislation did not contain explicit 
food security policy goals or instruments. More in general, in contrast to the recent 
expansions and enhancements of the EU’s internal procedural instruments, there were 
relatively few new types of substantive instruments. Thus, whereas policy integration for 
the three other dimensions advanced clearly, the dimension of policy instruments lagged 
somewhat behind, and for some domains integration did not even proceed beyond 
discursive levels. This was also confirmed by respondents in the interview round at the 
European Commission. In the case of the CAP, for example, respondents claimed that 
food security is a good ‘buzzword’ for enhancing the legitimacy of policy proposals 
because it is an acceptable issue for to a wide array of stakeholders, but it does not 
necessarily result in substantive actions (Candel et al., 2015).
Food security primarily seen as a development 
concern, though some awareness in agriculture and 
trade.
2000 2008 2010 2014
Cultures of beliefs
One dominant subsystem, development cooperation 
and humanitarian aid. Only in 2008 and 2009 some 
involvement of Agriculture and Environment.
Subsystem 
involvement
Growth and diversification of food security concerns 
among domains. Food security still mainly perceived as 
development concern. Awareness in many domains does 
not proceed beyond managing externalities and do-no-
harm. 
Increase of subsystem involvement, mainly by ‘new’ 
subsystems, such as agriculture, trade, and 
environment. Shift towards a more complex network of 
subsystems that interact with each other, in which 
Development still has a central role. 
Food security goals primarily embedded within development 
and external assistance policies and programs. 
Diversification of food security policy goals to 
alternative domains. Increase of (notions of) 
coherence and linkages with other issues. Often 
limited to soft law.
Policy goals
Various food security instruments, mainly 
in development cooperation and external 
assistance. Some internal procedural 
instruments, such as impact assessments 
and inter-service consultations, not used 
to full potential.
Development and external assistance instruments are embedded 
within more consistent mixes. Food security concerns are adopted 
within a number of existing and new instruments, most of which are 
related to new domains, although number of new substantive 
instruments is limited. Use of internal procedural instruments is 
strengthened to some extent.
Policy instruments
Figure 6.5 Dimensions of policy integration in the EU governance of food security
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It is important to note that discursive or symbolic policy integration is not necessarily an 
undesired condition (cf. Edelman, 1985). Symbolic integration can play an important 
agenda-setting role in the sense that it draws subsystems’ attention to particular food 
security concerns (Candel & Biesbroek, In Review-b). Consequentially, learning 
processes may occur within subsystems, resulting in strengthened awareness of the cross-
cutting nature of food security and governance implications thereof. Such awareness 
generally is a prerequisite for governance changes to occur. However, the last point 
implies that, from a problem perspective, not much changes by discursive integration 
as such. Eventually the introduction or an adjustment of policy instruments will be 
necessary to realize improved food security outcomes. 
Undeniably, the relationship between strengthened policy integration in governance 
processes and eventual (food security) outcomes remains understudied and therefore 
unclear. Although policy integration scholars assume that more integration would result 
in better outcomes, studying such impacts is both a conceptual and methodological 
challenge (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010). We consider overcoming these challenges 
through conceptual and methodological innovation as a vital next step in future research 
on integrative food security approaches. The policy success and failure heuristic of 
McConnell (2010, 2015) could be useful in this respect, as it enables distinguishing 
various types of policy impacts, e.g., programmatic, process, and political success. 
Our second ambition in this chapter is to reflect on the policy integration framework we 
used for this study. Our analysis shows that the multi-dimensional approach can result 
in a sophisticated understanding of the various dynamics through which integration 
proceeds. This makes it possible to examine whether politicians’ claims and policy goals 
are being followed up by actual policy changes, i.e. changes of policy instruments, 
and to thus hold decision-makers accountable for their pursuit of policy integration. 
However, we encountered two problems. It was difficult to access the documents that 
could provide an insight into the EU’s internal policy process, forcing us to use proxies 
that were far from ideal. Moreover, implementing the framework is time-consuming, 
and substantial resources are needed for an in-depth study of the EU institutions’ 
administrative cultures and embedded food security concerns. The framework, and 
research on policy integration in general, would therefore benefit from continued 
methodological creativity and innovation. 
The policy integration framework allows for more refined studies on the interactions 
between the governance of crosscutting policy problems, such as possible trade-
offs resulting from the enhanced policy integration of the governance of a particular 
problem. Not only do higher degrees of integration require more resources, including 
institutional capacity, that cannot be used elsewhere, but a focus on the coherence of 
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goals and the consistency of instruments with respect to food security may diminish the 
coherence and consistency of the governance of other issues (Adelle et al., 2009; Lagreid 
& Rykkja, 2015). These are everyday choices in the working practice of decision-makers. 
It is generally not the case that subsystems do not want to address ‘external’ concerns 
such as food security, but they often simply lack the resources or have other policy 
priorities. The framework offers openings to start exploring these interactions and the 
integration priorities within a governance system to better understand why the four 
dimensions of policy integration do not always proceed synchronously.  
In this respect it could be interesting to also include the mechanisms that drive policy 
(dis)integration on food security, such as policy entrepreneurship, social learning 
processes, and coalition building (Bauer et al., 2012; Candel & Biesbroek, In Review-b; 
Jochim & May, 2010). Studying these mechanisms may answer the ‘why-question’ 
behind changes in degrees of integration. Some of our results suggest the presence of 
integration mechanisms. For example, the rather symbolic use of food security arguments 
in the CAP and CFP reforms suggests forms of (ideational) entrepreneurship, whereas 
the work of the PCD unit may be considered coalition building across jurisdictional 
boundaries. However, these examples would need to be studied more systematically to 
make any scientific claims. 
We conclude with our concrete recommendations on how the EU governance of food 
security could be advanced further. As Table 6.1 elaborates, full policy integration 
into food security governance would implicate the involvement of all possibly relevant 
subsystems, some of which we mentioned earlier in this discussion. Subsystems would 
then need to get involved beyond ‘do-no-harm’, aiming to create synergies between 
policy efforts. In addition, full integration would require the design and implementation 
of an overarching EU strategy, which elaborates the role of each of these subsystems in 
addressing food insecurity, thereby ensuring the coherence of policy efforts. The PCD 
commitment to food security would be a good starting point for doing so, but would 
have to be extended from development cooperation to other fields of EU policymaking. 
Such an extension would require coordinative policy instruments at the system-level. 
These coordinative instruments do not necessarily have to be created anew; existing 
coordinative entities, such as the Secretariat-General in the Commission, could serve as 
boundary-spanning structures that take the lead in developing a holistic approach and 
facilitating coordination between subsystems (cf. Candel et al., 2015; Hartlapp et al., 
2012; Kassim et al., 2013). The consistency of subsystems’ instrument mixes is a key 
challenge in realizing such a boundary-spanning policy regime. 
An important question is of course whether further policy integration is politically 
feasible or desirable in the current political landscape (Jordan & Halpin, 2006). Member 
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states have been reluctant to hand over jurisdictions to the EU institutions, especially 
regarding domains related to external affairs and issues for which the EU has no formal 
competence, which has been reinforced by the rise of Euroscepticism over the last years. 
It may therefore be more realistic to strive for the optimization of lower degrees of policy 
integration, for example by attempting to reduce the clearest externalities. Although 
high policy integration ambitions help picturing the desired path forwards, in the short-
term it may be more productive to harvest the low-hanging fruit to ensure that actions 
do speak louder than words.
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This dissertation was prompted by the observation that food security has recently 
reappeared on the political agendas of the European Union institutions. Since the 2007-
8 and 2010 world food price crises, notions of and concerns about food security have 
been pervasive in a wide range of EU policy debates and communities. This increase 
in and diversification of attention to food security has not been without considerable 
criticism and controversies. Decision-makers, stakeholders, and academics have blamed 
each other for ‘hijacking’ the term food security to pursue vested interests and have 
disagreed about the policy directions that should be followed to effectively address food 
insecurity. 
The increased attention to and ideas about food security has been accompanied by calls 
for a change in how food security is governed at the EU level. The food price crises 
resulted in new insights into the complexity of the drivers of food insecurity as well as 
a recognition that food security is inherently intertwined with other (wicked) policy 
problems, such as climate change, social inequality, energy policy, and agricultural 
policy. This improved understanding has resulted in pleas for strengthened policy 
coherence and integration and for more comprehensive and holistic approaches to EU 
food security governance. 
Starting from the above observations, this dissertation conceptualized food security as 
a wicked policy problem that, by definition, cannot be solved permanently (section 
1.2). Instead, wicked problems rely on elusive political judgement for realizing temporal 
resolutions or settlements (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Such an approach to food security 
differs from most of the literature and commentaries, which share an assumption that, 
although food insecurity is a complex and contested problem, it can ultimately be solved.
The EU, and particularly the European Commission, have been criticized for their 
inability to govern wicked problems (for overviews, see: Jordan & Schout, 2006; Kassim 
et al., 2013). In this respect, three critical challenges to the EU governance of food 
security were identified (section 1.1.2): (i) the difficulty of defining the problem of 
food security; (ii) the Commission’s alleged incapability of governing wicked problems, 
and (iii) the problem of overcoming policy incoherence and inconsistencies in the 
stovepiped EU governance system. At the same time, both the EU’s ability to address 
wicked problems in general and its governance of food security specifically have 
hardly been studied systematically. Therefore, the central question of this dissertation 
is: how does the European Union govern the wicked problem of food security? To 
address this question, the three challenges were translated into three research questions. 
These questions were preceded by a research question that aimed to provide a deeper 
understanding of food security governance and associated manifestations of wickedness 
in general:
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5. What insights does the existing body of food security governance literature provide 
about governing the wicked problem of food security?
6. Which food security frames can be distinguished in EU policymaking and how do 
the EU institutions deal with this diversity?
7. What conditions enable or constrain the European Commission in coping with the 
wicked problem of food security?
8. To what extent has the EU realized a shift towards strengthened policy integration 
in the governance of food security?
Section 7.1 will provide answers to each of these questions and to the central question. 
Following from the ambition to also contribute to theoretical debates within the public 
governance and policy literatures, section 7.2 reflects on the main contributions of my 
research to the academic literature. Subsequently, section 7.3 concisely reflects on the 
methodological choices made in the research. Section 7.4 reflects forward by setting out 
three major directions for future research. The chapter ends with some implications and 
recommendations for EU policymakers. 
7.1  Synthesis of the research: answering the research questions
7.1.1 The current state of knowledge about food security governance
Research question 1: What insights does the existing body of food security governance 
literature provide about governing the wicked problem of food security?
To be able to study the EU governance of food security, it was necessary to first better 
understand food security governance and associated manifestations of wickedness in 
general. So far, the food security governance literature has been fragmented, containing 
multiple definitions, and entailing different epistemologies. Therefore, a systematic 
literature review of the food security governance literature was conducted and presented 
in chapter 2. The main finding of the review is that, although the emerging body of 
literature provides many relevant insights into the wicked characteristics of governing 
food security, it does so implicitly. In addition, the majority of the literature adheres 
to a rather simplistic governance perspective that runs counter to the governance 
assumptions within the governance of wicked problems literature. The literature 
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recognizes characteristics of wickedness, but the governance implications thereof are 
hardly acknowledged. 
Chapter 2 presented four insights that are particularly relevant in the light of the 
wicked problem governance challenges of food security. First, the literature portrays 
food security governance as highly complex; there are many determinants affecting food 
security outcomes, and their individual influence as well as the effects of interactions 
between them are not yet well understood. Moreover, these determinants develop in 
unpredictable ways, resulting in high uncertainty. Second, because the determinants of 
food security entail ecological, economic, social, and political factors, and thus multiple 
policy domains, food security governance spans the boundaries of jurisdictions. The 
literature shows that this awareness has led to the inclusion of new types of actors as well 
as to increased calls for policy coordination and coherence. Third, the literature provides 
a number of accounts of ideational conflicts about problem definitions and proposed 
courses of action, particularly at the global governance level. Fourth, the literature is 
highly critical of existing governance arrangements, arguing that these are too fragmented, 
underresourced and characterized by a democratic deﬁcit. This critique particularly applies 
to global governance, as food security governance at national or local levels has hardly 
been studied. These insights confirm and expand the initial conceptualization of food 
security as a wicked problem provided in the introduction of the dissertation. In 
addition, they contributed to a better understanding of the contextual conditions that 
EU policymakers need to deal with in everyday food security governance and, as such, 
they informed the following analyses. 
My research shows that the food security governance literature hardly links up to nor 
draws from public governance and policy theories. As a result there is only limited 
explicit reflection on the nature of food security as a (wicked) policy problem and the 
ensuing governance challenges. Instead, the literature can be characterized as adhering 
to a dominant optimistic understanding of governance as a problem-solving mechanism 
(Biesbroek et al., 2013b; Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996). The key assumption of such an 
understanding is that if governance arrangements and practices are optimized, for example 
through more coordination between governance arrangements, policy coherence, and 
stakeholder participation, it would ultimately be possible to effectively solve food 
insecurity. Chapters 5 and 6, however, showed that the inclusion of new subsystems 
and enhancing coordination between them does not necessarily result in actual changes 
of governance practices (section 7.1.4). More in general, the public administration and 
policy literatures have shown that, even when optimizations of governance processes can 
be successfully implemented, eventual solutions often fail to appear, precisely as a result 
of the wicked characteristics that the food security governance literature puts forward 
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Stone, 2012; Termeer et al., 2013). Chapter 2 argued 
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that this paradox of the food security governance literature - simultaneously recognizing 
and overlooking the wicked problem characteristics of food security - could be overcome 
by more explicitly reflecting on its conceptual and ontological underpinnings and by 
including a wider variety of governance understandings (Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996). 
The framing, governance capabilities, and policy integration lenses adopted in this 
dissertation are examples of such alternative understandings.
7.1.2 Framing food security in EU governance
Research question 2: Which food security frames can be distinguished in EU 
policymaking and how do the EU institutions deal with this diversity?
Following the theoretical expectation that food security serves as a consensus frame 
behind which considerable dissensus lies hidden (Mooney & Hunt, 2009), the second 
research question aimed to distil the various EU food security frames. This question was 
addressed by analyzing the debate surrounding the reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy post-2013, in which food security arguments proved particularly pervasive. 
Chapter 3 presented six food security frames that were found by extensively analyzing 
stakeholder and EU documents, complemented with four conference observations. 
Additionally, together with chapter 4, the research suggests that the EU institutions 
made strategic use of the fractured consensus surrounding food security in the CAP 
post-2013 debate to find resonance among stakeholders with diverging interests.
I revealed that there are six food security frames in the EU context, which have been 
referred to as: (1) the productionist frame, (2) the environmental frame, (3) the 
development frame, (4) the free trade frame, (5) the regional frame and (6) the food 
sovereignty frame. These six frames fundamentally conflict with each other in their 
definitions of food security, problem definitions, and proposed solutions. The food 
security frames that were found exceed and differed from the number and types of 
frames that were previously put forward in the literature (Mooney & Hunt, 2009). 
Moreover, each of the frames was shown to be invoked by a specific set of actors whereby 
many frames were supported by a configuration of private stakeholders, member states, 
and European Parliament political groups. This finding shows that frame conflicts also 
occurred within the EU institutions. The productionist frame and, to a much lesser 
extent, the environmental frame proved to be the most dominant frames in terms of the 
number of invocations. This is in line with previous studies of EU agricultural policy 
discourse (Feindt, 2010; Lynggaard & Nedergaard, 2009; Termeer & Werkman, 2011). 
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However, it might be possible to distinguish alternative frames that would be  more 
influential in other food governance debates and venues, both within and beyond the 
EU. Regarding the latter for example, it has been shown that the food sovereignty frame 
is relatively well represented in the reformed Committee on World Food Security (CFS) 
(Duncan & Barling, 2012).
These findings empirically confirm the dissensus lying hidden behind the consensus 
frame of food security. At the same time, however, chapters 3 and 4 suggest that the 
consensus frame was deliberately kept intact and used strategically by the EU institutions. 
This becomes clearest in the analysis of the Commission’s framing efforts, which contain 
elements of multiple food security frames. Putting food security forward as one of the 
strategic objectives of the CAP post-2013 may have served the EU to regain some of 
the legitimacy that was lost as a result of heavy criticism of the CAP’s trade-disturbing 
effects and the heavy burden that agricultural subsidies put on the EU budget, inter 
alia (cf. Swinnen, 2015). Dianne Dodds, member of the European Parliament, put this 
more explicitly by publicly naming food security as a new lynchpin for the CAP post-
2013 (Agra Europe, 2010b). Although not shown directly, the findings also suggest that 
EU actors used the dissensus lying behind food security to target different audiences 
adhering to different food security frames, thereby attempting to find resonance among 
the whole spectrum of stakeholders. In other words, the EU institutions benefitted from 
maintaining the  ‘fractured consensus’ (Maye & Kirwan, 2013) around food security 
in their communications and public performances as it provided a way of reconciling 
competing interests and perspectives and allowing for a continuation of the policy 
process (cf. Majone, 2005). This suggestion is enforced by the statement of various 
respondents from the European Commission that they used the Eurobarometer as an 
indicator of food security’s resonance (chapter 4). I found that food security is considered 
an effective ‘buzzword’ in interactions with the Council and Parliament to find support 
among different constellations of interests within these institutions. 
7.1.3 The Commission’s capabilities for governing the wicked problem of food security
Research question 3: What conditions enable or constrain the European Commission in 
coping with the wicked problem of food security?
The third question aims to unravel whether the Commission possesses conditions – 
skills, repertoires, capacities, commitments, and readiness – that enable them to cope 
with the wicked problem of food security as well as possible constraints to this ability. 
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Chapter 4 addressed this question explicitly by focusing on the Commission’s governance 
capabilities. Contrary to the expectation raised by the dominant view within the EU 
governance literature that the European Commission is incapable of satisfactorily 
dealing with wicked problems (for an overview of these critiques, see Kassim et al., 
2013), the chapter shows that the Commission is relatively well capable of addressing 
several of the challenges that result from food security’s wickedness. At the same time, 
these capabilities tend to be ad hoc and are not governed at the meta-level. 
Applying the governance capabilities framework to the EU governance of food security 
confirms some of the major constraints to the Commission’s ability to govern wicked 
problems that have been mentioned throughout the literature. Conditions that were 
found to have a major constraining effect were the Commission’s relatively limited 
human capacity, its lack of latitude following from its dependence on the other EU 
institutions, and a relatively firm belief in objectivity. At the same time, my findings 
nuance the image that the Commission is too inflexible, underequipped, and dependent 
to realize (temporal) resolutions. The Commission ‘scores’ particularly well on reflexivity 
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, resilience, responsiveness, and rescaling. These 
capabilities are enabled by various previously underappreciated factors and properties, 
including the widespread awareness and tolerance of frame conflicts, uncertainty, and 
scale dynamics among Commission staff, cross-sectoral and -institutional structures and 
procedures that enable the exchange of views, information and concerns, and bridging 
arrangements, such as thematic units. The only capability on which the Commission 
did not perform well at all is its ability to revitalize societal and political deadlocks. 
However, EU rules and procedures are so organized that they work towards reaching 
compromises within and between the EU institutions. As a result, the policy process 
almost always continues, even when deadlocked societal interaction patterns cannot be 
overcome.
While the majority of the Commission’s capabilities to cope with wickedness are quite 
well developed, they simultaneously tend to be ad hoc and to rely on individuals’ skills 
and commitments. Although a number of enabling conditions are facilitated by formal 
structures and procedures, such as inter-service consultations, impact assessments, and 
Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), the success of these procedural instruments 
eventually relies on individual efforts. For example, whereas the role of fisheries had 
long been neglected in development cooperation efforts, renewed efforts of two or 
three persons within the directorate-generals of Maritime Affairs and Development 
Cooperation led to renewed commitments. Of course one could argue that these 
individual commitments are also facilitated by the institutional context; for example, 
officials who had worked in different units or DGs seemed more receptive to external 
concerns, and the prioritizations of Commissioners proved to matter as well. At the 
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same time, the fisheries example makes clear that food security commitments are not 
self-evident and differ across subsystems as well as over time. This was also found in 
the analysis of policy integration (chapter 6), which showed that the substantiality of 
policy efforts differs considerably across subsystems. In addition to this ad hocery and 
reliance on individuals, the capabilities are precarious as a result of the Commission’s 
scarce resources and capacities, which need to be deployed judiciously. My study, for 
example, showed that for both the capabilities of resilience and responsiveness, the 
Commission largely has to restrict itself to observing and reacting to existing signals, 
trends, demands, and concerns, rather than proactively scanning for potential new 
threats and issues requiring attention. The need to allocate resources and capacities 
to the most pressing or prioritized issues leaves the governance system vulnerable and 
dimensions of the problem of food security potentially unattended to. The combination 
of these challenges is further worsened and remains unaddressed by the Commission’s 
lack of a metacapability, i.e. a meta-governance mechanism or approach that could 
maintain the capabilities and balance resources within and between them (see section 
7.2). At the same time, whereas a metacapability may safeguard the Commission’s ability 
to successfully cope with the many dichotomies and seemingly conflicting properties 
of food security governance, its proposals and actions can generally be overruled by the 
other EU institutions. Although in times of sudden crises the institutions have been able 
to deploy substantial measures, it is unclear whether the EU polity as a whole is also 
successful in coping with the wickedness of food security.
7.1.4 Horizontal policy integration in the EU governance of food security
Research question 4: To what extent has the EU realized a shift towards strengthened 
policy integration in the EU governance of food security?
The fourth research question aims to unravel whether the EU has adopted more 
comprehensive or holistic governance approaches, as propagated by various EU 
decision-makers and commentators. This question proceeds beyond the Commission’s 
capabilities for governing wicked problems (chapter 4) in that it asks whether these 
capabilities have actually been deployed within a more or less holistic approach. The 
question was addressed by developing and adopting a policy integration heuristic and 
associated framework (chapter 5), which provide an alternative to existing static policy 
integration approaches (section 7.2). The approach recognizes the asynchronous and 
multi-faceted processes of integration over time as well as the sub-optimal governance 
practices and outcomes that these can result in. Applying the framework to the EU 
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governance of food security led to the insight that, although overall policy integration 
increased, substantive integration efforts remained limited to a number of domains and 
did not entail large changes in the types of policy instruments deployed (chapter 6). 
Applying the framework demonstrated that policy integration has increased in the EU 
governance of food security, particularly in the period following the 2007-8 and 2010 
global food price crises. In chapter 6 I discussed the increase in the number of EU 
subsystems within the European Parliament and the Commission that were involved 
in the governance of food security. In addition, relatively more subsystems were found 
to have cultures of beliefs that were open to addressing externalities and achieving 
coherence. Also, policy goals in which food security concerns were adopted increased in 
number and diversified over domains, particularly in soft legislation. Lastly, a number of 
new or expanded substantial and procedural policy instruments were deployed. 
However, we can ask whether policy integration of food security at the EU level truly 
proceeded beyond discursive levels. Significant differences can be observed between 
policy domains in terms of the substantiality of food security policy efforts. I found an 
increase of intentional policymaking across subsystems that was hardly accompanied by 
a diversification of actual, on the ground, policymaking. Instead, most new or expanded 
substantive instruments were deployed within the ‘traditional’ domains of development 
cooperation, humanitarian aid, and external assistance. A few exceptions were the 
increased funding for research on food security in the EU’s research frameworks, the 
monitoring of the impacts of biofuels production, and the new Fund for European Aid 
to the most Deprived (FEAD) within the Union. In most other domains, integration 
remained restricted to discursive utterances without accompanying instruments. 
Moreover, these discursive utterances were often only made in preparatory acts and soft 
legislation and did not always recur in final legislation. For example, preparatory acts of 
the reformed Common Agricultural Policy contained many references to food security 
concerns, but these did not recur in the final CAP regulations, nor were food security 
instruments incorporated. This finding supports the argument in chapter 2 that food 
security was used as a buzzword to gather support and legitimacy. It seems that the effect 
of new or enforced procedural instruments at the system level, such as PCD and impact 
assessments, have mainly resulted in increased awareness, but only in limited actual 
policy change to deal with food security more holistically. 
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7.1.5 Answering the main question
How does the European Union govern the wicked problem of food security?
Taken together, the framing analysis (chapter 3), the analysis of the Commission’s 
capabilities (chapter 4), and the study of policy integration (chapters 5 and 6) provide 
a mixed view of how the EU governs the wicked problem of food security. Although 
they illustrate that, in principle, the EU is quite capable of dealing with the challenges 
inherent to the wicked characteristics of food security governance, they simultaneously 
show that EU food security governance is characterized by relatively high degrees of 
symbolic or discursive policymaking (cf. Edelman, 1985). 
Summing up the main findings of chapters 3 and 4 shows that that the EU possesses 
a relatively well developed potential or latent ability to deal with the wicked problem 
characteristics of food security. There is indeed a wide range of conflicting food security 
frames, resulting in unstructuredness, continuously evolving demands and concerns, 
and deadlocked societal interaction patterns. However, policymakers within the EU 
institutions are generally well aware of these frame conflicts and manage to make strategic 
use of them by exploiting the ambiguity surrounding the consensus frame of food 
security to gather support among different audiences. More in general, the Commission 
possesses more enabling conditions and strategies than was commonly assumed within 
the academic literature. Apart from revitalizing societal deadlocks, the Commission 
generally appears to cope relatively well with the properties of wicked problems. In 
addition to these latent capabilities, Commissioners and Commission officials have 
stressed that food security is a holistic issue that needs to be addressed accordingly. 
For that reason, they have propagated strengthened coherence and policy integration. 
Although the advancement of policy integration was shown to be far from optimal, it 
did improve in the years during and following the 2007-8 and 2010 food price crises. 
At the same time, it was shown that actual governance changes in terms of policy 
integration remained largely restricted to discursive levels. This leads to the more 
general question of why although food security concerns were pervasive and capabilities 
to address food insecurity were largely present, new or enhanced policy commitments 
remained essentially absent. In this respect, the combined insights of chapters 3, 4, 
and 6 offer the plausible explanation that whereas in some domains genuine food 
security concerns prevailed, eventually resulting in the deployment of substantial policy 
instruments, in many domains notions of food security primarily served to pursue or 
legitimize existing interests. Just like concepts such as ‘sustainability’, ‘green growth’, 
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or ‘sustainable intensification’ (chapters 3 & 4), food security served policymakers 
as a discursive device that could be used to bridge both internal and external divides 
within stagnated or contested policy processes. Consequently, whereas the food price 
crises certainly led to renewed food security efforts within some domains, in many 
other domains these crises opened a ‘policy window’ (Kingdon, 1995) for deploying 
new (food security) ideas to revive, alter, or legitimize ongoing policy processes. This 
conclusion suggests that food security has largely been used symbolically; it is a strong 
symbol that EU policymakers have used to represent various desired courses of political 
action (cf. Edelman, 1985).
In terms of agenda-setting, food security has been high on the agenda of the subsystems 
of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, and, for a short time, on that of 
high-level EU decision-makers (the governmental agenda). However, it does not seem to 
have developed from the phase of ‘idea’ to that of ‘issue’ on other specialized agendas, i.e. 
it has not become subject to a genuine conflict of ideas between actors within alternative 
subsystems that would be prerequisite to adopt food security concerns in new or existing 
policies (cf. Cobb & Elder, 1972; Princen, 2007). When there is no disagreement within 
a subsystem about food security or no pressure of high-level decision-makers to address 
food security concerns, food security will simply not be a point of discussion at the 
negotiation table. The CAP reform round proved illustrative in this respect; Commission 
officials at DG Agriculture indicated that they were aware of food security concerns and 
that these were taken seriously, but when pushed by asking whether these concerns 
played a role in the actual negotiations about the new CAP they all admitted that this 
was not the case. 
An implication of this conclusion is that although both food governance scholars and 
societal stakeholders and commentators have stressed the importance of and potential 
for more holistic approaches to food security, e.g., an EU common food policy 
(Marsden, 2015), the renaissance of food security in EU governance does not yet seem 
to have resulted in a more comprehensive European approach to food security. Instead, 
even though new food security framings emerged, the crises were followed by a mere 
‘traditional’ upscaling of development cooperation efforts. Even innovative procedural 
instruments, such as PCD, do not seem to have had a major integrative effect in this 
respect. From a wicked problems perspective, the limited success in integrating food 
security concerns into new domains and associated policies, and thus to truly attempt to 
address these concerns and associated controversies in some way (nota bene: that does 
not mean solving them), raises the question whether the EU institutions have managed 
to realize temporal resolutions (cf. Bryson, 1988; Termeer et al., 2015a; Weick, 1984). 
These are further reflected on in section 7.5. 
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7.2 Theoretical contributions
The research chapters in this dissertation entail various smaller and larger contributions 
to theoretical debates within the public governance and policy literatures. This section 
concisely elaborates six main contributions of the research: (i) an innovative framework to 
study policy integration, (ii) a nuancing of the European Commission’s ability to govern 
wicked problems, (iii) the introduction of consensus frames as a valuable perspective on 
framing in the EU, (iv) insights into the limited effect of the Commission’s strengthened 
coordinative procedural instruments, (v) a more concrete conceptualization of the 
metacapability, and (vi) the inclusion of constraints in the analysis of the governance of 
wicked problems. 
A first and clearest contribution is the development of an innovative framework to study 
policy integration processes. Although various approaches to studying horizontal policy 
coordination and/or integration already existed, these were rather fragmented and did 
not prove helpful to study the development of policy integration within a governance 
system vis-à-vis a specific wicked problem over time. In addition, existing approaches 
tended to consider policy integration as a ‘mere’ desired outcome of policy processes. 
Policy integration is then understood as something that can be achieved or not. Such 
approaches do not acknowledge the inherently processual nature of policy integration as 
a concept; amounts and dimensions of policy integration can change across governance 
systems and over time. The framework that was proposed in chapter 5 does embrace 
this processual nature and conceptualizes policy integration as an asynchronous and 
multi-faceted process. Policy integration can hereby be subdivided into four constitutive 
elements: cultures of beliefs, subsystem involvement, policy goals, and policy instruments. 
These dimensions do not necessarily move at the same pace, or even in the same 
direction. For example, this study showed that in the EU governance of food security 
discursive dimensions of integration, i.e. cultures of beliefs, advanced further and at a 
faster pace than policy instruments. In addition, the framework also includes processes 
of disintegration, which have been argued to be essential to any comprehensive policy 
integration approach. The framework furthers the debate on policy integration in that it 
provides a tool for systematically analyzing the development of policy integration across 
governance systems as well as over time. As such it provides opportunities for more 
advanced understandings of policy integration patterns and associated mechanisms. 
Second, this dissertation proves that the European Commission is more capable of governing 
wicked problems than the dominant view within the EU governance literature assumes 
(section 7.1.3). Applying the governance capabilities framework offers a way of more 
systematically analysing the Commission’s enabling and constraining conditions than 
was done in previous studies. Although the outcomes of the analysis confirm some 
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of the Commission’s major restrictions mentioned throughout the literature, various 
enabling practices, procedures, and structures that had previously been overlooked or 
underestimated were identified. These findings give rise to a further nuancing of the 
Commission’s reputation with respect to governing wicked problems (Kassim et al., 
2013).
A third contribution concerns the introduction of consensus frames as a valuable 
perspective to framing processes within the EU. Scholarly attention to framing processes 
and their impact on policy change and stability within the EU polity is relatively recent 
(e.g., Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2008; Daviter, 2011; Klüver, Mahoney, & Opper, 
2015; Princen, 2011) and can be broadly divided into two perspectives: one that tries 
to explain the diversity of frames within and between the EU institutions, and one that 
focuses on how particular frames become dominant as a result of policy entrepreneurship 
within or by the EU institutions (cf. Daviter, 2007). These perspectives seem somewhat 
paradoxical at first sight: the former implies a continuous struggle between (proponents 
of ) frames, whereas the second acknowledges that specific frames can come to 
dominate others. Chapter 3 provides a valuable addition to these broad perspectives 
by introducing and analyzing the use of consensus frames at the EU level (Gamson, 
1995; Mooney & Hunt, 2009). The consensus frame of food security was shown to 
function as a dominant discursive device that simultaneously embeds a wide range of 
underlying frames that conflict with each other. As such, consensus frames provide an 
explanation for the simultaneous occurrence of frame diversity and dominating frames 
at the EU level. This contribution corresponds with previous accounts of deliberate 
ambiguity in EU governance (e.g., Majone, 2005; Treib, 2008). These accounts show 
that the use of ‘vague’ and widely resonating concepts and wordings has been deployed 
as an intentional strategy to provide diverging stakeholders with an opportunity to 
communicate compromises to their constituencies in a way that is favourable to them 
as well as to provide member states with some latitude in implementing controversial 
legislations.
Another contribution to the EU governance literature are the insights into the functioning 
of relatively recently deployed or expanded instruments targeted at strengthening policy 
integration within the EU, particularly within the Commission. Scholars have noted the 
potential of integrative commitments under the Barroso presidency of the Commission, 
such as the enforced role of the Secretariat-General in safeguarding the coherence of 
policies, the growing importance of impact assessments and consultations under the 
Better Regulation agenda, the Open Method of Coordination, and Policy Coherence 
for Development (Hartlapp et al., 2010; Kassim et al., 2013; Lang et al., 2015). This 
study, however, shows that such a configuration of instruments is insufficient on its 
own, at least for the EU governance of food security. In spite of discursive commitments 
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and enhanced coordinative instruments, very few food security goals and instruments 
were embedded in final legislation. This could be because procedural instruments were 
too weak to significantly impact the policy processes within subsystems (cf. Kassim et 
al., 2013), and/or that commitments and initiatives in general did not proceed beyond 
discursive levels (cf. Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Mickwitz & Kivimaa, 2007). This 
connects to the policy integration framework’s assumption that dimensions of policy 
integration are interconnected; without a shared vision or an administrative culture that 
stimulates integrated food security approaches, subsystems’ efforts will likely remain 
fragmented and contradictory. 
A fifth theoretical contribution involves the provision of a more concrete conceptualization 
of a metacapability for governing wicked problems. The metacapability forms an 
important element in the recently developed governance capabilities framework, but 
so far it has remained unclear what it could look like or entail in practice. For example, 
would it need to be formally embedded within a governance system, or does it rely 
on decision-makers’ intuition and vision? So far, the literature has not proceeded 
beyond the point that a metacapability has to do with balancing (resources between) 
capabilities. Chapters 4 through 6 have brought this discussion further by implicitly 
and explicitly conceptualizing the metacapability as a procedural policy instrument that 
spans the boundaries of a governance system’s subsystems to monitor, coordinate, and, if 
necessary, intervene in individual policies and processes. This institutionally embedded 
metacapability is similar to concepts such as ‘boundary-spanning policy regimes’ (Jochim 
& May, 2010) or ‘central authorities’ (Lafferty & Hovden, 2003) and fits within the 
broader notion of ‘meta-governance’ (Jessop, 2003). Concretely, such a metacapability 
could be embedded within inter-departmental taskforces, an ombudsman, or within the 
cabinets of decision-makers. At the EU level, the Commission’s Secretariat-General, the 
PCD-unit and -coordinators, or a new inter-institutional consultative body similar to 
the trilogues could potentially fulfil such a role.
Another contribution to the capabilities framework and evaluations of governance 
systems’ ability to govern wicked problems in general is the inclusion of constraining 
conditions. Most existing wicked problem frameworks and approaches focus solely 
on enabling ‘capabilities’ (and related enabling constructs) and can therefore not be 
used to conduct systematic analyses of governance systems’ overall capability to govern 
wicked problems. I have expanded the governance capabilities framework by defining 
constraining conditions as the absence of skills, repertoires, capacities, commitments, 
and readiness that enable governing wicked problems or any limitations to these. Major 
constraints that were found in this study were the limitations that the Commission’s 
limited resources put on its signalling and response capacities, its dependency on the other 
EU institutions, and the reliance on the prioritizations of individual decision-makers. 
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Although these constraints largely correspond with previous accounts of traditional 
governance modes and do not offer very new insights in that respect (e.g., Koppenjan 
& Klijn, 2004; Roberts, 2000), they need to be included to obtain a comprehensive 
understanding of a governance system’s functioning vis-à-vis wicked problems as well as 
to carry out interventions to ameliorate this functioning. 
7.3 Reflecting backwards: strengths and limitations of the research
7.3.1  Reflecting on the exploratory research design
Recent years have witnessed the relatively rapid development of food (security) policy 
and governance as a distinct research field within the political sciences. This rapid 
development of the field is well illustrated by the steady increase of publications on 
the theme, an increasing number of food policy and governance sections at academic 
conferences, and the establishment of a food governance research network under the 
auspices of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). Nevertheless, until 
now relatively little empirical research had been conducted on existing food security 
governance arrangements (but see: Duncan, 2015; Oosterveer, 2007; Sonnino, Lozano 
Torres, & Schneider, 2014) and virtually none about the EU governance of food 
security. The focus and timing of my dissertation therefore fit in well with the rise of 
food governance research. This dissertation is one of the first attempts to systematically 
analyse how governance systems, in this case the European Union, govern food security 
and the specific challenges associated with it. The virgin territory of EU food security 
governance was studied by adopting an exploratory research design throughout the 
dissertation (see section 1.4). Within this exploratory design, the best fitting public 
governance and policy theories were selected to study the three challenges to the EU 
governance of food security. Over the course of the research, I experienced that this 
approach had both advantages and disadvantages.
The exploratory approach allowed me to follow where the research findings led me. 
It enabled identifying and studying the most pressing governance challenges and 
theoretical gaps that appeared in the research, in commentaries of the EU governance 
of food security, and in the emerging literature on food (security) governance. As such, 
all research chapters have a direct relevance to both EU (and) food security practitioners 
and academics. At the same time, the choice for such an iterative approach and the 
lack of a single conceptual framework may attract criticism for being too concept-
heavy or incoherent (cf. Evans & Davies, 1999). Moreover, readers may wonder why 
these research questions were asked and these challenges and gaps were studied and 
not others. Indeed, many other relevant questions could be thought of. I put forth two 
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arguments to defend this eclecticism. First, this research was driven by a desire to better 
understand the EU governance of food security. It is difficult, if not impossible, to adopt 
an explanatory, evaluative, or other type of research design to study a phenomenon 
about which so little initial knowledge exists. The exploratory approach adopted instead 
resulted in better insights into (the challenges of ) everyday food security governance 
(section 7.1). The consequent research directions that are identified in the research 
chapters and in section 7.4 can be the impetus to following studies, which may adopt 
a different research design. Second, the research conducted did follow a consequential 
order and thus restrained the exploratory nature. In section 1.4 this was referred to 
as a reasoned exploratory design. The focus successively shifted from the manifestation 
of food security as a wicked problem, to the general ability (within the Commission) 
to govern this wickedness, to actual governance shifts in the EU governance of food 
security. 
Chapter 2 showed that it is too soon to speak of food security governance as an 
established field of research. Instead, it can be considered as an emerging field that is 
characterized by a wide diversity of schools of thought and conceptual approaches. The 
consequential lack of a shared set of ontological and epistemological understandings is 
not strange and has been shown to occur in other emerging academic communities as 
well (such as that on climate change adaptation: Swart, Biesbroek, & Capela Lourenço, 
2014). I contributed to furthering this research field by informing ongoing debates 
through multiple theoretical lenses and different empirical cases. In doing so, it proved 
challenging to strike a balance between contributing to the domain of food security 
and food governance on the one hand and to theoretical debates within the public 
governance and policy literature on the other within individual research chapters. 
Eventually, I decided to target half of the chapters to a food governance audience and 
the other half to a public governance and policy readership. This is not to say that these 
two are mutually exclusive: the chapters targeted at the food security community also 
offer valuable theoretical insights, e.g., about the use of consensus frames and policy 
integration processes, and the theoretical chapters say much about food governance. 
However, the ambition to contribute to different types of debates required different 
accentuations. This also shows in (dynamics within) the EU governance of food security 
being the main object of some chapters, whereas it serves as a case for theoretical 
investigation in others.
Finally, the choice for multiple methods, both within and between research chapters, 
contributed to the increased validity of the research conducted. Variety of methods 
served as a triangulation tool and resulted in drawing balanced conclusions that take 
different types of knowledge into account. Throughout the research, I have attached 
much importance to applying methods of data collection and analysis systematically and 
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transparently. These methods have therefore been extensively discussed in the chapters 
and associated supplementary materials. A method that particularly deserves mentioning 
in this respect is the systematic literature review, which strongly shaped my view on how 
good scientific research ought to be conducted and presented.
7.3.2  Limitations of the research
Throughout the research chapters various methodological limitations were mentioned. 
Three recurring limitations require further elaboration. First, although the research 
centres around the EU governance of food security, its primary focus is on the European 
Commission and, to a lesser extent, the Parliament. Apart from the study on food 
security frames in the CAP reform debate, the Council has hardly or only indirectly 
been taken into account. This choice was made for two reasons. First, the Commission 
is the EU institution that is responsible for initiating, monitoring the implementation 
of, and overviewing the coherence and consistency of food-security-related policies at 
the EU level. It is therefore the EU policy arena in which the wickedness inherent to 
food security governance is most likely to become manifest and to pose challenges to 
policymakers and their institutional surroundings. A second reason is more practical; 
the policy process within the Commission and Parliament is relatively much more 
transparent and accessible for researchers than that within the Council, allowing for 
more systematic modes of data collection and analysis. Public documents published 
by the Council are sparse in terms of the information they provide, and it is almost 
impossible to identify relevant documents and, consequentially, relevant actors and 
working parties. Although the influence of the Council was to some extent studied 
through the perspective of the Commission, there is need for studies that further explore 
the Council’s role in food security governance.
A second limitation is that the interviews at the European Commission were only 
conducted at one moment in time, in spring 2014. As a consequence, statements about 
the development of capabilities are often based solely on accounts of Commission staff 
in retrospect. In addition, in spite of repeated attempts, it proved impossible to talk 
to representatives of the political component of the Commission, i.e. Commissioners 
and their cabinets. This was largely due to the upcoming elections of the European 
Parliament in 2014. Although I attempted to partly overcome this inaccessibility by 
asking directors-general about the political dimension of their work, it implies that the 
research, particularly the study of the Commission’s capabilities, has a slight bias towards 
the administrative, technocratic component.
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The final limitation is that even for the Commission and Parliament, proxies had to be 
used to study the internal policy process. It proved impossible to attend meetings in 
which ‘real-life policymaking’ takes place, e.g., inter-service consultations or meetings 
with lobbyists. Instead, these were studied through secondary accounts and public 
documents. Although, as elaborated in the introduction, systematic research methods 
and triangulation were used to enhance the reliability of data, the question remains 
of whether ethnographic or participatory research methods would have resulted in 
different or additional insights.
7.4 Reflecting forward: three directions for future research
Throughout the research chapters of this dissertation, I made various specific suggestions 
for future research. This section reflects on three overarching directions for further 
research that follow from the dissertation: (i) comparative studies to study general 
patterns of stability and change in food security governance, (ii) the operationalization 
of the governance capabilities framework, and (iii) the ‘policy success’ of enhanced food 
security governance approaches.
First, while I have argued that changes of EU governance settings and practices have 
remained relatively limited in the aftermath of the food price crises, future comparative 
studies could provide further insights into whether this also applied to other national 
and international food security governance arrangements. As was shown in the 
systematic literature review, recent years have witnessed the initiating and reviving of 
a wide array of governance arrangements, at global, regional and (sub-)national levels, 
accompanied by new understandings of how food security ought to be governed, e.g., 
through more coherent and comprehensive approaches. At the same time, not much is 
known about whether food security governance arrangements have truly incorporated 
these governance principles or whether they have proceeded beyond discursive levels. 
Scholars of global food security governance have noted that substantial changes seem 
limited so far (Alves Zanella & Duncan, 2015), or have even been deliberately obstructed 
(Clapp & Murphy, 2013). It would be valuable to both the academic community and 
practitioners to track the advancement of (different forms of ) food security governance, 
particularly also in the light of attempts to pursue the recently adopted Sustainable 
Development Goals, as well as to explain changes and differences in policy integration 
adoption patterns. The policy integration framework proposed in chapter 5 would be a 
good perspective for analyzing such advancements. 
Second, future research would need to strengthen the systematic applicability of the 
governance capabilities framework. The research presented in this dissertation is one 
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of the first attempts to empirically apply the framework. Whereas the framework 
provides a more systematic tool for analyzing governance systems’ ability to govern food 
security (and other wicked problems), I have identified various opportunities for further 
development and fine-tuning throughout the dissertation. A most critical challenge 
in this respect would be the operationalization of the framework into univocal and 
measurable indicators that could be used to conduct comparative studies over time and 
between governance systems. Although the framework’s indicators proved adequate 
for the purposes of this research, they are rather general, possibly resulting in different 
interpretations and consequent variance in applications of the framework. The latter 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to discern broader patterns or identify similarities 
and differences across cases. To come to such an operationalization, I would recommend 
a systematic evaluation of empirical applications of the various public governance and 
policy theories that the framework draws from and synthesizes. Many of the individual 
components of the framework have already been studied extensively in various 
governance settings. Determining, synthesizing, and, if necessary, complementing the 
best methodological practices could result in a more rigorous approach accompanying 
the framework.
Third and last, it remains an open question of whether and under what conditions 
further integrated food security approaches, or enhanced governance capabilities for 
that part, result in better food security outcomes. Despite the widespread assumption 
that reducing externalities and creating synergies has positive effects on the ground, 
these impacts have hardly been studied systematically (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010). Part 
of the reason is that there are significant conceptual and methodological challenges in 
studying the effects of public policies in general. In addition, various types of policy 
integration success can be distinguished, e.g., success in terms of process, programs 
and politics, and actors have different conceptualizations of whether a policy has been 
successful or not (Bovens, ‘t Hart, & Peters, 2001; McConnell, 2010). In spite of these 
constraints, I believe creative conceptual approaches and research designs could further 
the debate about the impacts of integrated (food security) governance approaches. I 
consider McConnell’s (2010) policy success heuristic as a promising way of doing so.
7.5  Policy implications and recommendations
This section sets out the dissertation’s main implications and recommendations for EU 
policymakers involved in the governance of food security. Most of the argument may 
also be relevant to policymakers and practitioners in different food security governance 
contexts. The argument consists of two steps. First, I argue that in principle there are 
opportunities for major enhancements of the EU governance of food security. This part 
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of the argument serves as a spot on the horizon that is worth pursuing. Second, however, 
given current political and administrative realities, it may be most opportune to strive 
for ‘good enough governance’ and ‘clumsy solutions’ in the short term. 
7.5.1  A spot on the horizon: opportunities for enhanced EU food security governance
Based on the research presented in this dissertation several rather straightforward 
recommendations can be made. I will here focus on two types of improvements that 
directly follow from governance shortcomings or gaps signalled in the research chapters: 
(i) a strengthening of EU governance capabilities, and (ii) augmented food security 
policy integration. 
First, while the European Commission’s capabilities to deal with the wickedness of 
food security proved to be further developed than expected, there is still room for 
improvement. This is particularly the case for the capabilities of resilience, responsiveness, 
and rescaling. Reflexivity is already well developed and would therefore initially require 
fewer investments. Revitalization was almost fully absent, but one wonders whether it 
can ever be expected of a highly technocratic institution such as the Commission, which 
also has to tread lightly towards the other, internally fragmented, EU institutions, to 
revitalize societal and/or political deadlocks. Table 4.1 provided an overview of several 
general enabling strategies and conditions that could be pursued to strengthen resilience, 
responsiveness, and rescaling. Based on the immediate outcomes of the analysis of the 
Commission, three specific interventions can be identified as the most pressing or 
desirable. First, investing in strengthened (human) capacity would enable the Commission 
to focus more on small signals, threats, demands, and concerns that are not yet on 
its radar or that may develop unexpectedly. The EU’s support of the UN Agricultural 
Market Information System (AMIS) is a good recent example in this respect. In general 
though, this study found that the Commission has to allocate most of its scarce resources 
to monitoring or responding to already well-known threats and pressures. This leaves 
the EU exposed to ‘unknown-unknowns’ (Termeer & van den Brink, 2012; Wintle, 
Runge, & Bekessy, 2010), regarding both sudden changes to food security’s properties 
and to political forces. Strengthened capacity could reduce this vulnerability, and as 
such enhance the Commission’s resilience and responsiveness. Second, a particularly 
contributive strengthening of capacity would lie in increasing redundancy. Intentional 
overlap of tasks and jurisdictions can serve as a back-up within the Commission and other 
EU institutions in terms of signalling externalities, new threats, or particular concerns 
(cf. Perrow, 1994). An example of such redundancy is the unit ‘ACP, South Africa, FAO 
and G8/G20’ in the Commission’s DG Agriculture and Rural Development (chapter 
4). The creation of more such boundary-units within various directorate-generals could 
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further enhance the Commission’s redundancy. At the same time, more redundancy 
increases the risk of unclear responsibilities and consequent inertia in decision-making 
(Termeer et al., 2015a) and would therefore have to be well balanced and accompanied 
by clear rules or agreements (cf. Pahl-Wostl, 2009). Third, a highly controversial way 
of enhancing the EU’s ability to govern food security more comprehensively would be 
by pooling the efforts of individual member states at the EU level, i.e. to rescale food 
security governance from national to EU policy arenas. Various member states, such as 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, have allocated relatively many resources to 
enhancing food security, particularly in developing countries. Pooling these efforts at the 
EU level could enable a better targeted and more comprehensive allocation of resources 
as well as an enhanced awareness of changing problem properties and contexts. 
Strengthened capabilities are insufficient if they are not actively deployed within the 
EU’s policy subsystems. Chapter 5 sketched various possibilities for increased policy 
integration across subsystems. At the moment, the EU lacks an overarching vision or 
strategy on how all potentially relevant policy domains and associated subsystems could 
contribute to food security in the broadest sense. Such a vision would be a major step 
in aligning subsystems’ efforts and enhancing policy coherence between policy goals, at 
least on paper. This would also imply that policy domains that are currently not or hardly 
involved in the governance of food security, such as those on economic and financial 
policies, social policy, or health policy, would need to take a seat at the figurative 
negotiation table. Furthermore, the EU lacks inter-institutional and inter-sectoral 
procedural policy instruments that could monitor subsystems’ policy efforts and intervene 
if they threaten the coherence of the EU’s food security strategy. Such procedural 
instruments could take the shape of an inter-institutional taskforce, inter-service groups, 
and/or could be embedded within the Commission’s Secretariat-General. 
The realization of a European Common Food Policy, as has been propagated by various 
commentators and civil society organizations (e.g., Marsden, 2015; Slow Food; Via 
Campesina et al., 2010), would not be the way forward in terms of enhanced policy 
integration. A Common Food Policy would merge various existing food policies, such 
as the Common Agricultural Policy and the General Food Law, into a new framework 
and de facto create a new, more holistic, policy domain. However, one of the essential 
characteristics of wicked problems is that they lack clear boundaries and therefore 
largely overlap with other wicked problems. It is very difficult to determine where the 
wicked problem of food security ends and that of climate change, or social inequality, 
begins. This is especially the case in the light of new attempts for synergetic approaches, 
such as climate-smart agriculture (Scherr, Shames, & Friedman, 2012). In this respect, 
a parallel can be made with a similar discussion within the climate change adaptation 
community. Whereas some scholars have argued for the development of climate change 
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adaptation into a new policy domain (Massey & Huitema, 2013), others have pointed 
at the risk for renewed compartmentalization, albeit at a different level, that this would 
entail (Adelle et al., 2009). Chapter 5 followed the latter argument in pleading for 
maintaining individual (food) policy domains and associated subsystems. Instead of 
establishing a new policy domain, enhanced policy integration would then be realized 
by synergizing subsystems’ food security efforts and by creating coordinative procedural 
instruments at the governance-system level. Food security would then still be governed 
in individual subsystems, but the efforts of these would be coordinated centrally and 
would all contribute to a shared strategy.
7.5.2  Good enough governance and clumsy solutions
Realizing the changes recommended in the previous section would require major 
political support throughout the EU institutions and consequential high prioritization 
of food security commitments over a longer course of time. In the current political 
contexts in which both the EU institutions and the (EU) governance of food security 
find themselves, such prioritization is not realistic. In times of consecutive economic 
and political crises and increased Euroscepticism, it is unthinkable that member states 
would hand over food security competences to the EU level or allocate more financial 
resources to the EU institutions. Moreover, in times of receding attention to food 
security, it is improbable that the EU institutions will give much priority to and make 
major investments in developing overarching food security strategies and substantial 
procedural policy instruments. This research showed that even when attention and 
priority to food security was at a higher point in the immediate aftermath of the food 
price crises, priorities and investments were not significant enough to realize a substantial 
holistic approach to food security. Most of the recommendations made in the previous 
section can therefore serve as a long-term strategy, but not as practical short-term advice. 
Rather than trying to pursue the most advanced form of policy integration or the best 
developed governance capabilities, it may be more opportune to first focus on less 
ambitious but more feasible and therefore potent integration steps and enhancements 
of capabilities. This does not mean that long-term reforms and interventions should be 
dismissed altogether, but making explicit that other efforts are initially more essential 
and feasible helps setting priorities and allocating resources. This recommendation is 
similar to what scholars have referred to as ‘good enough governance’ (Grindle, 2004, 
2007; Purdon, 2014). Contrary to good governance criteria put forward by international 
development organizations and donors, good enough governance involves a focus on 
determining which governance enhancements are essential and which are not, which 
should come first and which could follow later, which are feasible and which are not 
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(Grindle, 2004, 2007). Thinking in terms of good enough governance requires being 
explicit about priorities and trade-offs and focusing on those governance practices 
and institutions that work rather than on those that do not. This dissertation does 
not provide univocal answers to exactly what governance reforms are most essential 
or work best from a food security perspective. Further research would need to explore 
the impacts of specific policy interventions on food security (cf. ibid.), which is a 
methodological challenge in itself (Engel, Lein, van Helden, & van Seters, 2013; Jordan 
& Lenschow, 2010). The European Commission has already started such a trajectory by 
allocating a prominent role to food security in its Policy Coherence for Development 
approach and individual impact assessments. However, significantly more resources and 
methodological innovation would be required for these assessments to convincingly 
inform decision-making; the realization of such resources and innovation would be a 
first step.
At the same time, it should be recognized that how one perceives and evaluates what 
works  depends on one’s (or subsystems’) frames and associated interests (McConnell, 
2010). New knowledge obtained through impact assessments and other types of studies 
may lead to shifts in these perceptions but will alter uncertainties rather than reduce them 
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). It may therefore be productive to think about good enough 
governance in terms of ‘clumsy solutions’. Clumsy solutions are policy approaches that 
recognize the inherent frame conflicts and competing knowledge claims that characterize 
wicked problems and therefore entail creative and flexible combinations of different 
social realities (Verweij et al., 2006). Consensus frames like ‘food security’, ‘sustainable 
food systems’ or ‘sustainable intensification’ could be considered as attempts of offering 
such clumsy solutions (chapter 3). They try to combine efforts targeted at alleviating the 
vulnerable position of European farmers, at safeguarding environmental conditions such 
as soil fertility, at creating a level playing field for developing countries, and at enhancing 
production and productivity, all at the same time. Although seemingly conflicting in 
terms of policy coherence or consistency, such clumsy solutions acknowledge that food 
security spans temporal, spatial, and jurisdictional scales and simultaneously leave 
space for different types of approaches and underlying rationales. This does not mean 
that anything goes; although there is no objective truth, some sets of arguments and 
knowledge claims are more convincing or internally coherent than others. It would 
therefore still be necessary to make political choices, but these can combine elements of 
different frames. As such, these kind of sub-optimal approaches not only do justice to 
the multi-dimensional nature of food security, but they are also more democratic than 
approaches that consist of only one dominant problem understanding (Verweij et al., 
2006). Eventually, good enough governance through clumsy solutions will not solve 
food insecurity permanently, but EU governance processes and outcomes that are more 
acceptable and credible to all stakeholders are within reach.
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Part A: search strategy
172 
 
Part A: search strategy 
 
‘Food security’  ‘Governance’  Search terms 
‘Food insecurity’  ‘Government’ 
‘Administration’ (synonym, although not 
matching exactly) 
‘Handling’ (idem) 
‘Management’ (idem) 
‘Stewardship’ (idem) 
‘Superintendence’ (idem) 
‘Policy‐making’  
‘Policy formation’ 
 
*governance*; government*; 
administration*: handling: 
*management*; stewardship; policy‐
making; “policy formation”; 
superintendenc*  
 
 
When possible, I searched databases for an occurrence of “food (in)security” and (synonyms of) 
“governance” within a distance of five terms from each other. For Scopus and Web of Science, the 
search was restricted to titles, abstracts, and keywords of articles.  
 
The exact queries were: 
 
Scopus, performed on June 26, 2013: 
 
(TITLE‐ABS‐KEY("food *security" W/5 (*governance* OR government* OR administration* OR handling 
OR stewardship OR policy-making OR "policy formation" OR superintendenc*)) OR TITLE("food 
security" W/5 *management*) OR ABS("food security" W/5 *management*)) AND DOCTYPE(ar) 
Results: 396 
 
(TITLE‐ABS‐KEY("food *security" W/5 (*governance* OR government* OR administration* OR handling 
OR stewardship OR policy-making OR "policy formation" OR superintendenc*)) OR TITLE("food 
security" W/5 *management*) OR ABS("food security" W/5 *management*)) AND DOCTYPE(re) 
Results: 65 
 
(TITLE‐ABS‐KEY("food *security" W/5 (*governance* OR government* OR administration* OR handling 
OR stewardship OR policy-making OR "policy formation" OR superintendenc*)) OR TITLE("food 
security" W/5 *management*) OR ABS("food security" W/5 *management*)) AND DOCTYPE(ip) 
Results: 6 
 
When possible, I searched database  f r an ccurrence of “food (in)security” and 
(synonyms of ) “governance” within a istance of five t rms from each other. For Scopus 
and Web of Science, the search was restricted to titles, abstracts, and keywords of articles. 
The exact queries were:
Scopus, performed on June 26, 2013:
(TITLE-ABS-KEY(“food *security” W/5 (*governance* OR government* OR 
administration* OR handling OR stewardship OR policy-making OR “policy 
formation” OR superintendenc*)) OR TITLE(“food security” W/5 *management*) 
OR ABS(“food security” W/5 *management*)) AND DOCTYPE(ar)
Results: 396
(TITLE-ABS-KEY(“food *security” W/5 (*governance* OR government* OR 
administration* OR handling OR stewardship OR policy-making OR “policy 
formation” OR superintendenc*)) OR TITLE(“food security” W/5 *management*) 
OR ABS(“food security” W/5 *management*)) AND DOCTYPE(re)
Results: 65
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(TITLE-ABS-KEY(“food *security” W/5 (*governance* OR government* OR 
administration* OR handling OR stewardship OR policy-making OR “policy 
formation” OR superintendenc*)) OR TITLE(“food security” W/5 *management*) 
OR ABS(“food security” W/5 *management*)) AND DOCTYPE(ip)
Results: 6
(TITLE-ABS-KEY(“food *security” W/5 (*governance* OR government* OR 
administration* OR handling OR stewardship OR policy-making OR “policy 
formation” OR superintendenc*)) OR TITLE(“food security” W/5 *management*) 
OR ABS(“food security” W/5 *management*)) AND DOCTYPE(cp)
Results: 57
Because the keyword “management” led to too many irrelevant results, we restricted the 
combination of “food security” and “management” to the abstracts in Scopus (this was 
not possible in Web of Science).
Web of Science, performed on June 26, 2013:
(TS=(“food *security” NEAR/5 (*governance* OR government* OR administration* 
OR *management* OR handling OR stewardship OR policy-making OR “policy 
formation” OR superintendenc*))) AND Document Types=(Article OR Editorial 
Material OR Proceedings Paper OR Review) 
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH Timespan=All years
Google Scholar, performed on July 5, 2013: 
“food security governance”
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Part B: Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria:
1. In English
2. Both empirical and theoretical
3. Papers that reflect on concrete food security governance arrangements, or papers 
that provide insights into food security governance in general 
Exclusion criteria:
1. Language: Not in English 
2. Food security: Paper is not about food security, or no part of the paper is about 
food security 
3. Governance: Paper does not reflect on either concrete food security governance 
arrangements or on food security governance in general. 
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Part C: reference checking
175 
 
Part C: reference checking 
 
 
Publication  Backward (B) or Forward (F) 
reference checking25 
Found via  Reason for not showing up 
in search results 
McKeon 2011  B  Clapp, Murphy 2013  Not covered by databases 
Duncan & Barling 2012  B  Lang, Barling 2012  Not covered by databases 
Margulis 2012  B  Margulis 2013  Book chapter 
Drimie, Ruysenaar 2010  B  Pereira, Ruysenaar 2012  Use other terms (institutional 
arrangements) 
Mohamed Salih 2009  B  Pereira, Ruysenaar 2012  Not covered by databases 
Sahley et al. 2005  B  Pereira, Ruysenaar 2012  Not covered by databases 
Misselhorn et al. 2012  F  Gonzalez 2010  Uses other terms 
Jarosz 2011  F  Jarosz 2009  Governance link mainly in full 
paper (lacking in abstract) 
 
Forward references were checked in both Scopus and Web of Science.
                                                            
25 Backward references refer to the references that a particular article cites, forward references to articles that 
were published later and refer to the particular article.  
For ard references were checked in both Scopus and Web of Science.
Supplementary Materials
216
Part D: data extraction matrix
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ov
er
nm
en
ta
lit
y 
N
on
e 
Ex
pl
ai
ns
 Ja
pa
n’
s a
pp
ro
ac
h t
ow
ar
ds
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y u
sin
g t
he
 
no
tio
n o
f g
ov
er
nm
en
ta
lit
y,
 an
sw
er
in
g t
he
 qu
es
tio
n w
hy
 Ja
pa
n 
su
pp
or
ts
 fre
e t
ra
de
 an
d t
ra
de
 pr
ot
ec
tio
n a
t th
e s
am
e t
im
e.
 
Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 th
e p
ro
te
ct
io
n o
f d
om
es
tic
 fo
od
 pr
od
uc
tio
n,
 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ly
 fis
he
rie
s,
 is 
th
e r
es
ul
t o
f d
ee
pl
y e
m
be
dd
ed
 in 
w
ay
s o
f th
in
ki
ng
 ab
ou
t p
ro
te
ct
io
n o
f n
at
io
na
l cu
ltu
re
, an
d 
so
ci
al
 an
d e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
, w
hi
ch
, in
 its
 tu
rn
, 
af
fe
ct
 po
lic
y.
  
In
 Ja
pa
n,
 dis
cu
ss
io
ns
 of
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y a
re
 alw
ay
s a
bo
ut
 se
lf‐
su
ffi
ci
en
cy
, an
d it
 ac
tiv
el
y fr
am
es
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y a
s s
uc
h 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
lly
. D
iff
er
en
ce
s in
 de
fin
iti
on
s o
f fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
re
fle
ct
 dif
fe
re
nt
 po
lic
y p
os
iti
on
s.
  
Ap
pl
yi
ng
 go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
lit
y h
ig
hl
ig
ht
s h
ow
 th
e J
ap
an
es
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 is 
en
tr
en
ch
ed
 th
ro
ug
h a
 ra
ng
e o
f a
pp
ar
en
tly
 
un
re
la
te
d in
st
itu
tio
ns
 an
d a
re
as
 as
 dif
fe
re
nt
 as
 wh
al
in
g a
nd
 
tu
na
 fis
hi
ng
.  
A c
ha
ng
e t
o t
he
 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 co
ul
d n
ot
 
oc
cu
r si
m
pl
y 
th
ro
ug
h a
lte
rin
g 
po
lic
ie
s,
 or
 br
ea
ki
ng
 
up
 th
e e
nt
re
nc
he
d 
in
te
re
st
s.
 It 
w
ou
ld
 
in
vo
lv
e a
 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
l 
re
th
in
ki
ng
 of
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 to
 th
e 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
re
ga
rd
in
g f
oo
d a
s a
 
w
ho
le
 an
d o
f 
Ja
pa
ne
se
 dip
lo
m
ac
y,
 
th
us
 in 
po
pu
la
r 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
gs
 of
 
th
e w
ay
 fo
od
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n a
nd
 fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y s
ho
ul
d b
e 
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7 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
do
ne
. 
3 
Ba
st
ia
n &
 
Co
ve
ne
y 
20
11
 
Re
gi
on
al
 
(s
ub
‐
na
tio
na
l) 
So
ut
h 
Au
st
ra
lia
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
, 
em
pi
ric
al
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Th
e a
rt
ic
le
 aim
s to
 ex
am
in
e r
ea
lis
t p
ol
ic
y o
pt
io
ns
 fo
r th
e 
So
ut
h A
us
tr
al
ia
n g
ov
er
nm
en
t to
 im
pr
ov
e f
oo
d s
ec
ur
ity
. It
 
ar
gu
es
 th
at
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y p
ol
ic
ie
s c
an
 be
tt
er
 fit
 to
 loc
al
 
co
nt
ex
ts
 by
 dr
aw
in
g o
n lo
ca
l kn
ow
le
dg
e.
 Lo
ca
l st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 
ca
n 4
pr
ov
id
e e
vi
de
nc
e a
nd
 ins
ig
ht
 int
o t
he
 f5
ea
sib
ili
ty
 of
 
im
pl
em
en
tin
g c
er
ta
in
 po
lic
y o
pt
io
ns
 an
d s
tr
at
eg
ie
s a
nd
 th
us
 
in
cr
ea
se
 th
ei
r e
ffe
ct
iv
en
es
s.
 Th
e r
es
ea
rc
he
rs
 th
er
ef
or
e a
sk
ed
 
lo
ca
l st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 wh
at
 th
ey
 th
ou
gh
t w
ou
ld
 be
 re
al
ist
ic
 po
lic
y 
op
tio
ns
. Fo
ur
 ca
te
go
rie
s o
f p
ol
ic
y o
pt
io
ns
 ar
e d
ist
in
gu
ish
ed
: 
1)
 po
lic
y t
o c
re
at
e s
up
po
rt
iv
e e
nv
iro
nm
en
ts
, 2)
 to
 str
en
gt
he
n 
co
m
m
un
ity
 ac
tio
n,
 3)
 to
 su
pp
or
t in
di
vi
du
al
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y,
 an
d 
4)
 to
 im
pr
ov
e c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n a
nd
 ca
pa
ci
ty
 fo
r F
S.
 W
ith
in
 th
es
e 
ca
te
go
rie
s 4
4 p
ol
ic
y o
pt
io
ns
 ar
e p
re
se
nt
ed
.  
44
 po
lic
y o
pt
io
ns
. 
U
se
 of
 loc
al
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e.
 
4 
Be
hn
as
si &
 
Ya
ya
 20
11
 
Lo
ca
l, 
na
tio
na
l 
an
d 
gl
ob
al
 
N
on
e 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
bo
ok
 
ch
ap
te
r 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
 
Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 at
 ro
ot
 of
 th
e f
ai
lu
re
 to
 ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y r
ed
uc
e h
un
ge
r 
th
e f
ai
lu
re
 of
 th
e g
lo
ba
l fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e a
nd
 
ar
ch
ite
ct
ur
e is
 a k
ey
 fa
ct
or
. It
 is 
th
er
ef
or
e n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 
de
ve
lo
p a
de
qu
at
e g
lo
ba
l fo
od
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 
fr
om
 a N
or
th
‐So
ut
h r
ed
ist
rib
ut
io
n p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e,
 wi
th
 th
e a
ct
iv
e 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t o
f m
aj
or
 sta
ke
ho
ld
er
s a
nd
 su
pp
or
t o
f so
un
d 
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c e
vi
de
nc
e.
 
Fo
od
 ins
ec
ur
ity
 dr
iv
er
s a
re
 co
m
pl
ex
 an
d p
la
y a
t d
iff
er
en
t 
le
ve
ls.
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 sh
ou
ld
 th
er
ef
or
e b
e s
et
 up
 
at
 loc
al
, n
at
io
na
l an
d t
he
 glo
ba
l le
ve
l. W
ea
k in
st
itu
tio
ns
 an
d 
la
ck
 of
 ef
fe
ct
iv
e c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n a
nd
 pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n a
t a
ll t
he
se
 
le
ve
ls i
m
pe
de
 th
e im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n o
f so
un
d p
ol
ic
ie
s.
 At
 th
e 
gl
ob
al
 lev
el
, a 
tr
ul
y r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e,
 ac
tio
n‐o
rie
nt
ed
 bo
dy
 wi
th
 
st
ro
ng
 po
lit
ic
al
 su
pp
or
t, a
 cre
di
bl
e s
ci
en
tif
ic
 ba
sis
 an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 su
pp
or
t is
 lac
ki
ng
, at
 na
tio
na
l le
ve
ls,
 go
od
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 an
d r
ig
ht
 to
 fo
od
 pr
in
ci
pl
es
 ar
e n
ot
 pr
om
ot
ed
. 
An
al
yz
es
 th
e a
ct
or
s,
 po
w
er
s a
nd
 dy
na
m
ic
s o
f th
e g
lo
ba
l fo
od
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 re
gi
m
e.
 No
tic
es
 a s
hi
ft
 fro
m
 a g
ov
er
na
nc
e r
eg
im
e 
do
m
in
at
ed
 by
 po
w
er
fu
l st
at
es
 an
d a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 co
rp
or
at
io
ns
 to
 
on
e d
om
in
at
ed
 fo
r m
os
t p
ar
t b
y c
or
po
ra
tio
ns
, m
ai
nl
y fo
od
 
re
ta
il c
om
pa
ni
es
, w
hi
ch
 ar
e in
cr
ea
sin
gl
y in
de
pe
nd
en
t fr
om
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l po
w
er
 an
d c
on
tr
ol
. Th
e r
eg
im
e is
 fra
gm
en
te
d,
 
in
co
he
re
nt
, an
d f
ar
 re
m
ov
ed
 fro
m
 da
ily
 str
ug
gl
es
 of
 hu
ng
ry
. 
Fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e s
ho
ul
d b
e a
 do
m
ai
n o
f g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
in
 its
 ow
n r
ig
ht
.   
Im
pr
ov
in
g 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 at
 
na
tio
na
l le
ve
l is
 
hi
gh
es
t p
rio
rit
y.
 
Ho
w
ev
er
, gl
ob
al
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 re
m
ai
ns
 
cr
uc
ia
l to
 ad
dr
es
s 
so
m
e o
f th
e m
ai
n 
dr
iv
er
s o
f fo
od
 
in
se
cu
rit
y.
 
5 
Bo
yd
 & 
W
an
g 2
01
1 
N
ot
 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 
N
on
e 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Ar
tic
le
 is 
no
t re
al
ly
 ab
ou
t fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e,
 bu
t 
br
ie
fly
 re
fe
rs
 to
 wo
rk
 of
 Ba
ue
r, w
ho
 ar
gu
es
 th
at
 go
od
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 co
ul
d b
rin
g a
bo
ut
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y,
 an
d t
ha
t fa
m
in
es
 
ar
e o
ft
en
 th
e r
es
ul
t o
f ill
‐ad
vi
se
d g
ov
er
nm
en
t p
ol
ic
y.
 Ba
ue
r 
he
ld
 th
at
 fa
m
in
es
 ar
e o
ft
en
 cr
ea
te
d o
r p
er
pe
tu
at
ed
 by
 hu
m
an
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8 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
be
in
gs
 an
d g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
, ra
th
er
 th
an
 na
tu
ra
l fo
rc
es
. 
Ill
us
tr
at
ed
 wi
th
 th
e e
xa
m
pl
e o
f th
e t
w
o K
or
ea
s.
  
6 
Br
ow
nh
ill
 & 
Hi
ck
ey
 
20
12
 
N
at
io
na
l, 
lo
ca
l 
W
ot
e,
 
Ke
ny
a 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
, 
em
pi
ric
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Th
e a
rt
ic
le
 pr
es
en
ts
 a s
tu
dy
 th
at
 us
ed
 ke
y in
fo
rm
an
t 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s o
f re
sp
on
de
nt
s fr
om
 th
re
e in
te
rli
nk
ed
 ins
tit
ut
io
ns
 
to
 pr
ov
id
e a
 m
ul
ti‐p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e le
ns
 th
ro
ug
h w
hi
ch
 Ke
ny
a’
s 
fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y p
ol
ic
y b
ar
rie
rs
 co
ul
d b
e e
xa
m
in
ed
. Th
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n is
 th
at
 m
ob
ili
zin
g d
iff
er
en
t p
ar
tie
s’
 kn
ow
le
dg
e 
re
su
lts
 in 
ne
w
 sy
nt
he
se
s o
f in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 wh
ic
h c
an
 be
 us
ed
 to
 
en
ha
nc
e p
ol
ic
y‐m
ak
in
g.
 “B
ot
to
m
‐up
” k
no
w
le
dg
e c
re
at
io
n c
an
 
le
ad
 to
 gr
ea
te
r p
ub
lic
 ow
ne
rs
hi
p o
f p
ol
ic
ie
s,
 an
d c
om
bi
ni
ng
 
so
ur
ce
s o
f kn
ow
le
dg
e h
as
 th
e p
ot
en
tia
l to
 pr
ov
id
e a
 de
ep
er
, 
ric
he
r a
nd
 m
or
e in
te
gr
at
ed
 un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g o
f th
e e
xi
st
in
g 
in
st
itu
tio
na
l an
d c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n f
ac
to
rs
 af
fe
ct
in
g f
oo
d 
se
cu
rit
y p
ol
ic
y o
ut
co
m
es
 in 
a r
an
ge
 of
 co
nt
ex
ts
.  
 
7 
CF
S 2
01
2 
G
lo
ba
l 
CF
S 
St
ra
te
gi
c 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Pr
ov
id
es
 a g
lo
ba
l st
ra
te
gi
c fr
am
ew
or
k fo
r fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y a
nd
 
nu
tr
iti
on
 an
d p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 th
e p
os
iti
on
 of
 th
e C
FS
 wi
th
in
 th
is 
fr
am
ew
or
k.
 Fr
am
ew
or
k is
 no
t e
xp
lic
itl
y fo
cu
se
d o
n 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
. St
at
es
 th
at
 th
e a
m
bi
tio
us
 re
fo
rm
 of
 th
e C
FS
 wa
s 
a w
ay
 to
 ad
dr
es
s th
e f
ra
gm
en
te
d g
ov
er
na
nc
e o
f fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y,
 so
 th
at
 th
e C
FS
 co
ul
d c
om
e t
o p
la
y it
s v
ita
l ro
le
 in 
th
e 
ar
ea
 of
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y a
nd
 nu
tr
iti
on
, in
cl
ud
in
g in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
co
or
di
na
tio
n.
 
Fu
rt
he
r a
rg
ue
s th
at
 (th
e la
ck
 of
) g
ov
er
na
nc
e w
as
/is
 on
e o
f th
e 
ro
ot
 ca
us
es
 of
 hu
ng
er
: 
*L
ac
k o
f g
oo
d g
ov
er
na
nc
e t
o e
ns
ur
e t
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y,
 
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y a
nd
 ru
le
 of
 law
; *L
ac
k o
f h
ig
h‐l
ev
el
 po
lit
ic
al
 
co
m
m
itm
en
t a
nd
 pr
io
rit
iza
tio
n,
 inc
lu
di
ng
 fa
ilu
re
 to
 fu
lly
 
im
pl
em
en
t p
as
 ple
dg
es
 an
d c
om
m
itm
en
ts
 an
d la
ck
 of
 
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y;
 *la
ck
 of
 co
he
re
nc
e in
 po
lic
y‐m
ak
in
g w
ith
in
 
co
un
tr
ie
s,
 bu
t a
lso
 glo
ba
lly
 an
d r
eg
io
na
lly
; *w
ar
, co
nf
lic
t a
nd
 
la
ck
 of
 se
cu
rit
y;
 *w
ea
k in
te
rn
at
io
na
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
 of
 FS
, 
re
su
lti
ng
 in 
fr
ag
m
en
te
d c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n a
nd
 fin
an
ci
ng
, d
isp
er
sio
n 
of
 as
sis
ta
nc
e in
 lar
ge
 nu
m
be
rs
 of
 pr
oj
ec
ts
 th
at
 lac
k s
ca
le
 to
 
m
ak
e s
ig
ni
fic
an
t im
pa
ct
 an
d a
dd
 to
 hig
h a
dm
in
ist
ra
tio
n c
os
ts
. 
G
oo
d g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
ne
ed
ed
 at
 co
un
tr
y 
le
ve
l; p
ea
ce
 an
d t
he
 
ru
le
 of
 law
, to
 
pr
ov
id
e t
en
ur
e o
f 
as
se
ts
 an
d a
 
co
nd
uc
tiv
e b
us
in
es
s 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, a
re
 
es
se
nt
ia
l; f
os
te
r 
co
or
di
na
tio
n a
t 
na
tio
na
l, r
eg
io
na
l 
an
d g
lo
ba
l le
ve
l. 
G
oo
d g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
re
qu
ire
s 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
 to
 
pr
io
rit
ize
 str
at
eg
ie
s,
 
po
lic
ie
s,
 pr
og
ra
m
s,
 
an
d f
un
di
ng
 to
 
ta
ck
le
 hu
ng
er
, an
d 
th
e in
t. c
om
m
un
ity
 
to
 co
or
di
na
te
 an
d 
m
ob
ili
ze
 m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l 
su
pp
or
t. 
A c
ha
lle
ng
e is
 als
o 
to
 lim
it t
he
 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
bu
rd
en
 of
 all
 th
es
e 
pa
rt
ne
rs
hi
ps
, 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 to
 LD
Cs
. 
8 
Cl
ap
p &
 
G
lo
ba
l 
 G
20
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
An
al
ys
es
 th
e e
ng
ag
em
en
t o
f th
e G
20
 wi
th
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
G
lo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
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 of
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do
cu
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M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
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ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
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t &
 In
si
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 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
M
ur
ph
y 
20
13
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
iss
ue
s.
 Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 th
e G
20
 ha
s s
ho
w
n it
’s
 no
t th
e m
os
t 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 fo
ru
m
, b
ec
au
se
: 1
) it
 did
n’
t ta
ck
le
 str
uc
tu
ra
l FS
 
pr
ob
le
m
s,
 2)
 it 
ha
d a
 ch
ill
in
g e
ffe
ct
 on
 ot
he
r fo
ru
m
s (C
FS
), 3
) 
sm
al
l an
d im
po
rt
‐de
pe
nd
en
t co
un
tr
ie
s a
re
 no
t m
em
be
rs
, 4)
 
its
 de
ci
sio
n‐m
ak
in
g p
ro
ce
ss
, b
as
ed
 on
 co
ns
en
su
s,
 is 
in
ap
pr
op
ria
te
, 5)
 it 
la
ck
s e
xp
er
tis
e,
 an
d 6
) C
SO
s h
av
e b
ee
n 
sh
ut
 ou
t. 
Le
ar
ns
 th
at
: 
*F
oo
d c
ris
is h
as
 va
rio
us
 ec
on
om
ic
 dim
en
sio
ns
. 
*F
or
um
s a
ffe
ct
 ea
ch
 ot
he
r, a
nd
 ca
n u
nd
er
m
in
e e
ac
h o
th
er
. 
*F
or
um
s in
vo
lv
e q
ue
st
io
ns
 of
 inc
lu
sio
n a
nd
 ex
cl
us
io
n,
 an
d 
th
us
 of
 leg
iti
m
ac
y.
 
*S
tr
uc
tu
ra
l so
lu
tio
ns
 vs
. co
pi
ng
 m
ea
su
re
s.
 
*F
or
um
s/
ve
nu
es
 ea
ch
 ha
ve
 a c
er
ta
in
 ra
ng
e o
f in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
an
d ju
ris
di
ct
io
ns
. 
*N
ot
 ev
er
y g
lo
ba
l or
ga
ni
za
tio
n’
s in
vo
lv
em
en
t in
 de
al
in
g w
ith
 
FS
 is 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 or
 de
sir
ab
le
.    
*T
he
re
’s
 a c
al
l fo
r (a
nd
 th
us
 a l
ac
k o
f) c
oo
rd
in
at
ed
 ac
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n G
O
s.
 
*F
S c
an
 ge
t re
de
fin
ed
/r
ef
ra
m
ed
 in 
fo
ru
m
s.
 Th
e d
isc
ou
rs
e o
f 
fo
ru
m
s h
as
 an
 im
pa
ct
 on
 de
ba
te
s e
ls
ew
he
re
. 
*A
s d
ef
in
iti
on
s F
S h
av
e e
vo
lv
ed
, th
e c
om
pl
ex
ity
 of
 po
lic
y 
ch
al
le
ng
es
 ha
s g
ro
w
n.
 
of
 FS
 sh
ou
ld
 be
 
pl
ac
ed
 wi
th
in
 th
e 
U
N
, ab
ov
e a
ll w
ith
in
 
th
e C
FS
. Th
e G
20
 
sh
ou
ld
 lim
it i
ts
 ro
le
 
in
 FS
 ar
en
a t
o 
su
pp
or
tin
g 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 th
at
 
ar
e s
pe
ci
fic
al
ly
 fo
cu
s 
on
 FS
, p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 
th
ro
ug
h r
eg
ul
at
or
y 
re
fo
rm
s.
 
9 
Co
le
m
an
 & 
G
ab
le
r 
20
02
 
G
lo
ba
l 
M
ul
tip
le
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
pa
pe
r; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
re
gi
m
es
 & 
N
or
m
at
iv
e‐
in
st
itu
tio
na
l 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 
N
on
e 
Sh
ow
s th
at
 bio
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 is 
su
rr
ou
nd
ed
 by
 fo
ur
 no
rm
at
iv
e‐
in
st
itu
tio
na
l ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 th
at
 ar
e o
rg
an
ize
d a
ro
un
d d
ist
in
ct
 
ge
ne
ra
l pr
in
ci
pl
es
, o
f w
hi
ch
 on
e is
 “w
or
ld
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y a
nd
 
sa
fe
ty
”.
 M
ai
n p
ar
t is
 no
t a
bo
ut
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e,
 bu
t 
ou
tli
ne
s th
e c
or
e p
rin
ci
pl
es
, n
or
m
s,
 an
d in
st
itu
tio
ns
 of
 th
is 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t. T
he
 10
 pr
in
ci
pl
es
 inc
lu
de
, in
te
r a
lia
, th
at
 
bi
ot
ec
hn
ol
og
y is
 cr
uc
ia
l bu
t p
ot
en
tia
lly
 ris
ky
, st
at
e 
so
ve
re
ig
nt
y r
em
ai
ns
 pr
im
ar
y in
 go
ve
rn
in
g,
 lib
er
al
ize
d t
ra
de
 is 
po
sit
iv
e,
 su
st
ai
na
bi
lit
y,
 an
d t
ha
t G
M
O
s a
re
 a t
hr
ea
t to
 
bi
ol
og
ic
al
 div
er
sit
y.
 Th
e n
or
m
s a
re
, in
te
r a
lia
, th
at
 ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 
sh
ou
ld
 be
co
m
e m
or
e p
ro
du
ct
iv
e,
 he
al
th
 ha
s p
rio
rit
y a
bo
ve
 
ot
he
r th
in
gs
, m
ea
su
re
s s
ho
ul
d b
e s
ci
en
ce
‐ba
se
d,
 int
er
na
tio
na
l 
st
an
da
rd
s s
ho
ul
d b
e h
ar
m
on
ize
d,
 ge
ne
tic
 re
so
ur
ce
s s
ho
ul
d b
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e w
ith
ou
t re
st
ric
tio
n,
 m
ea
su
re
s s
ho
ul
d h
av
e a
 m
in
im
al
 
ef
fe
ct
 on
 tra
de
. 
 
10
 
Co
lo
nn
el
li 
&
 Sim
on
 
20
13
 
G
lo
ba
l 
M
ul
tip
le
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
pa
pe
r; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
W
or
ki
ng
 
de
fin
iti
on
 FA
O
 
G
oo
d F
oo
d 
Se
cu
rit
y 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e:
 
re
la
te
s to
 fo
rm
al
 
Pr
ov
id
es
 a h
ist
or
ic
al
 ov
er
vi
ew
 of
 bo
th
 th
e d
ef
in
iti
on
 of
 fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y a
nd
 FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
.  
Th
er
e is
 no
 au
th
or
at
iv
e b
od
y t
ha
t ca
n t
ak
e t
he
 lea
d,
 co
ul
d b
e 
th
e C
FS
, al
th
ou
gh
 is 
st
ill
 in 
its
 sta
rt
in
g p
ha
se
. Su
ch
 a b
od
y 
sh
ou
ld
 be
 inc
lu
siv
e.
 
G
oe
s fu
rt
he
r in
to
 th
e d
ev
el
op
m
en
t o
f th
e C
FS
 an
d H
LP
E.
 
N
ee
d f
or
 ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
an
d in
cl
us
iv
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
. C
FS
 
fu
lfi
ls r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
. 
CF
S s
ho
ul
d n
ot
 
av
oi
d a
dd
re
ss
in
g 
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0 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
an
d in
fo
rm
al
 ru
le
s 
an
d p
ro
ce
ss
es
 
th
ro
ug
h w
hi
ch
 
in
te
re
st
s a
re
 
ar
tic
ul
at
ed
, an
d 
de
ci
sio
ns
 re
le
va
nt
 
to
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y in
 
a c
ou
nt
ry
 ar
e 
m
ad
e,
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d a
nd
 
en
fo
rc
ed
 on
 
be
ha
lf o
f 
m
em
be
rs
 of
 a 
so
ci
et
y.
  
Im
po
rt
an
t te
st
 to
 CF
S is
 re
pr
es
en
te
d b
y t
he
 co
ns
id
er
at
io
n t
ha
t 
w
ill
 be
 de
vo
te
d t
o it
s g
ui
de
lin
es
 by
 po
lic
y m
ak
er
s a
nd
 th
ei
r 
in
ci
de
nc
e o
n t
he
 gr
ou
nd
. 
co
nt
ro
ve
rs
ia
l is
su
es
, 
an
d a
im
 to
 ha
ve
 an
 
im
pa
ct
 on
 a w
id
e 
ra
ng
e o
f to
pi
cs
, 
gi
ve
n t
he
 m
ul
ti‐
se
ct
or
al
 an
d c
ro
ss
‐
cu
tt
in
g is
su
es
 
ha
vi
ng
 an
 im
pa
ct
 on
 
FS
. 
11
 
Dr
im
ie
 & 
Ru
ys
en
aa
r 
20
10
 
N
at
io
na
l 
So
ut
h 
Af
ric
a 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
Do
cu
m
en
ts
 
an
al
ys
is 
an
d 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Ex
am
in
es
 th
e d
isj
un
ct
ur
e b
et
w
ee
n S
ou
th
 Af
ric
a’
s In
te
gr
at
ed
 
Fo
od
 Se
cu
rit
y S
tr
at
eg
y u
nd
er
 th
e le
ad
er
sh
ip
 of
 th
e N
at
io
na
l 
De
pa
rt
m
en
t o
f A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 an
d t
he
 re
al
ity
 of
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y.
 
Th
is d
isj
un
ct
ur
e is
 de
m
on
st
ra
te
d b
y t
w
o a
rg
um
en
ts
. Fi
rs
t, t
he
 
le
ve
l of
 un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g o
f co
m
pl
ex
ity
 of
 fo
od
 ins
ec
ur
ity
, it
s 
ca
us
al
 fa
ct
or
s,
 pr
ev
en
ta
tiv
e m
ea
su
re
s a
nd
 its
 ve
ry
 na
tu
re
 as
 it 
oc
cu
rs
 in 
S‐A
. Th
e s
ec
on
d is
 th
at
 th
e r
es
po
ns
e s
tr
at
eg
y is
 
in
ad
eq
ua
te
 to
 en
ga
ge
 th
is c
om
pl
ex
ity
. Th
e in
st
itu
tio
na
l 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 ar
e in
su
ffi
ci
en
t in
 te
rm
s o
f e
ng
ag
in
g f
oo
d 
in
se
cu
rit
y a
t n
at
io
na
l an
d lo
ca
l le
ve
ls.
  
Th
e a
rt
ic
le
 sh
ow
s th
e im
po
rt
an
ce
 of
 ins
tit
ut
io
na
l 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
, co
or
di
na
tio
n o
f a
ct
iv
iti
es
, an
d a
lig
nm
en
t o
f 
se
ct
or
s a
t a
ll le
ve
ls.
 Th
e in
st
itu
tio
na
l ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 in 
th
e 
de
sig
n o
f th
e IF
SS
 we
re
 po
or
ly
 ex
ec
ut
ed
, an
d h
ad
 an
 
em
ph
as
is o
n a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 an
d p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 as
 th
e s
ol
ut
io
n t
o 
fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y.
 Co
or
di
na
tio
n la
ck
ed
, su
b‐p
ro
gr
am
s w
er
e 
w
ea
kl
y in
te
gr
at
ed
, st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 we
re
 no
t in
vo
lv
ed
, an
d 
le
gi
sla
tio
n la
ck
ed
. 
N
ec
es
sa
ry
 
in
st
itu
tio
na
l 
fr
am
ew
or
k n
ee
ds
 to
 
be
 pu
t in
 pla
ce
. 
Re
qu
ire
s c
on
ce
rt
ed
 
ef
fo
rt
 an
d 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 of
 iss
ue
s 
w
ith
in
 wi
de
r a
rr
ay
 
of
 go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
, an
d 
el
se
w
he
re
.  
12
 
Du
nc
an
 & 
Ba
rli
ng
 
20
12
 
G
lo
ba
l 
CF
S 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
ot
 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 
(in
te
rv
ie
w
s
?)
 
G
lo
ba
l 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
(n
eo
lib
er
al
); c
iv
il 
so
ci
et
y 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
N
on
e 
Th
e w
id
en
in
g a
nd
 str
en
gt
he
ni
ng
 of
 civ
il s
oc
ie
ty
 pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
is a
 tre
nd
 in 
(U
N
) g
lo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
, in
cl
ud
in
g F
S g
lo
ba
l 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
. Ex
am
in
es
 th
e c
as
e o
f th
e C
FS
 an
d C
iv
il S
oc
ie
ty
 
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s in
 or
de
r to
 ide
nt
ify
 ch
al
le
ng
es
/ le
ss
on
s le
ar
ne
d.
  
Fu
rt
he
r: 
*C
FS
 sh
ow
s th
at
 ch
an
gi
ng
 wh
o is
 en
ga
ge
d in
 de
ba
te
 
in
flu
en
ce
s m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s a
nd
 str
uc
tu
re
s th
at
 ar
e s
ha
pi
ng
 th
e 
w
ay
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y p
ol
ic
y is
 de
ba
te
d.
  
*M
ul
ti‐d
im
en
sio
na
lit
y  
*A
ct
or
s (C
SO
s)
 ch
oo
se
 pla
tf
or
m
 be
ca
us
e o
f st
ra
te
gi
c re
as
on
s;
 
pl
at
fo
rm
 sh
op
pi
ng
. 
Ad
dr
es
s c
ha
lle
ng
es
 
id
en
tif
ie
d.
 
14
 
Ed
ra
lin
, 
Lo
ca
l 
M
un
ic
ip
a
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
Su
rv
ey
 an
d 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
An
al
ys
es
 th
e im
pa
ct
 of
 a d
ec
en
tr
al
iza
tio
n o
f a
ut
ho
rit
y a
nd
 
Al
th
ou
gh
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1 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
Co
lla
do
 
20
05
 
lit
ie
s in
 
Bu
la
ca
n 
Pr
ov
in
ce
, 
th
e 
Ph
ili
pp
in
es
 
ar
tic
le
; 
em
pi
ric
al
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 fo
r fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y fr
om
 th
e n
at
io
na
l go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
to
 loc
al
 go
ve
rn
m
en
t u
ni
ts
 by
 co
nd
uc
tin
g a
 su
rv
ey
 an
d 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s a
m
on
g lo
ca
l st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
. A
rg
ue
s th
at
 
de
ce
nt
ra
liz
at
io
n h
as
 led
 to
 an
 im
pr
ov
em
en
t o
f lo
ca
l fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y.
 De
vo
lu
tio
n h
as
 em
po
w
er
ed
 loc
al
 co
m
m
un
iti
es
 to
 
ad
dr
es
s th
ei
r o
w
n b
as
ic
 ne
ed
s,
 an
d le
d t
o g
re
at
er
 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t o
f lo
ca
l st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s h
av
e 
be
en
 de
ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
, 
bu
dg
et
s h
av
e t
o a
 
gr
ea
t e
xt
en
t n
ot
. 
Do
in
g t
hi
s w
ou
ld
 
le
ad
 to
 a b
et
te
r 
fu
nc
tio
ni
ng
 of
 loc
al
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
. 
Au
th
or
s p
ro
vi
de
 
ei
gh
t o
th
er
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
po
lic
y 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
. 
13
 
Ed
w
ar
ds
 
20
12
 
St
at
e 
M
ul
tip
le
 
U
S s
ta
te
s 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
em
pi
ric
al
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
Co
lla
bo
ra
tiv
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
N
on
e 
Ar
tic
le
 ex
am
in
es
 th
e c
ol
la
bo
ra
tio
n b
et
w
ee
n s
ta
te
 ag
en
ci
es
 
an
d n
on
‐pr
of
it o
rg
an
iza
tio
ns
 in 
ta
ck
lin
g d
om
es
tic
 fo
od
 
in
se
cu
rit
y,
 us
in
g t
he
 co
nc
ep
t o
f co
lla
bo
ra
tiv
e g
ov
er
na
nc
e.
 It 
em
pi
ric
al
ly
 sh
ow
s th
at
 co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n h
as
 inc
re
as
in
gl
y 
in
cr
ea
se
d a
nd
 th
at
 it 
go
es
 be
yo
nd
 de
lib
er
at
io
ns
. A
nt
i‐h
un
ge
r 
no
np
ro
fit
s h
av
e f
un
ct
io
ne
d a
s c
o‐w
or
ke
rs
 as
 ex
pe
rt
s o
n p
ol
ic
y 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n,
 or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l ef
fic
ie
nc
y a
nd
 ac
ce
ss
 to
 
se
rv
ic
es
, d
at
a m
an
ag
er
s a
nd
 an
al
ys
ts
 an
d a
s b
rid
ge
s b
et
w
ee
n 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t a
ge
nc
ie
s th
at
 did
 no
t co
op
er
at
e b
ef
or
e.
 Th
is 
in
cr
ea
se
d c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n r
es
ul
te
d f
ro
m
 a s
en
se
 of
 em
er
ge
nc
y 
af
te
r a
 19
96
 we
lfa
re
 re
fo
rm
, an
d h
as
 no
w
 be
en
 de
ep
ly
 
in
st
itu
tio
na
liz
ed
 in 
th
e a
dm
in
ist
ra
tiv
e p
hi
lo
so
ph
y o
f 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t. A
lth
ou
gh
 th
e d
at
a c
an
no
t sh
ow
 wh
et
he
r g
re
at
er
 
le
ve
ls o
f co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n y
ie
ld
s b
et
te
r o
ut
co
m
es
, an
ec
do
ta
l 
ev
id
en
ce
 se
em
s to
 su
pp
or
t su
ch
 a c
la
im
.  
 
15
 
FA
O
 20
09
 
G
lo
ba
l 
M
ul
tip
le
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
co
m
m
un
ic
a
tio
n 
N
ot
 
re
le
va
nt
 
N
ot
 re
le
va
nt
 
Re
fe
rs
 to
 a 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 th
at
 
w
ill
 fa
ci
lit
at
e 
de
ba
te
, 
co
nv
er
ge
nc
e o
f 
vi
ew
s a
nd
 
co
or
di
na
tio
n o
f 
ac
tio
ns
 to
 
im
pr
ov
e f
oo
d 
se
cu
rit
y a
t g
lo
ba
l 
bu
t a
lso
 at
 
re
gi
on
al
 an
d 
na
tio
na
l le
ve
ls.
 
Th
e p
re
se
nc
e o
f h
ig
h le
ve
ls o
f h
un
ge
r p
oi
nt
s to
 a s
er
io
us
 ne
ed
 
fo
r re
fo
rm
 of
 glo
ba
l fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e.
 A 
m
or
e 
co
he
re
nt
 an
d e
ffe
ct
iv
e r
es
po
ns
e is
 re
qu
ire
d.
 Pr
og
re
ss
 ha
s 
be
en
 slo
w
ed
 do
w
n b
ec
au
se
 of
 ne
gl
ec
t b
y g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 an
d a
 
la
ck
 of
 co
he
re
nc
e a
nd
 co
nv
er
ge
nc
e a
m
on
g p
ol
ic
ie
s a
nd
 
pr
og
ra
m
s o
f co
un
tr
ie
s,
 do
no
rs
 an
d o
th
er
 sta
ke
ho
ld
er
s.
 
O
ve
r la
st
 ye
ar
s n
um
be
r o
f n
at
io
na
l an
d r
eg
io
na
l ef
fo
rt
s h
av
e 
be
en
 de
ve
lo
pe
d,
 wh
ile
 re
gi
on
al
 re
sp
on
se
s p
ro
m
ot
e 
in
te
gr
at
io
n,
 co
he
re
nc
e a
nd
 co
ns
ist
en
cy
 of
 na
tio
na
l le
ve
l 
ef
fo
rt
s.
 Th
e s
am
e is
 ne
ce
ss
ar
y o
n t
he
 glo
ba
l le
ve
l, in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e U
N
. G
re
at
er
 co
he
re
nc
e is
 sti
ll n
ee
de
d t
o e
nc
ou
ra
ge
 
co
nv
er
ge
nc
e o
f p
ol
ic
ie
s a
nd
 ac
tio
ns
 ta
ke
n b
y a
ll s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s.
 
Th
e r
ef
or
m
 of
 th
e C
FS
 is 
a f
irs
t st
ep
 in 
th
is.
 
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s c
an
 be
 
en
su
re
d b
y g
re
at
er
 
in
te
gr
at
io
n a
nd
 
co
or
di
na
tio
n o
f 
re
fo
rm
 ini
tia
tiv
es
 
ho
riz
on
ta
lly
 an
d 
ve
rt
ic
al
ly
. A
 
ch
al
le
ng
e is
 ho
w
 to
 
fa
ci
lit
at
e a
nd
 
ac
ce
le
ra
te
 su
ch
 
in
te
gr
at
io
n a
nd
 
gu
ar
an
te
e t
ha
t th
e 
on
go
in
g r
ef
or
m
 in 
pr
ac
tic
e e
ffe
ct
iv
el
y 
se
rv
es
 th
e h
un
gr
y.
 
Fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
po
lic
ie
s n
ee
d t
o b
e 
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2 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
fu
lly
 int
eg
ra
te
d in
to
 
na
tio
na
l 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
pr
io
rit
ie
s a
nd
 
st
ra
te
gi
es
.  
Th
e n
ew
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 sy
st
em
 
sh
ou
ld
 be
 inc
lu
siv
e,
 
co
ns
id
er
at
e o
f 
m
em
be
rs
’ vi
ew
s,
 
fle
xi
bl
e a
nd
 ab
le
 to
 
m
ob
ili
ze
 po
lit
ic
al
 
co
ns
en
su
s,
 sc
ie
nt
ifi
c 
ex
pe
rt
ise
 an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 an
d o
th
er
 
re
so
ur
ce
s a
s 
ne
ed
ed
. 
16
 
FA
O
 20
10
 
G
lo
ba
l 
CF
S 
N
ew
s 
ar
tic
le
 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
ew
s a
rt
ic
le
 ab
ou
t th
e r
ef
or
m
ed
 CF
S.
 Se
es
 CF
S a
s th
e 
co
rn
er
st
on
e o
f th
e g
lo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
 of
 ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 an
d F
S,
 
w
hi
ch
, af
te
r th
e r
ef
or
m
, ca
n f
ac
e c
ha
lle
ng
es
 to
 FS
 m
or
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y.
  
 
17
 
FA
O
 20
11
a 
G
lo
ba
l ‐ 
na
tio
na
l 
N
on
e 
Ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
 
pa
pe
r 
w
or
ks
ho
p 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
De
fin
es
 “g
oo
d 
fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
” a
s:
 
Fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
re
la
te
s to
 fo
rm
al
 
an
d in
fo
rm
al
 ru
le
s 
an
d p
ro
ce
ss
es
 
th
ro
ug
h w
hi
ch
 
in
te
re
st
s a
re
 
ar
tic
ul
at
ed
, an
d 
de
ci
sio
ns
 re
le
va
nt
 
to
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y in
 
a c
ou
nt
ry
 ar
e 
m
ad
e,
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d a
nd
 
en
fo
rc
ed
 on
 
be
ha
lf o
f 
m
em
be
rs
 of
 a 
so
ci
et
y.
 
Pa
pe
r e
xp
lo
re
s w
ha
t (g
oo
d)
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e is
, an
d 
de
ve
lo
ps
 a c
ou
nt
ry
‐le
ve
l fr
am
ew
or
k f
or
 an
al
yz
in
g a
nd
 
in
te
gr
at
in
g g
ov
er
na
nc
e in
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y in
te
rv
en
tio
ns
. G
oo
d 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 of
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y c
an
 ha
ve
 a p
os
iti
ve
 ef
fe
ct
 on
 
tw
in
‐tra
ck
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y p
ro
gr
am
s.
   
Th
e c
on
ce
pt
 of
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e r
ec
en
tly
 em
er
ge
d,
 
bu
t e
ve
n w
ith
in
 FA
O
 it 
is n
ot
 ve
ry
 cle
ar
 wh
at
 it 
m
ea
ns
. 
Di
ffe
re
nt
 no
m
en
cl
at
ur
es
 ha
ve
 be
en
 us
ed
, su
ch
 as
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
of
 FS
, FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 or
 go
od
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 fo
r F
S,
 of
 wh
ic
h t
he
 
fir
st
 tw
o a
re
 m
os
t u
se
d in
 co
nt
ex
t g
lo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
. 
Al
th
ou
gh
 th
es
e g
lo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
 re
gi
m
es
 sh
ou
ld
 als
o 
co
m
pl
y w
ith
 a n
um
be
r o
f g
oo
d g
ov
er
na
nc
e p
rin
ci
pl
es
, th
e 
pa
pe
r p
rim
ar
ily
 de
ve
lo
ps
 a f
ra
m
ew
or
k fo
r th
e c
ou
nt
ry
 lev
el
. 
G
oo
d f
oo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 at
 th
e c
ou
nt
ry
 lev
el
 m
at
te
rs
 
be
ca
us
e it
 fo
rc
es
 go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
 to
 re
sp
on
d t
o t
he
 ne
ed
s o
f th
e 
fin
al
 us
er
s a
nd
 be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s.
 Ne
ve
rt
he
le
ss
, fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 do
es
 no
t st
an
d o
n it
s  o
w
n,
 an
d is
 de
pe
nd
en
t o
n 
ge
ne
ra
l go
od
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 an
d s
oc
io
‐po
lit
ic
al
 co
nt
ex
ts
 at
 
na
tio
na
l, r
eg
io
na
l an
d g
lo
ba
l le
ve
ls.
 
Th
e p
ro
po
se
d f
ra
m
ew
or
k is
 or
ga
ni
ze
d a
ro
un
d f
ou
r st
ag
es
 of
 
th
e f
oo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 po
lic
y c
yc
le
: p
ol
ic
y a
nd
 leg
al
 fra
m
ew
or
k,
 
co
or
di
na
tio
n a
nd
 co
he
re
nc
e,
 im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n a
nd
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t, a
nd
 inf
or
m
at
io
n,
 m
on
ito
rin
g a
nd
 ev
al
ua
tio
n.
 
 
18
3 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
Th
es
e s
ta
ge
s c
an
 be
 an
al
yz
ed
 us
in
g t
he
 go
od
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
qu
al
ity
 cri
te
ria
 of
 ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s a
nd
 ef
fic
ie
nc
y,
 eq
ua
lit
y a
nd
 
fa
irn
es
s,
 ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y,
 re
sp
on
siv
en
es
s,
 tra
ns
pa
re
nc
y,
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n,
 an
d r
ul
e o
f la
w
. It
 sh
ou
ld
 be
 no
te
d t
ha
t w
ha
t 
m
ak
es
 go
od
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e is
 hig
hl
y c
on
te
xt
ua
l. 
Di
ffe
re
nt
 m
ix
 of
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 dim
en
sio
ns
 an
d d
iff
er
en
t fo
rm
s 
of
 ins
tit
ut
io
ns
 m
ay
 be
 ne
ed
ed
 ac
ro
ss
 co
un
tr
ie
s.
  
18
 
FA
O
 20
11
b 
G
lo
ba
l 
M
ul
tip
le
 
W
or
ks
ho
p 
Re
po
rt
 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e f
or
 
fo
od
 an
d n
ut
rit
io
n 
se
cu
rit
y r
el
at
es
 to
 
fo
rm
al
 an
d 
in
fo
rm
al
 ru
le
s a
nd
 
pr
oc
es
se
s th
ro
ug
h 
w
hi
ch
 pu
bl
ic
 an
d 
pr
iv
at
e a
ct
or
s 
ar
tic
ul
at
e t
he
ir 
in
te
re
st
s,
 an
d 
de
ci
sio
ns
 fo
r 
ac
hi
ev
in
g fo
od
 
an
d n
ut
rit
io
n 
se
cu
rit
y (a
t lo
ca
l, 
na
tio
na
l, r
eg
io
na
l 
an
d g
lo
ba
l le
ve
l) 
ar
e m
ad
e,
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d a
nd
 
su
st
ai
ne
d.
 
Fo
llo
w
‐up
 of
 FA
O
 20
11
a,
 af
te
r w
or
ks
ho
p.
 So
m
e p
oi
nt
s it
 ad
ds
: 
*R
eg
io
na
l or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 ho
ld
 a k
ey
 pla
ce
 in 
th
e r
ef
or
m
ed
 FS
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 str
uc
tu
re
 as
 th
ey
 pe
rf
or
m
 es
se
nt
ia
l fu
nc
tio
ns
 th
at
 
gu
ar
an
te
e t
he
 sm
oo
th
 lin
ka
ge
s b
et
w
ee
n g
lo
ba
l an
d n
at
io
na
l 
le
ve
ls.
 Th
es
e o
rg
an
iza
tio
ns
 ar
e c
rit
ic
al
 to
 en
su
re
 th
at
 po
lic
es
 
at
 na
tio
na
l, r
eg
io
na
l an
d g
lo
ba
l le
ve
l ar
e c
oh
er
en
t a
nd
 ad
he
re
 
to
 th
e r
ig
ht
 to
 fo
od
. 
*N
at
io
na
l fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y b
od
ie
s e
ns
ur
e t
ha
t n
at
io
na
l re
sp
on
se
s 
to
 fo
od
 ins
ec
ur
ity
 ta
rg
et
 th
e m
os
t v
ul
ne
ra
bl
e a
nd
 ar
e w
el
l 
co
or
di
na
te
d a
m
on
g s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s th
at
 be
ar
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 fo
r a
 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 of
 th
e F
S r
es
po
ns
e.
 
*R
eg
ar
di
ng
 th
e la
ng
ua
ge
, th
e w
or
ks
ho
p c
on
sid
er
ed
 
“g
ov
er
na
nc
e f
or
 FS
” m
or
e a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 th
an
 “F
S g
ov
er
na
nc
e”
, 
as
 FS
 is 
an
 ou
tc
om
e,
 no
t a
 se
ct
or
 or
 go
al
 in 
its
el
f. F
oo
d 
se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e c
ou
ld
 sti
ll b
e u
se
d t
o r
ef
er
 to
 th
e 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 th
at
 co
m
pr
ise
 th
e g
ov
er
na
nc
e r
eg
im
e f
or
 FS
 at
 
gl
ob
al
 lev
el
. 
*G
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 an
d d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
ge
nc
ie
s h
av
e t
o g
o b
ey
on
d 
th
e r
ec
og
ni
tio
n t
ha
t g
ov
er
na
nc
e m
at
te
rs
. It
 do
es
 fiv
e 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 in 
th
is r
es
pe
ct
. 
In
te
r a
lia
: 
R1
: Le
ar
n f
ro
m
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
es
 ab
ou
t 
w
hi
ch
 pr
in
ci
pl
es
 ar
e 
m
os
t re
le
va
nt
. 
R3
: w
or
k m
or
e 
sy
st
em
at
ic
al
ly
 
to
w
ar
ds
 im
pr
ov
ed
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 as
 a 
m
ea
ns
 to
 ac
hi
ev
e 
im
pr
ov
ed
 FS
 
ou
tc
om
es
. 
R4
: p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
an
d in
cl
us
io
n.
 
19
 
FA
O
 20
12
 
G
lo
ba
l 
M
ul
tip
le
 
N
ew
s 
ar
tic
le
 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
ew
s a
rt
ic
le
 ab
ou
t a
 m
in
ist
er
ia
l m
ee
tin
g.
 Th
ey
 ag
re
ed
 th
at
 
co
nt
in
ui
ng
 fo
od
 pr
ic
e v
ol
at
ili
ty
 re
qu
ire
s im
pr
ov
ed
 glo
ba
l 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 of
 FS
. G
ra
zia
no
 da
 Sil
va
: “I
n t
hi
s c
on
te
xt
, it
 is 
im
po
rt
an
t to
 im
pr
ov
e g
ov
er
na
nc
e o
f F
S.
 In
 th
e g
lo
ba
liz
ed
 
w
or
ld
 we
 liv
e in
, it
’s
 no
t p
os
sib
le
 to
 ha
ve
 FS
 in 
on
e c
ou
nt
ry
 
al
on
e.
 […
] T
he
 ne
w
 glo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
 sy
st
em
 of
 FS
 th
at
 we
 
ar
e b
ui
ld
in
g t
og
et
he
r, t
ha
t h
as
 th
e C
FS
 as
 its
 co
rn
er
st
on
e  a
nd
 
AM
IS
 as
 on
e o
f it
s c
om
po
ne
nt
s,
 is 
pa
rt
 of
 a n
ew
 wo
rld
 or
de
r 
th
at
 ne
ed
s to
 em
er
ge
.”
  
Ad
va
nc
es
 ar
e a
lre
ad
y m
ad
e:
 th
e r
ef
or
m
 of
 th
e C
FS
, th
e m
os
t 
in
cl
us
iv
e in
te
rg
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l pl
at
fo
rm
 on
 FS
 an
d n
ut
rit
io
n,
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
t o
f th
e H
ig
h L
ev
el
 Ta
sk
 Fo
rc
e o
n G
lo
ba
l Fo
od
 
Se
cu
rit
y,
 an
d t
he
 cre
at
io
n o
f th
e A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l M
ar
ke
t 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n S
ys
te
m
 (A
M
IS
). 
 
20
 
G
al
iè
 20
13
 
N
ot
 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 
Sy
ria
, b
ut
 
no
t 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
em
pi
ric
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s;
 
do
cu
m
en
ts
 
an
al
ys
is;
 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Pa
pe
r is
 ab
ou
t se
ed
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
, n
ot
 so
 m
uc
h a
bo
ut
 fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e.
 Ha
s a
 ve
ry
 sm
al
l pa
ra
gr
ap
h a
bo
ut
 “fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y a
nd
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
”,
 wh
ic
h s
ta
te
s th
at
 go
od
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
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 Aut
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r(
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Fo
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ve
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 of
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M
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nt
at
io
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at
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n 
Ar
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m
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Re
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m
m
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Th
es
e s
ta
ge
s c
an
 be
 an
al
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ed
 us
in
g t
he
 go
od
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
qu
al
ity
 cri
te
ria
 of
 ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s a
nd
 ef
fic
ie
nc
y,
 eq
ua
lit
y a
nd
 
fa
irn
es
s,
 ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y,
 re
sp
on
siv
en
es
s,
 tra
ns
pa
re
nc
y,
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n,
 an
d r
ul
e o
f la
w
. It
 sh
ou
ld
 be
 no
te
d t
ha
t w
ha
t 
m
ak
es
 go
od
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e is
 hig
hl
y c
on
te
xt
ua
l. 
Di
ffe
re
nt
 m
ix
 of
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 dim
en
sio
ns
 an
d d
iff
er
en
t fo
rm
s 
of
 ins
tit
ut
io
ns
 m
ay
 be
 ne
ed
ed
 ac
ro
ss
 co
un
tr
ie
s.
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FA
O
 20
11
b 
G
lo
ba
l 
M
ul
tip
le
 
W
or
ks
ho
p 
Re
po
rt
 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e f
or
 
fo
od
 an
d n
ut
rit
io
n 
se
cu
rit
y r
el
at
es
 to
 
fo
rm
al
 an
d 
in
fo
rm
al
 ru
le
s a
nd
 
pr
oc
es
se
s th
ro
ug
h 
w
hi
ch
 pu
bl
ic
 an
d 
pr
iv
at
e a
ct
or
s 
ar
tic
ul
at
e t
he
ir 
in
te
re
st
s,
 an
d 
de
ci
sio
ns
 fo
r 
ac
hi
ev
in
g fo
od
 
an
d n
ut
rit
io
n 
se
cu
rit
y (a
t lo
ca
l, 
na
tio
na
l, r
eg
io
na
l 
an
d g
lo
ba
l le
ve
l) 
ar
e m
ad
e,
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d a
nd
 
su
st
ai
ne
d.
 
Fo
llo
w
‐up
 of
 FA
O
 20
11
a,
 af
te
r w
or
ks
ho
p.
 So
m
e p
oi
nt
s it
 ad
ds
: 
*R
eg
io
na
l or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 ho
ld
 a k
ey
 pla
ce
 in 
th
e r
ef
or
m
ed
 FS
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 str
uc
tu
re
 as
 th
ey
 pe
rf
or
m
 es
se
nt
ia
l fu
nc
tio
ns
 th
at
 
gu
ar
an
te
e t
he
 sm
oo
th
 lin
ka
ge
s b
et
w
ee
n g
lo
ba
l an
d n
at
io
na
l 
le
ve
ls.
 Th
es
e o
rg
an
iza
tio
ns
 ar
e c
rit
ic
al
 to
 en
su
re
 th
at
 po
lic
es
 
at
 na
tio
na
l, r
eg
io
na
l an
d g
lo
ba
l le
ve
l ar
e c
oh
er
en
t a
nd
 ad
he
re
 
to
 th
e r
ig
ht
 to
 fo
od
. 
*N
at
io
na
l fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y b
od
ie
s e
ns
ur
e t
ha
t n
at
io
na
l re
sp
on
se
s 
to
 fo
od
 ins
ec
ur
ity
 ta
rg
et
 th
e m
os
t v
ul
ne
ra
bl
e a
nd
 ar
e w
el
l 
co
or
di
na
te
d a
m
on
g s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s th
at
 be
ar
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 fo
r a
 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 of
 th
e F
S r
es
po
ns
e.
 
*R
eg
ar
di
ng
 th
e la
ng
ua
ge
, th
e w
or
ks
ho
p c
on
sid
er
ed
 
“g
ov
er
na
nc
e f
or
 FS
” m
or
e a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 th
an
 “F
S g
ov
er
na
nc
e”
, 
as
 FS
 is 
an
 ou
tc
om
e,
 no
t a
 se
ct
or
 or
 go
al
 in 
its
el
f. F
oo
d 
se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e c
ou
ld
 sti
ll b
e u
se
d t
o r
ef
er
 to
 th
e 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 th
at
 co
m
pr
ise
 th
e g
ov
er
na
nc
e r
eg
im
e f
or
 FS
 at
 
gl
ob
al
 lev
el
. 
*G
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 an
d d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
ge
nc
ie
s h
av
e t
o g
o b
ey
on
d 
th
e r
ec
og
ni
tio
n t
ha
t g
ov
er
na
nc
e m
at
te
rs
. It
 do
es
 fiv
e 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 in 
th
is r
es
pe
ct
. 
In
te
r a
lia
: 
R1
: Le
ar
n f
ro
m
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
es
 ab
ou
t 
w
hi
ch
 pr
in
ci
pl
es
 ar
e 
m
os
t re
le
va
nt
. 
R3
: w
or
k m
or
e 
sy
st
em
at
ic
al
ly
 
to
w
ar
ds
 im
pr
ov
ed
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 as
 a 
m
ea
ns
 to
 ac
hi
ev
e 
im
pr
ov
ed
 FS
 
ou
tc
om
es
. 
R4
: p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
an
d in
cl
us
io
n.
 
19
 
FA
O
 20
12
 
G
lo
ba
l 
M
ul
tip
le
 
N
ew
s 
ar
tic
le
 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
ew
s a
rt
ic
le
 ab
ou
t a
 m
in
ist
er
ia
l m
ee
tin
g.
 Th
ey
 ag
re
ed
 th
at
 
co
nt
in
ui
ng
 fo
od
 pr
ic
e v
ol
at
ili
ty
 re
qu
ire
s im
pr
ov
ed
 glo
ba
l 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 of
 FS
. G
ra
zia
no
 da
 Sil
va
: “I
n t
hi
s c
on
te
xt
, it
 is 
im
po
rt
an
t to
 im
pr
ov
e g
ov
er
na
nc
e o
f F
S.
 In
 th
e g
lo
ba
liz
ed
 
w
or
ld
 we
 liv
e in
, it
’s
 no
t p
os
sib
le
 to
 ha
ve
 FS
 in 
on
e c
ou
nt
ry
 
al
on
e.
 […
] T
he
 ne
w
 glo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
 sy
st
em
 of
 FS
 th
at
 we
 
ar
e b
ui
ld
in
g t
og
et
he
r, t
ha
t h
as
 th
e C
FS
 as
 its
 co
rn
er
st
on
e a
nd
 
AM
IS
 as
 on
e o
f it
s c
om
po
ne
nt
s,
 is 
pa
rt
 of
 a n
ew
 wo
rld
 or
de
r 
th
at
 ne
ed
s to
 em
er
ge
.”
  
Ad
va
nc
es
 ar
e a
lre
ad
y m
ad
e:
 th
e r
ef
or
m
 of
 th
e C
FS
, th
e m
os
t 
in
cl
us
iv
e in
te
rg
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l pl
at
fo
rm
 on
 FS
 an
d n
ut
rit
io
n,
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
t o
f th
e H
ig
h L
ev
el
 Ta
sk
 Fo
rc
e o
n G
lo
ba
l Fo
od
 
Se
cu
rit
y,
 an
d t
he
 cre
at
io
n o
f th
e A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l M
ar
ke
t 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n S
ys
te
m
 (A
M
IS
). 
 
20
 
G
al
iè
 20
13
 
N
ot
 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 
Sy
ria
, b
ut
 
no
t 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
em
pi
ric
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s;
 
do
cu
m
en
ts
 
an
al
ys
is;
 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Pa
pe
r is
 ab
ou
t se
ed
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
, n
ot
 so
 m
uc
h a
bo
ut
 fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e.
 Ha
s a
 ve
ry
 sm
al
l pa
ra
gr
ap
h a
bo
ut
 “fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y a
nd
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
”,
 wh
ic
h s
ta
te
s th
at
 go
od
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
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18
4 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
FS
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
or
y m
et
ho
ds
 
is t
he
 m
os
t im
po
rt
an
t fa
ct
or
 in 
er
ad
ic
at
in
g f
oo
d in
se
cu
rit
y,
 
an
d t
ha
t g
ra
nd
 sta
te
m
en
ts
 ab
ou
t re
du
ci
ng
 hu
ng
er
 ne
ed
 to
 be
 
tr
an
sla
te
d in
to
 sp
ec
ifi
c a
ct
io
ns
 “o
n t
he
 gr
ou
nd
”.
 
21
 
G
lo
ba
l 
Fo
ru
m
 on
 
Fo
od
 
Se
cu
rit
y 
an
d 
N
ut
rit
io
n 
20
11
 
G
lo
ba
l, 
na
tio
na
l, 
lo
ca
l 
M
ul
tip
le
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
CF
S 
Di
sc
us
sio
n 
su
m
m
ar
y 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Pa
pe
r p
re
se
nt
s th
e o
ut
co
m
es
 of
 a d
isc
us
sio
n o
n g
lo
ba
l 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 fo
r fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y,
 as
ki
ng
 th
e q
ue
st
io
n w
he
th
er
 
th
e c
ur
re
nt
 ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 ar
e f
it f
or
 th
e jo
b.
 It 
w
as
 un
de
rli
ne
d 
th
at
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y n
ee
ds
 a m
ul
ti‐d
isc
ip
lin
ar
y a
pp
ro
ac
h.
 Al
so
, 
be
ca
us
e o
f th
e s
pr
ea
d o
f re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s a
m
on
gs
t a
 nu
m
be
r 
of
 int
er
na
tio
na
l or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 th
at
 ge
ne
ra
te
s o
ve
rla
ps
, 
co
nf
lic
ts
 an
d in
co
he
re
nc
e,
 a r
ef
oc
us
in
g o
f ro
le
s is
 ne
ed
ed
. 
So
lu
tio
n s
ho
ul
d p
rim
ar
ily
 be
 so
ug
ht
 loc
al
ly
, th
er
eb
y 
re
sp
ec
tin
g t
he
 su
bs
id
ia
rit
y p
rin
ci
pl
e,
 wh
er
eb
y m
et
ho
ds
 an
d 
pr
ac
tic
es
 ar
e e
xc
ha
ng
ed
. A
 St
at
e a
pp
ro
ac
h is
 es
se
nt
ia
l fo
r 
re
al
izi
ng
 th
is,
 wh
er
ea
s in
te
rn
at
io
na
l su
pp
or
t is
 ne
ed
ed
 to
 
ad
dr
es
s fa
ct
or
s th
at
 oc
cu
r b
ey
on
d t
he
 co
nt
ro
l of
 loc
al
 an
d 
na
tio
na
l in
st
itu
tio
ns
.  
Th
e g
ov
er
na
nc
e s
ys
te
m
 sh
ou
ld
 als
o e
ns
ur
e t
ha
t g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 
ad
he
re
 to
 fo
od
 as
 a f
un
da
m
en
ta
l hu
m
an
 rig
ht
 fo
r e
ve
ry
on
e.
  
Th
e p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 ca
lle
d f
or
: 
*I
nf
or
m
at
io
n b
y t
he
 glo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
 str
uc
tu
re
s.
 
*S
tr
on
ge
r ci
vi
l so
ci
et
y r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n.
 
*A
ss
ist
an
ce
 to
 co
un
tr
ie
s in
 th
e f
or
m
 of
 ad
vi
ce
, ad
vo
ca
cy
, an
d 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 bu
ild
in
g.
 
*M
on
ito
rin
g o
f p
ro
gr
es
s a
nd
 co
m
pl
ia
nc
e.
 
*P
ro
m
ot
io
n o
f a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 an
d s
ha
rin
g o
f b
es
t p
ra
ct
ic
es
. 
Th
e r
ef
or
m
ed
 CF
S h
as
 alr
ea
dy
 ad
dr
es
se
d m
os
t o
f th
es
e 
iss
ue
s,
 bu
t st
ill
 ne
ed
s to
 pr
ov
e it
s e
ffe
ct
iv
en
es
s.
 Al
so
, p
ol
iti
ca
l 
w
ill
 m
us
t b
e m
ob
ili
ze
d a
t n
at
io
na
l le
ve
ls,
 an
d,
 at
 th
e 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l le
ve
l, a
 str
on
ge
r se
ns
e o
f so
lid
ar
ity
 m
us
t 
em
er
ge
. 
 
22
 
G
on
zá
le
z 
20
10
 
G
lo
ba
l 
FA
O
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
Ju
st
ifi
ca
tio
n 
re
gi
m
es
 
N
on
e 
Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 th
er
e h
av
e b
ee
n t
hr
ee
 wi
de
 ra
ng
in
g d
eb
at
es
 on
 
w
or
ld
 FS
, ea
ch
 wi
th
 its
 ow
n ju
st
ifi
ca
tio
n r
eg
im
e.
 Th
es
e t
hr
ee
 
re
gi
m
es
 ar
e t
he
 sc
ie
nt
ifi
c,
 th
e p
ol
iti
ca
l‐id
eo
lo
gi
ca
l, a
nd
 th
e 
et
hi
ca
l re
gi
m
e.
 Th
e F
AO
 do
es
 no
t p
la
y a
 ne
ut
ra
l ‘s
ci
en
tif
ic
’ 
ro
le
 in 
th
es
e d
eb
at
es
, b
ut
 ch
oo
se
s p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 ide
ol
og
ie
s a
bo
ve
 
ot
he
rs
. FA
O
 its
el
f is
 als
o c
ha
ra
ct
er
ize
d b
y id
eo
lo
gi
ca
l st
ru
gg
le
 
w
ith
in
 th
e o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 wh
er
eb
y it
’s
 inf
lu
en
ce
d b
y t
he
 
in
te
re
st
s o
f g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
, G
O
’s
, N
G
O
’s
 an
d c
or
po
ra
tio
ns
.  
 
23
 
Ha
dd
ad
 
20
11
 
N
at
io
na
l 
In
di
a 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Pl
ea
ds
 fo
r a
 na
tio
na
l nu
tr
iti
on
 str
at
eg
y in
 In
di
a.
 Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 
st
ro
ng
er
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 is 
ne
ed
ed
 to
 ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y a
dd
re
ss
 
un
de
rn
ut
rit
io
n.
 Th
es
e g
ov
er
na
nc
e a
rr
an
ge
m
en
ts
 wo
ul
d n
ee
d 
hi
gh
 lev
el
s o
f ca
pa
ci
ty
 to
 inv
es
t co
he
re
nt
ly
 in 
re
du
ci
ng
 
un
de
rn
ut
rit
io
n,
 ne
ed
 to
 we
ll‐c
oo
rd
in
at
ed
, sh
ou
ld
 inc
lu
de
 hig
h 
le
ve
ls o
f a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 an
d t
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y,
 an
d s
ho
ul
d b
e 
Se
e le
ft
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5 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
re
sp
on
siv
e t
ow
ar
ds
 ra
pi
dl
y e
m
er
gi
ng
 sh
oc
ks
. Su
cc
es
sf
ul
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 re
qu
ire
s a
 na
tio
na
l nu
tr
iti
on
 str
at
eg
y b
ac
ke
d b
y 
st
ro
ng
 na
tio
na
l le
ad
er
sh
ip
. 
24
 
Ha
dd
ad
 
20
12
 
N
ot
 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 
Is
la
m
ic
 
w
or
ld
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 
pa
pe
r; 
em
pi
ric
al
 
An
al
ys
is o
f 
Q
ur
an
 te
xt
s 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Ex
am
in
es
 an
d e
va
lu
at
es
 th
e Is
la
m
ic
 pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e o
f FS
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t b
y a
na
ly
zin
g Q
ur
an
 ve
rs
es
. Th
e Q
ur
an
 sta
te
s 
th
at
 M
os
le
m
s in
 Isl
am
ic
 sta
te
s o
r so
ci
et
ie
s c
on
du
ct
 th
ei
r 
af
fa
irs
 by
 m
ut
ua
l co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n,
 an
d t
ha
t th
ey
 sh
ou
ld
 re
fe
r 
m
at
te
rs
 re
la
te
d t
o p
ub
lic
 sa
fe
ty
, o
r th
e h
an
dl
in
g o
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f fe
ar
, to
 th
os
e c
ha
rg
ed
 wi
th
 au
th
or
ity
 
am
on
gs
t th
em
 i.e
. th
e Is
la
m
ic
 St
at
e le
ad
er
sh
ip
. Th
e m
ai
n 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 fo
r F
S fa
lls
 th
us
 on
 th
e S
ta
te
, w
hi
ch
 sh
ou
ld
 
th
er
ef
or
e e
st
ab
lis
h a
n e
ffi
ci
en
t a
dm
in
ist
ra
tiv
e/
 ins
tit
ut
io
na
l 
se
tu
p.
 Th
e a
ut
ho
r p
ro
po
se
s a
n in
st
itu
tio
na
l st
ru
ct
ur
e t
o d
o 
so
. 
 
25
 
Hi
gh
 Le
ve
l 
Ta
sk
 Fo
rc
e 
on
 th
e 
G
lo
ba
l 
Fo
od
 
Se
cu
rit
y 
Cr
isi
s 2
01
0 
N
ot
 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 
N
on
e 
U
pd
at
ed
 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
fo
r a
ct
io
n 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
G
oo
d g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
fo
r fo
od
 an
d 
nu
tr
iti
on
 se
cu
rit
y 
is f
un
da
m
en
ta
lly
 
ab
ou
t 
na
tio
na
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
 
pr
io
rit
izi
ng
 
po
lic
ie
s,
 pla
ns
, 
pr
og
ra
m
s a
nd
 
fu
nd
in
g t
o t
ac
kl
e 
hu
ng
er
, 
m
al
nu
tr
iti
on
 an
d 
fo
od
 ins
ec
ur
ity
 in 
th
e m
os
t 
vu
ln
er
ab
le
 
po
pu
la
tio
ns
, 
w
he
th
er
 it 
be
 
th
ro
ug
h 
hu
m
an
ita
ria
n o
r 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
as
sis
ta
nc
e,
 
na
tio
na
lly
, 
bi
la
te
ra
lly
 or
 
m
ul
til
at
er
al
ly
. 
G
lo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s h
av
e s
ho
w
n t
o b
e f
ra
gi
le
. 
Ex
ist
in
g s
ys
te
m
s o
f re
so
ur
ce
 m
ob
ili
za
tio
n d
o n
ot
 re
sp
on
d 
ra
pi
dl
y,
 pr
ed
ic
ta
bl
y,
 or
 ad
eq
ua
te
ly
 en
ou
gh
 to
 th
e f
oo
d a
nd
 
nu
tr
iti
on
al
 ne
ed
s o
f p
oo
r p
eo
pl
e w
he
n t
he
y a
re
 af
fe
ct
ed
 by
 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l ex
te
rn
al
 sh
oc
ks
. 
Ta
ck
lin
g t
he
 str
uc
tu
ra
l ca
us
es
 of
 fo
od
 ins
ec
ur
ity
 ca
lls
 fo
r 
co
nv
er
ge
nt
 po
lic
ie
s,
 str
at
eg
ie
s a
nd
 pr
og
ra
m
s th
at
 giv
e u
rg
en
t 
pr
io
rit
y t
o m
ee
tin
g b
ot
h lo
ng
‐te
rm
 ne
ed
s a
nd
 em
er
ge
nc
y 
re
qu
es
ts
 fo
r fo
od
 an
d n
ut
rit
io
n s
ec
ur
ity
. Th
is r
eq
ui
re
s a
cr
os
s‐
go
ve
rn
m
en
t su
pp
or
t, p
ol
iti
ca
l w
ill
, an
d lo
ng
‐te
rm
 co
or
di
na
te
d 
ac
tio
ns
. 
Th
e n
ee
d t
o s
tr
en
gt
he
n F
S g
ov
er
na
nc
e h
as
 no
w
 be
en
 
re
co
gn
ize
d a
nd
 is 
re
ce
iv
in
g a
tt
en
tio
n a
t g
lo
ba
l, r
eg
io
na
l an
d 
co
un
tr
y le
ve
ls.
 Its
 re
fo
rm
 m
us
t b
ui
ld
 on
 th
e b
es
t o
f e
xi
st
in
g 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
. Th
is i
nc
lu
de
s th
e s
ea
rc
h o
f m
ul
tip
le
 sta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
fo
r st
ro
ng
er
 ins
tit
ut
io
ns
, p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
s a
nd
 re
ne
w
ed
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
. 
Th
e C
FS
, w
hi
ch
 pr
ov
id
es
 th
e h
ig
he
st
 lev
el
 of
 glo
ba
l 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
, ca
n  p
la
y a
n im
po
rt
an
t ro
le
 in 
th
is r
es
pe
ct
. 
Fo
st
er
 str
at
eg
ic
 
co
or
di
na
tio
n a
t 
na
tio
na
l, r
eg
io
na
l 
an
d g
lo
ba
l le
ve
l to
 
im
pr
ov
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
, 
pr
om
ot
e b
et
te
r 
al
lo
ca
tio
n o
f 
re
so
ur
ce
s,
 av
oi
d 
du
pl
ic
at
io
n o
f 
ef
fo
rt
s a
nd
 ide
nt
ify
 
re
sp
on
se
 ga
ps
. 
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Ja
ro
sz
 20
09
 
G
lo
ba
l 
FA
O
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
Po
lit
ic
al
 ec
on
om
y  
N
on
e 
Ex
am
in
es
 th
e g
lo
ba
l re
sp
on
se
s to
 wo
rld
 hu
ng
er
 th
ro
ug
h a
n 
an
al
ys
is o
f th
e p
ol
iti
ca
l ec
on
om
y o
f g
lo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
be
tw
ee
n 1
94
5 a
nd
 th
e p
re
se
nt
 (2
00
8)
 fo
od
 cr
isi
s.
 Th
e F
AO
 
ha
s b
ee
n c
rit
iq
ue
d f
or
 be
in
g in
ef
fe
ct
iv
e in
 ad
dr
es
sin
g fo
od
 
cr
ise
s.
 Ja
ro
sz
 ar
gu
es
 th
at
 th
is i
s n
ot
 so
le
ly
 ba
se
d u
po
n it
s 
De
sp
ite
 de
ca
de
s‐
lo
ng
 as
se
rt
io
ns
 th
at
 
on
ly
 glo
ba
l 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 an
d 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 ca
n 
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 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
m
as
siv
e b
ur
ea
uc
ra
tic
 str
uc
tu
re
, b
ut
, m
or
e im
po
rt
an
tly
, th
e 
re
su
lt o
f a
 ste
ad
y p
ro
ce
ss
 of
 er
os
io
n o
f FA
O
’s
 inf
lu
en
ce
, th
at
 
co
m
e f
ro
m
 th
e t
en
sio
ns
 wi
th
in
 th
e o
rg
an
iza
tio
n.
 Th
es
e 
te
ns
io
ns
 ar
e e
vi
de
nt
 in 
di
sc
ou
rs
es
 an
d p
ra
ct
ic
es
 th
at
 re
sp
on
d 
to
 wo
rld
 hu
ng
er
, in
 wh
ic
h t
w
o a
ss
um
pt
io
ns
 ca
n b
e id
en
tif
ie
d.
 
Th
e f
irs
t is
 th
at
 wo
rld
 tra
de
, th
e a
bi
lit
y t
o b
uy
 fo
od
, an
d 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 is 
th
e m
os
t e
ffe
ct
iv
e a
pp
ro
ac
h.
 Th
e s
ec
on
d is
 
th
at
 re
du
ci
ng
 wo
rld
 hu
ng
er
 is 
a c
ol
le
ct
iv
e m
or
al
, et
hi
ca
l, a
nd
 
so
ci
al
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
, an
d t
ha
t p
eo
pl
e h
av
e a
 rig
ht
 to
 fo
od
. 
Th
es
e t
w
o c
on
fli
ct
 wi
th
 ea
ch
 ot
he
r, w
he
re
by
 th
e f
irs
t is
 
m
ai
nl
y u
se
d b
y g
ra
in
 ex
po
rt
in
g c
ou
nt
rie
s,
 pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ly
 th
e 
W
es
t, a
nd
 th
e s
ec
on
d b
y g
ra
in
 im
po
rt
in
g c
ou
nt
rie
s.
 Th
es
e 
te
ns
io
ns
 ha
ve
 led
 to
 ch
ar
ge
s o
f in
co
he
re
nc
e a
nd
 ine
ffe
ct
ua
lit
y 
as
 FA
O
 ta
ck
s b
et
w
ee
n t
he
se
 po
sit
io
ns
. 
el
im
in
at
e w
or
ld
 
hu
ng
er
, th
e a
na
ly
sis
 
de
m
on
st
ra
te
s th
ei
r 
in
ab
ili
ty
 to
 do
 so
. 
Th
e h
op
e li
es
 in 
so
ci
al
 m
ov
em
en
ts
 
th
at
 em
ph
as
ize
 fo
od
 
so
ve
re
ig
nt
y a
nd
 
fo
od
 jus
tic
e.
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G
lo
ba
l 
W
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ld
 
Ba
nk
 & 
FA
O
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
em
pi
ric
al
 
Do
cu
m
en
ts
 
an
al
ys
is 
Sc
al
e 
N
on
e 
Ex
pl
or
es
 th
e c
ha
ng
in
g d
ef
in
iti
on
s F
S in
 its
 re
la
tio
n t
o s
ca
le
 in 
gl
ob
al
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
. D
ef
in
iti
on
s o
f FS
 ar
e m
ul
tip
le
, 
co
nt
in
uo
us
ly
 ev
ol
vi
ng
 an
d c
on
te
st
ed
. O
ve
r ti
m
e,
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 ha
s m
ov
ed
 fro
m
 on
e o
f n
at
io
na
l le
ve
ls o
f 
pr
od
uc
tio
n t
o a
 m
ul
ti‐f
ac
et
ed
 iss
ue
 inv
ol
vi
ng
 ac
ce
ss
, co
nt
ro
l, 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
, p
ov
er
ty
, ge
nd
er
, an
d H
Rs
 ac
ro
ss
 ge
og
ra
ph
ic
 
sc
al
e.
 Th
e s
ca
le
d d
ef
in
iti
on
s m
ov
e f
ro
m
 an
 ea
rly
 em
ph
as
is a
t 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l an
d n
at
io
na
l le
ve
ls,
 to
 m
ic
ro
‐le
ve
l fo
cu
s u
po
n 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 an
d g
en
de
re
d in
di
vi
du
al
s,
 to
 lin
k in
di
vi
du
al
s a
nd
 
gl
ob
al
 m
od
al
iti
es
 of
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
. In
 th
e c
ur
re
nt
 de
ba
te
, 
di
ffe
re
nt
 em
ph
as
is a
re
 lai
d,
 as
 ha
s b
ee
n s
et
 ou
t in
 Ja
ro
sz
 
20
09
.  
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Ko
c e
t a
l. 
20
08
 
N
at
io
na
l 
Ca
na
da
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Ex
am
in
es
 ho
w
 civ
il s
oc
ie
ty
, p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 Fo
od
 Se
cu
re
 Ca
na
da
‐
Sé
cu
rit
é A
lim
en
ta
ire
 Ca
na
da
, ca
n m
ak
e a
n im
pa
ct
 wi
th
in
 th
e 
in
cr
ea
sin
gl
y r
er
eg
ul
at
ed
 po
lic
y d
ec
isi
on
 sy
st
em
. In
 th
e a
rt
ic
le
, 
FS
 an
d C
om
m
un
ity
 FS
 ar
e s
ub
su
m
ed
 un
de
r th
e t
er
m
 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e f
oo
d s
ys
te
m
s.
 
Th
e a
rt
ic
le
 ar
gu
es
 th
at
 sh
ift
s in
 de
ci
sio
n‐m
ak
in
g a
ut
ho
rit
y a
nd
 
po
lic
y in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 (fr
om
 pa
rli
am
en
t to
 go
ve
rn
m
en
t a
ge
nc
ie
s)
 
ha
ve
 pr
of
ou
nd
 im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 fo
r th
e f
ut
ur
e o
f ci
vi
l so
ci
et
y‐
fe
de
ra
l go
ve
rn
m
en
t re
la
tio
ns
. In
 th
eo
ry
 bo
th
 ha
ve
 m
uc
h t
o 
of
fe
r e
ac
h o
th
er
: cr
ea
tiv
ity
, in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 on
‐th
e‐g
ro
un
d 
su
cc
es
se
s,
 leg
iti
m
ac
y fr
om
 CS
, an
d d
ec
isi
on
‐m
ak
in
g p
ow
er
, 
fin
an
ci
al
 re
so
ur
ce
s,
 an
d s
ca
lin
g‐u
p c
ap
ac
ity
 fro
m
 go
ve
rn
m
en
t. 
In
 re
al
ity
 it 
is c
ur
re
nt
ly
 no
t o
bv
io
us
 th
at
 eit
he
r h
as
 th
e w
ill
, 
kn
ow
le
dg
e,
 str
uc
tu
re
s,
 or
 ca
pa
ci
ty
 to
 wo
rk
 in 
lo
os
e n
et
w
or
ks
 
of
 co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n.
 Th
e c
ha
lle
ng
e f
or
 CS
O
s is
 ho
w
 to
 ge
t in
to
 th
e 
po
lic
y d
ec
isi
on
 sy
st
em
. A
n o
pp
or
tu
ni
ty
 is 
to
 int
er
ac
t m
or
e 
w
ith
 m
id
dl
e a
nd
 se
ni
or
 m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 les
s to
 try
 inf
lu
en
ce
 
pa
rli
am
en
ta
ria
ns
.  
Pr
ov
isi
on
 of
 hig
h‐
qu
al
ity
 inf
o,
 
cr
ea
tiv
ity
 an
d 
an
al
ys
is i
s a
 sta
rt
in
g 
pl
ac
e.
 Su
bs
eq
ue
nt
ly
 
th
is c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
co
ul
d g
ra
du
al
ly
 be
 
in
st
itu
tio
na
liz
ed
. Fo
r 
bo
th
 se
ct
or
s,
 
em
br
ac
in
g 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 plu
ra
lis
m
 
w
ill
 lik
el
y b
e 
es
se
nt
ia
l. 
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re
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al
 
or
ie
nt
at
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FS
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ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
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 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
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Re
co
m
m
en
da
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La
ng
 & 
Ba
rli
ng
 
20
12
 
G
lo
ba
l 
M
ul
tip
le
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
Di
sc
ou
rs
e 
N
on
e 
Th
e p
ap
er
 ex
pl
or
es
 th
e d
iv
er
sit
y o
f p
er
sp
ec
tiv
es
 on
 wh
at
 is 
m
ea
nt
 by
 FS
, co
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
at
 th
e c
or
e 2
1s
t ‐ce
nt
ur
y t
as
k is
 to
 
cr
ea
te
 a s
us
ta
in
ab
le
 fo
od
 sy
st
em
. It
 is 
no
t p
rim
ar
ily
 ab
ou
t 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
, b
ut
 pr
ov
id
es
 a c
ou
pl
e o
f in
sig
ht
s in
 it.
 It 
ar
gu
es
 
th
at
 th
e p
ol
ic
y r
es
po
ns
es
 to
 FS
 ar
e f
ra
ct
ur
ed
 an
d c
on
te
st
ed
, 
as
 is 
re
fle
ct
ed
 in 
th
e d
ef
in
iti
on
al
 flu
id
ity
. Th
e a
ut
ho
rs
 ide
nt
ify
 
tw
o e
nc
om
pa
ss
in
g f
oo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 dis
co
ur
se
s,
 wh
ic
h t
he
y t
er
m
 
‘o
ld
’ fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y a
na
ly
sis
 an
d ‘
em
er
gi
ng
’ su
st
ai
na
bl
e f
oo
d 
an
al
ys
is.
 Th
es
e d
isc
ou
rs
es
 co
nf
lic
t w
ith
 ea
ch
 ot
he
r. 
Su
ch
 flu
id
ity
 of
 de
ba
te
 is 
no
rm
al
 fo
r fo
od
 po
lic
y.
 Th
e ju
gg
lin
g 
of
 ev
id
en
ce
, in
te
re
st
s,
 ch
al
le
ng
es
 an
d p
ol
ic
y r
es
po
ns
es
 is 
in
ev
ita
bl
y m
es
sy
.   
Po
lic
y‐m
ak
er
s n
ee
d 
to
 ex
pl
or
e,
 at
 glo
ba
l, 
re
gi
on
al
, n
at
io
na
l 
an
d lo
ca
l le
ve
ls o
f 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
, h
ow
 
po
lic
y fo
ru
m
s c
ou
ld
 
be
tt
er
 inc
lu
de
 
ec
ol
og
ic
al
 an
d s
oc
ia
l 
co
ns
id
er
at
io
ns
 int
o 
a d
isc
ou
rs
e t
ha
t is
 
st
ill
 sh
ro
ud
ed
 by
 
ne
o‐M
al
th
us
ia
n 
as
su
m
pt
io
ns
 th
at
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n a
nd
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
y a
re
 th
e 
ke
y fa
ct
or
s a
nd
 th
at
 
th
e s
ol
ut
io
ns
 lie
 in 
pr
od
uc
in
g m
or
e 
fo
od
. 
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d p
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y h
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o d
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er
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ai
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bi
lit
y a
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 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y.
 Th
e p
ap
er
 lay
s o
ut
 so
m
e 
co
nc
er
ns
 an
d m
ak
es
 pr
op
os
al
s fo
r th
e t
ra
ns
iti
on
 to
 a p
ol
ic
y 
m
ak
in
g s
ys
te
m
 th
at
 wo
ul
d b
e b
et
te
r e
qu
ip
pe
d t
o a
dd
re
ss
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ex
 pr
ob
le
m
s fa
ci
ng
 th
e C
an
ad
ia
n f
oo
d a
nd
 ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 
sy
st
em
. A
 via
bl
e p
ol
ic
y m
ak
in
g s
ys
te
m
 m
us
t fo
cu
s o
n t
he
 
cr
ea
tio
n o
f fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y a
nd
 ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l su
st
ai
na
bi
lit
y,
 an
d 
bu
ilt
 on
 pr
in
ci
pl
es
 th
at
 co
nt
ra
di
ct
 th
e c
ur
re
nt
 pr
ob
le
m
s:
 
*I
nt
eg
ra
te
d r
es
po
ns
ib
ili
tie
s a
nd
 ac
tiv
iti
es
. 
*A
n e
m
ph
as
is o
n m
ac
ro
‐po
lic
y 
*T
ra
ns
di
sc
ip
lin
ar
y p
ol
ic
y d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
*P
ol
ic
y m
ak
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s a
re
 clo
se
 to
 th
e d
iv
er
se
 gr
ou
ps
 af
fe
ct
ed
 by
 
pr
ob
le
m
s n
ee
di
ng
 re
so
lu
tio
n.
 
*F
oo
d s
ys
te
m
s p
ol
ic
y.
 
To
 en
su
re
 th
is t
he
 pa
pe
r p
ro
po
se
s th
e c
re
at
io
n o
f n
ew
 un
its
 
at
 th
e m
un
ic
ip
al
 lev
el
, an
d p
ro
vi
nc
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d f
ed
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de
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 Fo
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d F
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d S
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, w
hi
ch
’ fu
nc
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ns
 ar
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w
or
ke
d o
ut
 in 
th
e p
ap
er
. 
Se
e le
ft
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e t
o d
ev
el
op
 th
e p
ol
ic
y t
hr
ou
gh
 a 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
or
y c
on
su
lta
tiv
e a
pp
ro
ac
h.
 Th
e n
eg
ot
ia
tio
ns
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 m
ee
tin
gs
 an
d w
or
ks
ho
ps
 wh
er
e m
em
be
rs
 an
d 
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8 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
gr
ou
ps
 co
ul
d d
eb
at
e p
ro
po
sa
ls,
 be
fo
re
 re
ac
hi
ng
 co
m
pr
om
ise
. 
Th
e in
vo
lv
em
en
t o
f e
xp
er
ts
 an
d (
lo
ca
l) s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s is
 se
en
 as
 
ke
y fa
ct
or
 in 
th
e s
uc
ce
ss
 of
 de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 th
e p
ol
ic
y.
 In
 ad
di
tio
n,
 
th
e p
ol
iti
ca
l w
ill
 wi
th
in
 va
rio
us
 de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
 wa
s e
ss
en
tia
l. 
32
 
M
al
uf
 19
98
 
Re
gi
on
al
 
La
tin
 
Am
er
ic
a 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
ec
on
om
ic
s 
N
on
e 
Ex
am
in
es
 th
e m
ai
n c
on
di
tio
ns
 fo
r a
ch
ie
vi
ng
 ec
on
om
ic
 gr
ow
th
 
w
ith
 inc
re
as
in
g s
oc
ia
l eq
ui
ty
 an
d w
ith
 a s
pe
ci
al
 fo
cu
s o
n F
S.
 
Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 th
e m
ul
ti‐d
im
en
sio
na
l ch
ar
ac
te
r o
f FS
 de
m
an
ds
 
sp
ec
ia
l po
lit
ic
al
 an
d in
st
itu
tio
na
l re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
, in
 wh
ic
h 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t a
nd
 civ
il s
oc
ie
ty
 pa
rt
ne
rs
. In
 ad
di
tio
n,
 int
ra
‐
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l, i.
e.
 int
er
‐m
in
ist
er
ia
l, c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n is
 ne
ed
ed
. 
 
33
 
M
ar
gu
lis
 
20
11
a 
G
lo
ba
l 
M
ul
tip
le
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 
pa
pe
r; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
Re
gi
m
e 
co
m
pl
ex
es
 
N
on
e 
Se
e M
ar
gu
lis
 20
13
 fo
r g
en
er
al
 ar
gu
m
en
t. 
  *N
o s
in
gl
e in
te
rn
at
io
na
l in
st
itu
tio
n r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 fo
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t F
S.
 Re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 sp
re
ad
 am
on
g n
um
be
r o
f IO
’s
, 
w
hi
ch
 ca
us
es
 ov
er
la
p r
ul
es
 an
d n
or
m
s (p
ar
ad
ig
m
s)
. C
ha
lle
ng
e 
to
 ac
hi
ev
in
g c
oh
er
en
ce
. 
*C
on
tin
ui
ng
 hu
ng
er
 sh
ow
s th
e f
ai
lu
re
 of
 wo
rld
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 so
 fa
r. 
*R
ul
e a
nd
 no
rm
 co
nf
lic
ts
 ar
e h
ei
gh
te
ne
d b
y la
ck
 of
 
co
or
di
na
tio
n o
r co
he
re
nc
e a
t th
e n
at
io
na
l le
ve
l, e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 
be
tw
ee
n m
in
ist
rie
s.
 Al
so
 div
er
sit
y o
f st
at
e in
te
re
st
s 
re
pr
es
en
te
d a
t in
st
itu
tio
ns
 wi
th
in
 re
gi
m
e c
om
pl
ex
. 
*F
oo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 m
ul
ti‐d
im
en
sio
na
l 
St
at
es
 pr
in
ci
pa
l 
ac
to
rs
 to
 m
iti
ga
te
 
co
nf
lic
t. M
or
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 re
qu
ire
s 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s to
 
pr
om
ot
e g
re
at
er
 
in
te
rn
al
 po
lic
y 
co
he
re
nc
e w
ith
in
 
st
at
es
 an
d b
et
w
ee
n 
m
ul
tip
le
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
. 
34
 
M
ar
gu
lis
 
20
12
 
G
lo
ba
l 
CF
S,
 CF
A,
 
G
8/
G
20
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
bo
ok
 
ch
ap
te
r; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Do
es
 no
t g
iv
e a
 
de
fin
iti
on
, b
ut
 
st
at
es
 th
at
 glo
ba
l 
fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 is 
co
ns
tit
ut
ed
 by
 th
e 
ov
er
 a d
oz
en
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 an
d 
nu
m
er
ou
s 
re
gi
on
al
, n
on
‐
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l an
d 
pr
iv
at
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 
ac
tiv
e in
 th
e f
ie
ld
 
of
 FS
. 
Ch
ap
te
r a
na
ly
se
s k
ey
, re
ce
nt
 ins
tit
ut
io
na
l de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
 in 
gl
ob
al
 FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 an
d p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 fo
cu
se
s o
n t
hr
ee
 
in
st
itu
tio
na
l re
sp
on
se
s to
 th
e 2
00
8 g
lo
ba
l fo
od
 cri
sis
, i.e
. C
FS
, 
CF
A a
nd
 G8
/G
20
.  
Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 th
e a
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
e o
f g
lo
ba
l FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 ha
s 
ev
ol
ve
d o
ve
r ti
m
e a
lo
ng
 fo
ur
 co
nn
ec
te
d d
im
en
sio
ns
: 1
) A
n 
in
cr
ea
sin
g d
en
sit
y o
f in
te
rn
at
io
na
l in
st
itu
tio
ns
, w
hi
ch
 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 th
ro
ug
h a
 pu
nc
tu
at
ed
 pa
tt
er
n,
 pr
im
ar
ily
 in 
fo
ur
 ke
y 
pe
rio
ds
; 2
) va
ria
tio
n in
 ins
tit
ut
io
na
l fo
rm
s,
 inc
lu
di
ng
, m
or
e 
re
ce
nt
ly
, tr
an
sn
at
io
na
l ne
tw
or
ks
 of
 go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
ffi
ci
al
s a
nd
 
N
G
O
s;
 3)
 inc
re
as
ed
 aw
ar
en
es
s o
f th
e c
au
se
s a
nd
 ef
fe
ct
s o
f 
fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y,
 wh
ic
h h
as
 inf
lu
en
ce
d g
ov
er
na
nc
e p
ra
ct
ic
es
; 4
) 
di
ffu
sio
n o
f FS
 ac
ro
ss
 glo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
, re
su
lti
ng
 in 
a w
id
er
 
sp
re
ad
 of
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 an
d d
isa
gg
re
ga
tio
n a
cr
os
s m
an
y 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
. 
Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 th
e 2
00
8 g
lo
ba
l fo
od
 cri
sis
 wa
s th
e c
at
al
ys
t fo
r 
th
e d
ev
el
op
m
en
t o
f n
ew
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 ins
tit
ut
io
ns
. C
FS
, 
HL
TF
/C
FA
 an
d G
8/
G
20
 va
ry
 sig
ni
fic
an
tly
 in 
th
ei
r 
m
em
be
rs
hi
ps
, m
an
da
te
s a
nd
 so
ur
ce
s o
f a
ut
ho
rit
y a
nd
 
le
gi
tim
ac
y.
 Th
ey
 ea
ch
 cla
im
 a c
en
tr
al
 po
sit
io
n.
 De
sp
ite
  sh
ar
in
g 
po
lic
y o
bj
ec
tiv
es
 an
d e
ng
ag
in
g in
 fo
rm
al
, in
fo
rm
al
 an
d a
d h
oc
 
Im
pr
ov
in
g g
lo
ba
l 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 FS
 
re
qu
ire
s c
on
se
ns
us
 
am
on
g a
ll t
he
 ac
to
rs
 
th
at
 ar
e in
vo
lv
ed
 to
 
be
 tru
ly
 ef
fe
ct
iv
e.
 
Br
oa
d‐b
as
ed
 
co
ns
en
su
s,
 
co
op
er
at
io
n a
nd
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n a
m
on
g 
st
at
es
 an
d n
on
‐st
at
e 
ac
to
rs
 is 
an
 
in
cr
ea
sin
gl
y 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 glo
ba
l 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 to
 FS
. 
Supplementary Materials
229
18
9 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
co
or
di
na
tio
n t
he
re
 is 
co
ns
id
er
ab
le
 co
nt
es
ta
tio
n a
m
on
g t
hr
ee
 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 ov
er
 dir
ec
tio
n o
f g
lo
ba
l FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
. Th
es
e 
co
nt
es
ts
 ca
nn
ot
 be
 re
so
lv
ed
 th
ro
ug
h s
ta
te
 co
ns
en
su
s a
lo
ne
 
an
d t
he
 CF
A a
nd
 CF
S p
ro
vi
de
 sig
ni
fic
an
t sc
op
e f
or
 no
n‐s
ta
te
 
ac
to
rs
 to
 ex
er
t in
flu
en
ce
 an
d c
la
im
 leg
iti
m
at
e r
ol
es
 in 
gl
ob
al
 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
. G
lo
ba
l FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 th
us
 ap
pe
ar
s to
 be
 
sh
ift
in
g t
ow
ar
ds
 gr
ea
te
r p
lu
ra
lis
m
.  
35
 
M
ar
gu
lis
 
20
13
 
G
lo
ba
l 
M
ul
tip
le
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
Re
gi
m
e 
co
m
pl
ex
es
 
N
on
e 
Th
er
e is
 wi
de
 ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 th
at
 glo
ba
l FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 sh
ou
ld
 be
 
re
fo
rm
ed
 an
d a
ck
no
w
le
dg
ed
 th
at
 glo
ba
l sc
al
e,
 dr
iv
er
s,
 an
d 
co
m
pl
ex
ity
 fo
od
 ins
ec
ur
ity
 ar
e b
ey
on
d c
ap
ac
ity
 ind
iv
id
ua
l 
st
at
es
. R
ef
or
m
 dr
iv
e in
cl
ud
es
 co
op
er
at
io
n a
nd
 co
he
re
nc
e 
ac
ro
ss
 UN
 sy
st
em
, B
re
tt
on
 W
oo
ds
, re
gi
on
al
 bo
di
es
, G
20
. 
Ho
w
ev
er
, th
e in
te
rn
at
io
na
l fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y r
eg
im
e h
as
 sh
ift
ed
 
in
 a r
eg
im
e c
om
pl
ex
 fo
r fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y,
 wh
ic
h h
as
 im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 
fo
r e
ffo
rt
s to
 im
pr
ov
e c
oh
er
en
ce
 an
d a
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
e.
 Di
ve
rg
in
g 
ru
le
s a
nd
 no
rm
s a
cr
os
s th
e e
le
m
en
ta
l re
gi
m
es
 of
 ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 
an
d f
oo
d,
 int
er
na
tio
na
l tr
ad
e,
 an
d h
um
an
 rig
ht
s c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 ro
le
 of
 sta
te
s a
nd
 m
ar
ke
ts
 in 
ad
dr
es
sin
g f
oo
d 
in
se
cu
rit
y p
ro
du
ce
d c
on
fli
ct
, w
hi
ch
 m
ak
es
 a c
oh
er
en
t 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 m
or
e d
iff
ic
ul
t.  
Fu
rt
he
r le
ar
ns
 th
at
: 
*H
ist
or
y h
as
 sh
ow
n t
ha
t co
un
tr
ie
s h
av
e a
 str
on
g in
flu
en
ce
 on
 
th
e m
an
da
te
 of
 GO
’s
. 
*O
ve
rla
pp
in
g r
ul
es
 m
ay
 inc
re
as
e b
ot
h p
ro
bl
em
s a
nd
 
co
he
re
nc
e.
 Re
ga
rd
in
g t
he
 fo
rm
er
 th
ey
 ca
n b
e t
he
 so
ur
ce
 of
 
tr
an
sn
at
io
na
l co
nf
lic
t b
et
w
ee
n s
ta
te
s a
nd
 IO
’s
. 
*I
O
’s
 af
fe
ct
 ea
ch
 ot
he
r, a
nd
 ca
n h
av
e a
 “c
hi
lli
ng
 ef
fe
ct
” o
n 
ea
ch
 ot
he
r (W
TO
). 
*R
eg
im
e c
om
pl
ex
es
 ca
n p
ro
du
ce
 tra
ns
na
tio
na
l po
lit
ic
al
 
co
nf
lic
ts
 re
la
te
d t
o a
ct
or
s’
 pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 of
 hie
ra
rc
hy
. 
*N
or
m
s c
an
 div
er
ge
 be
tw
ee
n I
O
’s
, b
et
w
ee
n o
ld
 an
d n
ew
 
po
w
er
s,
 et
c.
 Th
ey
 en
ge
nd
er
 pr
ob
le
m
s o
f tr
us
t a
m
on
g a
ct
or
s.
 
Al
so
 po
sit
iv
e s
ig
na
ls:
 fo
od
 ins
ec
ur
ity
 is 
no
w
 a p
rio
rit
y is
su
e,
 
an
d t
he
re
’s
 inc
re
as
in
g c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n.
 
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 
co
nf
lic
t ru
le
s a
nd
 
no
rm
s.
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M
ar
ze
da
‐
M
ly
na
rs
ka
 
20
11
 
M
ul
tip
le
 
N
on
e 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
pa
pe
r; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
M
ul
ti‐l
ev
el
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
N
on
e 
Pa
pe
r d
ea
ls w
ith
 th
e q
ue
st
io
n w
he
th
er
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 ca
n b
e c
on
sid
er
ed
 a f
or
m
 of
 m
ul
ti‐l
ev
el
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
. It
 co
nc
lu
de
s th
at
 sta
te
s a
re
 no
t w
ill
in
g t
o s
ha
re
 
po
w
er
 in 
th
e a
re
as
 of
 tra
de
 an
d a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
, b
ut
 th
at
 th
er
e a
re
 
so
m
e e
xa
m
pl
es
 wh
er
e m
ul
ti‐l
ev
el
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 do
es
 oc
cu
r.  
At
 th
e s
am
e t
im
e,
 th
e p
ap
er
 ar
gu
es
 th
at
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 ta
ke
s p
la
ce
 at
 th
re
e le
ve
ls:
 glo
ba
l, r
eg
io
na
l an
d 
na
tio
na
l. 
Fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e is
 ty
pi
fie
d a
s c
om
pl
ex
, m
ul
ti‐
di
m
en
sio
na
l, a
nd
 su
bj
ec
t to
 ins
tit
ut
io
na
l in
co
he
re
nc
e.
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 Aut
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r(
s)
 
Fo
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Le
ve
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   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
37
 
M
cK
eo
n 
20
11
 
G
lo
ba
l 
M
ul
tip
le
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
pa
pe
r; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
 
Pr
ov
id
es
 a h
ist
or
ic
al
 ov
er
vi
ew
 of
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e,
 
lo
ok
s a
t in
st
itu
tio
ns
, p
ar
ad
ig
m
s a
nd
 ac
to
rs
 an
d in
te
re
st
s.
 3 
as
pe
ct
s m
al
‐go
ve
rn
an
ce
: 1
) C
ur
re
nt
 ar
ch
ite
ct
ur
e f
ra
gm
en
te
d,
 
in
co
he
re
nt
, o
pa
qu
e,
 an
d u
na
cc
ou
nt
ab
le
, 2)
 it 
is s
tr
on
gl
y 
co
nd
iti
on
ed
 by
 un
re
gu
la
te
d w
ei
gh
t o
f p
riv
at
e s
ec
to
r in
te
re
st
s,
 
3)
 po
lic
ie
s it
 pr
op
os
es
 ar
e in
ad
eq
ua
te
, if
 no
t 
co
un
te
rp
ro
du
ct
iv
e.
 
Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 th
e f
oo
d c
ris
is p
ro
vi
de
s a
 wi
nd
ow
 of
 op
po
rt
un
ity
 
fo
r ch
an
ge
. N
ew
 co
nc
ep
ts
 ar
e n
ow
 se
rio
us
ly
 co
ns
id
er
ed
. N
ew
 
ac
to
rs
, su
ch
 as
 CS
O
’s
, w
ho
 pr
ov
id
e t
he
 es
se
nt
ia
l lin
k b
et
w
ee
n 
na
tio
na
l an
d g
lo
ba
l le
ve
l.  
  Fur
th
er
: 
*F
S g
ov
er
na
nc
e in
cr
ea
sin
gl
y d
iff
ic
ul
t in
 glo
ba
liz
ed
 wo
rld
: 
m
ul
tip
le
 lay
er
s d
ec
isi
on
‐m
ak
in
g,
 FS
 ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 af
fe
ct
ed
 by
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t fr
om
 loc
al
 to
 glo
ba
l, e
ve
n n
at
io
n‐s
ta
te
s lo
sin
g 
co
nt
ro
l. T
he
re
 is 
a v
ac
uu
m
 in 
gl
ob
al
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
, in
 ab
se
nc
e o
f 
an
 au
th
or
ita
tiv
e a
nd
 inc
lu
siv
e g
lo
ba
l bo
dy
. 
*F
S g
ov
er
na
nc
e h
as
 be
co
m
e in
cr
ea
si
ng
ly
 co
m
pl
ex
. 
O
ve
rla
pp
in
g a
nd
 co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
y p
ol
ic
ie
s a
nd
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
, 
co
m
pl
ic
at
ed
 by
 un
w
rit
te
n r
ul
es
 an
d p
ra
ct
ic
es
 no
t su
bj
ec
t to
 
po
lit
ic
al
 ov
er
sig
ht
. 
*G
ov
er
na
nc
e F
S is
 m
uc
h‐c
on
te
st
ed
 te
rr
ai
n:
 m
ul
tip
le
 ac
to
rs
, 
pa
ra
di
gm
s,
 an
d p
ow
er
 dif
fe
re
nc
es
.  
*F
ra
m
es
 fig
ht
in
g h
un
ge
r ch
an
ge
 ov
er
 tim
e.
 
*A
ct
or
s s
ho
p b
et
w
ee
n v
en
ue
s/
fo
ru
m
s.
  
*T
he
 fo
od
 cri
sis
 sh
ow
s s
ys
te
m
ic
 fa
ilu
re
.  
*P
riv
at
e v
s.
 pu
bl
ic
 re
gu
la
tio
n.
 
*N
at
io
na
l in
te
re
st
s v
s.
 glo
ba
l co
m
m
on
s.
 
*I
m
po
rt
an
t to
 loo
k a
t w
ho
’s
 on
 th
e t
ab
le
 in 
IO
’s
. 
Pr
er
eq
ui
sit
es
 be
tt
er
 
gl
ob
al
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
sy
st
em
: se
t o
f b
as
ic
 
va
lu
es
 an
d 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
; in
cl
us
iv
e,
 
le
gi
tim
at
e,
 an
d 
de
m
oc
ra
tic
 po
lit
ic
al
 
pr
oc
es
s;
 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s;
 m
ul
ti‐
se
ct
or
al
 an
d h
ol
ist
ic
; 
pr
in
ci
pl
e o
f 
su
bs
id
ia
rit
y.
  
Be
tt
er
 sy
st
em
 
ca
nn
ot
 be
 inv
en
te
d 
at
 dr
aw
in
g b
oa
rd
, 
bu
t re
fo
rm
ed
 CF
S 
po
te
nt
ia
lly
 fu
lfi
ls 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s.
  
Im
po
rt
an
t to
 br
in
g 
CF
S t
o t
he
 re
gi
on
s.
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M
cK
eo
n 
20
13
 
G
lo
ba
l 
CF
S 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Ar
tic
le
 is 
no
t re
al
ly
 ab
ou
t fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y,
 bu
t a
bo
ut
 ac
ce
ss
 to
 
la
nd
/ la
nd
 rig
ht
s.
 Ho
w
ev
er
, it
 br
ie
fly
 ela
bo
ra
te
s o
n g
lo
ba
l FS
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
, st
at
in
g t
ha
t th
e g
lo
ba
l fo
od
 cri
sis
 re
ve
al
ed
 a 
gl
ob
al
 po
lic
y v
ac
uu
m
. In
 th
e a
bs
en
ce
 of
 an
 au
th
or
ita
tiv
e a
nd
 
in
cl
us
iv
e b
od
y d
el
ib
er
at
in
g o
n f
oo
d is
su
es
, d
ec
isi
on
‐m
ak
in
g 
w
as
 be
in
g c
ar
rie
d o
ut
 by
 ins
tit
ut
io
ns
 th
at
 did
 no
t h
av
e F
S a
s 
th
ei
r co
re
 bu
sin
es
s a
s w
el
l as
 by
 gr
ou
ps
 of
 th
e m
os
t p
ow
er
fu
l 
na
tio
ns
 an
d p
riv
at
e c
or
po
ra
tio
ns
 th
at
 ar
e n
ot
 su
bj
ec
te
d t
o 
an
y p
ol
iti
ca
l co
nt
ro
l. A
 str
on
g c
on
fr
on
ta
tio
n e
m
er
ge
d 
be
tw
ee
n d
iff
er
en
t a
pp
ro
ac
he
s to
 fill
in
g t
he
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 ga
p,
 
ill
us
tr
at
ed
 by
 co
nt
ro
ve
rs
ie
s a
ro
un
d t
he
 es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
t o
f th
e 
HT
LF
’s
 CF
A a
nd
 th
e r
ef
or
m
 of
 th
e C
FS
. 
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M
iss
el
ho
rn
 
et
 al.
 20
12
 
M
ul
tip
le
 
N
on
e 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
N
on
e 
Fo
od
 sy
st
em
 
N
on
e 
Re
vi
ew
s c
ur
re
nt
 th
in
ki
ng
 to
 fir
st
 ide
nt
ify
 so
m
e c
ha
lle
ng
es
 
fa
ci
ng
 glo
ba
l fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y,
 an
d t
he
n s
om
e k
ey
 ele
m
en
ts
 th
at
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1 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
m
ig
ht
 su
pp
or
t a
 su
cc
es
sf
ul
 fo
od
 sy
st
em
. A
rg
ue
s th
at
 fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y d
em
an
ds
 a c
ro
ss
‐se
ct
or
 an
d c
ro
ss
‐sc
al
e a
pp
ro
ac
h.
 
Su
ch
 an
 ap
pr
oa
ch
 co
ul
d c
om
e f
ro
m
 ins
tit
ut
io
na
l pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
at
 th
e lo
ca
l le
ve
l, b
ou
nd
ar
y o
rg
an
iza
tio
ns
, an
d g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t th
at
 en
ab
le
 ad
ap
ta
tio
n a
nd
 re
sil
ie
nc
e a
t 
m
ul
tip
le
 sc
al
es
. 
40
 
M
oh
am
ed
 
Sa
lih
 20
09
 
N
ot
 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 
N
on
e 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
bo
ok
 
ch
ap
te
r; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Is
 ab
ou
t th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 of
 po
w
er
 
w
ith
in
 
in
st
itu
tio
na
l 
co
nt
ex
ts
, 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ly
 
cr
af
te
d t
o d
ire
ct
, 
co
nt
ro
l, a
nd
 
re
gu
la
te
 ac
tiv
iti
es
 
co
nc
er
ne
d w
ith
 
fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
w
he
re
by
 th
es
e 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 ar
e 
vi
ew
ed
 by
 cit
ize
ns
 
as
 leg
iti
m
at
e,
 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e,
 an
d 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
t. 
  No
 cle
ar
 
di
st
in
ct
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n f
oo
d 
se
cu
rit
y a
nd
 fo
od
 
sa
fe
ty
. 
An
al
ys
es
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 of
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y in
 th
e 2
1s
t  ce
nt
ur
y.
 
Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 ha
s b
ee
n s
tr
on
gl
y a
ffe
ct
ed
 by
 
gl
ob
al
iza
tio
n a
nd
 is 
en
ta
ng
le
d w
ith
 ot
he
r (s
ec
ur
ity
) d
om
ai
ns
. 
Fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e h
as
 a l
ow
 pr
of
ile
 co
m
pa
re
d t
o 
ot
he
r g
lo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
 de
ba
te
s,
 th
er
e is
 no
 ‘go
od
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
’ re
gi
m
e in
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y y
et
. A
lso
 inc
lu
de
s fo
od
 
sa
fe
ty
 iss
ue
s in
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e.
 
Fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y g
ov
er
na
nc
e is
 pa
rt
 of
 a b
ro
ad
er
 co
nt
ex
t, a
nd
 
ha
s li
nk
ag
es
 wi
th
 ot
he
r a
sp
ec
ts
 of
 so
ci
et
y,
 as
 a r
es
ul
t o
f w
hi
ch
 
m
an
y s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s a
re
 inv
ol
ve
d.
 
Po
or
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 is 
pa
rt
ly
 re
su
lt o
f tw
o c
om
pe
tin
g d
ef
in
iti
on
s 
of
 se
cu
rit
y.
 Se
cu
rit
y w
as
 fo
r lo
ng
 tim
e p
re
do
m
in
an
tly
 de
fin
ed
 
as
 na
tio
na
l se
cu
rit
y,
 wh
ile
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y is
 es
se
nt
ia
lly
 pa
rt
 of
 
hu
m
an
 se
cu
rit
y,
 wh
ic
h d
em
an
ds
 a d
iff
er
en
t a
pp
ro
ac
h.
  
   
Fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
sh
ou
ld
 no
t b
e a
 
pe
rio
di
c c
on
ce
rn
, 
bu
t a
n in
te
gr
al
 pa
rt
 
of
 th
e o
ve
ra
ll 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 de
ba
te
. 
Th
e a
rt
ic
le
 ple
ad
s 
fo
r g
ua
ra
nt
ee
in
g 
de
m
oc
ra
tic
 va
lu
es
  in 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
. 
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O
rs
in
i, 
M
or
in
 & 
Yo
un
g 2
01
3 
G
lo
ba
l 
N
ot
 
re
le
va
nt
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
, 
ed
ito
ria
l 
N
on
e 
Re
gi
m
e 
co
m
pl
ex
es
 
N
on
e 
Ed
ito
ria
l of
 iss
ue
 on
 re
gi
m
e c
om
pl
ex
es
. R
ep
ea
te
dl
y r
ef
er
s to
 
M
ar
gu
lis
 20
13
. St
at
es
 th
at
 M
ar
gu
lis
 de
al
s w
ith
 a f
ra
gm
en
te
d 
co
m
pl
ex
, d
em
on
st
ra
tin
g t
ha
t fr
ag
m
en
te
d c
om
pl
ex
es
 co
ul
d b
e 
de
tr
im
en
ta
l to
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 ou
tc
om
es
. 
Pr
ob
le
m
 so
lv
in
g is
 en
ha
nc
ed
 in 
a c
on
te
xt
 of
 re
gi
m
e 
co
m
pl
ex
es
, ev
en
 if c
om
pl
ex
 is 
fr
ag
m
en
te
d,
 be
ca
us
e t
he
 
ex
ist
en
ce
 of
 a c
om
pl
ex
 m
ea
ns
 th
at
 po
te
nt
ia
l pr
ob
le
m
s a
re
 
lik
el
y t
o b
e s
or
te
d o
ut
. 
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Pa
ar
lb
er
g 
20
02
 
N
at
io
na
l 
&
 glo
ba
l  
M
ul
tip
le
 
IF
PR
I 
di
sc
us
sio
n 
pa
pe
r; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Ar
gu
es
 th
at
, ev
en
 in 
an
 ag
e o
f g
lo
ba
liz
at
io
n,
 pr
ob
le
m
s o
f 
hu
ng
er
 an
d f
oo
d in
se
cu
rit
y r
eq
ui
re
 a n
at
io
na
l, n
ot
 a g
lo
ba
l 
fo
cu
s.
 Al
th
ou
gh
 glo
ba
l in
iti
at
iv
es
 sh
ou
ld
 be
 su
pp
or
te
d,
 th
e 
m
ai
n g
ov
er
na
nc
e d
ef
ic
its
 ar
e s
til
l at
 th
e n
at
io
na
l le
ve
l. G
lo
ba
l 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 ca
nn
ot
 fil
l th
es
e g
ap
s to
 fu
ll e
xt
en
t. N
at
io
na
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
 sh
ou
ld
 be
 pe
rs
ua
de
d t
o d
el
iv
er
 m
in
im
al
 pu
bl
ic
 
go
od
s n
ee
de
d a
t th
e n
at
io
na
l le
ve
l.   
N
at
io
na
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
 sh
ou
ld
 
be
 pe
rs
ua
de
d t
o 
de
liv
er
 m
in
im
al
 
pu
bl
ic
 go
od
s 
ne
ed
ed
 at
 th
e 
na
tio
na
l le
ve
l.   
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2 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
Le
ar
ns
 th
at
:  
*F
S g
ov
er
na
nc
e is
 re
la
te
d t
o p
ub
lic
 go
od
 pr
ov
isi
on
.  
*D
eb
at
e a
bo
ut
 glo
ba
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
 re
sp
on
se
 vs
. lo
ca
liz
at
io
n.
 
*C
on
tin
ui
ng
 ce
nt
ra
lit
y n
at
io
n‐s
ta
te
s.
 
*C
on
ce
pt
 of
 ad
eq
ua
te
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 fo
r F
S b
as
ed
 on
 pu
bl
ic
 
go
od
s p
ro
vi
sio
n.
 In
st
itu
tio
ns
 ca
n b
e ju
dg
ed
 on
 th
is.
 
*C
on
tr
ar
y t
o v
ie
w
 th
at
 fo
od
 ins
ec
ur
ity
 in 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 co
un
tr
ie
s 
is r
el
at
ed
 to
 ex
te
rn
al
 fo
rc
es
 it 
ar
gu
es
 th
at
 m
os
t im
po
rt
an
t 
fo
rc
es
 te
nd
 to
 be
 loc
al
 or
 na
tio
na
l, r
at
he
r th
an
 glo
ba
l. 
43
 
Pe
re
ira
 & 
Ru
ys
en
aa
r 
20
12
 
N
at
io
na
l 
So
ut
h 
Af
ric
a 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
Ad
ap
tiv
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
; 
co
m
pl
ex
 ad
ap
tiv
e 
sy
st
em
s 
M
ai
nl
y r
ef
er
s to
 
fo
od
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
, 
al
th
ou
gh
 pa
pe
r 
ex
cl
us
iv
el
y d
ea
ls 
w
ith
 fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y.
 
Ta
ck
lin
g t
he
 co
m
pl
ex
ity
 of
 FS
 re
qu
ire
s a
 ne
w
 fo
rm
 of
 ad
ap
tiv
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
. Th
e p
ap
er
 pr
ov
id
es
 a r
ev
ie
w
 of
 va
rio
us
 
co
nc
ep
tio
ns
 of
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 fro
m
 a m
on
oc
en
tr
ic
 or
 
po
lit
ic
ot
ec
hn
ic
al
 un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g o
f g
ov
er
na
nc
e t
hr
ou
gh
 to
 
ad
ap
tiv
e g
ov
er
na
nc
e,
 wh
ic
h is
 gr
ou
nd
ed
 by
 a c
rit
iq
ue
 of
 th
e 
ex
ist
in
g in
st
itu
tio
na
l st
ru
ct
ur
es
 re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r F
S in
 So
ut
h 
Af
ric
a.
 Th
e c
ur
re
nt
 str
at
eg
y a
nd
 de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
 ar
e n
ot
 
su
ffi
ci
en
tly
 fle
xi
bl
e o
r co
or
di
na
te
d t
o d
ea
l w
ith
 an
 iss
ue
 as
 
m
ul
ti‐s
ca
la
r a
nd
 m
ul
tid
isc
ip
lin
ar
y.
 Ac
tio
ns
 ta
ke
n in
 th
e n
on
‐
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l se
ct
or
 sig
na
l th
e e
m
er
ge
nc
e o
f a
 ne
w
 ty
pe
 of
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
, h
in
tin
g a
 ch
an
gi
ng
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 str
uc
tu
re
 
in
cl
ud
in
g c
ol
la
bo
ra
tio
n b
et
w
ee
n d
iv
er
se
 sta
ke
ho
ld
er
s.
 Th
e 
st
at
e s
ho
ul
d a
da
pt
 an
d g
et
 inv
ol
ve
d in
 th
es
e n
ew
 fo
rm
s o
f 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
. 
Fu
rt
he
r: 
*P
oo
r g
ov
er
na
nc
e e
xa
ce
rb
at
es
 fo
od
 ins
ec
ur
ity
 be
ca
us
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
 ar
e u
na
bl
e t
o r
es
po
nd
 ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y t
o c
ris
es
 du
e 
to
 po
or
 de
ci
sio
n m
ak
in
g,
 lim
ite
d c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n,
 we
ak
 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
, an
d s
ca
rc
e r
es
ou
rc
es
 as
 we
ll a
s th
e in
flu
en
ce
 of
 
ne
o‐p
at
rim
on
ia
l po
lit
ic
s.
 
*D
es
pi
te
 inc
re
as
in
g r
ec
og
ni
tio
n o
f th
e n
ee
d f
or
 ad
ap
tiv
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
, w
e s
til
l fa
ce
 th
e in
st
. B
ar
rie
rs
 th
at
 pla
gu
ed
 ea
rli
er
 
st
at
e‐b
as
ed
 re
sp
on
se
s to
 fo
od
 ins
ec
ur
ity
,  gr
ou
nd
ed
 in 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t’s
 cu
ltu
re
.  
It i
s n
ec
es
sa
ry
 fo
r 
th
e s
ta
te
 to
 ad
ap
t 
its
 m
on
oc
en
tr
ic
 
m
od
el
 to
 en
ab
le
 it 
to
 ge
t in
vo
lv
ed
 an
d 
en
su
re
 th
at
 th
e 
ou
tc
om
es
 ar
e f
ai
r 
fo
r th
e m
os
t 
vu
ln
er
ab
le
 in 
so
ci
et
y.
 A 
sh
ift
 to
 
ad
ap
tiv
e f
oo
d 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 ac
ro
ss
 
al
l ac
to
rs
 wi
th
in
 th
e 
fo
od
 sy
st
em
 ne
ed
s 
to
 ha
pp
en
 so
on
er
 
th
an
 lat
er
. 
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Pé
re
z‐
Es
ca
m
ill
a 
20
12
 
N
at
io
na
l 
Br
az
il 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
EB
FS
S 
U
se
s th
e F
AO
 
de
fin
iti
on
: re
la
te
s 
to
 fo
rm
al
 an
d 
in
fo
rm
al
 ru
le
s a
nd
 
pr
oc
es
se
s th
ro
ug
h 
w
hi
ch
 int
er
es
ts
 
ar
e a
rt
ic
ul
at
ed
, 
an
d d
ec
isi
on
 
re
le
va
nt
 to
 FS
 in 
a 
co
un
tr
y a
re
 m
ad
e,
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d a
nd
 
So
ci
al
ly
 pr
og
re
ss
iv
e c
ou
nt
rie
s li
ke
 Br
az
il a
s w
el
l as
 th
e F
AO
 
an
d o
th
er
 UN
 ag
en
ci
es
 str
on
gl
y e
m
br
ac
e a
nd
 pr
om
ot
e t
he
 
id
ea
 of
 FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
. O
ne
 of
 th
e k
ey
 co
nd
iti
on
s th
at
 m
us
t 
be
 m
et
 fo
r a
tt
ai
ni
ng
 FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 is 
th
e c
ap
ac
ity
 to
 m
ea
su
re
 
ho
us
eh
ol
d F
S.
 W
ith
ou
t th
is i
nf
or
m
at
io
n it
 is 
sim
pl
y n
ot
 
po
ss
ib
le
 to
 de
ve
lo
p r
es
po
ns
iv
e,
 ac
co
un
ta
bl
e,
 an
d t
ra
ns
pa
re
nt
 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
. Th
e a
rt
ic
le
 ar
gu
es
 th
at
 Ex
pe
rie
nc
e‐b
as
ed
 FS
 
Sc
al
es
 (E
BF
SS
) h
av
e t
he
 po
te
nt
ia
l to
 as
sis
t w
ith
 ev
id
en
ce
‐
ba
se
d d
ec
isi
on
 m
ak
in
g f
ro
m
 th
e n
at
io
na
l to
 th
e lo
ca
l le
ve
l, 
an
d d
em
on
st
ra
te
s th
is w
ith
 th
e c
as
e o
f B
ra
zil
. 
Fu
rt
he
r: 
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3 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
en
fo
rc
ed
 on
 
be
ha
lf o
f m
em
be
r 
of
 so
ci
et
y.
 
*F
S g
ov
er
na
nc
e is
 a r
el
at
iv
el
y n
ew
 co
nc
ep
t th
at
 bu
ild
s u
po
n 
th
e id
ea
 of
 go
od
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
. 
45
 
Ro
ch
a &
 
Le
ss
a 2
01
0 
U
rb
an
 
Be
lo
 
Ho
riz
on
t
e 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
em
pi
ric
al
 
Do
cu
m
en
t 
an
al
ys
is,
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 Be
lo
 Ho
riz
on
te
 pr
es
en
ts
 a u
ni
qu
e e
xa
m
pl
e o
f 
ur
ba
n f
oo
d s
ec
ur
ity
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 in 
th
e c
re
at
io
n o
f a
n 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e f
oo
d s
ys
te
m
. Th
e m
od
e o
f fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 is 
di
ffe
re
nt
 fro
m
 th
os
e b
ei
ng
 at
te
m
pt
ed
 in 
Eu
ro
pe
 an
d N
or
th
 Am
er
ic
a b
ec
au
se
 it 
is g
ov
er
nm
en
t‐d
riv
en
. 
Th
e p
ro
gr
am
 en
ta
ils
, in
te
r a
lia
, su
bs
id
ize
d f
oo
d s
al
es
, fo
od
 
an
d n
ut
rit
io
n a
ss
ist
an
ce
, su
pp
ly
 an
d r
eg
ul
at
io
n o
f fo
od
 
m
ar
ke
ts
, su
pp
or
t to
 ur
ba
n a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 an
d e
du
ca
tio
n f
or
 fo
od
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 It’
s le
gi
tim
ac
y is
 de
riv
ed
 fro
m
 a c
on
sis
te
nt
 
pr
eo
cc
up
at
io
n w
ith
 qu
al
ity
, th
er
eb
y a
ch
ie
vi
ng
 tru
st
 in 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t’s
 ef
fo
rt
s.
 Ot
he
r su
cc
es
s fa
ct
or
s a
re
 th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nc
e,
 ex
pe
rt
ise
, an
d e
xp
ed
ie
nc
y o
f g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
of
fic
ia
ls a
s w
el
l as
 th
e p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n o
f ci
vi
l so
ci
et
y.
 Its
 
vu
ln
er
ab
ili
ty
 lie
s o
n t
he
 va
ga
rie
s o
f p
ol
iti
ca
l ch
an
ge
s.
 
Al
th
ou
gh
 so
m
e o
f it
s fe
at
ur
es
 co
ul
d b
e r
ep
ro
du
ce
d a
s m
ar
ke
t‐
ba
se
d,
 de
ci
siv
e p
ub
lic
 int
er
ve
nt
io
n is
 es
se
nt
ia
l. 
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Ro
la
 20
13
 
N
at
io
na
l 
Ph
ili
pp
in
es
 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
em
pi
ric
al
 
Li
te
ra
tu
re
 
re
vi
ew
 
Re
gi
m
e 
co
m
pl
ex
es
 
N
on
e 
An
al
yz
es
 th
e in
st
itu
tio
na
l an
d g
ov
er
na
nc
e is
su
es
 th
at
 
co
nf
ro
nt
 ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l de
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
nd
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y in
 th
e 
Ph
ili
pp
in
e u
pl
an
ds
 by
 ex
am
in
in
g t
he
 lit
er
at
ur
e.
 Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
fr
am
ew
or
k d
ra
w
s o
n M
ar
gu
lis
 20
11
.  
Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 th
e im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n o
f F
S p
ro
gr
am
s a
nd
 pr
oj
ec
ts
 
in
 th
e P
hi
lip
pi
ne
s h
as
 fa
ile
d,
 an
d t
ha
t b
es
t g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 sh
ou
ld
 be
 pu
t in
 pr
ac
tic
e.
 Th
es
e g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 sh
ou
ld
 go
 be
yo
nd
 sin
gl
e p
ol
ic
ie
s,
 an
d r
eq
ui
re
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g o
f in
st
itu
tio
na
l an
d g
ov
er
na
nc
e s
tr
uc
tu
re
s a
nd
 
ch
an
ge
 pr
oc
es
se
s.
 
Th
e p
ap
er
 ide
nt
ifi
ed
 an
d f
ou
nd
 ou
t th
at
 cri
tic
al
 ins
tit
ut
io
na
l 
an
d g
ov
er
na
nc
e is
su
es
 ha
ve
 be
en
 inf
lu
en
ce
d b
y P
hi
lip
pi
ne
 
la
w
s,
 po
lic
ie
s a
nd
 pr
og
ra
m
s.
 Th
es
e is
su
es
 inc
lu
de
 
de
ce
nt
ra
liz
at
io
n a
nd
 m
ul
tip
lic
ity
 of
 ag
en
ci
es
, u
nd
er
‐
in
ve
st
m
en
t, l
ac
k o
f in
st
itu
tio
na
l ca
pa
bi
lit
ie
s,
 we
ak
 co
lle
ct
iv
e 
ac
tio
n a
nd
 se
cu
rit
y o
f te
nu
re
. 
FS
 sta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
sh
ou
ld
 cra
ft
 a 
Re
se
ar
ch
 
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
nd
 
Ex
te
ns
io
n a
ge
nd
a 
th
at
 dir
ec
tly
 su
pp
or
t 
ac
hi
ev
em
en
t o
f FS
 
ch
al
le
ng
es
 by
 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
kn
ow
le
dg
e a
nd
 
to
ol
s to
 su
pp
or
t a
 
po
lic
y a
nd
 ins
t. 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t to
 
ad
dr
es
s a
 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e u
pl
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t. 
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Sa
hl
ey
 et
 
al
. 20
05
 
N
at
io
na
l 
M
al
aw
i 
As
se
ss
m
en
t 
re
po
rt
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
N
on
e 
N
on
e 
Re
po
rt
 of
 a g
ov
er
na
nc
e a
nd
 fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y a
ss
es
sm
en
t o
f 
M
al
aw
i. A
rg
ue
s th
at
 po
or
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 is 
no
t th
e p
rim
ar
y 
ca
us
al
 fa
ct
or
 fo
r fo
od
 ins
ec
ur
ity
 in 
M
al
aw
i, b
ut
 ca
n b
e 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 a c
on
tr
ib
ut
in
g fa
ct
or
s,
 pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ly
 re
ga
rd
in
g t
he
 
lim
ite
d c
ap
ac
ity
 to
 im
pl
em
en
t e
ffe
ct
iv
e p
ol
ic
y a
nd
 pr
og
ra
m
 
re
sp
on
se
s to
 ad
dr
es
s v
ul
ne
ra
bi
lit
y a
nd
 m
ee
t d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
ch
al
le
ng
es
. Fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y is
 a p
ol
iti
ca
lly
 ch
ar
ge
d p
ol
ic
y is
su
e 
in
 M
al
aw
i, b
ut
 de
sp
ite
 th
at
, th
er
e r
em
ai
ns
 a l
ac
k o
f co
ns
en
su
s 
on
 th
e p
ro
pe
r c
ou
rs
e o
f a
ct
io
n.
 Po
lic
y fo
rm
ul
at
io
n h
as
 be
en
 
Do
no
rs
 ne
ed
 to
 
re
co
gn
ize
 th
at
 th
ei
r 
ac
tio
ns
 ca
rr
y 
po
lit
ic
al
 an
d s
oc
ia
l 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
, an
d 
ne
ed
 to
 be
 se
ns
iti
ve
 
to
 all
ow
in
g 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t, p
riv
at
e 
se
ct
or
 int
er
es
ts
, an
d 
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4 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
ad
 ho
c,
 an
d r
es
ul
te
d in
 a p
le
th
or
a o
f p
ol
ic
ie
s a
nd
 pr
og
ra
m
s,
 
so
m
et
im
es
 dis
co
nn
ec
te
d f
ro
m
 an
d c
on
tr
ad
ic
to
ry
 to
 ea
ch
 
ot
he
r, s
pr
ea
d o
ve
r c
en
tr
al
 go
ve
rn
m
en
t a
ge
nc
ie
s.
 Th
e la
ck
 of
 
co
m
m
on
 ca
us
e h
as
 led
 to
 inc
oh
er
en
t im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n.
  
Th
er
e is
 a l
ac
k o
f cl
ea
r le
ad
er
sh
ip
 in 
th
e F
S p
ol
ic
y a
re
na
. G
iv
en
 
M
al
aw
i’s
 tra
di
tio
na
l re
lia
nc
e o
n e
xt
er
na
l fu
nd
in
g,
 do
no
rs
 
ha
ve
 a b
ig
 inf
lu
en
ce
. Th
e t
w
ist
s a
nd
 tu
rn
s o
f p
ol
ic
y 
fo
rm
ul
at
io
n m
irr
or
s th
e e
bb
 an
d f
lo
w
 of
 re
so
ur
ce
s a
s w
el
l as
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l do
no
r tr
en
ds
.  
G
ov
er
nm
en
t d
oe
s n
ot
 ha
ve
 th
e c
ap
ac
ity
 to
 im
pl
em
en
t 
po
lic
ie
s.
 Th
is h
as
 be
en
 fill
ed
 up
 by
 do
no
rs
, ra
isi
ng
 
su
st
ai
na
bi
lit
y is
su
es
. 
Ce
nt
ra
l le
ve
l co
m
m
itm
en
t to
 im
pl
em
en
tin
g d
ec
en
tr
al
ize
d 
lo
ca
l go
ve
rn
an
ce
 ha
s b
ee
n la
ck
lu
st
er
. 
CS
 to
 es
ta
bl
ish
 th
ei
r 
vi
sio
n f
or
 M
al
aw
i. 
Th
ey
 sh
ou
ld
 
st
im
ul
at
e a
 fe
el
in
g 
of
 ow
ne
rs
hi
p a
m
on
g 
im
pl
em
en
te
rs
, 
(lo
ca
l) g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ac
to
rs
, an
d o
th
er
 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
, an
d,
 
th
ird
, co
nt
rib
ut
e t
o 
st
re
ng
th
en
in
g 
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s.
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Se
ed
 et
 al.
 
20
13
 
St
at
e 
Br
iti
sh
 
Co
lu
m
bi
a
, C
an
ad
a 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
em
pi
ric
al
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s,
 
do
cu
m
en
ts
, 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
Co
m
m
un
ity
 Fo
od
 
Se
cu
rit
y,
 La
ng
’s
 
fo
od
 po
lic
y 
tr
ia
ng
le
, R
itc
hi
e &
 
Sp
en
ce
r’s
 
ca
te
go
rie
s o
f 
ap
pl
ie
d p
ol
ic
y 
re
se
ar
ch
, 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 
pl
ur
al
ism
 
N
on
e 
An
al
ys
es
 th
e in
te
gr
at
io
n o
f fo
od
 se
cu
rit
y p
ol
ic
y in
to
 Pu
bl
ic
 
He
al
th
 an
d e
xa
m
in
es
 th
e r
es
ul
ts
 wi
th
in
 th
e c
on
te
xt
 of
 his
to
ric
 
an
d in
te
rn
at
io
na
l tr
en
ds
 an
d t
he
or
et
ic
al
 m
od
el
s o
f fo
od
 
po
lic
y,
 co
m
m
un
ity
 FS
, an
d a
pp
lie
d p
ol
ic
y r
es
ea
rc
h.
 W
hi
le
 
Pu
bl
ic
 He
al
th
’s
 lea
d r
ol
e s
up
po
rt
ed
 an
 inc
re
as
e in
 leg
iti
m
ac
y 
fo
r F
S in
 BC
, in
te
rv
ie
w
ee
s d
es
cr
ib
ed
 a c
la
sh
 of
 cu
ltu
re
s 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 pa
rt
ly
 as
 a r
es
ul
t o
f P
ub
lic
 He
al
th
’s
 lim
ite
d F
S 
m
an
da
te
 an
d t
op
 do
w
n a
pp
ro
ac
h.
 Co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 civ
il s
oc
ie
ty
 
vo
ic
e a
t th
e p
ro
vi
nc
ia
l le
ve
l w
as
 m
ar
gi
na
liz
ed
. Th
e p
ap
er
 
pr
op
os
ed
 a n
ew
, em
er
gi
ng
 po
lic
y m
ap
. 
Fu
rt
he
r: 
*R
es
ol
vi
ng
 FS
 is 
a c
le
ar
 ex
am
pl
e w
he
re
 so
lu
tio
ns
 ne
ed
 to
 be
 
so
ug
ht
 at
 bo
th
 ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
 an
d d
ec
en
tr
al
ize
d le
ve
ls.
  
*I
nc
lu
sio
n/
ex
cl
us
io
n o
f st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
. 
*W
ith
in
 a c
on
te
xt
 of
 glo
ba
liz
at
io
n,
 civ
il s
oc
ie
ty
 ha
s a
n 
in
cr
ea
sin
g u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 an
d a
w
ar
en
es
s o
f th
e im
pa
ct
s o
f 
br
oa
de
r, c
en
tr
al
iz
ed
 de
ci
sio
n o
n t
he
ir p
er
so
na
l an
d 
co
m
m
un
ity
 FS
. Sh
rin
ki
ng
 go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
 m
ay
 inc
re
as
in
gl
y 
re
co
gn
ize
 th
e n
ee
d t
o u
til
ize
 CS
 ca
pa
ci
ty
 in 
of
fe
rin
g p
ro
gr
am
s 
to
 fu
lfi
l po
pu
la
tio
n n
ee
ds
. 
*I
llu
st
ra
te
s th
at
 ag
en
da
s a
re
 m
or
e s
al
ie
nt
 th
an
 de
fin
iti
on
s in
 
th
e d
es
ig
n a
nd
 im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n  o
f F
S in
iti
at
iv
es
. Fu
rt
he
r 
su
gg
es
ts
 th
at
 ali
gn
in
g F
S a
ge
nd
as
 wi
th
 ag
en
da
s o
f o
th
er
 
se
ct
or
s m
ay
 be
 he
lp
fu
l in
 fo
rw
ar
di
ng
 FS
 iss
ue
s.
 At
te
nt
io
n t
o 
co
m
pe
tin
g a
ge
nd
as
 is 
es
se
nt
ia
l in
 un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g t
he
 ke
y 
pr
io
rit
ie
s o
f st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
, ev
al
ua
tin
g in
iti
at
iv
es
 wi
th
in
 a 
br
oa
de
r co
nt
ex
t, a
nd
 un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g b
ar
rie
rs
 to
 ac
hi
ev
e F
S.
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Th
om
so
n 
20
01
 
N
at
io
na
l 
N
on
e 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 
ar
tic
le
; 
na
rr
at
iv
e 
N
on
e 
Su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
liv
el
ih
oo
ds
 
N
on
e 
Ar
gu
es
 th
at
 FS
 is 
no
w
 ge
ne
ra
lly
 re
co
gn
ize
d a
s a
n is
su
e o
f 
ho
us
eh
ol
d a
cc
es
s to
 fo
od
 ra
th
er
 th
an
 na
tio
na
l fo
od
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n le
ve
ls.
 Th
is r
ai
se
s is
su
es
 of
 ho
w
 to
 ad
dr
es
s th
is a
t 
 
Supplementary Materials
235
19
5 
 Aut
ho
r(
s)
 
Fo
cu
s 
Le
ve
l    
     
   L
oc
us
 
Ty
pe
 of
 FS
 
do
cu
m
en
t 
M
et
ho
d 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
FS
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
at
io
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t &
 In
si
gh
ts
 in
 FS
 Go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
Re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
th
e p
ol
ic
y le
ve
l. T
oo
 of
te
n in
 th
e p
as
t, F
S h
as
 be
en
 de
al
t w
ith
 
th
ro
ug
h p
ro
je
ct
, m
ai
nl
y b
y F
AO
 an
d W
FP
. Fe
w
 at
te
m
pt
s h
av
e 
be
en
 m
ad
e t
o a
dd
re
ss
 ho
us
eh
ol
d F
S in
 na
tio
na
l an
d 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l po
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Part A: overview of enabling conditions to deal with wicked problems based on 
Termeer et al. (2013) and Termeer & Dewulf (2014)
Reflexivity:
Tolerance of ambiguity: noticing and accepting the variety of perspectives through which 
a problem is approached. Can be enhanced by boundary-spanning organizations or 
structures between policy sectors or governance levels. 
Embedding reflexive activities: the embedding of temporary reflexive arrangements in 
the broader socio-political context, so that the co-ordination of frame differences also 
becomes acceptable to others who are not involved in the reflexive activities themselves. 
Both relevant for within organizations and for the relation between organization and 
their broader environment.
Process skills: the ability of individuals to stimulate reflexive activities. This can be done 
by hiring a process manager or facilitator.
Resilience:
Tolerance of uncertainties: a culture that tolerates continuous processes of change in 
unpredictable directions
Bridging arrangements: bridging arrangements between scientists and policymakers, or 
between different sector, networks, levels, etc. enable linkages between different types of 
actors and knowledge, which enhances the system’s adaptability. 
Flexible institutions: institutional adjustments are often required to mobilize the necessary 
actors and enable them to adapt quickly. Includes flexible legislation that allows for 
experiments and tailor-made solutions, decentralizing decision-making authority, and 
room for self-governance. 
Redundancy: the reliability of the systems improves with high levels of redundancy, i.e. 
through back-up systems. 
Improvisation skills: the ability of individuals to improvise when faced with change and 
surprises.  
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Responsiveness: 
Tolerance of information overload: being capable of monitoring attention and filtering 
relevant information, for example through corporate communication departments. 
Should detect issues that will potentially be high on the agenda in the near future. 
Be present where the attention is: being present in venues where attention is being 
produced, such as public debates, press releases, social media.
Parallel structures: dividing system in various subsystems that communicate with 
different target groups. Can help to cope with variety of audiences, but may also result 
in compartmentalization.
Political-sensitivity skills: the ability to ‘know’ when to engage responding to extreme 
calls for attention and when not. For example through developing response strategies 
or prepare policy solutions that are feasible and acceptable in case of a media hype. This 
requires political-sensitivity skills.
Revitalization:
Tolerance of disappointments: ability of actors not to be overwhelmed by disappointments 
but to try to step out of stagnated patterns and to understand what is going on in terms 
of interactions patterns.
Readiness to introduce third actors and contents: bringing in someone who is not part of 
stagnated interaction patterns, and who has a fresh perspective on the process, and is 
in the position to intervene even in power structures. An alternative is bringing in new 
ideas and innovative approaches, that were not thought of before.  
Postponements of judgments: willingness to postpone disqualifying judgments and 
conspiracy
narratives, and to tolerate conflicts as vital elements of policy processes. 
Intervention skills: ability of individuals to intervene in stagnated interactions and to 
introduce new perspectives, innovations, etc.
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Rescaling: 
Openness for multiple scale logics: openness to the scale logics of different perspectives and 
thus leaving behind scale as a dogmatic concept
Flexible institutions to create and recreate ﬁt: between problem and governance scales. 
Tolerance for redundancy and blurred responsibilities: matching existing cross-level 
interactions in the problem scale with cross-level interactions in the governance scale will 
often require some redundancy in the system, e.g. in the form of polycentric institutional 
arrangements, with nested quasi-autonomous decision-making units operating at 
multiple levels. This requires tolerance for redundancy and blurred responsibilities. 
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Directorate‐General  Number of respondents  Unit(s) or directorate(s) in 
which respondents work 
Types of respondents 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development (AGRI) 
6  A3 ACP, South Africa, FAO and 
G8/G20 
B2 Analysis of trade and 
international policies 
C Single CMO, economics and 
analysis of agricultural markets 
E Economic analysis, 
perspectives and evaluation; 
communication 
E1 Agricultural policy analysis 
and perspectives 
Director (2) 
 
Head of unit (2) 
 
Policy officer (2) 
Development and Cooperation 
(DEVCO) 
5  A1 Development and 
coherence 
C1 Rural development, food 
security, nutrition 
Head of sector (1) 
 
Policy officer (4) 
Energy (ENER)  1  C1 Renewables and CCS Policy  Policy officer (1) 
Environment (ENVI)  2  B1 Agriculture, forests and soil 
E2 Sustainability, trade and 
multilateral agreements 
Deputy head of unit (1) 
 
Policy officer (1) 
Health and Consumers (SANCO)  1  ‐  Deputy director general (1) 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection (ECHO) 
1  A4 Specific thematic policies  Policy officer (1) 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
(MARE) 
1  B3 Bilateral agreements and 
fisheries control in international 
waters 
Policy officer (1) 
Secretariat‐General (SEC‐GEN)  1  D3 Resource efficiency  Policy officer (1) 
Trade (TRADE)  2  D3 Agriculture, fisheries, 
sanitary and phytosanitary 
market access, biotechnology 
F1 WTO coordination, OECD, 
export credits and dual use 
Head of unit (1) 
 
Policy officer (1) 
 89 
   90 
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Part A: data search strategies
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Search strategies 
Dimension  Database  Type(s) of 
document(s) 
Search terms  Additional info 
Cultures of beliefs  Press releases database RAPID 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/search.htm)  
European 
Commission – 
speeches 
Food security, 
food insecurity, 
hunger, 
malnutrition 
‐ 
Subsystem 
involvement 
EP search engine 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/texts‐
submitted.html)  
EP parliamentary 
reports 
Food security, 
food insecurity, 
hunger, 
malnutrition 
‐ 
Eur‐Lex (http://eur‐lex.europa.eu/advanced‐
search‐form.html)  
COM‐ and JOIN‐
documents 
Food security, 
food insecurity, 
hunger, 
malnutrition 
Selected 
‘European 
Commission’ for 
the category 
‘author’ 
Policy goals and 
instruments 
Eur‐Lex  Regulations, 
directives, decisions 
Food security, 
food insecurity, 
hunger, 
malnutrition 
‐ 
Eur‐Lex   COM‐ and JOIN‐
documents (see 
subsystem 
involvement) 
Food security, 
food insecurity, 
hunger, 
malnutrition 
‐ 
   102 
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Part B: data matrixes and figures
This Supplementary Material presents the aggregate of source data that were used for our 
analysis. The data is presented per dimension of policy integration. Section 1a presents 
the references of European Commissioners to food security and synonyms in their 
speeches. Section 1b shows the insights into cultures of beliefs from the interview data. 
Section 2 provides an overview of all legislation and policies that have food security as a 
policy goal as well as how notions of coherence and coordination are embedded within 
these. Section 3 elaborates food security instruments found in hard and soft legislation 
and internal procedural instruments that were mentioned in interviews. The data figures 
for the dimension of subsystem involvement is presented in the chapter itself.
1a Cultures of beliefs: attention to food security in Commissioners’ speeches
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Table 1 Attention to food security in Commissioners’ speeches
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 104 
This Supplementary Material presents the aggregate of source data that were used for our analysis. The 105 
data is presented per dimension of policy integration. Section 1a presents the references of European 106 
Commissioners to food security and synonyms in their speeches. Section 1b shows the insights into 107 
cultures of beliefs from the interview data. Section 2 provides an overview of all legislation and policies 108 
that have food security as a policy goal as well as how notions of coherence and coordination are 109 
embedded within these. Section 3 elaborates food security instruments found in hard and soft legislation 110 
and internal procedural instruments that were mentioned in interviews. The data figures for the 111 
dimension of subsystem involvement is presented in the chapter itself. 112 
 113 
1a Cultur s of beliefs: attention to food security in Commissioners’ speeches 114 
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Tabl    Attention to f od security in Commissioners’ speeche  116 
DG  Commissioner 
(period) 
Number of 
speeches in 
which they 
referred to FS 
or synonym 
Main context of use 
Presidency  Prodi (00‐04) 
Barroso (04‐14) 
5 
48 (of which 
20 from 05‐
09 and 28 
from 10‐14) 
Important policy goal; EU action 
Important policy goal; EU action; cooperation with international 
organizations 
Development cooperation and 
Humanitarian Aid/ 
International Cooperation and 
Development/ International 
Cooperation, Humanitarian 
Aid and Crisis Response/  
Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Liberties 
Nielson (00‐04) 
 
 
Michel (04‐09) 
De Gucht (09‐10) 
Piebalgs (10‐14) 
 
Georgieva (10‐14) 
 
29 
 
 
8 
2 
19 
 
21 
Important policy goal; coherence with other policies; EU action; 
improved coordination within Commission 
Important policy goal 
 
Important policy goal; EU action; link humanitarian aid and 
development aid 
Important policy goal; EU action; link humanitarian aid and 
development aid; cooperation with international organizations 
Agriculture and Fisheries/ 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development/ Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries 
Fischler (00‐04) 
 
Fischer Boel (04‐09) 
 
Borg (04‐10) 
Cioloş (10‐14) 
Damanaki (10‐14) 
Hogan (14) 
28 
 
28 
 
2 
12 
3 
1 
Multifunctionality agriculture; CAP; special treatment FS in trade 
negotiations; coherence trade and aid 
Multifunctionality agriculture; CAP; Health Check; cooperation 
with international organizations 
Fisheries 
CAP; Trade; special treatment FS in trade negotiations 
 
Coherence FS and climate change objectives 
Science and Research/ 
Research, Innovation and 
Science 
Potočnik (04‐10) 
Geoghegan‐Quinn (10‐
14) 
6 
55 
Scientific cooperation; innovation; research calls 
Horizon2020; societal challenges for research 
Trade  Lamy (00‐04) 
Mandelson (04‐08) 
Ashton (08‐09) 
De Gucht (10‐14) 
15 
3 
1 
3 
Multifunctionality agriculture; special treatment FS in trade 
negotiations 
Multifunctionality agriculture 
Special treatment FS in trade negotiations 
Special treatment FS in trade negotiations 
Environment  Wallström (00‐04)  3   
211 
 
Dimas (04‐10) 
Potočnik (10‐14) 
3 
21 
 
(Sustainable) agriculture; biodiversity; Rio+20 
External Relations/ External 
Relations and Neighborhood 
Policy/ High Commissioner 
Patten (00‐04) 
Ferrero‐Waldner (04‐
09) 
Ashton (09‐14) 
11 
9 
4 
EU action 
EU action ; important policy goal 
EU action 
Inter‐Institutional Relations 
and Communications Strategy/ 
Inter‐Institutional Relations 
and Administration 
Wallström (04‐09) 
Šefčovič (10‐14) 
8 
1 
 
 
Health and Consumer 
Protection/ Health/ Health 
and Consumer Policy 
Byrne (00‐04) 
Vassiliou (08‐10) 
Dalli (10‐12) 
5 
1 
3 
 
Enlargement  Verheugen (00‐04)  1   
Employment and Social Affairs  Diamantopoulou (00‐
04) 
3   
Climate Action  Hedegaard (10‐14)  1   
Regional Policy  Hübner (04‐09)  1  EU action 
Energy  Piebalgs (04‐10)  3  Biofuels should not harm food security 
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Table 2 Synthesis of coding interviews with Commission officials for views on cross‐cuttingness of 120 
(governance of) food security 121 
Category/Domain/policy  Insights  Respondent nr.26 
Agriculture/CAP  Ciolos jumped on FS after food price crises 
Already under Fischer Boel, Food Facility 
was set up together with DG 
Development, now international 
dimension institutionalized in unit 
Reflection of fear after crisis 
 
CAP priority of PCD 
Awareness that agriculture can play a role 
 
Different visions on what food security 
means in context CAP/Agriculture 
 
FS one of initial objectives CAP, after that 
reorientation 
 
Looked at externalities, no more direct 
negative impact on developing countries 
 
Also FS from an EU perspective on 
agenda: stability, access, availability, 
nutrition 
 
Longer term: sustainability, greening 
 
CAP has different objective/ priority, but 
recognize that they can contribute to food 
security. DG Agri very active. 
Tensions, but in general good cooperation 
and similar ideas 
15 
 
11 
 
 
5 
 
2, 11, 12 
7, 13 
 
5 
 
 
7 
 
 
7 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
20 
 
7 
 
 
11 
                                                            
26 Each number represents a respondent. Due to an agreement of anonymity with respondents the full names are 
not given.  
1b Cultures of beliefs: synthesis of insights from interviews with Commission 
officials
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Table 2 Synthesis of coding interviews with Commission officials for views on cross-cuttingness 
of (governance of ) food security
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Tensions, but in general good cooperation 
and similar ideas 
15 
 
11 
 
 
5 
 
2, 11, 12 
7, 13 
 
5 
 
 
7 
 
 
7 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
20 
 
7 
 
 
11 
                                                            
26 Each number represents a respondent. Due to an agreement of anonymity with respondents the full names are 
not given.  
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Biofuels  DG Energy considers externalities existing 
legislation 
 
Before crises biofuels were solution to all 
kinds problems, now other extreme 
1, 7 
 
 
1 
Fisheries/ CFP  Priority PCD 
 
Food security element that was not there 
in past, e.g. certain share to local 
populations 
 
Sustainability/ long‐term 
 
Fisheries was for long term ignored in 
development/ fs policy, now more 
attention. More expertise in DEVCO, and 
more attention to FS in MARE, though still 
with only few persons, no unit. 
2 
 
13 
 
 
20 
 
3 
Environmental concerns  Integration of environmental concerns in 
other policies, such as CAP, to guarantee 
long‐term food security 
 
International for a: sustainable 
development goals 
 
Environment tends to be more holistic 
19, 20, 21 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
21 
Food price crises triggered awareness  In general 
 
In case of biofuels, agriculture 
 
In trade already before 2008 concern 
 
Resulted in awareness of inter‐
connectedness, need to address in more 
comprehensive way 
7, 11 
 
1, 11, 15, 16, 18 
 
17 
 
7 
Food safety  Cannot speak about food safety without 
FS considerations. Started to think about 
it in DG SANCO 
10 
Humanitarian Aid  DGs ECHO and DEVCO close to each other 
in terms ideas. Thinking about aligning 
short‐ and long‐term, resilience 
 
From food aid to food assistance, more 
holistic, multi‐sector 
2, 8 
 
 
 
8 
Research  Horizon2020 food security 
 
FP7 projects 
9 
 
16 
Sec‐Gen  Keeps overview, coherence with overall 
goals 
20 
Trade  Priority PCD 
 
Big issue in WTO, EU very open to these 
concerns 
 
Already before food price crises 
2 
 
4, 11, 15, 17 
 
 
17 
 122 
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Regulation on food‐aid policy, 
food‐aid management and 
special operations in support of 
food security
Revised 
Cotonou
Revised 
CotonouCotonou
Regulation 
2014‐2020Regulation financing instrument for development cooperation
Cooperation with ACP and OCT/ 
EDF
Hard law
Ban import fish
Cooperation Agreements Algeria
Soft law
5Guidelines and policies Development  4 6
Fishing agreement with Guinea
1International Treaties (in effect)
Tajikistan
7
Food Facility
EPA Cariforum
8
Policy Coherence for 
Development
9
New 
regulation
Distribution of food to most 
deprived persons in the Union
Vietnam; 
Mongolia
3
Greenland; 
ECOWAS & 
WAEMU
COM CAP
Food 
Assistance 
Convention
Environmental guidelines and 
policies
COM Plant 
Health Regime
COMs CAP 13
14COMs neigbourhood policy
12
13
COM 
Resilience
Research framework Horizon2020 & JRC
Common Fisheries Policy
Environment Action 
Programme
COM Agenda 
for Change 10
13
WTOPosition multilateral trade negotiations
2
11
15
16Research policy
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1 =  International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
2 =  Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources
3 =  Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing
4 =  COM on partnership with UN in Development and Humanitarian Affairs; COM on use of ICTs in development 
policy
5 =  COM on water management in developing countries; COM on rural development and sustainable management 
natural resources in developing countries
6 =  COM on climate change in context development cooperation; COM on Global Monitoring for the Environment 
and Security (GMES)
7 =  COM thematic strategy for food security; COM framework country strategy papers; COM regional policy 
partnership for Horn of Africa
8 =  COM Tackling the challenge of rising food prices
9 =  COM food security framework; COM Humanitarian food assistance; COM EU role in global health
10 =  COM Enhancing Maternal and Child Nutrition in External Assistance; COM Comprehensive EU approach to 
Syrian crisis
11 =  COM Water and Sanitation; COM A decent life for all
12 =  Report implementation Soil Strategy; COM bioeconomy strategy
13 =  Proposals regulation CAP 
14 =  COM A new response to a changing neighbourhood
15 =  COM ENP for Agriculture and Rural Development
16 =  COM indicating scientific cooperation with Australia and NZ
Figure 1 Overview of policies and programs that have food security as policy goal
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Table 3 Coherence and policy linkages engrained in legislation
214 
 
1 = International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 1 
2 = Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 2 
3 = Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 3 
4 = COM on partnership with UN in Development and Humanitarian Affairs; COM on use of ICTs in development policy 4 
5 = COM on water management in developing countries; COM on rural development and sustainable management natural resources in 5 
developing countries 6 
6 = COM on climate change in context development cooperation; COM on Global Monitoring for the Environment and Security (GMES) 7 
7 = COM thematic strategy for food security; COM framework country strategy papers; COM regional policy partnership for Horn of Africa 8 
8 = COM Tackling the challenge of rising food prices 9 
9 = COM food security framework; COM Humanitarian food assistance; COM EU role in global health 10 
10 = COM Enhancing Maternal and Child Nutrition in External Assistance; COM Comprehensive EU approach to Syrian crisis 11 
11 = COM Water and Sanitation; COM A decent life for all 12 
12 = Report implementation Soil Strategy; COM bioeconomy strategy 13 
13 = Proposals regulation CAP  14 
14 = COM A new response to a changing neighbourhood 15 
15 = COM ENP for Agriculture and Rural Development 16 
16 = COM indicating scientific cooperation with Australia and NZ 17 
Figure 1 Overview of policies and programs that have food security as policy goal 18 
 19 
Table 3 Coherence and policy linkages engrained in legislation 20 
Year  Type of legislation  Remarks on coherence and coordination of goals: 
2000  Hard law 
(regulations, 
directives, 
decisions) 
 
Soft law (COM 
documents) 
- Coherence and consistency aid instruments 
- Policy coherence 
- Attuning FS and food aid policies 
2001  Hard law   
Soft law   
2002  Hard law   
Soft law  - Attuning FS and food aid policies 
2003  Hard law   
Soft law   
2004  Hard law   
Soft law  - Linkage with energy 
2005  Hard law   
Soft law   
2006  Hard law   
Soft law  - Biomass 
2007  Hard law   
Soft law  - Attuning FS and humanitarian aid 
- Biofuels 
- PCD 
2008  Hard law   
Soft law  - Biofuels 
2009  Hard law   
Soft law   
2010  Hard law   
Soft law  - Attuning FS and humanitarian assistance 
- Linking health and nutrition 
2011  Hard law   
Soft law  - Lisbon Treaty: take development cooperation objectives into account in all policies 
- Coordination with Joint Programming Initiative Agriculture, Food Security and 
Climate Change 
- Aligning pre‐accession assistance innovation, research, ICTs 
215 
 
- Linking human rights, democracy and development 
2012  Hard law   
Soft law  - Interlinkage trade and food security 
- Reconciling use biomass with food security 
2013  Hard law   
Soft law  - Link animal health and FS 
- Reconciliation biomass and food security 
- Trade in line with FS 
2014  Hard law  - Reconciliation biomass and food security 
Soft law  - Linkage with water 
 21 
3 Policy instruments: overview of food security policy instruments 22  3 Policy instruments: overview of food security policy instruments
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1 =  Alignment of food aid and food security regulation with Food Aid Convention; suspension of food aid to Haiti 
2 =  Humanitarian Food Assistance Policy
3 =  Food Security Thematic Programme
4 =  DCI 2014-2020, food security part of Global Public Goods and Challenges programme
5 =  EU Consensus on Development
6 =  Joint Programming Initiatives under 7th Framework; call on water and food security in Africa
7 =  Embedded within European Research Area (02-06)
8 =  7th Framework Programme
9 =  In EPA’s with Ivory Coast, Central Africa Party and SADC and in IPA with pacific states; regulation allowing for 
public stockholding for food security purposes
10 =  Position at WTO negotiation: food security exemption clauses should be allowed
11 =  Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean: 
food security one of criteria that determines participation in fishing
12 =  International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
Figure 2 Overview of food security policy instruments
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Table 4 Synthesis of coding interviews with Commission officials for views on internal procedural 
instruments
217 
 
 
1 = Alignment of food aid and food security regulation with Food Aid Convention; suspension of food aid to Haiti  
2 = Humanitarian Food Assistance Policy 
3 = Food Security Thematic Programme 
4 = DCI 2014‐2020, food security part of Global Public Goods and Challenges programme 
5 = EU Consensus on Development 
6 = Joint Programming Initiatives under 7th Framework; call on water and food security in Africa 
7 = Embedded within European Research Area (02‐06) 
8 = 7th Framework Programme 
9 = In EPA’s with Ivory Coast, Central Africa Party and SADC and in IPA with pacific states; regulation allowing for public stockholding for 
food security purposes 
10 = Position at WTO negotiation: food security exemption clauses should be allowed 
11 = Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean: food security one of 
criteria that determines participation in fishing 
12 = International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
Figure 2 Overview of food security policy instruments 
 
Table 4 Synthesis of coding interviews with Commission officials for views on internal procedural 
instruments 
Instrument  Insights  Respondent(s) nr. 
Foresights  Food safety foresight, including food 
security considerations. Developing 
scenarios 
 
Foresight JRC on global food security 
 
Are generally done in collaboration with 
other DGs 
10 
 
 
 
16 
PCD  Mostly do‐no‐harm, but attempt to also 
use for synergies. Positive narrative can 
bring PCD further. However, capacity 
problems. 
More positive responsiveness 
 
Screening and work program 
 
PCD inter‐service group 
 
Relatively new policy, implementation has 
been quite long, requires cultural change 
 
Mostly do‐no‐harm, also synergies, need 
positive narrative 
 
Informal inter‐service group, e.g. around 
Indian Ocean 
 
Obligatory for DGs 
2   
 
 
7 
 
2, 7 
 
2 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
6, 16 
Impact assessment  Biofuels 
 
Constant struggle to reinforce control of 
development analysis in IAs 
 
PCD uses IAs to emphasize development 
concerns, fs 
 
PCD assists other DGs with IAs, create 
awareness 
 
Trying to fight that what can’t be measured 
doesn’t exist 
1 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
218 
 
 
CAP: 20 DGs involved 
 
Proposed to enlarge IA to impacts on third 
countries. 
 
Horizon2020 
 
IAs used to present supportive data by 
various DGs 
 
5, 13, 7 
 
7 
 
 
9 
 
16, 18 
Inter‐service consultation  Biofuels 
 
Used to raise concerns of other domains 
 
Relatively many inter‐service contacts in 
Commission compared to other 
administrations 
 
Pushing other DGs to include development, 
happening more 
 
CAP 
 
Trade 
 
SG keeps overview, checks for coherence 
with overall goals 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
7, 11, 16, 19 
 
15, 17 
 
20 
JRC  Doing foresights  6, 16, 10 
Mobility  Good for awareness and exchange 
expertise, e.g. fisheries 
2, 3 
Research focus areas  DGs engaged in setting up research focus 
areas, bring themes together, e.g. societal 
challenge 2 in Horizon2020 together with 
Agri 
9 
Units  DG Agri has concerns institutionalized in 
unit 
 
MARE not, though would be wish for future 
11 
 
 
3 
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Food security concerns have made a revival in European Union (EU) governance since 
the 2007-8 and 2010 world food price crises. This revival has manifested itself through 
the pervasiveness of food security arguments in a broad range of policy debates as well 
as through calls for strengthened policy coherence and coordination. This dissertation 
explores how the EU governs the wicked problem of food security. Contrary to the 
dominant perspective among EU policymakers and within the food security literature 
that food (in)security is a complex but ultimately soluble problem, characterizing food 
security as wicked implies that there are no definite solutions. Instead, formulating the 
problem is the problem and today’s problem perceptions arise as the result of attempts 
to solve yesterday’s.  This wickedness follows from the simultaneous occurrence of high 
complexity and uncertainty, frame controversies, stagnated interaction patterns, and 
cross-scale dynamics. Consequently, food security relies on elusive political judgment 
and can only be temporarily resolved or settled. Recognizing the wicked problem nature 
of food security poses specific challenges to its governance. At the same time, both 
the EU governance of food security and the EU governance of wicked problems have 
hardly been studied systematically. By combining initial empirical observations with 
theoretical gaps and expectations, I have identified three critical challenges to the EU 
governance of food security: (i) the difficulty of defining the problem of food security; 
(ii) the European Commission’s alleged incapability of governing wicked problems; and 
(iii) the problem of overcoming policy incoherence and inconsistencies vis-à-vis food 
security in the stovepiped EU governance system. The central question of how the EU 
governs the wicked problem of food security is addressed by three research questions 
that each cover one of these governance challenges. These questions are preceded by a 
question about the current state of knowledge about governing the wicked problem of 
food security:
1. What insights does the existing body of food security governance literature 
provide about governing the wicked problem of food security?
2. Which food security frames can be distinguished in EU policymaking and how 
do the EU institutions deal with this diversity?
3. What conditions enable or constrain the European Commission in coping with 
the wicked problem of food security?
4. To what extent has the EU realized a shift towards strengthened policy 
integration in the governance of food security?
These questions are addressed by following a reasoned exploratory research design; the 
dissertation aims to explore the virgin territory of EU food security governance but does 
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so by selecting the most relevant public governance and policy theories to answer the 
research questions. Multiple methods were used to obtain complementary insights and 
to ensure the validity of findings. The dissertation consists of five publications that both 
empirically investigate the EU governance of food security and, while doing so, also 
contribute to theoretical debates and provide practical recommendations.
Chapter 2 addresses the question of what food security governance entails and what 
insights the state-of-the-art provides into the wicked characteristics of governing food 
security. Because I found the emerging literature on food security governance to be 
rather fragmented, I undertook a systematic literature review of both grey and academic 
literature.  The chapter presents the synthesis of this review along seven recurring 
themes: (i) the view of governance as both a challenge and a solution to food security; 
(ii) a governability that is characterized by high degrees of complexity; (iii) failures of 
the current institutional architectures; (iv) the arrival of new players at the forefront; (v) 
calls for coherence and coordination across multiple scales; (vi) variation and conflict 
of ideas; and (vii) calls for the allocation of sufficient resources and the integration 
of democratic values in food security governance. These seven themes are critically 
discussed along two lines. First, I argue that the literature is characterized by a dominant 
problem-solving governance perspective. The chapter suggests the inclusion of a wider 
array of governance perspectives to obtain a more refined understanding of food security 
governance changes and political struggles over time. A second argument is that it would 
be a valuable addition to the literature to approach food security as a wicked problem. 
The seven recurring themes all touch upon characteristics of wicked problems; explicitly 
acknowledging this wicked problem nature could help to include alternative governance 
understandings as well as to develop more appropriate policy recommendations.
Chapter 3 addresses the question of what food security frames can be distinguished in 
EU policy debates as well as how the EU institutions themselves deal with such frame 
diversity. The central theoretical expectation in the chapter is that food security serves as 
a consensus frame behind which considerable dissensus lies hidden. The chapter presents 
the results of a qualitative content analysis of EU, stakeholder, and media texts covering 
the reform round of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) post-2013, in which food 
security arguments were observed to be particularly pervasive. This content analysis was 
complemented by observations during four practitioner conferences. The analysis shows 
that, although virtually the whole array of stakeholders involved in the CAP reform 
debate deployed food security arguments, these fundamentally conflicted in terms of 
food security understandings, problem definitions, and proposed solutions. A total of six 
food security sub-frames were identified, which were referred to as: (i) the productionist 
frame; (ii) the environmental frame; (iii) the development frame; (iv) the free trade 
frame; (v) the regional frame; and (vi) the food sovereignty frame. Each of these frames 
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was found to be supported by a specific group of actors, whereby the productionist 
frame and, to a lesser extent, the environmental frame proved most dominant. European 
Parliament groups and member states could also be linked to particular frames. On the 
other hand, the European Commission simultaneously invoked different frames in its 
communications. The chapter makes the argument that the Commission strategically 
maintained the fractured consensus surrounding food security to find resonance among 
a broad range of diverging stakeholders. This served to strengthen the support for and 
legitimacy of its proposals for a new CAP.
The fourth chapter presents the findings of a study of the European Commission’s potential 
abilities and constraints for governing wicked problems; the EU governance of food 
security served as a single-n case study of this issue. The EU governance literature provides 
mixed views about the Commission’s ability to deal with wicked problems; whereas the 
dominant image is that the Commission’s rigid jurisdictions, compartmentalization, 
limited resources, and dependence on the other EU institutions render the Commission 
incapable of addressing wicked problems, more recent findings nuance this image by 
pointing at the role of informal networks. Based on an extensive interview round at 
the Commission, the chapter analyzes to what extent the Commission possesses the 
capabilities of reflexivity, resilience, responsiveness, revitalization, and rescaling, each 
of which consists of particular sets of skills, repertoires, capacities, commitments, and 
readiness. The findings give rise to a further nuancing of the Commission’s ability 
to govern wicked problems; the Commission performs relatively well regarding its 
reflexivity and, to a bit lesser extent, resilience, responsiveness, and rescaling capabilities 
in the governance of food security. Revitalization is the only capability that the 
Commission does not score well on. Whereas the analysis confirms some of the earlier 
critiques by identifying serious constraints, its relatively good performance follows 
from the occurrence of various enabling conditions that were previously overlooked 
or underestimated, most notably inter-service and inter-institutional procedures and 
structures, boundary arrangements, and a widespread tolerance of frame conflicts, 
uncertainty, and cross-scale dynamics. At the same time, the chapter argues that these 
enabling conditions as well as the overarching capabilities are precarious due to the lack 
of a meta-capability, i.e. a form of meta-governance that functions to balance (resources 
between) the capabilities. Additionally, the dependence on the other EU institutions 
leaves open the question of whether the EU polity as a whole is as capable of governing 
wicked problems as the Commission. As a result of these two points, the EU remains 
vulnerable vis-à-vis the wicked characteristics of food security.
Chapters 5 and 6 together answer the question of the extent to which the EU has 
realized a shift towards strengthened policy integration in the governance of food 
security. Chapter 5 proposes a conceptual framework to study shifts of policy integration 
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within a governance system over time; chapter 6 presents the findings of the framework’s 
application to the EU governance of food security. The framework differs from existing 
approaches to policy integration and coordination in that it conceptualizes policy 
integration as an inherently asynchronous and multi-faceted process, rather than a 
mere desired principle or outcome of policymaking. The framework distinguishes four 
dimensions of integration: (i) cultures of beliefs; (ii) subsystem involvement; (iii) policy 
goals; and (iv) policy instruments. These dimensions do not necessarily develop in a 
concerted manner but may move at different paces or even in opposing directions. 
Applying the framework helps to better understand how policy integration vis-à-vis a 
cross-cutting policy problem develops over time, and as such, it enables to hold decision-
makers responsible for the political promises they made.
The application of the framework results in a mixed view of the development of policy 
integration in the EU governance of food security in the aftermath of the 2007-
8 and 2010 food price crises. Chapter 6 shows that, on the one hand, food security 
concerns became embedded within a wider array of the Commission’s and European 
Parliament’s subsystems, food security goals diversified, and various policy instruments 
were introduced or expanded. However, considerable differences exist between policy 
domains, particularly regarding the amount of new or expanded policy instruments 
deployed to actively address food security, most of which remained restricted to the 
‘traditional’ domains of development cooperation and humanitarian aid. In addition, 
food security goals were often embedded only within soft law and did not recur in final 
legislation. This was the  case of the reforms of the CAP and the Common Fisheries 
Policy. The chapter concludes that policy integration into the EU governance of food 
security did ‘not really’ proceed beyond discursive levels and elucidates various blind 
spots and opportunities for strengthened policy integration. At the same time, I argue 
that the most advanced forms of policy integration may not be feasible or opportune 
in the current political context of the EU governance of food security; it may actually 
be more productive to strive for the optimization of lower levels of policy integration.
Chapter 7 synthesizes the outcomes of the five chapters into an overarching conclusion. 
I argue that although the EU seems relatively capable of coping with frame diversity 
and the Commission possesses latent abilities to govern the wicked problem of food 
security, the lack of substantial policy integration suggests that actual changes in the 
EU governance of food security have remained very limited. This finding suggests that, 
whereas in some domains genuine food security concerns prevailed, in other domains 
food security frames were primarily used to find support or legitimization for existing 
policy processes or preferences. The EU governance of food security has thus been subject 
to relatively high degrees of symbolic policymaking, although it should be noted that in 
the domains of development cooperation and humanitarian aid substantial efforts were 
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initiated. Consequently, the renaissance of food security concerns in EU governance 
does not seem to have resulted in a more comprehensive or holistic EU food security 
approach. Instead, a ‘mere’ upscaling of traditional policy instruments has occurred. It is 
doubtful whether major governance changes are realistic in the short-term. Whereas the 
chapter provides various suggestions for strengthened capabilities and increased policy 
integration that can be used as a long-term vision for the EU governance of food security, 
realizing such ameliorations is probably unfeasible in times of increased Euroscepticism, 
sparse resources, and declining attention to food security. I therefore argue that it 
may be more opportune to strive for good-enough governance of food security, i.e. 
to focus on those interventions that work and are feasible instead of on those that are 
not. Because what works also depends on one’s frames and associated interests, it may 
be productive to think about good-enough governance in terms of clumsy solutions. 
Clumsy solutions to food security entail creative and flexible combinations of EU policy 
efforts that are seemingly incoherent and inconsistent but that do more justice to the 
different rationales, complexities, and uncertainties underlying the wicked problem of 
food security. Such policy approaches will not permanently solve food insecurity, but 
may be more acceptable and credible to all stakeholders involved in the EU governance 
of food security.
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